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Abstract 

Much attention has been devoted in the social sciences to the reorganisation of the 
moral order of society (Smart, 1999). This reorganisation means that responsibility 
for welfare is now located with the individual. In spite of the salience given to 
privately held responsibility for welfare in social policy, little work has been carried 
out on the discourses underpinning this way of distributing responsibility (Finch and 
Mason, 1993, Duncan and Edwards, 1999, Rowlingson, 2002). Work on this issue 
is especially timely as New Labour continues the privatisation of responsibility for 
welfare in a way that, many people believe, neglects a moral dimension. Instead, 
New Labour favours a more ethical construction that exhorts the individual to do her 
duty by which they mean she should work for her own betterment and well-being 
(Levitas, 1998, Giddens, 1998, Jordan, 1998, Lund, 1999). 
This work begins by situating responsibility as a historically variable and discursive 
construction, uncovering how the understanding of responsibility changed as the 
problem focusing the minds of social engineers altered from one of poverty to one 
of security in the 1970s. While responsibility has only recently been identified as a 
particular issue for social policy academics (Roche, 1992, Dwyer, 1998, Dean et aI., 
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2004) philosophers and sociologists have paid close attention to responsibility over 
the past decade (Bauman, 1993, 1995, Habermas, 1990, 1995, Apel, 1989, 1996, 
Etzioni, 1995, Schmidtz, 1998, Goodin, 1998). Building on the issues raised by 
these authors, this work presents a qualitative study of government press releases, 
interviews with benefits recipients, members of the general public, welfare advisors 
and welfare benefits administrators to explore the rational structure of the 
discourses of responsibility for welfare. As a result, I develop the argument that 
while the reconfigured moral order promotes a private acceptance of responsibility 
for welfare, people still want a way of interpreting responsibility taking in a more 
public way. 
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Introduction: Responsibility in hard times 

Introduction 
In the "golden age" of the welfare state a socialised responsibility was a 
responsibility that was both the property of the individual and a property of the 
collective (Pierson, 1998). Responsibilities were shouldered, either by the individual 
who was free to tackle them as she saw fit, and co-operatively as an issue that 
could be handled by the state administration, or various other experts. This mixture 
of freedom and co-operation drew on the altruistic and solidaristic attitude of mind 
promoted by the experience of war and described by Titmuss (1970). Of course the 
situation has changed such that the current Third Way ideology is built on the idea 
that this social settlement promoted a passive dependent attitude of mind (DSS, 
1998, but see Dean and Taylor-Gooby, 1992). But the classic welfare state struck a 
balance, precarious and ideologically loaded in favour of the white male 
breadwinner, between the public and private burdens of responsibility (Williams, 
1989). Insofar as issues were conceived in terms of their social dimension and thus 
the terrain of experts, bureaucrats, professionals, and philanthropists, then they had 
a public dimension. This public dimension has been losing ground through the New 
Right's New Managerialism and New Labour's Third Way. While the Third Way 
promotes a consensus politics, it also continues the dispersal of governance to 
businesses, individuals, and communities. Much of this is to be welcomed as a 
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genuine increase in personal freedom (Rose, 1999), but my concern is that this 
extension disperses responsibility to people and networks in civil society, effacing 
the public face of responsibility. 
This is a concern shared by many theorists who discuss ideas of culture and 
citizenship. For example, Levitas (1998) understands this dispersal of responsibility 
as a Durkheimian hegemony based on colloquial understandings of morality and 
responsibility. Taylor-Gooby (2001) comments on the 'new individualism' formed by 
the individualising of responsibility. Newman (2002), Heron (2001) and Dwyer 
(2000) note the increased emphasis on responsibility in civil society and 
community, shifting morality and responsibility out of the welfare state and into a 
welfare society (Rodger, 2000). Jordan (1998, 2000) notes the privatisation of 
justice and the reordering of welfare professionalism along the utilitarian lines of 
'tough love'. This relocation of welfare responsibility with the individual and in civil 
society is the substantive focus of this work which seeks to systematically describe 
the discourses surrounding the relocation of responsibility in the private domain. It 
deals with this relocation, not by looking at the status of concepts like citizenship 
(Roche, 1990, Dwyer, 2000), identity (Williams etc.), risk (Seck, Taylor-Gooby, 
2000) or justice (Lund, 2002), but at responsibility. 
Responsibility in sociology and social policy 
While responsibility is well recognised as a central organising concept in society in 
sociology and social policy it is a concept that is frequently used yet infrequently 
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addressed in a systematic way. Responsibility is dealt with as a complement to 
other central concepts, in particular rights (Roche, 1992) and more recently risk 
(Giddens, 1999), or as a theme within specific sectors. In relating responsibility with 
rights, commentators have typically used the discourse of rights to delineate and 
describe the responsibilities of the state (Strydom, 2000, Wainwright, 2003), and 
more recently, of the individual (Selbourne, 1992). 
Philosophers have long addressed responsibility as a concept in its own regard, 
dealing with it as a property of the subject and of society. Phenomenologists have, 
since Kierkegaard (1987), explored the way people develop a sense of their 
responsibility for the other, a line of thinking that has been incorporated into 
psychological theories of the subject (Mead, 1965, Habermas, 1995). Ontologists 
and existentialists have dealt with the way people are positioned as responsible in 
what Heidegger (1962) called, the 'thrown project'. In line with this anybody 
following Sartre (1946) would see the person as condemned to be responsible in 
the world in which she finds herself. At the same time, philosophers have 
characteristically turned their attention to the way society is organised, and how 
responsibility taking plays a role in the complex web of human relations. Writers 
working in the utilitarian tradition see people as adopting their responsibilities in 
light of the benefits and rewards that accrue from such forms of action (Mill, 1991, 
Kymlicka, 1990). Similarly, rationalists following Kant, discuss the way people adopt 
responsibility on the basis of good reason, and how such reason could be 
successfully institutionalised in society (Rawls, 1979, Habermas, 1990, Apel, 1998). 
On the other hand, thinkers who align themselves with Aristotle have emphasised 
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how adopting anything like a responsible moral attitude is only ever based on 
feeling and emotion, and outside the realm of reason (MacIntyre, 1988). 
As previously noted, sociology and social policy have 'frequently touched on the 
phenomenon of responsibility, but have infrequently directly addressed this 
phenomenon. For example, responsibility has been a central theme in relation to 
the professions (Freidson, 2001), the family (Finch and Mason, 1993) and in 
relation to crime (Young, 1999). However, the link between responsibility and social 
citizenship has been successfully conceptualised by the neo-conservatives (Mead, 
1986, Murray, 1984, Etzioni, 1995) and while it was raised as an issue for 
discussion by Roche (1992), this connection has received only lirnited attention 
(Dwyer, 1998, Rodger, 2000, Dean et al. 2004). In effect, there is a need for those 
of a more liberal or Marxist framework to tackle the connection between welfare 
and responsibility and to develop conceptions of this connection that might be 
offered as alternatives to those concepts developed by the neo-conservatives and 
communitarians. Challenging these is one area to which this thesis is intended to 
make a contribution. 
Responsibility in a state of crisis 
In general terms, the crisis of responsibility can be understood in four ways. Firstly, 
the rise of managerialism as a form of control promotes a responsibilisation of the 
individual and of civil society (Rose, 1999). Secondly, the increasing power of the 
market in the production of culture encourages a privatisation of responsibility and a 
demoralisation of society (Bauman, 1993, 1995, Fevre, 2000). Thirdly, changes in 
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the public sphere replace redistributive politics with a recognition politics that shifts 
responsibility to social groups to produce reasons backing their claims for 
resources (Fraser, 1997, Honneth, 1995). Finally, a further process can be 
discerned which involves the diversification of fate and the collapse of collective 
steering (Driver and Martell, 1998). 
Managerialism and responsibilisation 
The general framework organising responsibility today can be understood in terms 
of the changes in the forms of knowledge used by institutions and organisations 
(Clarke and Newman, 1997). The emergence of such new forms of knowledge 
challenge our understanding of social responsibility. This challenge is reflected in 
the plethora of work on new forms of governance, the decentralisation of power, 
and new styles of management which alter social arrangements and the moral 
order. Thus, for example, Rose's (1999) discussion of responsibilisation and 
autonomisation is similar to Clarke and Newman's (1997) discussion of 
managerialisms' claim on the right to manage, as the way in which organisations 
devolve power to managers in order to increase effectiveness, efficiency, and 
accountability_ In the context of welfare, these new forms of knowledge are applied 
to the mediating role that civil society can play between the state and the citizen 
(Coote and Mattinson, 1997). Most important here is the role of community as 
advanced by the communitarians (Etzioni, 1995), but also citizen involvement and 
partnership in decision making processes through citizen panels or citizen juries. 
These initiatives resituate power in civil society promoting the self-governance of 
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individuals and organisations (Newman, 2002), while eroding the ethos of 
professional cultures in the name of market consumerism (Jordan, 2000). 
The increasing power of the market and the erosion of responsibility 
The discourse of responsibility can also be understood as a response to the 
gradual increase in the capacities for control that have been developed by the 
market. As the power of market grows, thus encroaching more and more into the 
private lives of individuals, the structure of responsibility taking changes. For 
Bauman (1993, 1995, see also Fevre, 2000), responsibility taking is not an attitude 
that needs to be inculcated in people, but is part of the natural and fundamental 
implications of ethics and the moral call made by others in the world. As a result, 
the structure of responsibility is under threat precisely because of calls made on the 
self and by the incursion of the market into the moral and social relations of people 
in everyday life. Resulting from the erosion of the expert legislator or intellectual 
and the rise of so many competing voices asserting authority, moral calls enter into 
market relations with each other and a sense of moral anlbivalence enters into 
public communication (Bauman, 1992). As a result a new moral framework 
emerges that challenges moral rules will emerge (Bauman, 1993, Fevre, 2000). 
Bauman (2001) characterises this as a framework where it is: 
the fragility of [social and communal] bonds, their in-built transience and 'until­
further-noticeness', coupled with temporariness of commitment and revocability 
of obligations, that constitutes the new frame (if perpetual frame-breaking can 
be called a frame) of power relationships (Bauman, 2001: 140). 
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Th is is a perspective that looks at how the social is increasingly fragmented and the 
temporal dimension comes under greater pressure. The private sphere and its 
cultural logics are set free from the social and structural spheres so that symbolic 
forn1s become endlessly pliable and lose their public dimension. As the market 
encroaches the personal and internal life of the subject, the willingness to 'be there 
for the other' is weakened as the ethical relation with others, the relation of love is 
undermined and what is left in its stead is an aestheticised, amoral, selfish subject 
(Bauman, 1993). The crisis of responsibility appears as a genuine crisis of a culture 
structured by the market. 
Restructuring civil society and the demise of redistribution 
The emerging discourse of responsibility can also be understood as a 
"consequence of an increase in moral sensibility" (Honneth, 2001: 44). This new 
moral sensibility has come about as a result of the struggles of, amongst others, 
fen1inists, environn1entalists, gay rights activists, the disabled and ethnic minorities. 
These groups have campaigned to have their interests and concerns accepted as 
mainstream issues (Payne et aI., 2000). The politics of identity that underscores 
these struggles have contributed to an increase in moral awareness in the public 
sphere (Eder, 1996, Lara, 1998). This moral sensitivity is characterised by a 
struggle for recognition of individual identity and the responsibility of the individual 
for their own destiny (Honneth, 1996). Such responsibility, it is claimed, is 
manifested by a desire to be an authentic personality, a person who determines 
herself (Heller, 1999) and by the increasing burdens these processes place on 
people to judge the morality of action (Habermas, 1995). 
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This process can be related to the current emphasis on governance and be 
understood as a further elaboration of power mechanisms (Rose, 1999). The 
dispersal of power instigated by governance discourses (see Clarke and Newman, 
1997) tends to make individuals and groups more responsible for themselves, thus 
creating space to respond to the demise of redistributivist thinking as an opportunity 
to assert claims on society for the resources necessary to secure an identity in new, 
creative and solidaristic ways (Leonard, 1997). 
Responsibility after the col/apse ofsystemic steering 
The final dimension refers to the rise of responsibility as an issue related with the 
demise of socialism and collective steering, and the rise of n1arket collectivism and 
individualism. In this way responsibility becomes a theme because the autonomous 
person is no longer provided with a moral map with which she can steer her own 
way through life. The paternalism of experts and professionals has been eroded 
and their ideas shown to be mere ideology while the choices of the consumer in the 
market have turned out to be an effective way of organising society (Freidson, 
2001, Jordan, 2002). This moral vacuum has been filled by the triumph of 
capitalism replacing socialism (Driver and Martell, 1998). The resulting loss of an 
overarching transcendental idea, some utopian goal to strive for, means that 
society loses son1e of its capacity to place fairness and justice at its centre. The 
properties of society come instead from market individualism (Fitzpatrick, 1998, 
Driver and Martell, 1998). While New Labour's Third Way is tailored to steer a 
course between these poles of socialism and capitalism, it concentrates on the 
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individual while ignoring the ideals underpinning social systems (Driver and Martell, 
1998). Thus, the outcome is that the reorganisation of society after the collapse of 
systemic steering leads not only to a resurgence of the importance of civil society 
that, for all of its difficulties, still implies a use of publics. But it also implies an 
extension of the market. 
A cultural approach to responsibility 
Underlying each of these processes we can discern the individualisation of the 
social (Beck, 1992, Bauman, 1994) and the responsibilisation of the individual 
(Rose, 1999). In effect, through managerialism and responsibilisation, the rising 
power of the market, the restructuring of civil society and the collapse of systemic 
steering, the individual is increasingly expected to take responsibility for her own 
welfare. These processes are symptomatic of a wider shift in the normative core of 
modern society (Bauman, 1994, Rose, 1999). One way of understanding this shift 
is to examine the changing way in which justice is socially constructed has changed 
from a basis in social class to a basis in social identity and social status (Bradley, 
1996). Whether this change implies a shift from redistribution to recognition as 
Honneth (1995, 2004) and Taylor (1998) hold, or implies a relativisation of issues of 
redistribution to issues of recognition as Fraser (1995,2004) and Lara (1998) 
argue, is of less importance than the fact that the interests and concerns of the 
individual are increasingly important. This change therefore has major implications 
for justice as a normative concept. In this work, I focus on the concept of 
responsibility to gain access to research informants' understandings of the 
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changing nature of social and moral issues. In effect, I make use of responsibility as 
a prism through which responsibility is refracted and therefore addressed. 
Such a cultural approach (Inglis, and Hughson, 2003) to responsibility enables me 
to understand responsibility as a socially constructed phenomenon based on 
comn1unication and discourse (Strydom, 2000). Such a cultural approach allows me 
to understand discourse in two ways. Firstly, discourses come about in response to 
shared perceptions of problems and through these discourses, possible solutions 
involving various meanings and practices are developed that encapsulate ways of 
constructing responsibility (Foucaultl 2000 1 Strydom, 2000). In this way of 
understanding discourse, norms are formed, institutionalised, and internalised into 
people's personalities through communication. Understood in this way discourse 
refers both to norms, and the practices through which norms are institutionalised 
(Howarth, 2000). Analysing discourse in this sense means analysing the 
construction and meaning of norms concerning responsibility, and the way in which 
people are expected to take up roles and positions in relation to these norms. 
The second way of understanding discourse relies on an account of the cultural 
frameworks used to organise responsibility and stems from an argument that 
responsibility is not a category or idea in itself, but a social location within a cultural 
framework. Questions about the nature of the individual's responsibility: how these 
responsibilities accrue to her? How much responsibility is she expected to deal with 
herself? And how much others or society is supposed to accept? Are 
responsibilities dealt with using cultural or ideological forms of knowledge? This 
24 
second understanding of discourse follows Habermas (1984, 1987) in 
understanding discourse variously as 'forms of knowledge', 'rational structures', 
'norms', 'understandings' and 'reasons' and recognises that responsibility is a form 
of knowledge that is structured in light of individual interests, motivations and 
positions. 
Swidler (1986: 273) theorised culture as a 'repertoire' or 'tool-kit' comprised of 
"habits, skills and styles" or various kinds of symbols that provide a means through 
which social action and outlook could be co-ordinated. Swidler's (1986) point was 
that the causal significance of culture lay, not in the Weberian sense of defining the 
ends of action, but in providing the tools to construct recurrent strategies of action. 
Swidler expanded on this view of culture as a 'tool kit' that is used to organise 
behaviour by elaborating on 'settled' and 'unsettled' lives. That is, she distinguishes 
between how culture operates in routine situations and in situations of change, and 
how in times of change tools that otherwise remain tacit or even irrelevant are 
articulated and ideologies gain a temporary public saliency. Thus, culture can be 
seen both in terms of the forms of knowledge that organise the way people 
perceive the world, and in tern1S of the way knowledge is used by people, that is, 
both from ideological and symbolic interactionist points of view (de Certeau, 1988). 
The idea that culture is a 'tool kit' made up of ideas, models, and symbols used in a 
dynamic fashion to make sense of the world, is an idea that has become axiomatic 
to all the major traditions of cultural theory and analysis (Inglis, and Hughson, 2003, 
Silber, 2003). In order to explore constructions of responsibility, I make use of 
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Habermas's (1984, 1987) version of this framework because he offers an approach 
that can integrate both the interactionist and ideological elements of culture. In 
terms of ideology, discourse is used here to understand and explore the way 
settlements become destabilised and new settlements are reached. In terms of 
social interaction, Habermas (1984, 1987) offers a theory of how people construct 
issues in relation to aspects of their lifeworld. I outline this framework here in detail 
because it is of central importance to the way this work is organised. 
Habermas's three worlds 
Habermas's (1984, 1987) action theory divides the world into three parts and shows 
how the individual relates with these three worlds. He (1984, 1987) takes his 
theoretical starting point from Weber's action theory, but moves beyond Weber by 
looking on purposive action as a particularly narrow form of rationality (Habermas, 
1987). It begins by noting that there is an objective world that people need to 
master in some form or other. This world is comprised of anything that people can 
take an objective attitude towards, as such it includes material things, events, 
institutions, people and so on. People can take a manipulative approach to these 
objects, in other words, people can intentionally intervene in the world to realise a 
desired state of affairs. This manipulative rationality refers to the use of reason to 
make the best use of available means to realise a desired state of affairs. 
Ordinarily, this means evaluating the different courses of action to choose the most 
effective or efficient means of reaching a clearly defined goal. But the objective 
world consists not only in things and events, but also in relations between these 
things, between the actor and the object(s), and the actor with her action plans and 
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other actors and their action plans. Strategic action refers to the use of reason to 
calculate the best, most effective or efficient, way to realise desired ends in light of 
observations about how other actors have made their own plans. 
Alongside the objective world is a social world, but relating to this world means 
going beyond simply relating to the objective world. This is because the social world 
forms a normative context that establishes the legitimate forms of interaction for a 
social group. As members of a social group, people are oriented towards shared 
norms. Thus, in situations where a norm applies, people either adhere to the norm 
or break it. The social or normative dimension refers to the sense in which a norm 
is valid for all of the members of a social group, and the shared, often implicit, 
agreement that they will abide by these norms and so each member has a right to 
expect others to do the same. Relating to this social world means simultaneously 
relating to the objective world. For example, abiding by a norm can mean obeying a 
law (or legal norm), for example observing a speed restriction. In such cases 
conforming to norms is about taking cognisance of circumstances like financial 
penalties, or points on a licence. On the other hand, conforming to a norm can also 
mean considering values. In these instances the norm does not simply have validity 
in light of circumstances, but also in light of moral considerations. For instance 
many people may ignore speed restrictions if they think they will not be punished or 
because they think the restriction is set unreasonably low, however, most people 
would not kill another person simply because most people think it is unacceptable 
to do so. Therefore such a value has a moral validity in addition to a legal validity: 
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This means that a socially competent agent must be able to distinguish 
between the factual and normative elements of an action situation, i.e. to 
distinguish between having to relate to 'circumstances' and having to relate to 
values (so that we do not treat people as things and vice versa) (Eriksen and 
Weigard, 2003: 29). 
The trouble with identifying the peculiar quality of normative knowledge lies with 
trying to identify the precise nature of this knowledge. 
The subjective world relates to the person's own inner world, their feelings, 
emotions, thoughts, wishes and intentions. This internal subjective world is made 
accessible when one actor meets an audience and, through dramaturgical action, 
gives this audience a picture of her subjectivity: 
A performance enables the actor to present himself to his audience in a certain 
way; in bringing something of his own subjectivity to appearance, he would like 
to be seen by his public in a particular way (Habermas, 1984: 90). 
The concepts of 'drama' 'performance' 'expression' 'presentation' are, of course, 
taken from the world of theatre. But the central idea here is that in making a 
presentation of her self to others the actor is not relating an external or acquired 
feeling or desire, since she cannot possess these in the same way as she can 
possess a weight or colour. Instead she is, at will, expressing the feelings and 
desires that she experiences as she plays her own role in her own life. She is also 
constantly switching between taking the role of actor and the role of audience. The 
central issue for the relation with the subjective world is whether or to what extent 
the subject expresses her own feelings and desires: does she express the feelings 
and desires she wants her audience to believe she has? or might she be deceiving 
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herself that the feelings she expresses are really her own? The point is that the 
subjective world presupposes an internal world demarcated from an external world, 
cut off, that is, from physical and social objects (Habermas, 1984: 93). Because it is 
marked off as separate, the subject can decide to act wholly cynically or completely 
sincerely. This opens a wide range of possible positions of which three are 
important here. 
Firstly, the cynical person tries to manage how her audience receives her 
presentation as a means to achieve an end. This is not a purely strategic type of 
action because the use of strategy is about finding the most effective way of 
achieving an end in light of the plans of others. Rather, this subject makes 
statements that appear to be subjectively true for her to a judging public. Only if this 
public recognise that the presentation is based on cynical manipulation does the 
communication switch to openly strategic action. Secondly, the subject can make a 
presentation that she earnestly believes in, but that turn out to be based on some 
falsehood. For instance, she may feel she has responsibilities to care for her 
estranged husband's mother, but upon reflection conclude that she has no such 
responsibilities. The third mode of action that is of interest here calls up a range of 
problems that will be discussed at a later point. It relates with the how the public is 
supposed to decide that an actors self presentation is authentic. The fact remains 
that it is impossible to judge the truth of a self presentation on the grounds of 
rationality. But the truth can be judged in terms of the consistency of the different 
things the person says, or between what they say and how they behave. 
Authenticity calls up questions about who is best placed to judge whether what a 
29 
person says about their feelings and desires is true, the person themselves (on the 
liberal account) or the society (on an authoritarian account). Habermas, ever the 
liberal, believes that it is for the person themselves to judge the authenticity of their 
own statements about themselves by clarifying their claims with the help of others. 
The precise meaning of responsibility in this forrnulation will be made clearer in the 
chapters that follow. But the overarching theory is that people use reason in ways 
that is appropriate to their context and interests, and therefore the meaning of 
responsibility changes as the situation and interests of actors change. The form of 
knowledge that gives expression to responsibility communicates meanings and 
organises practices, is related in some way to the reality of the situation and the 
constructions that are to a certain extent logically structured by context, and 
formulated by relevant actors. 
Viewing ethics and morals using a discourse ethical methodology 
Insofar as this work is concerned with responsibility, it is concerned with ethics and 
morals. The distinction between ethics and morals that I have already alluded to is 
of central importance here because it relates to the dividing line between issues of 
the good for the self and the just for everyone in society. Since questions about 
responsibility are intimately bound up in normative issues about the best way of 
valuing and supporting people in society, then issues of an ethical and moral kind 
quickly emerge. Therefore, at this it is necessary to describe the way I understand 
ethics and morals; the connection that I make between ethics and morals and the 
way I use the terms 'ethics' and 'morals', in this study. This is important given that 
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fact that I take my understanding of these concepts from the discourse ethics of 
Habermas (1990, 1995) and Apel (1998) and not from more 'traditional' sources of 
understanding (Kymlicka, 1990) 
Within moral philosophy, as Fraser (2004: 27-28) notes,: 
... questions of justice are usually understood to be matters of "the right", which 
belong squarely on the terrain of "morality." Questions of self-realisation, in 
contrast, are considered to be matters of "the good." 
While, this may be "a matter of scope" (2004: 28) as Fraser intimates, this 
distinction is at the heart of discourse ethics. Discourse ethics makes this distinction 
by retaining a narrow meaning for morality. In effect, in discourse ethics, ethics are 
understood as the various kinds of 'good life' that the individual or collective seek to 
clarify. Whereas morality is concerned with only those issues that have implications 
for others and that raise questions of fairness or justice (Habermas, 1990, 1993, 
Apel, 1998, Rehg, 1994). This narrows the meaning of the moral "ought" from its 
broad conception in everyday life where a moral can be understood in terms of the 
right course of action given the situation, to a narrow conception where only those 
"ought" claims that impact on others are considered as moral issues (Rehg, 1994). 
While this approach means holding ethics and morals in a distinct and highly 
abstract way, it enables social scientists to conceptualise and analyse discourses of 
responsibility in relation to ethical and moral issues. Questions of responsibility can 
then be related either with issues of the 'good life' and questions about "who I am 
and who I want to be" (Habermas, 1993), or with questions of justice which arise as 
various interests collide and some form of resolution that recognises the interests 
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and claims of each affected party is needed. This distinction is central to this thesis 
and will be returned to again in subsequent chapters. 
The structure of the thesis 
Following this introductory chapter I include two related chapters. These chapters 
deal with the way responsibility has been used to organise British society. Chapter 
1 looks at the uses of responsibility in historical context by examining how 
responsibility has been positioned in various ideologies that dominated at different 
points of time. Chapter 2 presents a more detailed examination of the way 
responsibility has been constructed in more recent times under New Labour's Third 
Way, and also includes a discussion of the model of responsible action that I adopt 
in the substantive component of this thesis. In Chapter 3, I examine various 
pertinent social theories of responsibility paying attention to what these theories say 
about contemporary society and the ways of organising society to help people 
better accept their responsibilities. Chapter 4 contains a detailed description of the 
research design, methodology and qualitative data used in the substantive 
component of this project. In effect, these first four chapters provide a rationale for 
the overall research programme. 
In the next three chapters, an analysis of the findings generated in the fieldwork is 
presented. The data is organised and presented in line with the various themes that 
emerged from the data and in relation to the theory of motivation to accept 
responsibility detailed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 5, I analyse the ideas about 
responsible action communicated by the New Labour government and ideas drawn 
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on by people working to implement government social policy around welfare 
benefits. In this way, I analyse concepts about responsibility that have a direct 
effect on people's lives. In Chapter 6, I present an analysis of the constructs the 
research informants used to discuss their own personal responsibilities. Chapter 7 
covers the social and public dimension of the research informants discourses of 
responsibility by looking at perceptions of the issues faced by responsibility in 
society and at discussions about the way welfare should be organised to better 
reflect the way people accept their responsibilities. Finally, the concluding chapter 
draws together the discourses identified in the analysis to explore the potential for a 
more discourse oriented approach to responsibility as a response to the challenges 
of reflexivity amid the individualisation of welfare responsibility in contemporary 
society. In this chapter I draw conclusions from the research material and discuss 
how discourse ethics might provide New Labour's Third Way ideology a with more 
moral dimension. 
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Chapter 1: Socio-Historical Constructions of 
Responsibility 
Introduction 
The election of the New Labour government in Great Britain in 1997 brought with it 
the ascendancy of a politics that thematises responsibility (Lund, 1999). Placing 
rights alongside responsibility signifies a semantic shift, a shift in the relation 
between discourse and practice, and consequently, a change in the moral order of 
society (Foucault, 2000). But what is the nature of this shift, and how is it historically 
specific? 
In this Chapter, I address this question by approaching responsibility as a culturally 
organised phenomenon. I deal with responsibility as a socially constructed 
response to the problems facing people and society at particular points in society's 
history. If responsibility is not seen as 'a social fact, but as a cultural phenomenon 
constructed through discourse in a socio-historical time and space, and as a 
response to the particular problems perceived in society (Strydom, 2000), then it is 
possible to analyse the constructions of this phenomenon. I recognise that the 
discourses proffered by various actors are also ideological, and as such, it is 
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necessary to focus particularly on the hegemonic versions of responsibility and the 
kinds of society these ideologies are used to create (Mannheim, 1991). 
In order to make sense of the various constructions of responsibility operating 
through the history of the British welfare state, I take up Strydom's (1999a) thesis 
that the basic problem organising and coordinating the sense making and 
knowledge producing efforts of people in society changed in the late 1970s. Up to 
this point the preoccupation of policy makers had been with poverty, but changed to 
risk. Whereas Strydom (1999a) identifies risk as the problem faced by a society 
endangered by its relationship with nature, I follow Vail et al. (2000) in focusing on 
security as the problem facing a society endangered by its precarious position in 
the global economy. 
Discourses of welfare responsibility amid the problem of poverty 
The problem of poverty appeared everywhere in Britain in the early part of the 
nineteenth century. Poverty, of course, has always been a problem in society, but 
poverty became a problem for society during this period as industrialisation and 
urbanisation transformed society (Dean, 1991). As mechanisation and new farming 
methods came into use and people began to move to the cities in search of work, 
they came to perceive the problem and danger of poverty. This problem was 
highlighted by experiences of poor housing, poor sanitation, widespread disease, 
poor diet, and the insecurity that the sickness or death of a breadwinner brought to 
the family (Finlayson, 1994). These were problems that repeatedly arose for public 
discussion (Dean, 1991). A major response to these problems were the various 
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Friendly Societies and Co-operatives that sought to remedy such social ills 
(Finlayson, 1994). As a result, I conceive of the welfare state as a phenomenon 
that, historically, developed with the rise of this co-operative movement (Finlayson, 
1994, here I focus on the British context which, of course, has quite a distinct 
history (Kennett, 2001, Esping-Anderson, 1990)). Here, I follow Finlayson (1994) in 
understanding the welfare state as a range of programmes and institutions that 
were made possible by, and developed out of, the variolJs kinds of Friendly 
Societies and co-operative movements that were growing in influence and number 
around the 1840s. The peculiar structural context in which discourses about poverty 
carried by the various Friendly Societies and co-operative movements arose, and 
from which they drew their saliency, was the experience of industrialisation, 
urbanisation, and the perception of the problem of poverty as a guiding social 
concern. Therefore, responsibility for welfare was first treated as a matter for 
people and organisations in civil society and the market. Although the problem of 
poverty was discussed within the political public sphere, as will be shown, it was not 
until the early part of the twentieth century that those in government had the kind of 
knowledge at their disposal to deal with this problem (Dean, 1991). 
The shift in the construction of poverty as a private matter to one that could 
potentially be dealt with in a public way is reflected in the various discourses during 
the period between the mid nineteenth and the late twentieth century. Hence the 
middle to late nineteenth century context is structured by locally based welfare 
institutions. 
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The mid- to Jate- nineteenth century context: The Poor Law and the Friendly 
Societies 
Two welfare institutions dominated nineteenth century Britain: the Poor Law and 
working men's associations. The Poor Law raised questions about the grounds for 
entitlement to benefits (or poor relief) and how best to deal with claimants. A range 
of practices and ideas were developed over its long history. According to Fraser 
(1984) these included returning vagrants to their own parishes (1984: 34, 36), 
collecting taxes to support the poor (1984: 33), setting up the poor house (1984: 35) 
providing outdoor relief (1984: 38), and legislating for local administration and 
custom (1984: 36, 38). Approaches were often based on a general fear of the 
vagrant, and concerns with demoralisation and the perverse appeal of destitution 
(1984: 46, 47, 48). Proposed solutions were set out based on the "concept of 
'setting the poor to work'" (1984: 34), by using distinctions between the impotent, 
the able bodied and the persistent idler (1984: 35). The point, however, is that in 
the nineteenth century, the Poor Law organised responsibilities through a set of 
disciplinary practices that instilled particular kinds of moral agencies into the poor 
(Dean, 1991, Rose, 1999). On the one hand, through the dehumanising prospect of 
the workhouse, the Poor Law sought to generate a kind of moral agency that could 
thrive in the market. The prospect of the workhouse, it was assumed, would instil 
the self-discipline into the poor so that they would work in order to avoid the 
workhouse and maintain their freedoms (Poovey, 1995: 106-111). On the other 
hand, the Poor Laws enabled the creation of a range of spaces through which a 
civilised moral agency could be inculcated (Rose, 1999). The workhouse, along 
with the school and family life, could also be used to "invent the conditions in which 
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subjects themselves would enact the responsibilities that composed their liberties" 
(Rose, 1999: 72). 
Alongside the Poor Law were a range of practices organised around the ideas of 
self help and mutual aid (Fraser, 1984, Finlayson, 1994). These took a variety of 
different forms. Friendly societies were organisations that "offered a means of 
insuring against the vicissitudes which could so easily overtake a working-class life" 
in the industrial society; illness, old age and death (Finlayson, 1994: 24). According 
to Finlayson (1994), who carried out an exhaustive survey of such forms of working 
class voluntarism, these Friendly Societies often operated as local mutual societies, 
and were frequently in danger of going out of existence due to a lack of 
understanding of underlying actuarial principles, or excessive expenditure on drink 
(1994: 25, 26). National forms also operated which, according to Finlayson's (1994: 
26, 27) survey, were often based in London, and for whom mutuality "was 
embodied in monthly or annual social occasions." Mutualism was also expressed in 
trade unions and co-operatives (1994: 28, 29, 30) which developed schemes for 
relief during strike action, sickness or unemployment or, in the case of co­
operatives, developed the more Owenite idea of forming a co-operative society. 
These organisations operated local and mutual institutions largely because they 
distrusted what they feared might turn out to be a despotic centralised state (1994: 
100, 101). In doing so, these Societies generated a form of market collectivism, and 
developed ideas about how individuals could come together for mutual benefit in 
the market. They also served to institutionalise and normalise discourses and forms 
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of discipline concerned with thrift, cleanliness and the moral responsibilities of 
family members for one another (Finlayson, 1994, Rose, 1999: 74, 75). 
Together, the nineteenth century Poor Laws and the range of social movements 
organised around the problem of uncertainty in an industrialised world, contributed 
to the formation of knowledge about the proper attitude of the responsible subject 
and her responsibilisation in the context of the market (Dean, 1991, Rose, 1999). 
On the one hand, through the institution of the Poor Law, knowledge was 
developed about the strategic exploitation of welfare provision and modes of policy 
intervention that promoted responsible action by discouraging such explOitation. On 
the other hand, through trial and (frequently disastrous) error, the Mutual and 
Friendly Societies developed actuarial knowledge alongside knowledge concerning 
the need for social integration and personal self-discipline. These were seen as 
prerequisites for the smooth and reliable running of these organisations as modes 
of risk and responsibility sharing (Finlayson, 1994). Thus, forms of knowledge about 
how to deal with the objective world of welfare were developed relating to 
intervention into the welfare of the vulnerable, the strategic manipulation of these 
forms of intervention, and a shared understanding of how to apportion risks and 
responsibilities. As part of these modes of stabilising welfare, ideas were also 
developed about the need to moralise certain behaviours through appeal to certain 
values (Dean, 1991, Rose, 1999). This required the use of knowledge of a more 
normative kind. 
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Ideological constructions of responsibility in the mid- to late- nineteenth 
century: Libera/Individualism or Duty Individualism 
Welfare ideology in the nineteenth century placed responsibility on the individual 
whilst stressing the importance of associations in civil society (Finlayson, 1994). 
Within this ideology, fulfilment was seen as issuing from the individual's own efforts, 
hence "the irnportance of effort and perseverance, hard work and sobriety I self­
control and self-improvement - and the need to struggle to show independence, 
initiative and character to develop inner potential" (Finlayson, 1994: 20). For the 
first time the idea that personal fulfilment could be achieved through personal 
improvement, an idea that was derived from radical Protestantism "with its ideal of 
the self-governing congregation and the belief in the importance of individual calling 
and awakening for salvation" (Davies, 1997: 43) was being promoted. This idea 
was coupled with a communitarian notion of the individual as a 'free - standing' 
agent produced through social interaction and constituted by cooperation with 
others. The individual could become free standing through others, and so 
individualism was predicated on a pragmatic collectivism., a collectivism aimed at 
enabling and enhancing this individualism (Davies, 1997). Together, these ideas 
formed lithe doctrine of the moral responsibility of the individual for his actions and 
the important belief that virtue is only possible where, and to the extent that, actions 
are freely chosen" (Davies, 1997: 43). Moreover, Protestantism placed a new 
concept alongside working class voluntarism, that of middle class commercialism I 
and both were changed. 
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Since it was based on these two concepts, this ideology could be used to bring a 
description of the situation of individuals, with an ideal tailored to their contexts. 
Hence the normative content could alter for both working class voluntarism and 
middle class commercialism by altering what seeking help from within meant in 
each context. On the one hand, help was sought from within the community in order 
to deal with the social and economic disadvantages of industrialisation, and on the 
other, help was sought from within the person in order to exploit the opportunities 
offered by this industrialism (Finlayson, 1994: 22, 23). The advantage of these 
concepts lay with how they could be used to legitimate the concentration and 
exploitation of capital. Seeking help from the community through various kinds of 
mutual aid or friendly associations enabled a concentration of power in civil society 
by building on ideas about how to share risks and burdens. Similarly, developing a 
self-help mentality within the person enabled an exploitation of arising opportunities 
that a burgeoning capitalism produced (Finlayson, 1994). The important point here 
though is that responsibility for welfare was placed with the individual who "had 
within his grasp the power to find his own salvation" (Fraser, 1984: 47). Thus "the 
key to general welfare is the welfare and happiness of individuals" and welfare in 
the wider society was "a consequence of, the welfare of the individuals composing 
it" (Davies, 1997: 43). Finlayson (1994: 101) points out how this lead to a legislative 
paternalism "exercised to shield those who could not be expected to exercise 
individual effort and responsibility; but again, this was not intended to interfere with 
the workings of a state primarily designed to enable individual effort to prosper, and 
agencies devoted to further such effort to flourish." Similarly, Fraser (1984: 47) 
points out how such ideas of personal salvation cast society as "a loving parent 
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inflicting sharp, painful punishment on the miscreant child." In short, people were 
encouraged to take responsibility for themselves through cooperation with others 
and ideally become the free standing individual who was valued by society. 
This ideology complemented the use of norms to govern and responsibilise action 
by moralising certain values. It brought together an idea drawn from the relationship 
with the personal world - that people could realise tl1emselves by attending to their 
own personal calling, that they could become authentic persons - with an idea 
drawn from relations in the social world - that the individual could realise this 
projected subject through interacting with others in society or the market. This 
served to produce a highly potent ideology that could legitimate paternalist policy 
interventions that, nevertheless, did not interfere with the very liberal conception of 
the individual cast as realising their own personal calling. It could, simultaneously, 
legitimate and valorise, and thereby make a duty of, acting in the market and in the 
associations of civil society for personal purposes (Rose, 1999). The Protestant and 
liberal individualist assumptions of this 'framework broke down towards the end of 
the nineteenth century in large part because it "put insufficient emphasis on 
external circumstances and matters over which the individual had little control" 
(Finlayson, 1994: 102), and partly due to secularisation processes that undermined 
the idea of a calling (Fraser, 1984, Finlayson, 1994). On the other hand, the idea of 
placing a duty on the person to secure their own welfare through the market and 
civil society came under pressure, particularly during the 1890s, as perceptions of 
dietary, health, and education problems, or the problem of poverty, were 
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increasingly taken up in mainstream political discourses that highlighted their social 
din1ension (Fraser, 1984, Finlayson, 1994). 
The context in the early twentieth century: Welfare Statism 
As problems with the liberal individualist or duty individualist ideologies were 
exposed towards the end of the nineteenth century, a new situation was emerging 
where society, and not the individual, could be understood as a site of action 
(Finlayson, 1994, Davies, 1997, Rose, 1999). The modes of responsibilisation 
instituted in the nineteenth century were carried out in the name of the liberal 
individual, and sought to create this person by inculcating the attitudes and 
dispositions of the liberal person (Dean, 1991, Rose, 1999). As Rose (1999) shows, 
this responsibilisation was continued by the logic of the separation of the market 
from society. The economy came into view through a consciousness of territory 
delimited to the nation state, and the organisation of economies within the nation 
state through the limits placed on the economy by borders, customs, and money. 
This consciousness was consolidated in the twentieth century through the 
responsibilities of the state to ensure the security and well-being of the economy in 
order to secure the nation and the people, and through the formation of knowledge 
about the economy and the development of policies aimed at enhancing economic 
performance (1999: 102). Whereas, the economy was seen in terms of laws and 
causalities, a sphere which followed its own internal logics and therefore could not 
be acted upon by the state, the moral was seen as the proper sphere for action "by 
politicians, the churches, philanthropists, and others" (1999: 103). Within this 
context, the thinking that Davis (1999, above) refers to as incorporationism is 
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shown by Rose (1999) to have particularly involved sociologists in the sense of 
Bauman's (1995) legislators. That is, groups of politicians and scientists of the 
'social' who worked to engineer society in order to ameliorate or correct, the 
problems of crime, alienation, individualisation, urbanisation, and fragmentation 
caused by industrialisation. In effect, the terrain of the social became the panacea 
for the problems of a society seeking to manage and control itself in its industrial 
environment. Thus problems were translated into social issues and dealt with as 
social problems. 
The social became a panacea with perceptions of the successes and colossal 
failures of voluntarism and in conjunction with doubts regarding the effectiveness 
and adequacy of the minimal state support provided through the Poor Law 
(Finlayson, 1994: 136-155). Perceptions of the administrative possibilities 
embodied in the voluntary associations and the rising problem of poverty that the 
Poor Law not only seemed unable to tackle, but that also stigmatised the poor, 
generated the conditions wherein new forms of knowledge were sought on how to 
stabilise society. The 'New Liberals', a political party who emerged in the latter part 
of the nineteenth century, had seen how such new forms of knowledge needed to 
be predicated on a new conception of the individual (Fraser, 1984, Finlayson, 
1994). The idea "that there was such a thing as a 'free-standing' individual, 
independent of, and divorced from, his social environmene seemed increasingly 
mistaken, as did the focus of paternalism on individual cases of poverty but which 
was "impervious to the idea that anything might be wrong with the general working 
of the industrial system" (Finlayson, 1994: 156). Instead the New Liberals believed 
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that social intervention needed to pay greater heed to social justice and the wider 
context of social action while their socialist contemporaries took a more radical view 
of structural inequalities (1994: 156, 157, 158). Nevertheless, a political context was 
formed in which the state was seen as having "a role in setting right the 
shortcomings of an economic system which had produced poverty on such a scale 
as would put self-improvement beyond the capacity of the individual" (1994: 161). 
Such a role included a new form of societal manipulation differing from intervention, 
a form of manipulation that Claus Offe (1985) calls 'production'. That is, a kind of 
rationality that develops social policy as institutions which operate as organisations 
shaping the context in which other organisations and commodities operate. 
Moreover, in the context of the extended franchise, the idea that people should 
have social rights alongside their civil and political rights gained support and 
credence an10ngst all the major parties (Fraser, 1984: 162, 163, Strydom, 2000). 
These ideas provided the framework in which new forms of state intervention were 
developed that centralised welfare provision into an administrative body offering 
uniformity, professionalism and expertise (Fraser, 1984). 
Ideological constructions of responsibility in the early twentieth century: A 
Libera/Individualist Duty Collectivism 
The shifting of the burden of welfare responsibilities away from the individual and 
towards some form of collective, or towards the state, was criticised by proponents 
of liberal individualism who resisted the centralisation of power in the state (Fraser, 
1984, Finlayson, 1994). The collectivisation of welfare responsibility was based on 
the idea that individuals are "largely determined by the network of social relations of 
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which they are elements, so that factors and forces outside the individual or outside 
his control playa great part in determining his character and actions" (Davies, 
1997: 60). This shift from an individualist to a more social perspective that put 
people's ability to participate in their social group at the centre, "led to the idea of a 
generalised collective responsibility for the welfare of others and to the perception 
that a moral wrong or poverty in one part of society imposes a duty upon aW 
(Davies, 1997: 60). This idea was taken up by a turn to the twentieth century New 
Liberalism that: 
directed the emphasis of traditional liberal beliefs in individual effort and 
achievement more towards the needs of the individual in the community. 'Let 
liberalisnl proceed with its glorious work of building up the temple of liberty in 
this country,' said Lloyd George in 1903, 'but let it also bear in mind that the 
worshippers of that shrine have to live' (Finlayson, 1994: 124). 
This compromise between liberalism and collectivism enabled an acceptance of 
state intervention to prevent the accumulation and concentration of wealth and to 
prevent the exploitation of the poor through redistributive measures operating in 
conjunction with self-help organisations: 
By this means would emerge a general spirit of social responsibility, a 
strengthening of charity, self and mutual help, which would remove the need for 
long-term state intervention (Thane, 1982: 58). 
The effect of this compromise was that the twentieth century would involve a 
definition of a moral framework around a collectivisation of duties (Thane, 1982). 
The normative content of this framework brought together a social description of 
society with a discourse about the possibilities for engineering a more equal 
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society, offered by the state in conjunction with civil society (Davies, 1997). While 
looking at society in terms of its structural effects on individuals, th is discourse 
could appeal to the ideal of a well-ordered society stabilised and collectivised 
through state intervention while upholding liberal individualism. For example, the 
"[t]WO great protagonists [of social insurance], Lloyd George and Churchill, saw no 
place in insurance for the concept of the undeserving poor, since it was irrelevant to 
the issue, which was universal entitlement earned by contributions" (Fraser, 1984: 
150, 151). By taking a social point of view, these architects of social insurance 
could bypass arguments about how duty collectivism would undermine the moral 
fabric of the working classes and point instead towards the capacity of this system 
to incorporate the lower classes into society through this social contract. Henceforth 
the problem of poverty was placed firmly on the public agenda. 
The result of this process of deprivatisation was "a more democratic and collectivist 
state which sought to create what has been called la more organic relation' 
between the individual and society and to establish a citizenship of entitlement" 
(Finlayson, 1994: 198). Resulting from the growth of an organic notion of society; a 
social consciousness could develop that took a social and moral point of view that 
can be understood in terms of a duty collectivism. However, the need to align liberal 
individualism with this emergent duty collectivism, in the political context of the rise 
of socialism, led to a compromise and the formation of a liberal individualist duty 
collectivism (Davies, 1997). This did not mean that the burden of responsibility for 
welfare was shifted to the state, but instead that the state centralised the 
administration of welfare while still placing the onus on the individual to make the 
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necessary contributions. In this people who were deemed by Friendly Societies or 
Co-operatives as too risky to be insured could, through state provision access 
insurance thus enabling the development of a more just system. State collectivism 
served not only the interests of justice but also of liberalism since it distinguished 
between people's public activities and private burdens. Historically speaking, this 
moral framework did not break down. Rather its social utopianism, the idea that the 
state together with civil society could engineer a good society, was to be energised 
through the successes of state mobilisation of the society and the economy during 
the First World War (Thane, 1982). 
The inter-war context: The Welfare State 
The collectivisation of welfare provision and the centralisation of responsibility in the 
state continued in the inter-war period through the development and refinement of 
methods of stabilising society in its industrial environment. The problems posed by 
the environment were drama-Used in this period by the experience of the 
possibilities of mass collective mobilisation drawn fron1 the First World War, and the 
qualitatively new experience of unemployment brought about by demobbed troops. 
This situation of structural unemployment made the reasons to collectivise risks and 
responsibilities as a way of stabilising society ever more plain (Fraser, 1984: 185­
198). In this context, actors began to search for ways of more effectively 
collectivising responsibility for welfare. Finlayson (1994), in his history of 
voluntarism, stresses how voluntarist activity continued in this period. Indeed, he 
argues that the institutions expressing a state collectivism were formed in response 
to the weaknesses noted in voluntarism and in its local complement, the Poor Law 
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(1994: 250-253). Like Fraser (1984: 178-184), Finlayson (1994: 254, 255) notes 
how centralised state planning was very much 'in vogue' in the years directly after 
the First World War, but that this energy did not return until the 1930s. Fraser 
(1984: 197, 198) stresses how the strengthening of centralised planning brought 
about the demise of the Poor Law and demonstrated the weaknesses of Laissez­
faire capitalism. In response to these processes, new forms of knowledge about 
how to organise welfare using the agencies of the state to stabilise the problems 
faced by society in its industrial environment were sought. Such ideas were 
famously put forward by Keynes and Beveridge. 
At this time, the forms of knowledge that were developed were focused on the 
economy and society as an object. As such, society and the economy were 
identified as units that could be manipulated using policy frameworks based on an 
enhanced understanding of their structures (Rose, 1999). Hence, the gradual 
development of knowledge about the economy led to the possibility of a Keynesian 
economics that focused on manipulating demand (Pierson, 1998). The concept of 
collectivism did not change so much as its link with liberal individualism was 
weakened. 
Ideological constructions of responsibility in the inter-war years: Social 
Democracy and the utopianism ofDuty Col/ectivism 
The effect of the Second World War on welfare policies was to extend the 
collectivist component of the moral framework developed during the early part of 
the twentieth century (Sullivan, 1996: 32-36). In particular, the Fabian Socialist idea 
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of collective responsibility for welfare which postulated a society into which all social 
groups could be incorporated through the benevolent work of well trained welfare 
professionals, gained currency in a state at war seeking to boost morale through 
encouraging solidarity (Thane, 1982). The result was a new approach to the 
problem of poverty based on a redistributive moral agenda that brought together 
state intervention with citizen participation in a way that was supposed to enhance 
a sense of solidarity_ Titmuss (1970) identified this idea as the basis of the 'Gift 
Relationship' : 
what unites it [social policy] with ethical considerations is its focus on integrative 
systems: on processes, transactions and institutions which promote an 
individual's sense of identity, participation and community and allow him more 
freedom of choice for the expression of altruism and which, simultaneously, 
discourage a sense of individual alienation (Titmuss, 1970: 224). 
The basis of this moral order was the idea that poverty resulted in exclusion from 
social participation, an idea that perhaps received its clearest articulation in Peter 
Townsend's seminal study of poverty in 1979: 
Individuals, families and groups can be said to be in poverty when they lack the 
resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the 
living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least are widely 
encouraged and approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their 
resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual 
or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs 
and activities (Townsend, 1979: 32). 
Here, again, we find a bringing together of a description of the problem of poverty in 
society with an ideal. This description organises reality as a space in which people 
live out their lives within the context of a society where certain basic ways of living 
50 
p 
have become customary, and where everybody should be able to participate in 
social life. This idea was first given broad expression in the conception of 
citizenship offered by T. H. Marshall (1950), which gave a historical legitimacy and 
coherence to collectivism. Citizenship, for Marshall, "involves an equality of 
membership status and of ability to participate in a society, and it refers to what the 
society collectively acknowledges as legitimate and enforceable citizens' rights in 
respect of the various elements of the concept" (Roche, 1992: 19). With these 
arguments the collectivist framework provided certainty and direction to state 
welfare provision. This was a socialist duty collectivism insofar as it placed 
emphasis on the state to ensure that people could participate in the social world of 
which they were a part. It remained up to people to better themselves but in the 
sense of moving up in the class system. Duty became more of an issue for the 
state and the collective than for the individual within this framework, and justice 
went beyond issues of participation and into issues of redistribution (Roche, 1992). 
However, this framework focused on lithe development of rights rather than duties!! 
(Roche, 1992: 20). As Roche (1992: 19-21) points out, a framework which stresses 
rights over duties may have been suitable in the context of a society where people 
felt they were owed something after the hardships of war, but such a one-sided 
stress also laid the foundation for its breakdown. It was a "relatively duty free and 
unreciprocal conception of citizenship. If this is so, then it can also be argued that it 
has risked presiding over a diminution of the freedom and moral autonomy of those 
depending on it (promoting welfare dependency etc)" (Roche, 1992: 31, 32). 
Furthermore, such a de-moralising consequence also has affects in the political 
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realm where "[d]e-moralized individuals are unlikely to be able to see themselves 
as being credible bearers of the civil and political powers, the identity and status, of 
full citizenship" (1992: 35). Of course, the social democratic compromise broke 
down for reasons other than morals; also in1portant were the fiscal crises of the 
seventies which generated an uncertainty that reached right into the framework of 
knowledge about welfare and its moral content (c.f. Pierson, 1998, Taylor-Gooby, 
1991). This framework, which placed primary responsibility on the state to 
incorporate its citizens into society, broke down under its own entitlement and rights 
orientated logic, a breakdown that was given particular shape by Mead (1986) and 
Murray's (1984) critique and reappraisal of individual and collective welfare 
responsibilities. 
Discourses of welfare responsibility amid the problem of security: 
The late 1970s to the present 
During the 1980s the common perception of a whole range of social concerns 
altered. No longer was poverty understood as the basic social concern, although it 
retains a prominent place in people's thinking about the nature and organisation of 
society. Instead, during this period, a new concern with security took its place. The 
problem of security first made its appearance in public communication with the oil 
crisis of the 1970s, then again with the growing awareness of economic 
globalisation, the recession and the fiscal crises of the 1980s. This awareness of 
the problem of security became exacerbated in the context of the nuclear threat 
(Chernobyl, Three Mile Island), the world balance of power after the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall, the insecurity that accompanied economic globalisation, the Twin 
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Towers, the two Gulf Wars, and al-Qaida. The central position that poverty once 
took as a concern that people needed to address has been sidelined in favour of 
security. This shift has had a significant impact on the welfare state and social 
policy as institutions designed to combat the problem of poverty (Pierson, 1998, 
Gilbert, 2000). This shift has been witnessed by writers concerned with the question 
of a world beyond the welfare state, the meaning of a shrunken or entrenched 
welfare state, or the politics of welfare in an insecure global environment. 
The late twentieth century context: The Security State 
The form of knowledge that developed in the context of this critique and reappraisal 
of the welfare state centred around the idea of remodelling the welfare state in a 
manner closer to the market, and of managing change (Clarke and Newman, 
1997). The new form of knowledge about the social organisation of welfare has 
been conceived as a reorganisation of the state into a Schumpeterian Workfare 
Postnational Regime (SWPR) (Jessop, 1994, 2002), a managerial state (Clarke 
and Newman, 1997), or more broadly, an enabling state (Gilbert, 2000). These 
writers articulate the formation of a state that is more concerned with security then 
poverty, albeit in different ways. For example, both Jessop's (1994, 2002) SWPR 
and Clarke and Newman's (1997) managerial state share a focus on processes that 
place the interests of security above those of poverty. 
Firstly, Jessop's SWPR "is Schumpeterian insofar as it tries to promote permanent 
innovation and flexibility in relatively open economies" (2002: 250) through supply 
side economics and increased structural competitiveness in the knowledge 
53 
economy. This Schumpeterian competition state's focus on flexibility and innovation 
affects responsibilities by organising the values and horizons of responsibility within 
the networked, knowledge, and global economy (Jessop, 2002). For Jessop (2002), 
and Clarke and Newman (1997), this has meant the valorisation of flexibility, 
enterprise, and innovation. More particularly, these values have been incorporated 
into the welfare state using management discourses that point to the possibilities of 
effective management strategies (Clarke and Newman, 1997). Through these 
discourses, not only could the state be altered; but the generation of flexibility and 
innovation through discourses about change could be used to make individuals and 
managers more responsible for their role. This, so the argument goes, needed to 
be done to secure the state in the global market (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 39). 
The SWPR is Ha workfare regime insofar as it subordinates social policy to the 
demands of economic policy" (Jessop! 2002: 251). By variously recommodifying the 
citizen and seeking to reduce public spending, the workfare state Ugive[s] rise to a 
new institutional framework that subordinates social welfare policies to economic 
considerations, and the imposition of limits on deficit spending" (Gilbert, 2002: 43). 
Gilbert (2002) calls this the 'enabling state', linking it with a market orientation. It 
has been brought into the welfare state through management principles that narrow 
the distinction between the public and private sectors, and management's capacity 
for discretion (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 21). Nevertheless, the generation of new 
values in welfare around value for money, efficiency, consumer choice, customer 
care and competition, has not resulted in obvious benefits for the people living in 
poverty (Gilbert, 2002). This serves to privatise responsibility for welfare by 
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relieving the state of its responsibility for social provision and politicising such 
provision as a contractual matter for the individual's relation with the state. It also 
allows the state to conditionalise provision by linking "incentives and sanctions to 
behavioural requisites, such as accepting work, performing community service, and 
attending training sessions and clinics" (Gilbert, 2002: 45). This commodification of 
labour further privatises responsibility along contractualistic lines, making the 
recipient aware that if she does not attend to her part of the bargain, her status as a 
commodity is jeopardised, and the state can withdraw future investments in her. 
This post 1970s focus on extending the market sets the scene for a new 
environment in which people could shape their identities, orient their action, and 
legitimate themselves. People could now understand themselves as individuals in 
the market and work around the values of choice, efficiency, and competitiveness. 
But this regime could take the context further. On the one hand, the sense of 
insecurity has been exacerbated by the postnational dimension of SWPS. That is, 
the postnational "trend [is] occasioned by the increased significance of other spatial 
scales and horizons of action, which make the national economy less susceptible to 
effective macroeconomic management and the national territory less important as a 
power container" (Jessop, 2002: 252). As such, the state is less effective as an 
instrument that can be deployed to secure society in this global environment. On 
the other hand, the state compensates for this ineffectiveness by becoming more 
'regime-like'. This is "reflected in the increased importance of non-state 
mechanisms in compensating for market failures and inadequacies in the delivery 
of state-sponsored economic and social policies" (Jessop, 2002: 254), and in the 
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increased importance of governance through networks and self-organisation 
(Clarke and Newman, 1997, Rose, 1999). This is achieved by combining 
decentralisation with centralisation (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 21, 23). That is, the 
promotion of flexibility and competitiveness is frequently routed through an indirect 
management of governmental power, and is coupled with a centralisation of some 
forms of power. This enables a dispersal of power to organisations that are 
supposed to relate with themselves as businesses and manage themselves (1997: 
58-60). This dispersal of state control involves an expansion of state power 
"exercised through regulation, contracting, monitoring, and surveillance" (1997: 26), 
and involves a selective expansion of the voluntary sector and an expectation that 
this sector become more organised to deal with this new form of state control. This 
has been coupled with a privatisation of aspects of welfare and of public assets, a 
privatisation of welfare agencies in the sense of an expectation that these agencies 
are operated in a businesslike fashion, and a shift of responsibility from the public 
into the private domain of the family (Starr, 19a9). The point for Clarke and 
Newman (1997), is that these processes of privatisation have not simply taken the 
form of transferring tasks away from the state, but have also engaged agents with 
the state. Managerialism then, is a form of knowledge that combines a focus on 
strategies that manage intervention in welfare with the valorisation of a range of 
values that underpin and draw together these strategies (Clarke and Newman, 
1997). It enables a restructuring of the welfare state in the context of concerns 
about the future of that state while providing a framework in which people could 
shape their identities as consumers in a market (Clarke and Newman, 1997). 
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Rose (1999) traces the logics and underlying processes behind the formation of an 
intelligent, enabling state. Rose (1999) characterises these processes as a shift 
from the social and collectivist perspective dominant in the early to late twentieth 
century which gave way to an entrepreneurial perspective that reconceptualised 
social behaviours in economic ways (Rose, 1999: 140-142). In this new context the 
citizen "is understood in terms of the activation of the rights of the consumer in the 
marketplace" (1999: 165) and "rights and responsibilities [are] contractualized" 
(1999: 165): 
The politics of the contract becomes central to contests between political 
strategies concerning the 'reform of welfare', and to strategies of user demand 
and user resistance to professional powers (1999: 165). 
For Rose (1999) this means that power has been dispersed away from the centre 
of the knowing, planning, and steering state and returned to society; to businesses, 
organisations, localities, communities, and individuals. The point for Rose (1999: 
174-175) is that this process is based on a responsibilisation of these social forms. 
This implies that these social actors are both made free and responsible for their 
own destiny, which also makes them the custodians of the destiny of society, hence 
the emphasis on "individual morality, organisational responsibility and ethical 
community" (1999: 175). Rose (1999: 175-186) shows how community, understood 
in this way, becomes a conduit of governance that involves a multiplication and 
fragmentation of culture and identity, and how communitarians contribute by 
helping to consolidate this conduit by moralising community so that communities 
can call on their members and other communities to behave in moral, responsible, 
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and tolerant ways. For Rose (1999), these developments amount to a new form of 
governance that he terms 'ethico-politics': 
... ethico-politics concerns itself with the self-techniques necessary for 
responsible self-government and the relations between one's obligation to 
oneself and one's obligations to others (1999: 188). 
This new politics puts ethics at the centre of discussion, a trend Rose (1999: 192) 
welcomes because it shifts arguments out of the cognitive domain of science and 
into the moral domain. But he also recognises how this new form of control: 
'" help[s] maintain order and obedience to law by binding individuals into shared 
moral norms and values: governing through the self-steering forces of honour 
and shame, of propriety, obligation, trust, fidelity, and commitment to others 
(Rose, 2000: 324). 
As a result, the security state governs within the context of an unstable global 
environment that it incorporates into its own structures and makes a property of 
society. Within this state, people orient themselves by making themselves capable 
of accepting responsibility to others, and acting in relation to values of 
competitiveness, efficiency, custon1er care, consumerism and so on. Thus, 
responsibility becomes, not a straightforwardly individual matter, but a matter of 
how the individual relates to themselves, others, and a range of values that anchor 
a sense of responsibility. 
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Hegemonic constructions of responsibility in the 1980s: The New Right and 
the New Individualism 
The first attempt to restructure the welfare state along the lines of a post-social 
secu rity state was made by the conservative governments of the 1980s. The New 
Right famously combined seemingly irreconcilable ideas and arguments to produce 
a stable discursive coalition: 
Neo-liberal economics underpinned widespread privatisation, and justified 
growing inequalities in the name of incentives. But neo-conservatism, which 
developed alongside neo-liberalism, was concerned with order rather then 
freedom, with family nation and morality - and held no brief for a minimal state 
(Levitas, 1998: 14, 15). 
The point about these two apparently contradictory sets of ideas, for Levitas (1998), 
is that they n1utually reinforce each other. The free market of neo-liberalism needed 
the strong state of neo-conservatism to police unrest, pacify resistance, and 
institute reforms. The strong state relied on people's dependency on the free labour 
market Has a potent source of social discipline" (Levitas, 1998: 15). In the language 
of George and Wilding (1985), the New Right combined anti-collectivism with 
reluctant collectivism in its stance towards state provided welfare. The New Right 
remained trapped within an incorporationist thinking because of its combination of a 
reluctant neo-conservative acceptance of the need for state collectivism, which the 
New Right nevertheless sought to overturn using neo-liberalism's outright attack on 
collectivism (George and Wilding, 1985). The point is that the New Right could 
address the problem of poverty and the problem of security simultaneously. 
59 
But poverty did not disappear as a major problem for society; instead, as I have 
highlighted, it set alongside security as a growing concern. The New Right 
addressed the problem of poverty against the background of an increasingly 
unstable global economic environment by taking up the neo-liberal themes of 
accountability, efficiency, and freedom (Levitas, 1986: 82-91). By linking 
accountability with the idea of the minimal state, making actors accountable to 
consumers, linking efficiency with the idea that organisations should meet effective 
demand (not need), and defining freedom as freedom from restraint (1986: 91), the 
neo liberal strand of the New Right gave individuals the space to deal privately with 
their responsibility, in light of the possibility of poverty. The neo conservative strand 
of the New Right valued traditional values, institutions, and social order, and 
resisted experimenting with new institutions (Levitas, 1986: 92-97). Thus it offered 
insulation against changes in the social composition of society. In effect, the New 
Rig ht offered an ideology tailored to securing the market in the global environment 
by combining a discourse concerned with the needs of the market with a discourse 
concerned with conserving tradition and order (Levitas, 1986). 
As a moral framework, the New Right offered a qualitatively new form of knowledge 
(Levitas, 1986). Whereas previous ideologies took normative positions, broadly 
combining a description of society with some form of ideal, the New Right took a far 
more political approach. This involved combining, not a description of society with 
an ideal, but a range of concerns with social and public policies with an ideal 
(Levitas, 1986). Dwyer (2000) sun1marises this as follows: 
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The belief that a reduction of the state's welfare role is both positive and 
progressive, coupled to the idea that the future welfare of citizens will be best 
served by a system that encourages greater individual responsibility in meeting 
welfare needs, with only limited, often highly conditional, state provision, have 
become central tenets of the British Conservative Party's welfare policies (2000: 
64). 
Hence the New Right sh ifted the lines of debate onto a level of arguments about 
arguments and away from a direct concern with real social conditions. It is an 
understanding concerned with the moral erosion of society brought about by state 
collectivism that postulates the individualisation of welfare responsibilities as a 
panacea to this erosion (Dwyer, 2000: 64-68). 
In spite of the widespread panic about the future of the welfare state accompanying 
the New Right, the uncertainty it produced and the contradictory form of 
individualism it promoted served to undermine the dominant welfare paradigm 
rather more successfully than produce a viable alternative (Glennerster, 2000). In 
particular, the New Right's counter-revolution called into question the socialist and 
collectivist enterprise as a whole (Leonard, 1997). Indeed, in terms of moral 
frameworks, the New Right successfully undermined collectivism and 
incorporation ism while its market individualist alternative was never realised to the 
extent that the previous state collectivist models were (Glennerster, 2000). The 
New Right sought to relocate welfare responsibilities with the individual in civil 
society by promoting a market individualism. But without the ethical dimension 
provided by Protestantism or the utopian society provided by state collectivism, the 
New Right could only pron10te a possessive individualism that it tried to discipline 
using unemployment and family policies (Levitas, 1986). 
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The context at the turn to the twenty first century: Entrenching the Security 
State 
The discipline of social policy has become acutely aware of the relativisation of the 
problenl of poverty to the problem of security. Dean (with Melrose, 1999a) explores 
the way people's discourses of poverty and riches are connected with ideas about 
security. Through their study, Dean (with Melrose, 1999a) shows how people 
harbour a sense of fear about the prospect of poverty, confirming the view that lithe 
'comfortable' majority [are] troubled by insecurity and the prospect of poverty" 
(1999a: 48). On the other hand, on exploring attitudes towards wealth, Dean (with 
Melrose, 1999a: 71) concludes "that the spectre of poverty is more potent than the 
spectacle of riches", thereby showing that while poverty is a persistent concern in 
people's lives, it is now understood in relation to security. More recently Taylor­I 
Gooby (2000) reports on research which shows how a sense of insecurity has 
become a more prevalent part of (particularly poorer) people's lives. 
Social policy analysts have also had little difficulty identifying and explaining the 
shifting moral order. For example, Tony Fitzpatrick (1998: 15) argues that a new 
political space has opened up in the wake of the neo-liberal attempt to recast the 
social democratic welfare state along the lines of market individualism. This has 
given rise to a n1arket collectivism that combines the state collectivism of social 
democracy with the market orientation of neo-liberalism. According to Fitzpatrick 
(1998: 28), responsibility has been constructed as "the col/ectivisation of duties and 
the individualisation of rights with a system of post social security" (1998: 28, italics 
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in original). In effect, as Driver and Martell point out (1998: 182-183) I a new 
consensus has emerged which replaces the consensual socialism of social 
democracy with a consensual capitalism that is supposedly beyond left and right. 
The basic idea of social democracy - that democracy provides a means to make 
society into a socialist society - has given way to a capitalism in which we all have 
responsibilities (Driver and Martell, 1998). Thus duties are collectivised but without 
being concentrated in the state, and rights are individualised within capitalism. 
The Commission on Social Justice (1994) contributed ideas about how the state 
should operate in this broad context. According to the Commission, the antecedent 
welfare state operated at a high level of abstraction, taking a social point of view on 
questions of risk and poverty, and seeking to redistribute wealth using state powers 
over capital. This form of state was articulated in conjunction with old labour 
socialist and Marxist approaches and labelled 'Levellers' by the Commission. For 
the Commission, this approach was no longer feasible in the global market, given 
the changes in the labour force that enabled more women and other flexible labou r 
to take part, and given the changes in the relationship between the state and the 
citizen. Instead, the Commission (1994: 96) offered a new approach termed the 
'investors strategy' based on "a new combination of active welfare state, reformed 
labour market. and a strong community." The idea behind this 'investors strategy' is 
that social justice can be achieved through the capacity to exploit economic 
opportunities. Whereas the welfare state had been characterised by a focus on the 
spatial distribution of capital, and had sought to incorporate people into society by 
redistributing capital and thus also power, this 'strategy' focuses on the temporal 
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dimension. It looks at how the individual might be put into a position to exploit the 
opportunities that arise in the market. It attests to a resuscitation of the ideas 
current in Victorian Britain, but where the Victorian ideology emphasised pooling 
capital in spaces like co-operatives or friendly societies, this new ideology sees that 
capital is already being pooled in the state but seeks to revitalise spaces in civil 
society. Hence it focuses on community and citizen participation. The subject 
becomes 'free standing' through policies that encourage seizing opportunities, 
policies like 'welfare to work' (Hewitt, 2002) or 'lifelong learning' (Griffin, 1998, 
1999). 
The Third Way, as envisioned by Giddens (1998,2000), takes up this idea as a 
renewal of social democracy in response to change (2000: 27). Giddens (1998, 
2000) presents the Third Way as a modernising ideology, repairing and reforming 
organisations and institutions to meet the demands of a changed world. It is about 
revising and rethinking policies that were damaged by the break between social 
democracy and Marxism (2000: 28). The Third Way sets itself the task of 
"reconstructing and renewing public institutions" in response to globalisation (2000: 
29), on the basis that this is necessary in order to "re-establish continuity, re-create 
social solidarity and repair the civic order" (Sevenhuijsen, 2000). Responsibility is a 
central concern in Giddens' Third Way, and is strongly linked with another the 
concept of freedom conceived as autonomy. Connecting responsibility with 
autonomy rather than justice reflects the demise of socialist and incorporationist 
ways of thinking, and the trend that Rose (1999) identifies as a responsibilisation 
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through autonomisation and self government. As Giddens puts it, this is about 'life 
politics' rather than 'emancipatory politics': 
Life politics is about how we should respond to a world in which tradition and 
custom are losing their hold over our lives, and where science and technology 
have altered much of what used to be 'nature'. These transformations nearly all 
raise value or ethical questions, but not only to do with social justice (2000: 40). 
While issues of justice continue to arise, in the Third Way they no longer arise 
within a fixed moral universe where the idea of social emancipation through a 
paternalist systemic steering make sense. Instead both ethical and moral issues 
become thematic, that is, asking questions about, to use Giddens's (2000: 39, 40) 
own example, both the value assigned to, and the proper role of, older people in 
society and the morality of redistributing resources to those in society's care. The 
ascendance of ethical questions relativises issues of morality and justice without 
abandoning them. The question for the Third Way is how to bring both of these 
together, and how to encourage people to act in responsible ways in their freedom 
and autonomy while doing so in the light of principles of equality, social cohesion, 
social justice and emancipation. Giddens's (1998, 2000) answer is to foster 
autonomous responsible action based on capability and social capital (Prabhakar, 
2002) and through a new welfare contract. In effect, people's capacity and freedom 
to contribute to their well being and fulfilment themselves (Giddens, 2000: 49, 87­
89), and: 
... 'no rights without responsibilities'. Those who profit from social goods should 
both use them responsibly, and give something back to the wider social 
community in return (Giddens, 2000: 52). 
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Essentially, Giddens (1998, 2000) wants to enhance people's capacity to adopt 
their responsibilities themselves and for them to do so within an institutional 
framework which balances the responsibilities of different actors in different 
spheres in a fair and just way. 
Ideological constructions at the end of the twentieth century: New Labour, 
New Opportunity? 
By coupling responsibility with capability and connecting justice with the exploitation 
of economic opportunities, this framework incorporates forms of knowledge that 
further the process of responsibilising the individual. Under this framework, the 
individual is supposed to learn to take responsibility for themselves, read as the 
ability to seize opportunities in the market and civil society. Using this idea, 
managerialism has been continued and sharpened to bring social policy right down 
to the local level where people are at most risk of poverty (Turner and Balloch, 
2001). This has been achieved through the use of re-badged forms of means 
testing such as Tax Credits (McLaughlin, Trewsdale and McCay, 2001), an 
emphasis on social inclusion through paid employment (Levitas, 1998), a focus on 
partnership (Ambrose, 2001, Turner and Balloch, 2001), and a reshaping of social 
work into what Jordan (2000) has termed the ltutelary bureaucracy'. The focus that 
partnership discourses bring on networks has been institutionalised alongside 
governance, a statist model of hierarchy, and the New Right's market focused 
managerial model of welfare provision (Newman, 2002: 105, 106). Moreover, this 
mode of governance appears utilitarian and managerial insofar as it is based on a 
selection of 'what works' (Ambrose, 2001, Rouse and Smith, 2002) and exhorts 
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people to be realistic and ethical in acting to meet their responsibilities. However, it 
is the welfare subject who is exhorted to meet their responsibilities and is "is 
obliged to demonstrate that they are seeking to rejoin the labour nlarket, taking 
responsibility for their own 'individualised' form of welfare consumption, looking 
towards a traditional family network for (or to provide) welfare support, and/or 
adopting a specific sexual orientation" (Burden, Cooper and Petrie, 2000: 287-288) 
While managerialism represents an autonomising and responsibllising discourse, 
its method of dispersing power has been applied to communities and individuals "as 
partners in the prevention and solution of social problems through voluntary and 
community-based activity, self help and responsible lifestyle choices" (Newman, 
2002: 144). The welfare subject is no longer simply exhorted to be more 
autonomous and responsible; instead the use of such an array of policy measures 
to make her capable of being responsible, she is expected to take responsibility for 
herself and not look to the state for assistance should she fall on hard times. 
Among those who take this Third Way position, there has been a consensus that 
justice can be achieved by enhancing people's capability to be responsible for 
themselves in the market (Fitzpatrick, 1998: 29, Driver and Martell, 1998: 182). This 
contrasts with the politics of wealth redistribution, which is linked with the idea of 
de-commodifying the citizen, and off-setting capital's tendency to concentrate in the 
hands of the few (Fraser, 1997). Adopting this redistributionist politics entails an 
entanglement in the market by seeking to alter its conditions in the interests of the 
collective. But in the new consensus, the politics of redistribution have become 
unsustainable. Instead Blair understands "the basis of this modern civic society ... 
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as [an] ethic of mutual responsibility or duty. It is something for something. A 
society where we play by the rules. You only take out what you put in. That's the 
bargain" (Blair, 1997, quoted by Jones and Novak, 1999: 180). Thus the idea of 
justice for all has been pushed aside in favour of the good life for me (Jordan, 1998: 
32) and individual "[r]esponsibilities and moral cohesion have received an emphasis 
at least equalling that of rights" (Driver and Martell, 1998: 176). The basic idea 
underpinning this shift has been articulated as the 'post social' condition (Fraser, 
1997, Rose, 1999), and is that social integration is no longer of primary concern. 
The foclJs instead shifts to socialisation processes and the formation of personal 
characteristics that enable people to accept responsibility for themselves in the 
market. 
Communitarian ideas and the consensus around the idea that the market presents 
a route towards social justice enables New Labour to produce a politics suited to 
late modern and post modern times (Driver and Martell, 1998). As Driver and 
Martell (1998: 28) note, communitarianism "offers Labour modernizers' a political 
vocabulary which eschews market individualism, but not market capitalism; and 
which embraces collective action, but not the state", thus allowing New Labour to 
slip into a post-social environment. As Jordan (1998: 38-43) notes, situating justice 
in the market is based on a perspective that emphasises the freedom to enter into 
exchange relationships. This is to emphasise the temporal dimension of opportunity 
seizing rather than the spatial dimension of solidarity associated with continental 
Christian Democracy (1998: 38). The post social environment that New Labour 
align themselves with, is located within a national space, although it remains 
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blinkered in regard to its context. It emphasises flexibility and employability in the 
labour market, a strong work ethic, and a rendering of rights conditional on 
responsibilities (Dwyer, 1998). Each of these connects with people in a temporal 
sense. These policies build a capacity in benefits claimants to seize market 
opportunities as they arise, emphasises the benefit to society if everybody takes 
their opportunities and makes their contributions, and highlights the need to compel 
some people to seize their opportunities (DSS, 1998). In this sense New Labour's 
welfare reforms go beyond the social by emphasising the temporal inside the social 
domain of the nation state. This at a time when "international corporations are 
larger and stronger than nation states, where the division of labour over the 
production of most traded goods is global rather than local, and where First World 
countries are increasingly emerging as the centres for the financing of such 
production rather than the manufacture of these goods" (Jordan, 1998:43). This 
capacity to slip into a temporal way of thinking and evade spatial considerations 
allows New Labour to drive through a modernisation of governance aimed at 
improving effectiveness and efficiency in the interests of the consumer, and to 
adopt a post modern stance professing maturity and reflexivity in making 
considered decisions. The focus on enhancing the ability of people to help 
themselves and to take their opportunities legitimates a modernisation of services 
that seeks to decentralise power and to continue to pursue neo-liberal reform, all, 
we are told, in the interests of the customer (Newman, 2002, Jordan, 2000). 
Furthermore, by emphasising community, this strategy also emphasises networks 
in civil society as the appropriate locus for responsibility, thus shifting responsibility 
from an abstract state into a society that the state intelligently helps and promotes 
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through enabling, intervening, contracting and so on (Gilbert, 2002). In effect, 
market collectivism is used as a means of sharpening people's perception of their 
responsibilities in respect of welfare. 
Summary and conclusion: New Labour's discourse of 
responsibility 
In summary, the perception of problems posed in society has altered. Where once 
the problem was poverty and the stabilisation of society in its industrial context, now 
the problem is security and the stabilisation of society in its global context. The 
contexts in which these perceptions have been formed have themselves altered 
with the production of new kinds of knowledge and rationalities used to organise 
practices and organisations (Jessop, 2002). While both the ideologies and specific 
descriptions of context are open to dispute, constructions of responsibility are 
formed and developed that take cognisance of the situation and promote what are 
perceived to be appropriate practices and behaviours. 
As has been shown in this Chapter, the contexts and the relevant ideological 
constructions of responsibility were organised in a way that was mindful of the 
problem of poverty in the period from the mid nineteenth to late twentieth century 
and mindful of the problem of security since the late 1970s or early 1980s. Of 
course there have been many problems occupying the minds of British citizens in 
these periods, not least war, geo-political disputes, even the search for a cure for 
cancer and so on. The point is that the problem facing the people charged with 
organising society, those whose professional life is dedicated to this issue, and the 
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day-to-day experiences and perceptions of the people who perceive issues they 
feel their politicians should be prioritising, can be organised only very loosely. The 
problems perceived, and ideologies formed, in the period from the mid nineteenth 
to the late twentieth century can be organised around the problem of poverty to the 
extent that the construction of responsibility promoted in this period was supposed 
to address this problem. As I have shown, the responsibilities promoted through the 
poor house, the working men's associations, and the concept of liberal or duty 
individualism were all designed to promote participation in civil society and the 
market. As I have also shown, these initiatives were based on the idea that the 
individual can secure her own welfare herself through cooperation with a 
community, or by developing the traits of a liberal personality. As the situation 
changed, and the social came into focus as a discernable unit of analysis and 
society had certain properties which could themselves be manipulated using policy 
instruments, new constructions of responsibility were formulated that located duties 
with the individual and collective (Roche, 1992, Dwyer, 1998). The growth of 
knowledge about the nature of social organisations and the potential of collectivism 
gave rise to another ideology that placed responsibility primarily with the collective 
and gave new rights to the individual. While the perception of poverty altered, even 
if its nature did not, knowledge and ideology was produced to deal with poverty in 
an age of insecurity (Dean with Melrose, 1999). 
In line with this argument I have argued that poverty has been, since the late 
1970s, redefined in relation with security as the problem organising knowledge and 
ideology production. In relation to this argument I hold that the processes of 
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constructing a post-social and security state have been undergoing change since 
this period. In this context the New Right provided an ideology tailored to the 
purpose of securing the market in a global economy by promoting an 
individualisation of responsibility for welfare using neo-conservative concepts that 
safeguarded social values while responsibilising individuals, and by introducing 
market principles into welfare provision. A new construction of individualised market 
based responsibility for welfare was promoted. This construction was modified by 
New Labour. The neo-conservative ideas were reformulated using communitarian 
concepts and the neo-liberal arguments taken into a modernising social democratic 
language. This ideology continues to tackle the question of the security of the 
economy in its global environment, while the politics of redistribution is relegated to 
a shy second place. 
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Chapter 2: Social policy, responsibility, and the rise of an 
ethical sensibility 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1 I presented a reconstruction of ideological discourses in terms of how 
these discourses made use of the concept of responsibility. Through this 
reconstruction, it became clear that ideological discourses of welfare responsibility 
were, from the mid-nineteenth century, organised around the problem of poverty. 
However, since the late twentieth century the problem of security has become 
paramount. In this chapter, I focus on this more contemporary construction of the 
concept of responsibility around security. The purposes of this chapter are to 
describe how the discipline of social policy deals with responsibility, to review the 
relevant literature on responsibility as a concept, and to clarify the reasons why it is 
necessary to look more closely at this concept. 
I begin by looking at the processes of privatisation and responsibilisation as 
identified in social policy literature in a theoretically informed manner. By 
undertaking this review, I show how these processes are related with the rise of 
neo-liberal arguments, and with the wider process of the individualisation of the 
social. In order to show how this has occurred, I turn attention to empirical studies 
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of responsibility before returning to the existing theoretical literature on 
responsibility as it exists in social policy. I do this to highlight the concerns raised by 
the various contributors. However, by way of conclusion, I outline a framework for 
considering discourses of responsibility that I draw from Habermas (1990, 1995). 
These constructions are introduced as an integrated mechanism for dealing with 
the various aspects of discourses of responsibility identified in the social policy 
literature. 
Responsibility and society 
The first task here is to understand both the logic and meaning of the privatisation 
of welfare responsibility. The privatisation of responsibility for welfare is widely 
commented on in the social policy literature (Clarke and Newman, 1997, Goodin, 
1998, Gilbert, 2002), but precisely what privatisation means in terms of the reality of 
people's lives is the main concern of this literature review. In order to understand 
this process, I first outline a conceptual framework designed to sensitise analysis to 
the practical meaning of privatisation. This framework is then used to help 
comprehend analyses drawn from research literature. 
As I have shown, the relationship between society and responsibility centres on the 
power and complexity of the commonly held system of norms. These norms can 
esteem and reward or denigrate and punish, certain ways of performing ones' will 
responsibly (Honneth, 1995). As Doyal and Gough (1991: 93) point out, norms 
define the value of duties to the extent that the individual's contribution has a value 
for those who expect this duty to be carried out and therefore have a right to expect 
74 
it. If this duty is valued, then the person performing it has a right to the goods and 
services she requires to perform it. Conversely, if this duty is not valued, then those 
expecting it to be carried out would have little interest if the performer suddenly 
found she could no longer fulfil her duty (Doyal and Gough, 1991: 94). Hence, at 
minimum, the distribution of responsibilities in society is ordered according to a 
system of recognition by which the value of a contribution to social goals is defined 
as worthy of esteem and regard (Honneth, 1995). She who accepts valued 
responsibilities is provided with some degree of positive support, which enables her 
to continue to fulfil her duties, and she is provided with the forbearance to continue 
without impediment, while she whose responsibilities are not valued need to find 
new modes of contribution (Doyal and Gough, 1991: 95). Furthernl0re, the 
pursuance of a socially valued duty may require more resources than minimal 
support and forbearance will allow, and may require the individual to be fully 
committed to performing her duties to the best of her abilities (1991: 99). In such 
cases, the individual has a right "to the goods and services necessary for their best 
effort to be a realistic possibility", which puts a duty on the collective to cater for 
their needs within the confines of what is reasonable in her society (1991: 100). 
Therefore, the value of a contribution is not fixed by some social or institutional 
order existing independently of people, nor is it based on some objective value of 
the outcome. Rather, it is the product of cultural and social struggle (Woodward, 
2002). This value is directly related with achievements or goals that are sanctioned 
as worthy of recognition, respect, esteem (Honneth, 1995: 121-129) forbearance, 
capital, and support (Doyal and Gough, 1991: 98-102). Through an analysis of the 
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kinds of goals that are sanctioned, the sorts of responsibilities deemed acceptable, 
and the way resources are channelled to these responsibilities, it is possible to gain 
an understanding of practical meaning of welfare responsibilities today. In the 
following sections I will use this framework to gain such an understanding. 
New Labour's social policy and responsibility 
Within academic social policy, two related lines of analysis are used to understand 
the transfer of responsibility from the state to civil society and the individual, the 
trajectory of neo-liberal reforms and the individualisation process. I n the following 
sections, these two modes of privatisation are analysed in turn using concepts 
drawn 'from the foregoing discussion. 
Neo-liberalism and the privatisation of welfare responsibility 
While neo-liberal discourses take a variety of forms (Levitas, 1998, Waddan, 2003, 
Wainwright, 2003), the basic tenets of neo-liberalism are concerned with the 
minimisation of the role of the state in society, and the promotion of the market as 
the central mode of social and societal co-ordination (Leach, 2002: 191-195). 
Academic social policy has tracked the increasing hold that neo-liberalism has on 
welfare policies, by exploring the impact of this discourse on the welfare state 
(Pierson, 1998, Lund, 2002), the welfare professional (Clarke and Newman, 1997), 
and the welfare recipient (Lund, 1999, Dean, 2001a, Taylor-Gooby, 2001). The 
focus of this section is on how neo-liberal discourses serve to privatise welfare 
responsibility and the practical implications of this privatisation. To illustrate this, I 
76 
will look in particular at investigations of long-term care for the elderly and 
vulnerable and at pensions' reforms. 
In an examination of the transfer of responsibility for the long-term care of the 
elderly, frail, and vulnerable from the state to the individual, Player and Pollock 
(2001) discuss the rise of market collectivist discourses and their implications for 
these vulnerable people. Since the implementation of the post-war welfare 
settlement, long-term care has been an area "of rhetorical flourish, conceptual 
uncertainty and inconsistent resource allocation" (2001: 223). The privatisation of 
long-term care took place in the wake of cuts in NHS funding for the provision of 
beds for the frail and elderly under a Conservative government, heavily influenced 
by New Right thinking (see discussion in Chapter 1 above). The impact of these 
cuts was initially mitigated by the voluntary sector's response which was to secure 
resources from local DSS offices (2001: 234). However, a gap appeared in the 
provision of care "to residents in local authority Part III homes, or NHS institutions, 
or for community services delivered to people in their homes. This led the local and 
health authorities to encourage people to opt for private care subsidized by the 
social security budget" (2001: 235). This in turn paved the way for private 
companies to enter into this market. The introduction of such companies into the 
long-term care sector was consolidated by New Right efforts to channel funding in 
such a way that the voluntary sector was squeezed out of this market (2001: 239, 
240), and incentivising local authorities to encourage people to use private 
companies (2001: 240). The market in long-term care has been consolidated in the 
hands of the private sector over the past decade (2001: 241-248). For Player and 
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Pollock (2001), these trends mean that the responsibility for the provision of care 
for the elderly has become fragile. The companies providing care have shown 
themselves to be unattractive investments (2001: 248-249). The standards of 
homes expected of providers is seen as curtailing company profits so that the 
"danger is that residential care standards will suffer" (2001: 249), while increases in 
the cost of providing qualified staff "may also impinge on staff hours per resident 
that companies are willing to provide" (2001: 249). In addition there are problems of 
staff turnover and indifferent staff created by the industry's use of casual labour 
who are paid a minimum wage, and who are not provided with the benefits of sick 
payor training (2001: 250). 
This adds up to a valorisation of the way responsibilities are secured through 
market companies on the one hand, while conflating "significant aspects of 
vulnerability for an already vulnerable group" (2001: 248) on the other. While 
private companies are seen as behaving responsibly by seeking to secure a profit 
by providing care to the elderly, this vision of responsible behaviour is of a minimal 
sort. A contradiction lies in the fact that it is not seen as irresponsible for these 
companies to make a profit by paying their staff the wages that would make caring 
for the elderly to the best of their abilities a realistic and rewarding pursuit. 
A similar process can be seen in the context of pensions (Ward, 2000, Ring, 2002). 
Again the narrative begins with the lack of a clear policy framework (Ward, 2000: 
158-162) compounded by some popular myths that do little more than confuse the 
situation (2000: 163-165). Added to this is contradictory government thinking on 
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economics which, for example, urges people to take out personal pensions and 
contract out of the state earnings-related provision (SERPS) by encouraging 
insurance companies to offer private pensions to people on low pay with "a one-off, 
unrepeatable, backdated special offer with government backing" (2000: 160). The 
contradictory element relates to how such rebates actually cost more in terms of 
National Insurance than would otherwise have been the case (2000: 161). The New 
Labour government has continued with the Conservative government's 
liberalisation of pension provision by abolishing SERPS and replacing it with the 
State Second Pension (S2P), contracting out provision of this pension to the private 
insurance industry, and encouraging people earning more than £9,500 "to contract 
out of the S2P through membership of an occupational, personal or SHP 
(Stakeholder Pension) scheme" (2000: 166). At the same time, New Labour have 
introduced a Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG, or 'guarantee credif), which I 
"aimed at the very poorest pensioners, is effectively increased income support. For 
those unable to build up any or insufficient S2P benefit and/or private pension, the 
MIG will 'kick in' to provide baseline support" (Ring, 2002: 554). 
In terms of responsibility, this means that responsibility for pension provision is 
increasingly transferred to private companies in the market. This means that "for 
the majority of those whom the government is concerned to help, this will be 
publicly financed, at a higher cost and with less efficiency than if it was publicly 
provided, through NI rebates, collected by the state and passed on to the private 
providers" CVVard, 2000: 178, emphasis in original). Moreover, the provision of 
private insurance becomes ever more precarious as the insurance industry moves 
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towards greater segmentation of customers and the unpooling of risks in a highly 
competitive n1arket, forcing both the insured and insurer Uto engage in risky 
behaviour with immoral consequences" (Ericson, Barry and Doyle, 2000: 537). 
Overall, as Ring (2002) has shown, New Labour's pension policy institutionalises 
'contractual' obligations which, in practice, mean entrenching means-testing and 
diminishing the meaning of social rights. As Ring (2002: 555, 556) points out, the 
problems with means-testing include the low take-up of benefits by those who are 
entitled, and the problem of disincentives. While the New Labour government 
exhorts people to take responsibility for their own pensions by saving 'enoughl for 
their retirement, and to carefully choose a pension scheme that will provide the 
pension the individual wants, if offers no real clues about what saving a 'sufficient' 
amount might mean. In effect, "you need to know what your current level of 
contributions is likely to provide in terms of pension at retirement" (2002: 560). The 
government seeks to achieve this objective by making people aware using 
projections based on current earnings, but as Ring (2002: 560, 561) notes, such 
projections "cannot convey the rationale behind these assumptions or all of the 
uncertainties that they mask." Similarly, to effectively engage in the activity of 
choosing a scheme that will provide the individual with the pension she wants, she 
would need an investor's expertise to properly appraise the risks and returns 
involved in her choice of a scheme (Kind, 2002: 561). She is expected to be 
responsible for her own pension and to act to secure a scheme that operates in her 
best interests. In this regard, Ring (2002: 565) discusses the government's 
promotion of 'decision trees', flow charts designed to help inform consumers in their 
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decision making processes, which may "replace the need for [professional] advice." 
Not only is the consumer supposed to make her own decisions regarding welfare, 
she is supposed to do so by herself, by becoming an expert herself, and without 
necessarily taking advice from recognised professionals. 
The effect of neo-liberal market discourses is to promote forms of responsibility 
taking that place responsibility with the individual in the market and with businesses 
in civil society (Smart, 1999). In effect, it is the individual who is expected to bear 
the burden of the risks associated with the privatisation of welfare provision, risks 
that imply she must bear the brunt of reductions in service quality (Player and 
Pollock, 2001) or bear the risk of making decisions about her welfare investments 
(Ring, 2002). Such a policy framework is problematic to the extent that those who 
do not accept responsibility are constructed as irresponsible even though there "are 
good reasons why some people do not appear to be behaving 'responsibly' in terms 
of private pension planning" (Rowlingson, 2002: 633). These reasons include the 
constraints people face in thinking about their future, the sense in which people 
plan their future based on their perceptions of those around them and the amount 
of security and resources that people command. Rowlingson's (2002, see also 
Taylor-Gooby, 2001) argument is that government policy, based on a mixture of 
incentives and rewards, is based on a misunderstanding of these reasons and 
casts people who do not take responsibility for their own pensions as irresponsible, 
when in reality people find it difficult to think about, plan, or act effectively to secure 
their future (Rowlingson, 2002). 
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Social policy and the individualisation of responsibility 
Underscoring these neo-liberal discourses is the social process of the 
individualisation of responsibility. Individualisation refers to the trend in modern 
societies in which patterns of identity formation increasingly centre on the individual 
and move away from traditional social systems. Bauman (1994: 144) understands 
individualisation as: 
[the] emancipation of the individual from the ascribed, inherited and inborn 
determination of his or her social character: a departure rightly seen as the most 
conspicuous and seminal feature of the modern condition ... 'individualisation' 
consists in transforming human (identity' from a 'given' into a task - and 
charging the actors with the responsibility for performing that task. 
Discussions of individualisation draw attention to two central issues. Writers like 
Habermas (1995) and Hon neth (1995) discuss individuation and the way people 
develop an individualised sense of themselves through socialisation processes. By 
contrast, Beck (1992) and Giddens (1994, 1998) develop a more formal and 
functionalist account of individualisation that articulates the way in which people are 
expected to deal with their identities and responsibilities as an individualised task. 
The individualised task is to work in return for which the individual is bestowed 
rights and responsibilities (Giddens, 1998, Levitas, 1998). Whereas, for Habermas 
(1995) and Honneth (1995), the task of individuation is to socialise people to 
develop the skills and abilities to make decisions about their own lives themselves. 
In effect, individualisation focuses on the systems that demand that people accept 
the responsibilities thrust upon them (Beck, 1992, Giddens, 1994, 1998), while 
individuation takes up the point of view of the individual who understands her own 
acceptance of responsibilities as her own individual achievement (Habermas, 1995, 
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Honneth, 1995). These twin conceptions are discussed in connection with lifelong 
learning (Edwards, Ranson and Strain, 2002) and welfare to work (Ferguson, 
2003). These frameworks draw attention to how the individualisation of 
responsibility is being propounded, while the corresponding individuation process is 
neglected. 
In a study of UK and European academic and policy literature on 'lifelong learning', 
Piper (2000: 535) finds that 4individuals' and 'people' are constructed differently. 
The individual is constructed as a phenomenon that is more frequently acted upon, 
but where she is the actor, she is seen as having "abilities and responsibilities" 
(2000: 524) and is exhorted to play her "part in underpinning the UK government's 
principles for maintaining competitiveness" (2000: 525). For Piper (2000: 523), this 
appears to support the thesis that contemporary discourses of individualisation and, 
by implication, responsibility, are constructed "to the individual" because these 
discourses are structured in order to persuade the individual to act as an agent and 
to accept her responsibilities. Furthermore, "while individuals are expected to take 
rational decisions, be responsible citizens and stage their own lives, they have to 
do what they are enabled to do by someone else" (2000: 526). The individual is 
called upon to be responsible at the same time as this responsibility is enabled by 
government policy. Thus, individualisation is a process of creating a policy climate 
wherein the subject is called on to be responsible and orient her life accordingly. 
Such findings are in keeping with Edwards, Ranson and Strain's (2002) analysis of 
policy discourses of lifelong learning which, they argue, serve to structure a context 
f:n which the individual is supposed to adapt to risk and uncertainty through 
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continuous learning, rather than supporting capacity to engage with the processes 
of change that learning is supposed to respond to (see also Cunningham and 
Lavalette, 2004). 
The New Labour government's use of a primarily functional meaning of 
individualisation is well captured by Prideaux (2001), who argues that New Labour's 
discourse takes some of its cues from American functionalist theories that have 
long been discredited in sociology, and on Giddens's (1994) concept of the 
'autotelic self. Pridea ux (2001) argues that these concepts are brought together 
under the thesis "that a morally acceptable social generation of 'motivation' ­
through the provision of 'opportunity' - can sufficiently fuel and satisfy 'aspiration' 
so as to inspire a renewed social order based on feelings of 'obligation' alongside 
'responsibility'" (2001: 86). In effect, the argument that Prideaux (2001) believes to 
be central to New Labour's discourse is that the autotelic opportunity seizing person 
can be motivated by the opportunities that are presented to her. She can aspire to 
actualise her own will, and this aspiration can help generate a social order 
structured around feelings of obligation and responsibility. According to this logic, 
these feelings of obligation and responsibility would result from the way the person 
seizes her opportunities because, since she is autotelic, and therefore orientated 
towards self-actualisation, she has "no obsessive desire to dominate others" (2001 : 
87). Because she is only interested in actualising her own will, a will she can realise 
by seizing her opportunities, she has no reason to be jealous of others who also 
seek to realise their own will. Thus, her own pursuit of the good can coincide with 
the good for all because, having realised her own projections of the good for 
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herself, she becomes interested in helping others realise their own vision of the 
good (2001: 87). This motivation is to be secured through policies that expect the 
individual to adapt to the provision of new opportunities so that the desired 
individual characteristics would develop. 
On Prideaux's (2001) own analysis, setting out a policy context in which people are 
supposed to adapt by using or developing the relevant characteristics deemed by 
policy makers to be pertinent to them, actually works to further stigmatise and 
demoralise benefits recipients rather than to provide a route out of unemployment. 
Therefore, this policy initiative represents a mode of contractualising duty (Gilbert, 
2002, Rose, 1999). 
Popular perceptions of the privatisation of welfare 
Since, as shown above, New Labour's policies serve to valorise people seizing 
opportunities in the market and securing their own welfare in civil society, the 
question of how people perceive this privatisation of welfare responsibilities needs 
to be dealt with. Responses to this question have been formulated using both 
quantitative (Hills and Lelkes, 1999) and qualitative (Dwyer, 2000) research 
methods. 
Hills and Lelkes (1999) have used data from the British Social Attitudes Survey to 
show some of the changing and competing ideas about responsibility that people 
hold. First of all, they highlight a widespread agreement that the gap between rich 
and poor is too large and that it is the government's responsibility to narrow this gap 
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(1999: 5), although they also note that people are less inclined to agree that the 
government should tax the better off to spend on the poor. However, respondents 
tended to express worries about the kind of people the welfare state produces, 
expressing the feeling "that welfare benefits can dis~ourage people from seeking 
work" (1999: 9). Such worries, as Hills and Lelkes (1999: 8, 9) show, have been 
steadily increasing amongst the populations surveyed. This feeling was reiterated in 
the survey data in perceptions that "most unemployed people could find a job if they 
really wanted one" and the feeling that "people on the dole are fiddling the system 
in one way or another" (1999: 10). Moreover, when the concern with fraud and the 
perception that people are eligible for benefits they fail to claim are taken together, 
it becomes apparent that "there is a widespread perception that too many people 
who are eligible are missing out and that too many people who are ineligible are 
getting away with it" (1999: 10). 
This data suggests that people hold a contradictory set of ideas about the sort of 
person generated through dependence on the welfare state, and the role of the 
state in society. On the one hand, people feel that the state should work to 
redistribute wealth, while on the other, people express anxiety about the 
consequences of such redistribution, in particular, the personality characteristics 
thus promoted. Hills and Lelke (1999) also found that people favour the state giving 
equal payments of unemployment benefit and retirement pension to everybody 
regardless of current earnings, with over half supporting giving disability benefit to 
all disabled people and 45% supporting such an approach in respect of child 
benefit. Thus people appeared to take a view in opposition to the government with 
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regard to targeted benefits in the context of unemployn1ent, pension and disability 
benefits, but appeared to support such targeting in the context of child benefit, 
particularly with respect to low paid workers (1999: 15). Similarly, those responding 
to the survey tended to support the targeting of benefits on single mothers who take 
up paid employment (1999: 16). In effect, people appeared to support both 
universal and targeted provision of state welfare. 
Dwyer (1998, 2000) has also investigated this repositioning of the normative 
understanding of welfare using qualitative methods. Dwyer (2000) introduces the 
views of welfare users to this debate, presenting these views under three broad 
headings; provision, conditionality, and membership. Each of these categories 
identifies a normative issue. Provision confronts the issue of "the appropriate role of 
various agencies in providing for the welfare needs of citizens" (2000: 125). 
Conditionality deals with the idea "that eligibility to certain basic, publicly provided, 
welfare entitlements should be dependant on an individual first agreeing to meet 
particular compulsory duties or patterns of behaviour" (2000: 129). Finally, under 
the category of membership, Dwyer (2000: 171) "consider[s] the ground rules which 
are seen by welfare service users as being pertinent for individuals to be included 
in, or excluded from, arrangements for the collective provision of welfare benefits 
and services." In his analysis of these issues, Dwyer (2000) identifies a similar 
mixture of discourses as identified by Hills and Lelke (1999). 
Firstly, on the level of provision, Dwyer (2000: 192) finds that users of welfare 
services supported the view "that the state should continue to have a centrally 
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important role in meeting future welfare needs," The conception of the centrality of 
this role was tempered by an awareness that "social citizenship provides no more 
than a universally available guaranteed minimum of welfare, a minimum that is 
subject to constant redefinition and one which appears to be increasingly subject to 
reduction" (2000: 126). In short, the users informing Dwyer's (2000) study 
supported the combination of a strong state and a free market in the provision of 
welfare by combining a sense of the ethics involved in the individual realising the 
good for herself, and the morality of a collectivist and universalistic approach that 
gives rights of redress to the vulnerable and those in need. 
Secondly, on the level of conditionality, the users participating in Dwyer's (2000) 
study were acutely aware of the situations where conditionality might be applied. 
The idea that services might be linked with behavioural expectations was strongly 
resisted in the context of healthcare provision. However, conditionality was 
supported in relation to housing, and substantially supported in relation to social 
security. The link between behavioural responsibilities and welfare benefits was 
construed in such a way that the interests of the individual could be promoted. This 
implied protecting her basic rights in the context of health, balancing the interests of 
the 'nuisance' tenant with those of her neighbours in housing, and promoting the 
interests of the claimant in social security. Dwyer's (2000) study shows that welfare 
service users carefully weighed moral with ethical arguments. He shows how the 
interests of everybody are balanced against the interests of the individual. 
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Finally, in relation to membership, Dwyer (2000) notes the continuing relevance of 
'community' to discussions of welfare. In specific, he notes the connection between 
membership and conditionality and how exclusionary arguments draw on 
arguments similar to those citied in support of conditional welfare rights. More 
importantly here, Dwyer (2000) discerns how: 
[a] substantial number of users also appear to believe that it is reasonable that 
an individual should accept certain communally defined responsibilities before 
enjoying the benefits of any of the welfare provisions that a given community 
may bestow on its members (2000: 188). 
Such arguments draw on exclusive ideas of shared visions of the good. This was in 
contrast with more universalistic and moral visions expressed by some informants 
that "tended to stress universalistic justifications of a guaranteed base line of 
welfare provisions available for all" (2000: 189). 
These studies demonstrate how the norms connected with responsibility that 
organise social integration are increasingly based on a combination of ethical and 
moral discourses. While Hills and Lelkes (1999) show that concerns about the 
individual securing her own welfare herself have grown, albeit set alongside moral 
discourses advancing redistributivist arguments, Dwyer (2000) shows how these 
arguments are combined in complex ways depending on the context in question. 
Here we see how the connection between people's reflections on the norms 
organising their world and their personal experiences of the reality of their lives, 
enables people to understand the phenomenon of responsibility in complex ways. 
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The objective of this work is to further explore these connections by addressing the 
concept of responsibility itself. 
How do people accept their responsibilities? 
At this point it is necessary to investigate what the literature says about how people 
actually understand and accept their responsibilities. Leaving aside wider social 
theoretical issues about stimulating a responsible motivation using different kinds of 
social policies, we may seek answers to questions such as the following: How is 
responsibility constructed by people in contemporary British society? To what 
extent is responsibility socially constructed? To what extent is it individually held? 
The existing literature presents relatively few answers to such questions. 
Finch and Mason (1993), in their study of responsibility among kin networks, have 
explored how people reconcile their personal interests with family norms and come 
to accept family responsibilities. In so doing, their study demonstrates the socially 
negotiated and constructed nature of accepting responsibility. In their analysis, they 
identify four aspects to the process of socially constructing responsibility. 
The first aspect of the construction of responsibility that Finch and Mason (1993: 
Chapter 2) identify, surrounds the process of reciprocating exchanges of help and 
support. Central to this is the idea of Ilia proper balance' between giving and 
receiving" (1993: 58); that relationships involving exchanges of help are considered 
appropriate amongst kin networks, and that these exchanges are organised to 
maintain a proper balance to the relationship (1993: 58). Finch and Mason (1993) 
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identify a range of sub-processes that operate around this process. Their point is 
that fan1i1y responsibilities help integrate family members and enable members to 
protect or promote a sense of solidarity based on how they treat one another. 
The second aspect to constructing family responsibility centres on the process 
through which obligations are developed, that is, processes of negotiation (1993: 
Chapter 3). By looking at family obligations as the outcome of negotiation 
processes, Finch and Mason (1993) focus on the structures of these processes to 
explain variations "in the extent to which people - even within the same family - get 
involved in helping their relatives, and acknowledge responsibilities towards them" 
(1993: 61). Finch and Mason (1993) argue that through negotiation, people create 
and develop their commitments to one another and therefore that responsibility is a 
socially constructed phenomenon. 
The third cultural logic Finch and Mason (1993: Chapter 4) identify, arises from the 
products of negotiation as the meanings of responsibilities constructed through 
negotiation. They focus on excuses as a vehicle to help understand the 
"justificatory accounts which get deployed within negotiations, and how legitimacy 
gets constructed within that context" (1993: 98). Through their analysis, Finch and 
Mason (1993: 125) find that the legitimacy of justificatory accounts does matter to 
people. Moreover, the process of justifying the acceptance or avoidance of 
responsibility has implications for one's moral standing or reputation. 
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This gives rise to the fourth cultural logic (1993: Chapter 5) which is concerned with 
the moral dimension of how the individual manages their moral identity or 
reputation in the family. On this level, Finch and Mason (1993) argue that 
reputations "provide the basis on which exchanges of assistance can be 
negotiated" and therefore "provide a structure for negotiations about assistance 
within kin groups" (1993: 159, emphasis in original). 
This study shows how responsibilities are constructed on the basis of rules about 
the proper balance of responsibilities within family networks. Against these 
background rules, responsibilities are constructed through processes of negotiation 
that take cognisance of people's positions within the kin network, and their ability to 
contribute to the task of securing responsibilities. These negotiation processes are 
oriented towards producing tasks and responsibilities that are both justifiable, 
maintaining balance within relationships, and legitimate. Finally, knowledge about 
someone's acceptance or otherwise of responsibilities is attached to these 
individuals in the form of their moral reputation in the family. The key implication of 
Finch and Mason's (1993) study is that responsibility is constructed in a local way, 
specific to the particular family network, the relationships operative within this 
network, and the kinds of tasks that family members can legitimately be expected to 
perform. 
In their study of the 'gendered moral rationalities' used by lone-parents, Duncan 
and Edwards (1999) uncover the 'socially negotiated' and 'socially patterned' 
rationalities that people use to position themselves in a moral way in relation to 
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social norms. They build on Finch and Mason's (1993) insight into the negotiations 
involved in constructing task related responsibilities. Their analysis of interviews 
with lone mothers identifies three different kinds of moral rationalities. These 
rationalities model "the key variations and features of the conceptual relationship 
between motherhood and paid work" (1993: 120). They are methodological 
constructs that are supposed to map the modes by which lone mothers rationalise 
the moral decisions they make about motherhood in the capitalist market. Duncan 
and Edwards (1999: 120,121) map these modes as Weberian ideal types, that is, 
in terms of the goal or ideal of: 
• being a mother who "gives primacy to the moral benefits of physically caring for 
their children themselves over and above any financial benefits of undertaking 
paid work" (1999: 120); 
• integrating mother with worker so that "lone mothers see financial provision 
through employment as part of their n10ral responsibilities towards their children" 
(1999: 120); 
• being a worker who gives "primacy to paid work for themselves separate to their 
identity as mothers" (1999: 120). 
Using these identity orientations, Duncan and Edwards (1999) map some of the 
topography of lone parents' discourses. The point they make is that lone mothers 
make use of a particular kind of rationality! a form of moral reasoning. This moral 
reasoning is individually held and socially constructed through relations with kin, 
locality and national community, and this rationality provides a greater amount of 
explanatory power for the behaviour of lone parents than conceptions of the lone 
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parent as a calculative actor as assumed in policy discourse (Duncan and Edwards, 
1999). Therefore, while lone mothers accept their responsibilities as individuals, 
they understand the process of negotiating their responsibilities as obtained 
through negotiation with their own family, local social networks, or national policy 
frameworks. 
Because they identify 'gendered moral rationalities' using a methodology that 
constructs these rationalities as ideal types, Duncan and Edwards (1999) are 
insensitive to moral rationalities that might exist outside the purview of this 
framework. This obtains in spite of the insight they gain into how lone mothers 
construct their responsibilities. Therefore, while Duncan and Edwards (1999) 
expand on Finch and Mason's (1993) work on the social construction of 
responsibility, neither of these studies systematically address the rationalities 
people use in acting to realise their responsibilities. 
Responsibility, as we have seen, is socially constructed against the background of 
rules, and through a process of negotiation (Finch and Mason, 1993). People 
negotiate their responsibilities within their own life context by engaging with other 
individuals as well as local and national discourses (Duncan and Edwards, 1999). 
The objective of this study is to expand on these insights by investigating the 
structure of discourses of responsibility and how people are currently using them. 
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Critical commentaries on New Labour's reforms 
While empirical studies have not contributed to the understanding of the actual 
rationalities people use to deal with their responsibilities, social policy 
commentaries are replete with arguments about how moral constructions are, 
under New Labour, sidelined in favour of ethical constructions (Levitas, 1998, 
Jordan, 1998). In the following, I focus on a few seminal examples as a way of 
exploring this issue. I begin with Jordan (1998), Lister (2001), Taylor~Gooby (2001), 
Fitzpatrick (1998), and Levitas (1998) to identify the nleaning of this shift. I then 
discuss Le Grand (1997), Hoggett (2001), and Dean's (2002) contributions of 
systematic ways of addressing this issue. 
Jordan (1998) offers a nuanced analysis of the contradictions in the moral order 
developed in what he calls the 'Blair/Clinton orthodoxy'. He (1998: 79-82) argues 
that the correspondence generated between rights and civic duties or obligations 
made by New Labour "is quite misleading" because "[t]he liberal theory of 
citizenship insists that fundamental rights are only to be suspended for the most 
serious offences, and then only after careful judicial consideration" (1998: 81). The 
very idea behind liberalism has been the separation of moral obligations from 
freedoms in order to enter into contracts in civil society and discuss common 
interests in the public sphere (Habermas, 1989). The connection between rights 
and duties is a connection that is made in the communitarian critique of liberalism 
and which flies in the face of the careful separation of rights from duties made in 
liberalism (Jordan, 1998: 81,82). So, inferring from Jordan's (1998) analysis, the 
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connection between rights and responsibilities is an example of what Bauman, 
(2001: 140) describes as a frame breaking moral framework: 
the fragility of [social and communal] bonds, their in-built transience and 'until­
further-noticeness', coupled with temporariness of commitment and revocability 
of obligations, that constitutes the new frame (if perpetual frame-breaking can 
be called a frame) of power relationships. 
The connection between rights and responsibilities made by New Labour breaks 
the rules of liberalism to select particular groups of people (breaking the impulse 
towards anonymity and unconditional rights) who are burdened with restrictive 
obligations (breaking the rule of weak conditional duties). Added to this is the 
temporary nature of some social rights and the 'revocability' of the government's 
duties towards the individual if they fail to observe their duties to the government, 
and so for example, receipt of social security benefit is predicated on the recipient 
searching for work. The contradictions that Jordan (1998) goes on to identify 
provide further substance to Bauman's (1993,2001) theses. The new power 
relationships that are formed under the ambivalence, temporariness and 
revocability of moral commitment and obligation are relations focused on the poor. 
He highlights how globalisation has meant that "[g]overnments have lost the power 
to compel mobile factors; but they can now compensate themselves by coercing 
immobile ones." The immobile are the people "who cannot shift themselves or their 
resources to other countries" by use of "a double dose of their authority" (Jordan, 
1998: 82). 
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Finally, Jordan (1998: 83) identifies how the concept of the moral is a truncated 
one, based "on the idea of a club" or small voluntary association. But his charge 
against the new orthodoxy is that it effectively misunderstands the role of 
government. It imposes duties on society in order to help reinforce society's social 
glue when it is the quality of the glue (re)produced in civil society that is at issue. 
Political authority is no substitute for societal norms (1998: 83). But the politicians 
are imposing a morality they see as good for the society, one that will/shore up' (to 
use Etzioni's (1995) imagery) the cement of society, when what may be lacking is a 
social and moral point of view capable of taking the place of redistribution in forging 
social norms. Underscoring this is the sense that the challenge for morality is to 
take the social point of view (Habermas, 1990), so the challenge for government is 
to be there for its citizens and not imposing conditions on how it accepts its duties 
and responsibilities. 
The concern here is that the displacement of justice and the social in national 
welfare states in favour of the promise that social justice can be achieved through 
competition in the global market, places disproportionate risks and burdens on the 
poor and immobile. Lister (2001) admits her feeling of ambivalence towards this 
shift. The shift away from taking a social and structural perspective on inequalities 
has led to a productive emphasis on the connections between apparently different 
issues. As Lister (2001) notes, "the breaking down of departmental boundaries 
rather than of structural divisions" (2001: 433) is "less threatening than and diverts 
;attention from the need for more systemic cultural change" (2001: 434). The real 
problem for Lister (2001: 428-430) lies with New Labour's tendency to woo rather 
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than lead the electorate, but she accepts that this approach does at least 
acknowledge the complexity of social divisions even if it fails to tackle them 
adequately. Taylor-Gooby (2001) is more critical, drawing attention to the 
ideological underpinnings of this relocation of justice. He uses qualitative and 
quantitative data to show how ideas of reflexivity in the risk society damages and 
obscures the interests of weaker members of society who are more vulnerable to 
risks and uncertainties. 
Underscoring the post social argument, that "the 'community' is now replacing the 
'social' as the n1ain point of reference" (Fitzpatrick, 1998: 16), is the diagnosis that 
the moral is being eroded. A similar line of argument is offered by Levitas (1998) 
who contends that "we are all Durkheimians now" by pointing out that the central 
concerns of the newly arising discourses are "social integration, solidarity and 
social cohesion" (1998: 178). The thrust of this argument is that in the face of social 
and moral disintegration, discourses that draw attention to basic ideas and morals 
that we can all share are being formulated, but at the expense of glossing over and 
suppressing conflict. This is a serious concern for those who wish to promote a 
more universal concept of responsibility because it implies that the social point of 
view, where issues are resolved in a socially relevant way is being eclipsed by a 
more personalised or group specific thinking. What is clear from Levitas' (1998) 
analysis is that morality in the Durkheimian hegemony is 'colloquially' understood 
as "an attitude ... a set of beliefs, precepts and behaviours we may individually and 
collectively choose to adopt and foster" (1998: 185). If moral and social points of 
view are eroded, then what takes their place is a morality truncated by what is good 
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for us. The morals that are thus collectivised are those that suit the needs desires 
and interests of people in the capitalist market and are not the social and moral 
issues of a principled justice. The 'colloquial' morality is a morality narrowed to 
comparisons made between the norms or values of people who share our interests 
in the market place. In effect, we are limited to norms that suit our purposes and 
that we want to foster. The challenge of morality is always to take a more social 
point of view and enter into conversations with others, to converse with the other of 
our reason, which amounts to considering an-other reason (Habermas, 1990, 
Bauman, 1993, 1995, Smart, 1999, see Chapter 3 below). 
Responsibility and empirically oriented theories in academic 
social policy 
The theoretical question about how people accept their responsibilities is currently 
being deliberated within social policy under the theme of individual agency (Le 
Grand, 1997,2003; Deacon and Mann, 1999; Taylor-Gooby, 2000; Hoggett, 2001; 
Greener, 2002). Le Grand (1997) discusses the shift nlade by policy makers from 
conceiving of state administrators, welfare professionals and taxpayers as either 
altruistic 'knights' interested in helping their fellow citizens, or passive and 
unresponsive 'pawns', to the idea that such people are closer to self-interested 
'knaves', Using this straightforward theory of agency, Le Grand (1997) draws 
attention to the possibilities of a more 'robust' policy framework that deals with 
people as both Knaves and Knights, thus supporting a public spirited knightly 
attitude while dealing constructively with self-interested knavish behaviour. In this 
way, Le Grand (1997: 690) envisages a social democracy that engages with 
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communitarian arguments for a reassertion of civic responsibility. Le Grand (2003) 
further develops this analytical framework by introducing the concept of 'queens' to 
distinguish an active and autonomous agent from the passive and constrained 
'pawn'. Using this expanded framework, Le Grand (2003) argues that New Labour's 
policy regime effectively transforms welfare providers from knights into knaves, and 
transforms welfare recipients from passive and powerless pawns into powerful free 
market queens. 
While Le Grand (1997, 2003) himself is less interested in how changes in policy 
frameworks effects individual motivation, and focuses instead on the justice and 
efficiency of the frameworks themselves, there is some debate about the existence 
of evidence in support of his thesis that social policy can shape responsible 
n10tivation. In a review that compares the literature on intrinsic value based 
motivation and instrumental rationally calculated motivation, Jones and Cullis 
(2003) draw attention to the situations in which increased 'knightly' behaviour is 
identified as an outcome of policy intervention. Among their findings is the 
observation that U[t]here is widespread support for the proposition that reduced 
welfare state spending, coupled with tax incentives, generates both reason and 
resource for private charitable donation" (2003: 532). In effect, a socially 
responsible behaviour can be, and has been, stimulated by social policies that have 
intervened by operating on the value of goods. 
T1he problem this poses, however, is that to argue that responsible behaviour is 
stimUlated by policy frameworks gives credence to all of those who would argue 
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that social policy has contributed to the formation, in benefits recipients, of an 
agency that can be described in terms of an active, free market, 'queen' (Le Grand, 
2003). This is a form of agency linked with a demoralisation of people (of welfare 
benefits recipients in particular) and a wider sense of post-en10tionalism (Rodger, 
2003, Mestrovic, 1997). The basis of this thinking is that people have become 
preoccupied with their own interests and desires as a result of the focus of 
individualising and responsibilising social policies. Countering such arguments, 
Dean (2003) argues that post-emotionalism amounts to a new myth that the 
responsibilisation of the individual will help generate 'savvy' 'heroic' consumers 
shaped by, and suited to, life in the 'risk society'. Dean (2003: 703, 704) counters 
this thesis by pointing to the lack of clear adherence among research informants to 
this heroic identity. Dean (2003, Dean and Rodgers, 2004) accepts that people's 
motivations are shaped in part by the wider policy context, but he also shows how 
people draw their discourses from wider conceptual frameworks than the purely 
self-interested nature of post-emotionalism would suggest. 
Conceptions of the wider conceptual frameworks from which people draw their 
understandings of responsibility are offered by Haggett (2001, see also Greener, 
2002) and Dean (2002). Haggett (2001) conceives of individual motivation in terms 
of a constructive connection between the individual's own emotional situation and 
societal discourses. He approaches motivation as based on a range of cornpeting 
and contradictory psychosocial states and constructs responsibility in relation to 
these states. Hoggett's (2001) approach sidelines an analysis of norms and 
discourse in favour of psychosocial constructions within the wider society. It is, in 
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effect, an alternative approach to the analysis of responsibility than the one adopted 
here and because this study is focused on discourses of responsibility, the 
approach offered by Hoggett (2001) was not pursued. 
Dean's (2002) work, however, is of particular interest here precisely because he is 
interested in the relationship between the repertoires used by people in relation to 
welfare and policy discourses, and because he develops an empirically oriented 
theory that is sensitive to moral responsibilities. Dean (2002) offers an interpretation 
of discourses of responsibility that he represents using the following diagram (figure 
2.1). The vertical axis represents a distinction between systemic and agential 
assumptions underpinning discourses of responsibility and the horizontal axis 
articulates a distinction between contractarian and solidaristic conceptions of 
citizenship: 
Figure 2.1 I nterpreting cultural discourses of responsibility 
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Source: Dean, 2002: 200. 
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To summarise briefly, Dean (2002, see also Dean and Doheny, 2001) understands 
quadrant A in terms of the rights of the individual to freedom from infringement, 
corresponding with duties that "arise from the need to ensure, as far as can 
reasonably be expected, that one's interests can be met without unfairly prejudicing 
the interests of other individuals" (2002: 200). Quadrant B articulates a "notion of 
responsibility that is essentially rational, reflexive and democratic" (2002: 200). 
Quadrant C is concerned with the perception that "[s]elf-interested behaviour in the 
absence of systemic self-regulating duties is likely to result in irresponsibility and, in 
this context, the function of the state relates not to the promotion of responsibility, 
but to the governance of irresponsibility" (2002: 201). Finally, quadrant 0 refers to 
the way "[r]esponsibility is constructed with reference to collective loyalties and 
traditions; to moral norms and shared values; to the necessary and incontestable 
expectations that arise 'fron1 membership of a particular community" (2002: 201). I 
would suggest, however, that in view of the systematic use of the concepts of ethics 
and moral used in this work, quadrant B is misnamed 'ethical responsibility'. The 
"rational, reflexive and democratic" concept that Dean (2002: 200) has in mind is 
closer to a moral and universal construction than an ethical concept where ethics is 
understood as the orientation towards the good life for the individual or community. 
Therefore, I submit that quadrant B be renamed 'moral responsibility' because it 
represents a way of constructing responsibility that equally is in the interests of 
everybody I which means one that is just and fair to each person's interests. 
Dean's (2002) taxonomy is a useful tool to help think about, and reconcile in some 
way, the different discourses of responsibility that New Labour draw on. It is a 
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framework that I will make use of later in an analysis of New Labour's discourses of 
responsibility in Chapter 5. However, like all models, the difficulty with this 
framework is that it encourages writers to rigidify discourses into entities when the 
important aspect of discourses about responsibility is, for Finch and Mason (1993). 
Duncan and Edwards (1999) and Dwyer (2000), that such discourses are fluid and 
open to negotiation. While I would not suggest that Dean (2002, with Melrose, 
1999) is guilty of this, it is however necessary to use a framework that attends to 
the anticipatory character of discourses of responsibility. It is for this reason that I 
take up Habermas's (1990, 1993, 1995) work. 
Deriving a theory of responsibility from Habermas 
In order to conceive of discourses of responsibility in such a way that a distinctively 
moral discourse can be identified alongside ethical, strategic and conformist 
discourses, I take up Habermas's (1995) theory of reflexive individuation. As was 
outlined in the introductory chapter, Habermas (1984) conceives of the relations to 
the personal sphere as taking three forms. Firstly, the individual can take a deceitful 
relation to their real feelings and emotions. She can hide her feelings from those 
around her, effectively using a form of strategic action to cynically manipulate them. 
Secondly, she can role play. This means that she can take up the role she is 
expected to occupy and play at being the person that she is 'supposed' to be. 
Thirdly, she can become clear on her own interests. desires, and motivations, and 
seek to realise the kind of person she wants to be. This is a highly reflective way of 
relating to the personal world where the person clarifies to themselves and others 
how the person they are condemned to be is reconciled with the person they want 
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to be and how the two people are critically interrogated in relation to their situation 
in socio-cultural history. 
In each of these positions, the individual accepts responsibility in a different way. In 
the first instance, the subject acts strategically and is more or less irresponsible in 
the sense of accepting less responsibility than other people could reasonably 
expect; the second approach is more a norm-directed sense of behaving 
responsibly where accepting responsibility simply means following social norms; 
the third is a more principled sense of critically examining incumbent responsibilities 
in light of motivations, interests, desires and cultural expectations. In the following, I 
will develop these three models further by drawing on Habermas's (1995) work 
where he takes up the social psychology of George Herbert Mead, to elaborate on 
a theory about how the individual comes to accept her responsibilities in light of her 
social context, the expectations of others and social norms. 
Before outlining this framework is it necessary to make two central points. Firstly, 
Habermas's (1984, 1990, 1995) framework is based primarily, not on subject 
perspectives, but on a learning theory. It takes the model of the growing child who 
develops an expanded cognitive map to deal with ever more complex social 
situations. The exact nature of the learning process is not important here, but in 
contrast to Habermas's critics who claim that this approach is too utopian and lacks 
critical capacity, the point needs to be· made that this framework outlines the 
various relationship with norms that the person develops. Taken in the context of a 
broader theory of communicative action, this framework articulates the possibility of 
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unfolding reason in a more moral and universal direction (see How, 2001). This 
model is in fact always critical in the sense that it shows that even the person who 
reflects on universality and morality can find herself taking on a strategic or 
calculative attitude in response to social norms that leave her with no other choice. 
Thus, this approach attends to the different ways in which people process the 
world, in constructive relationship with meaning and discourse. 
Habermas (1990, 1993, 1995) works out the structure of discourse in relation to 
context by tracing the way reason unfolds its moments as people engage with the 
everyday reality they face in an increasingly critical and reflective way. I reconstruct 
Habermas's (1990, 1995) work using a variety of substantive labels to refer to the 
ways in which individuals construct their responsibilities in relation to social norms. 
The labels I have chosen are egoist, conformer, reformer and reflector, and are 
used to highlight different ways or relating with social norms. While these are not 
concepts that Habermas himself would use or necessarily endorse, they are not 
intended to suggest a natural phenomenon, but only to operationalise concepts 
drawn from Habermas's (1990, 1995) work. 
The egoist 
In Habermas's (1990, 1995) framework, the person who acts egotistically to secure 
her own interests is a person who looks on other people as objects. Drawing on 
Mead, Habermas (1995: 175) conceives of this person as one who takes an 
objectifying attitude towards others, looking upon them as social objects that can be 
influenced by her own behaviour. In the context of more recent developmental 
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psychology, Habermas (1990: 148, 149) uses the notion of reciprocity to fill out this 
attitude. Here Habermas takes up research on the growing child who relates either 
with the demands of an adult, or the needs of equals, to model this attitude. On the 
one hand, the child, who is relating with the adult, responds to the demands of the 
authority figure either by seeking to avoid sanction or maximise the chances of 
securing rewards. On the other hand, the child, by looking on her peer as a social 
object, is able to use deception to secure her own interests. The point is that this is 
not a form of action that is governed by norms of any kind. By looking on others as 
social objects, she is able to deceive others as to her personal intentions, and to 
manipulate others in order to secure her own interests. In the case of the person 
relating with authority, responsibility is about obeying authority because it is a 
convenient way of receiving a reward or avoiding punishment (Habermas, 1990). 
For the more deceptive and strategic actor, responsibility has no social meaning, 
she is simply out to secure her own interests or desires. 
The conformer 
Whereas the egoist deals with others as objects, and therefore treats norms as a 
feature of the situation that can be drawn into rational calculations, norms take on a 
more social meaning where the person sees herself as "the social object of an 
other" (Habermas, 1995: 179). Again Habermas elaborates on two models of action 
here, both of which apply to a social conformer. The first model is about the person 
who conforms to the norms of her immediate social group because she accepts 
these norms as convention. The second model is about the person who conforms 
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to norms because she recognises and accepts the reasons for organising action in 
particular ways. 
The social conformer goes beyond looking on others as objects that can be 
manipulated. She sees that others have legitimate expectations of her because, 
looking on herself from their position, she can see what their rights and her duties 
are, or what their wishes or needs are, and how she can help achieve them. On this 
level, the individual begins to conform to the role expectations of those closest to 
her, and accepts these roles because they embody the duties and expectations that 
appear legitimate within her social group. To be responsible in light of social 
convention is to do one's duty because this duty is based on the legitimate 
expectations of real others, and to fulfil these duties is to conform to roles. This 
conformer buries the interests and desires so important to the egoist and "adheres 
to the conventions and practices of a specific group" I exercising her will in "blind 
subjugation to external controls" (1995: 182). 
The second kind of conformer does not merely conform to convention because that 
is what is expected of her. Her own personal interests and desires resurface, and 
she wants the reassurance of knowing that she has a free will and is capable of 
spontaneous action. She gains this reassurance by realising that her roles are not 
arbitrary but rather embody the "community will" (1995: 181). By taking this 
'community will' together with her own personal will, the conformer begins to see 
herself as a morally accountable person who has "the capacity either to follow or 
a+$:o to violate the expectations that are held to be legitimate" (Habermas, 1995: 
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181). Once she realises this, the meaning of responsibility changes. She does her 
duty in accordance with roles that are now seen as norn1S. Therefore she is an 
accountable person because she can account for herself in relation to these norms. 
However, following convention does cause problems for the subject sirnply because 
she still does not recognise her own identity, her real or authentic self. Because she 
sees herself as the social object of another, she evaluates herself using communal 
norms. She has adopted a social role or conformed to norms, but these are still 
external to her own will. She is able to evaluate herself as praiseworthy or 
blameworthy, pat herself on the back or attack herself in blind fury (to paraphrase 
Mead 1964: 288 quoted in Habermas, 1995: 181) because she uses recognisable 
norms. Thus "the conventional ego-identity is at best a steward for the true one" 
(1995: 182). 
The reformer 
The ethical sense of responsibility arises when the person begins to take back the 
interests and intentions she had subordinated to her social role or to social norms. 
In doing this, she begins to reflect on the reasons for her acceptance of roles and 
responsibilities. On the one hand, the individual's responsibilities are mere 
obligations that she has because of the life she has led. On the other, in order to be 
an authentically responsible person she needs to take ownership of the life that is 
hers but that she did not choose and remake or reform it in the direction of her own 
interests. Her history and its attendant obligations are a part of her, of who she is 
and what she has become, and she has to deal with them as her own. For 
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Habern1as, this means taking the "extraordinary decision to posit oneself' (1995: 
165): 
... in a paradoxical act, I must choose myself as the one who I am and want to 
be. Life history becomes the principle of individuation, but only if it is transposed 
by such an act of self-choice into an existential form for which the self is 
responsible (1995: 164, emphasis in original). 
The act of positing the self is one whereby the individual seizes her life as her own, 
using it as the basis of her own will. She takes up the accidents of birth and life and 
chooses to see these accidents as determinants of the self for which she is 
responsible. In this way she brings together her own history with her own 
spontaneous will and makes an authentic person of herself: 
The authentic individual has himself to thank for his individuation: as this 
determinate product of determinate historical surroundings, he has made 
himself responsible for himself: "in choosing himself as product he can just as 
well be said to produce himself' (Habermas, 1995: 165 quoting Kierkegaard I 
1987: 251) 
In the midst of the recalcitrant material of her life she has chosen herself and taken 
responsibility for herself. This is a particularly personal innovation because it means 
accepting all of her accidentally given responsibilities as personal obligations. It 
means that the individual deals with her responsibilities as her own, as part of the 
life that makes her into who she is, so that she is able to posit her own will 
regarding them! and work to realise this will. She separates the accidents of fate 
from her own will and works to realise this will by reforn1ing her life. 
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The reformer is the authentic person because, in contrast to the inauthentic person, 
she 'pulls' herself (Heller, 1999: 226-228) in the direction of the person she wants to 
be. The inauthentic person is a person who is pushed by "desires, by external 
circumstances, by false opinions or judgements, by the whims of fate" (Heller, 
1999: 226). She is a 'passive slave' of her passions. Unable to impose her own will 
on her life she is at the mercy of her obligations. She responds passively to her 
obligations, allowing herself to be determined by the accidents of fate. In short, she 
does not take responsibility for herself in her social context and posit a state that, 
through the force of her will, she makes happen. The authentic person by contrast, 
is one who is 'pulled' by their own self-understanding. The authentic person 
translates the "push", those recalcitrant accidents of birth, into the "pull", the person 
she makes herself responsible for: 
Authenticity means to remain true to the leap, to one's choice of oneself. 
Authenticity is to remain true to oneself. Authenticity has become the single 
most sublime virtue of modernity, for authentic people are people who remain 
true to their existential choice, who are pulled and not pushed, who are 
personalities (1999: 227, emphasis in original). 
The authentic person has enough self-respect and self-confidence to make her will 
a reality and therefore to reform her life accordingly. In the same way, she can seek 
to realise the good for people like her, and reform the collective context so that 
social and policy norms better reflect the interests, motivations, and realities for the 
collective of which she is part. 
111 
The reflector 
To be responsible in the ethical sense, therefore, means deciding on what is good 
for the self and working to achieve this good. In fact, the reformer can equally be 
conceived as Giddens's (1994) 'autotelic self'. Like the 'autotelic self', the reformer 
strives to realise her own will. But the concept of the reformer taken up from 
Habermas's (1990, 1995) concepts does not directly incorporate a moral 
dimension. Whereas Giddens (1994) sees the 'autotelic self' as an authentic 
personality who is interested in helping others realise the good for themselves, the 
reformer works to realise her own will and has no necessary reason to consider the 
good for others. In fact, by drawing from Habermas (1990, 1995) a more moral 
conception of responsible consciousness emerges. 
This consciousness arises when the person is not simply able to observe 
themselves as participants in interaction and see how other people observe 
themselves as participants and what their expectations might be, but is now able to 
think about these perspectives in a hypothetical manner. This reflexive 
consciousness involves an acute awareness of the conflicts of interest arising from 
convention. The reflector can look on the norms governing action as merely a 
matter of convention and reflexively think about how these norms should be 
organised to better suit all of the participants from their perspectives. This reflexive 
insight arises with the ability to hypothesise norms, to turn norms from convention 
into matters of moral or ethical significance (1990: 160). On this level the motivation 
to abide by norms is no longer based on a dutiful commitment to norms, an 
approach that 'from this perspective reeks of heteronomy or "dependence on 
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existing norms" (1990: 162) since such dependence is now seen as based on mere 
convention. Instead it is based on autonomy: 
With this notion of autonomy, the notion of the capacity for responsible action 
also changes. Responsibility becomes a special case of accountability, the 
latter here meaning the orientation of action toward an agreement that is 
rationa lIy motivated and conceived as universal: to act morally is to act on the 
basis of insight (1990: 162). 
To act responsibly here means one of two things. To act on the basis of values, 
now conceived more abstractly as principles, and to commit to these principles 
because they are just and reflect the needs and lived experiences of everybody. Or 
to act responsibly means to seek out justifiable norms by engaging everybody 
affected by controversial norms in a discursive procedure, a discourse ethics or a 
Rawlsian (1971) reflection from the point of view of the original position, that holds 
open the possibility of arriving at just norms, but does not guarantee that just norms 
are the inevitable result. 
These four kinds of discourses represent ways of conceptualising the relationship 
between context and norms which can more fully explore the insight Finch and 
Mason (1993) made into the socially negotiated nature of responsibility I and the 
insight Duncan and Edwards (1999) made into the individually held and socially 
constructed character of responsibility. These constructions can help fill out these 
insights by opening up the kinds of discourses people use about the responsibilities 
they negotiate, and how this negotiation is carried out by the person and in relation 
to a community of others. 
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Conclusion 
The preceding discussion has shown how responsibility has been made into an 
issue for social policy as a result of two processes. On the one hand, neo-liberal 
reforms valorise the acceptance of responsibility in the market and civil society. On 
the other, individualisation processes place the risks and burdens of responsibility 
with the individual and seek to generate a subject who accepts these 
responsibilities as opportunities. As the research discussed above has shown, 
people accept the logic of these reforms through the use of complex arguments that 
take together a sensitivity to the ethical good for the individual and the morally just 
for society. Yet, as this review has shown, relatively little is known about the 
discourses people use as they formulate such arguments. The literature does, 
however, provide insights into the socially constructed character of discourses of 
responsibility; provide frameworks for understanding such discourses; and provide 
observations on the meaning of the privatisation of responsibility from the morally 
just for society, to the ethically good for the group or club. 
In order to increase sensitivity to the reflexive and negotiated character of 
discourses of responsibility, a Habermasian (1990, 1995) framework was 
introduced. Because this framework conceptualises the link between the reality of 
people's lives and the rational structure of the norms they use to comprehend their 
responsibilities, I argued that it provides the conceptual tools with which to fill out 
Duncan and Edwards (1999) insight into the individually held and socially 
constructed nature of discourses of responsibility. In so doing, this Habermasian 
(1990, 1995) framework complements Dean's (2002) work on the anatomy of 
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discourses of responsibility while providing deeper insights into the structures he 
identifies. Furthermore, the approach drawn from Habermas (1990, 1995) is 
sensitive to the distinctively ethical and moral aspects of discourses of 
responsibility, and to the rational processes involved in constructing such 
discourses. In this sense, this framework can aid the effort to systematically 
understand the discourses at issue in the transformation of n10ral discourses of 
responsibility into ethical discourses identified by Jordan (1998) Lister (2001) and 
Levitas (1998). 
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Chapter 3: The interventions of social theory and the 
challenge of responsibility today 
Introduction 
In the two preceding Chapters, I reconstructed discourses of responsibility in the 
context of British history, and in contemporary social policy. I have shown how 
responsibility has become an issue in the context of the emergence of security as a 
problem facing society, and how the forms of knowledge used to deal with poverty 
and security move in ever more local and individual directions. I have shown how, 
at the same time, knowledge about how to integrate society in responsible ways 
has been developed yet at the same time has benn marginalised in favour of more 
reactionary approaches. In addition, a large body of knowledge has been 
developed about how people actually construct their mutual responsibilities and 
develop the capacities to deal with them. In this Chapter I reflect on the forms of 
knowledge being developed at the level of social theory. Social theory is itself an 
ongoing discourse that reflects critically on the issues of the day. Dwyer (2000) has 
already contributed such a reflection in the context of discourses on citizenship and 
how these discourses situate rights and responsibilities. In this Chapter I take up 
,the reflections of various influential theorists and look at how the theories 
contributed by each positions this issue. In so doing I seek to come to a systematic 
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understanding of the current situation by making use of social theory. Moreover, the 
concepts developed by these theorists will also be taken up and used to come to a 
clearer understanding of the research data underpinning this work. 
In this Chapter, I again take up Habermas's (1987, 1984) conception of the three 
worlds, to look respectively at social theoretical constructions of responsibility within 
the personal or intimate sphere, the shared social or societal sphere, and the 
cultural institutional sphere. I therefore begin with Habernlas (1995) and Bauman 
(1993, 1995) and Fevre's (2000) work on the challenges of socialisation in the 
consumer society. As we shall see, this challenge is also a challenge to the kinds of 
values we as a society assert, and as both Bauman (1993, 1995) and Fevre (2000) 
argue, our ability to assert values capable of producing responsible people is 
threatened by the very ideas propagated by capitalism. These authors recommend 
different kinds of strategies for resolving this matter that draw variously on cultural 
and social processes. The related question of how to ensure that people can 
successfully be integrated into society is dealt with by the contributors to the 
feminist ethics of care (Tronto, 1993, Sevenhuijsen, 1998,2000), Apel (1987b, 
1996), and Etzioni (1995, 2001). Each of these presents a different strategy for 
securing social integration, focusing variously on how society produces values and 
asserts these values as morally right or as rules to be followed. To complicate the 
matter further! the modes of social integration need to be stabilised and 
incorporated into the cultural and institutional fabric of society. Etzioni (1995, 2001), 
$chmidtz (1998) and Goodin (1998) assert, respectively, the importance of the 
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community, the market, and the expert, in stabilising the production and 
transmission of socially important values. 
Images of how the person accepts responsibility 
The first set of social theoretical discourses to be discussed here are concerned 
with the way in which the person comes to develop and accept their responsibility 
for their own lives themselves. In this context I believe that Habermas's (1995) 
social theoretic perspective and Bauman's (1993, 1995) and Fevre's (2000) work 
on the cultural impediments to this acceptance are of vital importance. However, 
having discussed Habermas's (1995) work in the previous chapters, there is no 
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need to go into it in any great detail here. Bauman's (1993, 1995) and Fevre's 
(2000) work deserve much closer scrutiny. 
Accepting responsibility amid the inadequate institutionalisation of 
discourse: Habermas's Discourse Ethics 
As I have already shown (Chapter 2 above) Habermas (1995) considers that moral 
and ethical discourses presuppose one another. Moral discourses presume people 
can come to understandings of their own reality amid universality. Ethical 
discourses presume that people are granted the moral autonomy to make claims of 
an ethical nature. The particular focus of Habermas's (1996) social theory has been 
on how people become able to reflectively think about their situation and make 
moral and ethical claims. Starting from the observation that society has become 
highly diverse and that people are increasingly burdened with having to make moral 
and ethical decisions that their shared norms cannot help them with, Habermas 
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focuses on those sorts of practices that can help people clarify their situation and 
make such decisions themselves. Thus, Habermas's (1990, 1993, 1996) discourse 
ethics is about how reason can unfold through communication on an issue. 
Habermas (1990, 1993, 1996, see Rehg, 1994) develops his discourse ethics in the 
direction of the three world perspective outlined in the Introduction. His discourse 
ethics identifies three distinct ways in which people relate with the world, and thinks 
through the processes of critical reflection through which people choose critically a 
course of action (while there is a fourth, theoretical discourse, related with the 
discourses of the sciences, it is of less importance here). In pragmatic discourses, 
the basic question is "what does she (do we) want?" or "how can I/we realise 
my/our preferences and goals?" The preferences in question are of a pragmatic 
sort like "what job do I want to further my career" or "how can we use current social 
policies to fund our projects?" Pragmatic discourse is concerned with how these 
personal preferences can be realised. Ethical-existential discourses are about the 
person asking such questions as "who I am and who would I like to be, or how I 
should lead my life" (Habermas, 1998: 26). In seeking answers to these kinds of 
questions, the individual takes assistance from their family, friends and work 
colleagues who play the role of critic as the individual clarifies their self 
understanding. Moral discourse starts out with an awareness of the social world. "In 
this instance the question is what kind of behaviour we are justified to expect from 
our fellow members of society, and what they are equally justified to expect from 
us" (Eriksen and Weigard, 2003:77). In pragmatic discourse, critical reflection is 
focused on the strategies and technologies suited to realising aims in an expedient 
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manner, and towards producing the most rational decision based on various 
recommendations. In ethical-existential discourse, critical reflection converge the 
person's understanding of their personal preferences and goals with the aim of 
clarifying these and realising the good for the self. In moral discourses, critical 
reflection centres on norms that are in the interests of everybody with the aim of 
finding just solutions to social conflicts. 
However, Habermas's (1993, 1995) argument is that such practices require 
engaging with publics, in effect that people need to take up pOints of view that allow 
them to think about their interests in relation to universal discourses. Thus, ethical 
discourses require people to take up relations with a communication community 
that call on people to clarify who they are and want to be and how they will continue 
to be this person into the future so that making claims before this public means 
submitting the person's own confessions before a perpetual public. Moral 
discourses require people to take up relations with a communication community 
that includes all relevant voices, and so everybody who might possibly have 
someth ing relevant to say about a subject. Habermas's point about these is that 
while people are increasingly pushed into entering such critical discourses because 
they find their social norms are of little use in complex contexts, they nevertheless 
find that they are unable to enter such critical discussions because society is not 
organised to provide them with the tools of reflection, or a viable context in which to 
learn these skills. In response to this, Habermas (1996, 1998) theorises a 
deliberative and procedural democracy with the aim of thinking up forums in which 
people can enter reflective discourse and develop these tools. Such a democracy 
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would institutionalise the arguments of discourse ethics thereby creating the context 
for critical reflection and providing a space for people to learn the skills with which 
they could come to reasoned decisions on an issue. 
The culture ofambivalence and the pluralisation of the public sphere: 
Bauman's diagnosis of the state ofmoral culture 
Underscoring Habermas's (1995, 1996) arguments is an appreciation of the 
phenomenon of individualisation. Like Bauman (1993, 1995), Habermas (1995, 
1996) sees individualisation as both a formal process in which people are made 
into individuals, and a socialisation process that challenges people to incorporate 
the skills with which to make moral and ethical decisions themselves. But in 
contrast to Habermas (1995, 1996), Bauman (1993, 1995) emphasises the 
insecurity that results as people can no longer take guidance from social norms. 
The trouble with the individualisation of responsibility is that there is no way of 
ensuring that the meaning of abstract norms can be successfully interpreted, made 
relevant to situations and communicated to people. In fact, the postmodern moral 
crisis consists in the lack of assurance endemic to the abstraction and pluralisation 
of norms: 
In so many situations in which the choice of what to do is ours and apparently 
ours alone, we look in vain for the firm and trusty rules which may reassure us 
that once we followed them, we could be sure to be in the right. We would 
dearly wish to shelter behind such rules (even though we know only too well 
that we would not feel at all comfortable were we coerced to surrender to them). 
It appears, however, that there are too many rules for comfort: they speak in 
different voices, one praising what the other condemns (Bauman, 1993: 20, 
emphasis in original). 
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Ambiguity creeps into our moral decision making. For Bauman (1993: 33,34) post 
modernity is all about learning to live with the ambiguity and contingency that the 
abstraction and rationalisation of ethical codes has left us with. It is about coming to 
realise that moral responsibility is not something that can be imposed through 
ethical systems, but is something that needs to be nurtured because it is "somehow 
rooted in the way we humans are" (1993: 35). We have to follow our moral feelings 
and forget about using social norms because these norms are always being revised 
and so are chronically unreliable. Bauman (1993, 1995) effectively follows the 
French approach to everyday life that takes up an opposing view to Habermas (see 
Smith, 1999), and he advocates a humanism in contradistinction to Habermas's 
rationalism. 
Bauman's (1993: 31, 84,85) position is that with the rise of postmodern culture, the 
only thing that makes us into responsible beings is the call made by the other. He 
characterises modernity in terms of the production of a reason which sought to 
systematise ethics into an obligatory code legislated on people. Post-modernity 
exposes the limits of this project demonstrating how endemic uncertainty about 
conflicting ethical standards puts responsibility back on the shoulders of the 
individual. Thus, the individual is back at the centre of consideration where her 
moral spontaneity and impulsiveness is recognised for its moral worth: 
Rather than reiterating that there would be no moral individuals if not for the 
training/drilling job performed by society, we move toward the understanding 
that it must be the moral capacity of human beings that makes them so 
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conspicuously capable to form societies and against all odds to secure their ­
happy or less happy - survival (Bauman, 1993: 32). 
For Bauman (1993), the moral call implies three things. Firstly that the self gives the 
other the power to call on the self (1993: 85, 86). Secondly, that we willingly attend 
to the other waiting for their call (1993: 88, 89). Finally, that the way we are for the 
other follows the model of the loving caress (1993: 92, 93). In effect, the individual 
is simply there, in the world, lovingly and unselfishly being for the other (see also 
Smart, 1999: 102, 103). 
Baun1an's (1993, 1995) approach is somewhat idiosyncratic. While using concepts 
drawn from action theory, such as cognitive, normative and aesthetic 'spacing', he 
nevertheless makes use of a philosophically rooted theory of morality that cannot 
be verified in empirical research. Bauman's (1993: 70 - 75) approach is to make 
use of a weak form of realism that puts moral responsibility before ontology "in its 
own, moral sense of 'before'; that is, in the sense of being 'better'" (1993: 75). This 
sets responsibility as pre-ontological and ethical, arising from inside the subject's 
relations with social phenomenon: 
Responsibility conjures up the face I face, but it also creates me as a moral self. 
Taking responsibility as if I was already responsible is an act of creation of the 
moral space, which cannot be plotted elsewhere or otherwise (Bauman, 1993: 
75). 
This is about how the subject enters the moral space as a moral subject. The 
sociological difficulty with this thought is that it tends to consider all subjects as 
moral, which effectively means socially able and responsible adults. The 
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philosophical difficulty is that it tends to put God at the end of the other so that 
being for the other ultimately means being towards God, a situation which provides 
an implicit road map (see Smart, 1999). But the point here is that every subject is at 
least morally capable, simply because everybody is faced with moral calls 
emanating from somewhere. Furthermore, to be moral and responsible does not 
mean following the rationale of social norms, but to follow the moral impulse, to be 
there for the other in a loving and unselfish way. 
The target of Bauman's (1992, 1993, 1995) work is precisely the difficulty one has 
morally embracing the other in a world without transcendental ethical guides or a 
belief in the moral impulse. Bauman identifies a range of difficulties which stem 
from the deinstitutionalisaiton of public morality and an aesthetization of the social. 
In effect, the argument is that without any moral or ethical guides that bring the 
subject in the direction of the other, or the willingness or courage to follow the moral 
impulse, the subject falls back on a range of cultural models that promote 
individualistic and amoral action. The reasoning underpinning a social morality that 
necessitates living with ambiguity is a reasoning that leaves the subject without 
socially sanctioned moral guidance, so she finds other kinds of reasoning to take 
the place of social morality. The reasons that are made available to us by our 
culture are those of the consumer. 
In response to this, Bauman (1995: 278-281) endorses Hans Jonas' (1976,1984) 
appeal for a collectivised responsibility based on fear and uncertainty. He 
envisages an ethical argument that focuses on the potential side effects of policies 
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and courses of action and weighs these policies according to the principle that they 
should not threaten the human species with extinction. This is to reintroduce an 
ethical guide back into a public culture that has become fragmented, but it is an 
ethical guide that has been developed in the context of environmentalism and its 
concern for the future of humanity. While Bauman (1995: 284-287) is not optimistic 
about the prospects for such an ethical guide informing some kind of transcendent 
idea in the political culture marked by consumerism, he holds out the hope that the 
democratic polis and the consumer can come together. The work of Fevre (2000) 
can help us understand how this might happen. 
Morality and the capitalist market: Fevre's postmodernism 
Ralph Fevre (2000 builds on Bauman's (1992, 1993, 1995) work, but focuses on 
how moral reasoning fares in competition with other forms of reasoning. Overall, his 
argun1ent is that it is not the sUbstitution of reason for morality that contributes to 
moral decay, but the universalisation of one kind of reason and its imposition on 
moral issues: 
... there is nothing wrong with any sort of rationality, including the common 
sense version of it per se. The problems start to arise when common sense is 
applied in the wrong place. This happens all the time to a small degree ... but 
demoralisation has been the result when common sense has been applied 
where it would have been better to make sense in another way (2000: 18). 
Fevre (2000) takes up Bauman's (1992, 1993, 1995) work in an ideological sense, 
analysing how economic reason and common sense competes with, and 
undermines, the moral impulse and moral reason. On Fevre's (2000) analysis of 
issues such as the Nazi Holocaust or the Clinton/Lewinsky affair, modern society is 
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characterised by the dominance of leconomic rationality' and 'common sense' 
(Fevre, 2000: 78-83). Hence, strategies for achieving goals or calculations about 
the good for the self win out over the moral and compassionate thing to do. For 
example, sentin1ent, an emotional faculty for taking an interest in one another, has 
been eroded by an amity that enables us to take less interest in one another out of 
common sense (see also Metsrovic, 1997). But what this common sense puts in the 
place of sentiment and economic reasoning is precisely what the moral will puts 
aside when it wills; desire, gratification, sensation and selfishness (Fevre, 2000). As 
Arendt (1978, 2) pointed out, it was Paul, in his letters to the Romans, who first 
discovered that the wills "conflict is between flesh and spirit, and the trouble is that 
men are both, carnal and spiritual" (1978, 2: 70). Fevre's (2000) argument is 
focused on how the logics of the flesh or common sense increasingly overtake the 
logics of the spirit as the social is aestheticised and personalised. What this means 
for social responsibility is that the reasoning of the moral will is increasingly 
subordinated to the reasoning of the desiring and carnal will. Moral reasoning loses 
ground as a way of thinking both in the private and in public spaces. The social 
responsibility of individuals is subordinated to sensation and gratification while the 
social responsibility of the collective is subordinated to private economic desires 
and personal common sense calculations. 
In response, Fevre offers what he calls a "recombinant sensibility" (2000: 215-217): 
With cognition in charge I say, and everyone else agrees with me, that I am 
making sense when I say it, that I will do such-and-such because I will make 
money by it, or increase efficiency, or get a sexual sensation from it. With 
recombinant sensibility I will be able to say I want to follow this course of action 
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because some emotional objective will be achieved; I am following a course of 
action that passion dictates (Fevre, 2000: 217). 
Fevre's (2000) response is to put the moral will back on the agenda. Rather than 
rationalise decisions in terms of cost benefit calculations, to rationalise in terms of 
the state aimed at. He finds himself unable to envision how this representation of 
issues in terms of the moral will might'work (2000: 217), but the structure takes the 
form of placing love, encouragement, support, help and so on above criteria such 
as desire, gratification, self-indulgence and sensation. So for example (2000: 219), 
when making the decision between balancing a career with child-raising, he wants 
people to make their decision fully cognisant of the in1portance of love in raising a 
child. Remoralising in this way means putting the moral will back on the public 
policy agenda: 
At each stage in policy formation - the identification of the problem, the 
research, the solution, the drafting and all the rest of it - policy-makers would 
keep the effect of their decisions on the new sensibility at the forefront of their 
minds. For example, policy-makers could be told by the citizens they serve that 
maximizing the time parents have for their kids is a priority. It would not be a 
priority because we believe parents should help their children with their 
homework in order to help them to become more productive worker-citizens but 
because we believe loving relationships require time (Fevre, 2000: 221). 
Fevre (2000) wants the recombinant sensibility to make inroads into public policy 
making and for the moral will to receive expression in policy. This implies a 
remoralisation of both individual and collective thinking. However, after carrying out 
such a powerful critique of the perils faced by the contemporary moral will by 
economic and common sense reasoning, it is difficult to see what chance a 
recombinant sensibility has of motivating a moral will in the individual and of 
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seeping into public policy making. Fevre (2000) calls for individuals to become 
more aware of their social responsibilities, so that this awareness can be 
collectivised and enhanced in public morality. He sees recombinant sensibility as a 
cultural repertoire which would enable people to believe in the moral will. Its aim is 
to recombine "moral, emotional and aesthetic ideas and values" in a way of thinking 
"in which feelings are the things that do the work of explanation for us" (2000: 216). 
In other words, recombinant sensibility is the use of the moral will to rationalise and 
explain action. Recombinant morality accepts the moral claims made by the subject 
as sensible claims because it trusts her and resists using common sense or 
economic rationality to undermine the moral will's goal of contributing to the 
happiness or wellbeing of the other. Recombinant morality effectively defines a way 
in which social and moral thinking can enter into competition with other forms of 
thinking and can hope to effect action. 
The problem with Fevre's (2000) contribution lies with identifying the meaning and 
structure of the recombinant morality. Although a form of reasoning that puts moral 
issues and concerns at its centre is needed, this kind of reasoning needs to find a 
place in public communication. But it is difficult to see how individuals or groups 
might sustain such a latently moral agenda and press arguments that embody a 
recombinant morality in the public sphere. Such groups would face serious 
challenges to their motivation were they to set out reasons that are primarily moral 
and do not also meet with their personal interests or their own visions of the good 
life, Furthermore, there is much evidence to show that a consensus around difficult 
poli~ical issues often takes moral forms, even if the consensus is to substantively 
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disagree. However, I take Fevre's (2000) central point to be that mainstream public 
communication lacks a moral sensibility. 
Fevre's work also needs to be situated with reference to the sociology of everyday 
life which emphasises the creative and manipulative capacities of those dominated 
by elitist discourse. For example, de Certeau (1988) separates the production of 
culture from its consumption and looks at the tactics and uses to which the non­
producers of culture (the vast majority of people (1998: xvii)) submit to the cultural 
packages communicated to them. According to this line of thinking the 
asetheticised cultural packages communicated by the producers of culture are 
transformed by consumers into a myriad of tactics for use in performing in social 
life, for taking opportunities or for making decisions. The point for de Certeau 
(1988) is that everyday life is a social space without a central axis, and that there is 
no space over which the person can have complete power. Without a spatial locus 
of power, the person is always being called on by those surrounding her and can 
only build power in the temporal dimension. She has to seize opportunities on the 
go, or manipulate events in order to make them into opportunities, synthesising 
them into practical decisions. Fevre (2000) focuses on culture, inferring logics of 
consumption from the culture produced. But social systems cannot fully control the 
everyday consumption of culture. The question is not so much what our culture 
says about us, but what sort of uses is it put to in everyday life? 
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Images of how society conditions responsible values 
Inasmuch as the individual comes to a position where she can take responsibility 
for herself, she does so within the environment of a set of social relationships. The 
basic criterion here is that these relationships provide a range of legitimate norms; 
legitimate insofar as the norms are based on moral values that people find 
acceptable. In relation to this process the feminist ethics of care (Tronto, 1993, 
Sevenhuijsen, 1998, 2000) and the German philosopher Karl Otto Apel (1987b, 
1998) have contributed interesting ideas. 
Responsibility in the feminist ethics of care 
In contrast with Fevre's (2000) moralistic approach, the feminist ethics of care is 
based on an interdependent, relational ontology, where individuality is understood 
as formed in and through relations with others (Sevenhuijsen, 1998,2000, Tronto, 
1993, Lara, 1998, see also Honneth, 1995). Tronto (1993: 127) identifies "four 
ethical elements of care: attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and 
responsiveness." She outlines each element in a sequential way, identifying its core 
analytical meaning, its relations with the meanings it subsumes and the problems 
posed to it in our society. Thus to attend to the other is to set aside ones own will 
"in order to recognise and to be attentive to others" (1993: 128); being responsible 
for the other follows and is characterised by the messy, practical reality of multiple 
and flexible caring responsibilities (1993: 131, 132); competence introduces the 
dimension of resources and consequences into caring work (1993: 133,134); 
responsiveness flags the problem of how !lcare is concerned with the conditions of 
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vulnerability and inequality" (1993: 134) and the responses of the vulnerable to the 
caring work of others. 
The problem of care centres on the value placed on care in our society, the morally 
disinterested and inattentive attitude accepted as part of our culture and the 
importance placed on independence, autonomy and stigmatising of vulnerability 
and dependence. Proponents of the feminist ethics of care set about developing an 
alternative to this dominant ideology which undervalues care. For Sevenhuijsen 
(1998: 111) this idea is quite straightforward: 
In the ethics of care, the central moral issue is not 'what am I obliged to do, in 
general terms?' but 'how should I deal with dependency and responsibility?' 
The political corollary of this is government policy which creates necessary 
conditions rather than imposing obligations. 
The ethics of care, therefore, are about situated and bounded relationships, rather 
than formal and abstract rules (Sevenhuijsen, 1998: 108). They emphasise how the 
individual's responsibilities are particular to the practical and historically contingent 
situation in which she finds herself as she makes her choice. In a sense the ethics 
of care represent a renewal of the liberal project since they are concerned with 
shaping the contexts of decision making and instilling the values and attitudes of 
mind necessary for increasing the sense of justice in the choices made (see 
Skeggs, 1997, ch. 3). In this sense they also recognise the communitarian critiques 
of liberalism. Moreover, the policy proposals that the ethics of care make is about 
attending to the practicalities of responsible caring work. 
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The discourse ethical promise ofco-responsibility 
The discourse ethics of Habermas and Apel is concerned with generating 
universalisable ideas in post-traditional societies. In societies that have become 
fragmented and pluralised, discourse ethics offer a method for forming decisions 
that everybody can accept as legitimate (Rehg, 1994). Underscoring discourse 
ethics is a theory of morality that articulates the conditions needed for a public 
morality or a kind of morality needed to come to a moral point of view on issues and 
to form universalisable norms. Like Bauman, Habermas and Apel develop a theory 
of morality that is anthropologically generous insofar as it maintains that humans 
are capable of thinking and acting morally, and it starts from a phenomenological 
viewpoint (Habermas, 1998, Apel, 2001). But Habermas and Apel take a more 
realist and pragmatic view on the moral sensibility. In effect, they hold to the idea 
that humans are socialised as moral beings through their dealings with others (see 
also Honneth, 1996). Using this kind of weak naturalism, they (in particular 
Habermas) can theorise how social transformation is made possible by the 
immanent logics of the lifeworld and how socialisation into the shared system of 
norms forces the subject to rework its relation with itself at each stage of moral 
development. When it comes to the contemporary situation then, their focus is on 
the system of symbols about morality (symbols conceived broadly as bodies of 
knowledge or rationalities). They share the concern that the fragmentation of the 
cultural system places burdens on the subject to work out what the responsible 
course of action is, but they seek ways of reworking the institutional system to 
promote a public morality. Sociologists have taken up these ideas through the idea 
of social learning and deliberation (for example, Forester, 1999, and O'Neill, 2003). 
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Apel (1979, 1998) has contributed a version of discourse ethics that, in contrast to 
Habermas's more sociological focus on communicative action, individualisation and 
socialisation, focuses on reason and ethics and develops a concept of co­
responsibility. In particular, Apel (1987a) notes a connection between the use of 
reason in discourse with the aim of solving a social problem and the ethics involved 
in this use of reason. With this connection in mind, Apel (1987b) works out how a 
shared ethic of co-responsibility might be formed at the heart of serious debate. As 
with Bauman, Apel (1987b) also takes up Jonas' (1976, 1984) Principle of 
Responsibility but in a critical way. He does so within the framework of discourse 
ethics. Discourse ethics involves the use of discourse as a special form of reflection 
where problems are treated as issues and questioned using reasons (see Rehg, 
1994). For Apel (1998), ttlis means that discourse ethics is also concerned with an 
ethics of responsibility for consequences since everybody is, in principle, capable of 
entering into debate and reflectively participating in the organisation of a solidaristic 
ethic of responsibility. This version of responsibility shifts the emphasis away from 
the individual and into the social and political spheres without, however, loosening 
the burden of responsibility on the individual. It involves the person as a member of 
a communication community being drawn together with others in view of a shared 
interest in an issue. For example, in the national context of the welfare state, it 
involves all members of this community who have an interest in the well being (if 
not happiness) of all of the other members of this community, and perhaps the well 
being of all other human beings on the planet. Co-responsibility for the well being of 
others can only be achieved through formal and informal discussions. As Habermas 
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also points out, the special forum for reflection and discourse, and thus also a kind 
of public space, is invoked wherever a grievance is thematised as an issue. 
Therefore a sense of co-responsibility can be fulfilled through the discussion of 
friends/colleagues, at meetings, seminars and nationally or internationally. Co­
responsibility relates to how the socially shared dimension of the problem is 
stressed and how through communication and dialogue, people become conscious 
of the social and political nature of the problem. This consciousness does not in any 
way absolve people of their individual responsibilities, but by stressing the shared 
nature of the issue it "retains a participatory role for the individual in publicly 
relevant communication and thus also in the discursive shaping and treatment of 
such problems" (Strydom, 1999: 68). 
For Apel (1998) the concept of co-responsibility gets away from the conservativism 
of Jonas's (1976, 1984) concept of collective responsibility. By putting 
communication and discourse about issues at its centre, and by inviting all those 
affected by an issue to participate in the formation of a shared understanding by 
highlighting their concerns, Apel (1998) anticipates that, thereupon, everybody can 
accept equal co-responsibility for the consequences of the accepted norms. Thus it 
does not require the norm formers or legislators to legislate in the best long-term 
interests of society, in the sense that Bauman (1995) takes up Jonas. Instead, Apel 
(1998) recognises, with Bauman (1995), that the power and role of legislators has 
rescinded. He also recognises that the idea of progress, although altered, cannot 
be overcome using an ethic of responsibility that focuses on the possible harmful 
consequences of progress. Instead co-responsibility calls for ongoing discussion, 
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debate and communication about issues highlighting their social relevance so that 
everybody participating in serious argument might come to accept co-responsibility 
for norms and the consequences of norms. While co-responsibility is discursively 
organised, it does not mean that the norms agreed upon will necessarily be just for 
everybody, but the invitation to participate in discourse always remains (Apel, 
1998). People who feel genuinely aggrieved by a norm and cannot abide by its 
rules can always work to make their arguments heard and seek to have the 
repertoire reworked or abandoned in order to take their interests and concerns into 
account. Above all the ethic of co-responsibility does not of itself provide any new 
guiding transcendental ideas. It only pOints the way towards the social production of 
such ideas in complex societies by promoting discussion and debate and by inviting 
everybody to participate. However, even on Apel's (2001) own analysis of issues 
such as the environmental movement or the Nato/Kosovar war, such an ethic has 
not yet been fully realised. 
Images of how culture elicits responsible behaviour 
Having attended to social theories pertaining to how the individual comes to accept 
responsibility for themselves and how social relations can be ordered to produce 
legitimate values, we now need to look at theories of how society elicits responsible 
behaviour from the individual. The pertinent contributors to this debate are Etzioni 
(1995) Schmitz (1998) and Goodin (1998). 
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Reconstituting Moral Assurance: The Communitarian Approach 
The central response to the fragmentation and detraditionalisation of the social in 
'Blair's Britain', has been to follow the communitarian call to re-establish community 
by inviting greater community involvement and participation (Dwyer, 1998, Driver 
and Martell 1998, Heron, 2001). This has led to the call for the generation of social 
spaces within which people can become active members of their community, and 
the call to form such spaces on the communitarian model of 'community' (but see 
Driver and Martell, 1998) or Will Hutton's (1996) idea of 'stakeholding'. The concern 
here is with forming some new social space in a world that is increasingly 
temporalised, in order that the divisive and corrosive effects on morality might be 
stemmed. 
Unlike Bauman (1993, 1995) and Fevre (2000), who want to emphasis the initial 
moral gesture, Etzioni (1995, 2001) wants to emphasis the ethical standards that 
assure us as to the right course of action. The concept of norm governed 
responsibility takes the form of a story set inside a concrete community. Using her 
spontaneous moral will, the person acts in ways that she thinks are beneficial to 
another and which are directed by conventional ethical codes. While Bauman 
(1993, 1995) and Fevre (2000) want to get away from the use of ethical codes on 
the grounds that they detract, even thwart, the exercise of the spontaneous moral 
will, Etzioni (1995) thinks these codes need to be developed and clarified, given "a 
critical going-over" (1995: 12) in order to re-engage people with their social 
responsibilities. What makes this approach so different from Bauman's (1993, 
1995) and Fevre's (2000) is that it is not willing to leave moral responsibility with the 
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individual's moral impulse; rather responsibility is primarily the affair of the 
community: 
... morality does not soar on its own wings. True, the ultimate custodian of 
moral conduct is a person's own conscience. However, individual's consciences 
are neither in-born nor - for most people - self-enforcing. We gain our initial 
moral commitments as new members of a community into which we are born. 
Later, as we mature, we hone our individualized versions out of the social 
values that have been transmitted to us. As a rule, though, these are variations 
on community-formed themes ... 
Most important for the issue at hand is the sociological fact that we find 
reinforcement for our moral inclinations and provide reinforcement for our fellow 
human beings (Etzioni, 1995: 30-31). 
The communitarian concern lies with "the wellbeing of 'community' because it 
[community] is identified as underpinning and sustaining morality by calling 
members to account, by making claims on them" (Smart, 1999: 168). Etzioni's 
(1995) view of moral responsibility is also strikingly similar to the view outlined by 
Habermas (1990, 1995). However, there is an important difference. Habermas 
(1995) envisions community as the context in which the subject develops a sense 
of herself as a morally responsible person. Etzioni (1995) envisages community as 
an other that continually calls on the subject to be moral and responsible. So while 
Habermas (1995) sees the subject as growing into and out of its communal 
surroundings, all the while internalising communal norms and developing an 
understanding of her own autonomous moral will, Etzioni (1995) thinks that the 
community always has to remind the subject of its moral will and to force her to 
abide by community values. Without community the subject will lose her 'social 
moorings' (1995: 31) and with it, her morality. In effect, we cannot expect people to 
use their moral impulse to be responsible unless there is a community there that 
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can, at least potentially, call them to account. This threatens to reify community into 
some kind of subject, ontologising a shared culture that is re/produced through 
discourse and communication and played out through social institutions. While 
community does indeed have an ontology, in its contemporary fragmented and 
plural forms its epistemological properties are far more important. 
Setting this aside, Etzioni's (1995) argument is based on the belief that private self-
interest can be squared with the public good by enhancing community values. For 
instance, he argues that the private interest in 'making it', that is in gaining a 
promotion or in advancing a career, is: 
... an intrinsically unsatisfying activity. Like other addictions and obsessions, the 
more one takes in, the more one requires - and the less one enjoys the process 
(Etzioni, 1995: 123). 
The 'obsession' with pursuing private interests leads only to emptiness, so "[p]eople 
are better off when they combine their self-advancement with investment in their 
community" (1995: 124). To this end, Etzioni (1995) proposes a set of measures 
aimed at enhancing the communitarian 'nexus', or at shifting attention away from 
the self-interest of private individuals towards an interest in the public good. These 
measures include: 
... changing orientation, changing the "habits of the heartll; working out conflicts 
between career needs and community bonds; redesigning our physical 
environment to render it more community friendly; and fostering volunteer 
endeavours that do not trivia lise and squander our commitments to the 
commons (Etzioni, 1995: 123). 
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But as Smart (1999: 175) notes, although these measures acknowledge the need 
to move from a defensive self-interested perspective towards one that recognises 
the need and potential benefits of being for the other, Etzioni does not demonstrate 
how this 'transformation in attitude' might be realised. The thrust of Etzioni's (1995) 
argument is that if the self is made critically aware of how she benefits from being a 
responsible person, then she will become more conscious of her community and 
more willing to accept her responsibilities. The central difficulty with this argument is 
that it is self-perpetuating within a closed circle. As Smart (1999: 174, 175) points 
out, it avoids considering the root cultural and economic causes of the erosion and 
fragmentation of the moral. In particular, it does not provide grounds for 
understanding how being morally responsible for others is possible given the 
predominance of market forces and the isolated self-interested sovereign subject 
the market promotes. Nevertheless, viewed as a neo-Aristotelian and rhetorical 
argument, it does provide a way of dealing with the so called 'prisoners dilemma' 
(see Etzioni, 2001). 
Etzioni's (1995, 2001) work achieves this precisely because it is a self-perpetuating 
argument within a closed circle. It starts with the assumption that people are 
increasingly isolated and self-interested, although without diagnosing the process of 
individualisation or detraditionalisation that leads to this situation (Smart, 1999). 
The prisoner's dilemma is that in order to better her life, she needs to co-operate 
with other prisoners but is only able to achieve this cooperation in very minimal 
ways because of the structural conditions of the prison. Similarly, the self-interested 
person is only marginally able to communicate with others because of the 
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restrictions imposed by her own self-interest. However, while it would be in 
everybody's interest if communication could be enlarged, the blinkers of self­
interest make this difficult to achieve. Therefore, structures need to be put in place 
to entice this communication and such structures follow the model of the community 
(Etzioni, 2001). 
Etzioni's (1995, 2001) communitarianism, therefore, is about re-establishing 
community values so that the individual can become more aware of her 
responsibilities and more willing to contribute to the community. This concern has 
two components to it. On the one hand, a concern with community and the moral 
order, its breakdown, fragmentation and need to be shored up with new values, and 
on the other, the kind of subjects produced by this dysfunctional moral order and 
the kinds of subjects a communitarian order would produce. Underscoring this is 
the belief that self-interest can be squared with a commitment to community. 
Neo-liberalism and the argument for market collectivism 
A similar range of arguments are made by David Schmidtz (1998). Schmidtz (1998) 
argues that people should internalise their own responsibilities; to see their own 
welfare, their own future or the consequences of their actions as their own problem 
and not anybody else's (1998: 8, 9). Like Etzioni (1995), he believes that some kind 
of culture should be institutionalised if it helps people take ownership of their 
responsibilities (1998, 10, 11) and he believes that nineteenth century institutions 
like Friendly Societies, based around the idea of mutual aid, provide examples of 
such cultures (1998,60-79). Schmidtz's (1998) argument with the welfare state is 
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that it promotes 'externalising' responsibilities, enabling people to see their own 
welfare as somebody else's, in particular the government's, problem. His (1998) 
argument is that by looking at welfare and responsibility: 
... from a static perspective, where the only question is how to comfort those 
who suffer, internalising responsibility seems beside the point. Thus, a static 
perspective naturally gravitates towards helping people in ways that externalise 
responsibility. That gravitation toward externalized responsibility, 1 believe, 
explains why current welfare policies have not been more successful. Crudely 
put, we are asking our institutions to guarantee that people will not need to fend 
for themselves (or each other) when we ought to be asking our institutions to 
make people willing and able to fend for themselves (and each other) 
(Schmidtz, 1998: 21-22). 
The difficulty with arguing that people should take full ownership of their 
responsibilities is that it assumes that people can control the conditions through 
which to secure their responsibilities. To make this argument, Schmidtz (1998) talks 
about property rights and how the possession of property as a right enables people 
to take ownership, and to act on their responsibilities in meaningful and productive 
ways. Through this focus on property rights, Schmidtz (199B) can argue that the 
tragedy of the commons is less of a tragedy where people take ownership of 
property and accept responsibilities for it. The outcome is that where people are 
institutionally enabled to take responsibility, as through property rights, they 
internalise responsibility and contribute towards the comnlons. 
This argument for a privatisation of responsibility is also an argument for market 
collectivism. The assumption is that where people have to pay into some form of 
collective insurance or where they, as a group, can control their own collective 
property, they are more likely to see their responsibilities for their common purpose 
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as their own and be more successful at organising and sustaining their property 
(Schmidtz, 1998: 56, 57, 61). Market collectivism, it is argued, avoids the 'tragedy 
of the commons' brought on by the collectivisation of responsibility into the state 
(1998: 76). Schmidtz (1998: 65-67) argues that the collectivisation of welfare in the 
market was, in the time of the Friendly Societies, and could be again, exceptionally 
effective and less expensive and he implies that it would be almost as inclusive as 
centralised state welfare. Moreover, Schmidtz (1998: 75) advances the argument 
that the externalisation of responsibility and its centralisation in the state 
administration initiated a process of social change that led to demoralisation and 
individualisation. The problem now is how to "instill a general ethos of personal 
responsibility, thereby helping people, and thus their babies, from falling into 
poverty in the first place?" (1998: 18). For Schmidtz (1998: 78), this means 
institutionalising market collectivisn1 so that everybody knows that their "income is 
contingent on producing something that other people value." This means 
generating cultures and institutions that call on people to make provision for their 
own welfare themselves through the market, a trajectory that New Labour's welfare 
reforms have set in train. The aim of these policies is to get people to take the 
moral attitude of a rational adult towards their responsibilities. Justice, for Schmidtz 
(1998: 80-96), would ensue as a consequence of such policies since these policies 
work by "inducing behaviour that serves the common good" (1998: 88). That is, 
they contribute towards the generation of mature adults with a strong sense of self 
esteem who see the benefits in co-operative living arrangements (1998: 94,95). 
After all, the logic goes, if everybody is contributing in some way, everybody will be 
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better off and the common good of a co-operative peaceful society will be 
advanced. 
The classic liberal argument for moral collectivism 
Goodin (1998) restates the classic liberal arguments to challenge market 
collectivism by advancing a theory of welfare responsibility based on moral 
collectivism. Generally speaking, the context for Goodin (1998) is defined by a 
privatisation of responsibility along the lines of a causal and blame oriented model 
of thinking. Single mothers on benefit, he notes, are blamed for their welfare 
dependency so that: 
... "personal responsibility" and "taking charge of their own lives" seem primarily 
matters of getting control over their own fertility - not necessarily by means of 
abortion, which would widely be regarded as evading responsibility yet again, 
but rather through prudent contraceptive practices or (better yet) through sexual 
abstinence (1998: 105). 
His argument is with all of those conservative and neo-conservative perspectives 
that expect people to take control over their own lives themselves, and accept 
responsibility for them as prudent mature adults. For Goodin (1998), life is more 
complex then these perspectives allow. For example, the pregnant single woman's 
choice not to have an abortion is widely accepted as a responsible choice, but her 
choice to stay at home and raise her children herself is seen as irresponsible where 
it is made by a woman who would have to live on welfare benefits and who is not 
independently wealthy (1998: 110, 111). 
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Goodin (1998) seeks to build an idea of social responsibility as a collectivisation of 
moral responsibility, which means a sharing of responsibility through some form of 
division of labour or by way of an organisation or institution (1998: 146, 147). He 
conceives of this collectivisation in instrumental terms. Sharing responsibility is a 
means to achieve the end of securing members material welfare. So collectivisation 
is justified only to the extent that it realises this end. Collectivisation does not 
disburden the individual of her responsibilities; rather she is "a means to 
discharging our shared collective responsibilities." Collective remedies are held at 
the ready for "whenever individuals themselves fail to discharge those 
responsibilities effectively for themselves" (1998: 147), since such responsibilities 
are ultimately shared (1998: 148). Furthermore, he circumscribes the collective he 
has in view to some group, conceived in the fuzzy terms as one that is already 
interacting in some way (1998: 148). Finally, the focus of collectivisation on his 
theory building analysis, is "merely for one another's well being or welfare" (1998: 
149). 
This conception is similar to the collectivist and incorporationist concept of 
responsibility identified with social democracy above. But Goodin (1998) gives it a 
twist by insisting that this moral collectivism should be 'forward looking' and 'task­
oriented', a form that is always looking for ways of dealing with situations and the 
best remedies for particular or social problems (1998: 152). Its aim "is to tell us 
what to do in the future" and it works by "specifying whose job it is to see to it that 
certain tasks are performed and that certain things are accomplished" (150). He 
distinguishes this from 'backward looking' or 'blame responsibility', which holds that 
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U[t]hose who are responsible for causing an unfortunate situation are responsible for 
fixing it" (1998: 150). Moreover "those who are responsible [in a causal sense] 
should be held responsible. Insofar as they got themselves into this situation, it 
should be their responsibility to get themselves out of it" (1998: 151). The collective 
and the state can then simply shirk all responsibility for the blameworthy's 
problems. 
The substance of Goodin's (1998: 155-171) argument is to show how the 
collectivisation of responsibility is ultimately a political issue and that 
institutionalising welfare responsibi.lities in state centred collectivities represents a 
better option in the long run. This is because pooling risks in market collectives is 
based on the idea that risks can be managed and accommodated by private 
insurance companies using actuarial principles. However, this way of pooling risks 
is inferior to state centred collectivities since the state can use other resources, like 
general taxation, to guard against risks should a recession occur. The issue in such 
situations is a matter of political will rather than market forces. In effect, for Goodin 
(1998) state centred collectives have provided, and can continue to provide, cultural 
and institutional frameworks that organise responsibilities in forward looking and 
task-oriented ways. 
Summary 
The theoretical arguments explored in this Chapter draw attention to the difficulties 
and challenges that the question of responsibility poses for contemporary society. 
These difficulties and challenges have been grouped under three main headings; 
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those connected with individuals becoming responsible; those concerned with the 
social organisation of responsible roles; and those concerned with responsible 
cultures. There are, necessarily, significant overlaps in these headings, but by 
making a theme of the personal, social t and cultural, these contributors call 
attention to precisely those issues that must be faced in incorporating policies 
around responsibility into society. 
While Habermas (1993, 1995) holds out the possibility that people can learn the 
meaning of responsibility in complex modern societies, Bauman (1993, 1995) and 
Fevre (2000) draw attention to the ways in which a capitalist and consumerist 
culture undermines individual responsibility taking. The issue here is far more than 
simply taking sides on a matter of intellectual debate. If we take up Habermas 
(1993, 1995), and we support people's efforts to unfold the rationality of norms 
affecting their own lives and become people who are more responsible as a result, 
we adopt a politics that is open to reason. This kind of politics argues that people 
are as they are, not because it is their own or society's fault, but because we simply 
have not clearly understood the structure of reason from the personal perspective. 
Taking up Bauman (1993, 1995) and Fevre (2000) means adopting a form of 
politics where it is both the individual's and society's fault that people do not act 
responsibly. The unit of analysis is not reason, but the moral impulse. The fact that 
people do not follow this moral impulse is explained as resulting from their own 
moral failings and the ideas promoted by capitalism that make it easier for people to 
not follow the moral impulse. To adopt this view is to take a highly moralistic view of 
responsibility and to call for a wholesale reorganisation of society so that morality is 
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placed back at its centre. While this politics is useful as a means of calling for 
change, it is of less use as a politics informing the reengineering of society. 
If the personal provides the basic focus for the analysis provided by Habermas 
(1993, 1995) Bauman (1993, 1995) and Fevre (2000), the social provides this focus 
for writers on the feminist ethics of care (Sevenhuijsen, 1998, 2000, Tronto, 1993, 
Lara, 1998) as well as Apel (1987a, 1987b, 1998). Each of these writers contribute 
arguments about the social organisation of society. In the case of the feminists 
(Sevenhuijsen, 1998,2000, Tronto, 1993, Lara, 1998), the issue is how these 
relations place the burdens of caring responsibilities disproportionately on women, 
and these writers set out to challenge systematically this burdening. For Apel 
(1987a, 1987b, 1998), the way society organises responsibilities is an issue 
growing in importance, and processes need to be identified that can help organise 
these responsibilities in a fair and just manner. While the feminist ethics of care 
contributes arguments tailored to the needs and interests of women, Apel (1987a, 
1987b, 1998) contributes ideas on how all such arguments could be received in 
discourse more generally. 
The final section dealt with the cultural dimension, or more precisely, with 
arguments about how basic cultural forms institutionalise responsible practices in 
everyday life. The general focus of these arguments is centred on how society can 
be configured to sharpen the perception of responsibility for welfare. Etzioni (1995) 
holds that if the individual could perceive how behaving in socially responsible ways 
would benefit herself, she would be more likely to behave responsibly. To adopt this 
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politics is to take up an individually or communally focused approach to 
responsibility, promoting the good for the group or 'club' (as Jordan, 1998, notes). 
This involves actively seeking to reward good behaviour with the rewards of a good 
community. It pays no heed to the area beyond the local, or any other moral and 
universal argument. Schmidtz (1998) defends a market collectivism on the grounds 
that where people have a direct interest in their own welfare, they will adopt 
practices that promote these interests. The market provides an appropriate 
mechanism for collectivising and activating such interest because people have 
control over their own interests and wi·1I not expect an exterior body like the state to 
guarantee the security of their welfare. While this politics may appear attractive at a 
superficial level, the problem is that it means promoting institutions from which 
those with large amounts of social, cultural and educational capital, already benefit 
'from. Goodin (1998) offers ideas for the institutionalisation of responsible practices 
that are more in keeping with the interests of the more vulnerable members of 
society. Goodin (1998) takes up the classic welfare argument that col/ectivising 
responsibility is both defensible and practicable as a way of securing the interests 
of all members of society. Politically, Goodin's (1998) moral collectivism offers a 
framework that has a clear moral dimension in an era when ideas emphasising this 
dimension are lacking. But it still means presenting arguments where it is 
organisations and institutions making up society, and not the individual, that 
perceives and deals with issues of responsibility. 
Responding to these issues is not without difficulty since there is no single 
framework that can incorporate the interests, needs and concerns addressed by 
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each theory. However, searching for such a framework involves taking on two 
things. Firstly, the academic social scientist who is involved in the production of 
knowledge through research is called upon by the principle of justice to construct 
organisational forms that are in the interests of everybody and do not merely 
promote sectional interests. This requirement places a great deal of strain on the 
social scientist since she is supposed to deconstruct and critically appraise current 
practices and seek to develop new social norms that better serve everybody's 
interests. This is the particularly difficult task that the few social scientists who have 
deservedly been called critical have managed. Nevertheless, it is the task of the 
social scientist to look at ways of constructing social action that best secures the 
interests of all parties to a problem - for example, to think of ways of dealing with 
crime that deals with the issues facing the criminal and the victim of crime. 
Secondly, it is the task of people interested in the equitable organisation of society 
to find ways of integrating these perspectives so that social forms can be developed 
that: 
• 	 promote peoples perceptions of their responsibilities without overburdening them 
or disburdening society, 
• 	 recognises and resources people's responsibilities in a just manner, 
• and focuses the perception of welfare responsibilities for both the individual and 
society. 
These are not objectives can be achieved using a single framework; rather what is 
needed is some combination of the sorts of ideas outlined in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Methods 
Introduction 
In this chapter I present an overview of the empirical data underpinning this study. 
The peculiar quality of contemporary discourses surrounding responsibility was 
identified in Chapter 1 and frameworks for understanding discourses of 
responsibility were identified in Chapter 2. These 'frameworks either took the form of 
agent centred theories structured to describe the ways an agent accepts her 
responsibilities, or cultural theories that explain the social context conditioning this 
acceptance of responsibility. In response to these theories, a framework was 
outlined that drew on a theory about how the individual accepts her responsibilities 
by drawing on norms in a way that appears relevant to her situation. The need for a 
systematic investigation of this relationship, which is the relationship between 
individually held and socially constructed concepts of responsibility, was asserted 
through an examination of critical commentaries that demonstrate how moral 
constructions are elided in favour of ethical ones in contemporary ideology. 
In order to investigate this relationship between the position of the actor and the 
constructions offered by reason and culture with respect to responsibility, I take up 
the Critical Theoretical approach in the tradition of the second generation of the 
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Frankfurt School (Kellner, 1989). The specific reason for this is that this tradition is 
critical of knowledge while theorising how knowledge is formed from the 
perspective of the actors involved (see Kellner, 1989). Such a framework offers an 
opportunity to use a theoretical scaffold to relate the perspective of an actor dealing 
with their world with the kinds of constructions of knowledge this actor uses and to 
treat these constructions in terms of wider constructions. Within this study, this 
involves the use of qualitative methods, and in particular, the semi-structured 
interview. In this Chapter I first elaborate on this perspective before detailing the 
empirical data used in this work. 
Qualitative research and critical theory 
The objectives that qualitative research is expected to fulfil are not easily achieved 
nor are the appropriate methods always obvious (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 
Sayer, 1992, Seidman, 1991). The difficulty with matching goals with methods is 
exacerbated when working in the tradition of Critical theory since, by its very nature, 
Critical theory disputes actual social reality by seeing this reality as historically 
created and dependent on asymmetrical power relations (Kellner, 1989, 
Brunkhorst, 1996). Against this, Critical theory casts the social sciences as serving 
an emancipatory project (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000). The idea central to 
critical theory is that social theories are either critical, and reveal illegitimate power 
relations, or they will obscure suppression (Kellner, 1989). The emancipatory 
interest of Critical theory is based on the idea that if people are made aware of the 
relations that govern their lives and how these conflict with their interests, people 
can work together to change these relations (Brunkhorst, 1996: 103, 104). In 
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particular, such relations are not understood as mere facts of life that people have 
no choice but to adapt to, but instead they are seen as relations that can be 
analysed from within (Brunkhorst, 1996, Gouldner, 1975, How, 2003). Thus, the 
empirical work of social research in the tradition of Critical theory is aimed at 
reconstructing the rationale of discourses in order to understand the mean ing of 
such discourses from the point of view of actors, and relate with these constructions 
in order to overcome suppressive situations through some kind of solidarity of 
action (Brunkhorst, 1996). The semi-structured interview approach can be used in 
the tradition of Critical theory as a means of understanding the meaning of 
discursive practices from the point of view of actors (Stoker, 1995, Steedman, 
1991: 53). 
The use of qualitative methods in Critical theory and the increasing interest in 
developing a qualitative methodology began as a response to positivism (Honneth, 
1991, Alvesson and Sk6ldberg, 2000). By rejecting a more positivistic approach 
according to which the "truth or otherwise of a statement can be determined 
through systematic empirical observation" (Stoker, 1995: 14), Critical Theorists 
concentrated on process and context (Alvesson and Sk6ldberg, 2000). While this 
approach sees contextualised meaning and knowledge as drawn from wider social 
mechanisms, the downside is that by locating a cultural object in the wider social 
and historical context, Critical theory may lack the specificity associated with more 
tightly empirical approaches, like grounded theory or ethnomethodology (Alvesson 
and Sk6ldberg, 2000: 130, 131). Thus, Alvesson and Sk61dberg (2000: 131) advise 
critically inclined researchers "to make use of existing empirical studies and 
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examples, and then to interpret or reinterpret them on the basis of the issues they 
have selected for study" and generally to "broaden one's receptivity to empirical 
data." However, because Critical Theorists see contextualised knowledge and 
meaning as structured by the interests and motivations of actors, and these 
interests and motivations are rationally structured, then it can organise its 
receptivity to data in accordance with these interests (Brunkhorst, 1996). This is the 
sense in which Critical theory is used here, as a framework that can relate the 
rational structure of knowledge and motivation from the actors point of view, to the 
wider social, historical, and cultural context (Brunkhorst, 1996, Strydom, 2000). 
The task of the researcher working in a critical framework is to dispute perceptions 
of social reality and to "distinguish what is socially and psychologically invariant 
from what is, or can be made to be, socially changeable, and to concentrate on the 
latter" (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000: 110). For this reason, the researcher's 
choice of which methods to employ in a qualitative study has emerged as an 
important topic for the social sciences. Thus, for example: 
To say that sociologists are in the business of creating concepts means that they 
are in the business of proposing and fashioning ways of looking at, thinking and 
talking about - and hence contributing to the very constitution of - social objects 
and social worlds. They are not simply studying a social world-apart, but are 
contributing to the construction and destruction of social objects. (Gouldner, 1975: 
175) 
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The implication here, that the researcher's ability to accumulate knowledge and 
learning about changes in social systems, attitudes and behaviours, is of central 
importance to critical theory (Alasuutari, 1998). This distinction between the 
invariant and the changeable in Critical theory coalesces around what is variously 
called knowledge constitutive interests (Apel, 1984, Kettner, 1996). This is the 
argument that knowledge is developed by people and in society in response to the 
interests and constraints posed in everyday life and in society more generally. 
Starting with this idea, it is possible to begin to look at knowledge as both fact and 
value; as something that is a part of our objective world, and as something that is a 
mere construction based on reason and principle. Understood in this way, 
knowledge can be dealt with as a construction appropriated from our common 
history. Thus knowledge can be analysed to expose its rationality so that it can be 
codified and transmitted or, where it breaks down, critically appraised (Strydom, 
2000). Equally, knowledge can be analysed as a social value, as a construction that 
organises social relations and binds people together into a complex range of 
relationships. This also echoes Arendt's decision to stand "within the circle with her 
subject, rejecting all the viewing posts around the perimeter from where the experts 
might have claimed to speak knowingly about the gazed on subject" (Minnich, 
1989: 134-135). This opens up the issue of the fairness or justice of social 
constructions (Habermas, 1996: 19-21). The idea of a knowledge constitutive 
interest binds knowledge conceived as fact and value together because the 
knowledge bequeathed to us by our common history represents a mode of action 
that reflects and organises the use of knowledge in everyday life (Apel, 1984, 
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Kettner, 1996). In effect, knowledge is not simply a product but also "a production 
context" (Knorr Cetina, 1999: 6). 
Positioning a Critical Theoretical account of responsibility 
Critical theory, as it is practiced by the Frankfurt School, is based, as Honneth 
(1994) points out, on the left-Hegalian notion that critique should be anchored in 
some real social need or a social movement. This implies that Critical theory should 
identify in some way with a social actor. In dealing with responsibility in the context 
of welfare a number of potential actors and social needs recommend themselves. 
For example, in discussions of welfare responsibility, the state, pensioners and lone 
mothers are particularly prominent. By identifying with one of these groups it would 
be possible to produce a form of knowledge that will "have practical political effects 
because its critique will be taken up and disseminated by those in whose name the 
critique is voiced" (Freundlieb, 2000: 83). But this, as Freundlieb (2000) points out, 
does not provide any reasons why such a critique would be justifiable. Why would it 
be necessary to identify with a particular actor when it is the relationship among 
actors and the knowledge they share that is important? 
In this work I do not attempt to identify with any specific actor and their discourse on 
responsibility. Instead, I have carried out this work in line with Strydom's (2001) 
suggestion for a renewal of Critical theory. Strydom's (2001) approach focuses on 
the knowledge being constructed through communication among various actors to 
identify problems that need to be addressed. In putting together this work, I do not 
take up the position of any kind of objective observer of society on the model of 
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Rawl's (1971) 'veil of ignorance'. Instead I take the position of another person in 
society who has rights and responsibilities but who has concerns about the 
changing nature of responsibility in society. These concerns include the shift of 
responsibility for personal health and well-being to the individual person; for 
example, the call for the burden of healthcare provision to be shifted to the 
individual smoker who, it is argued, is responsible for the decline of their own 
health, and ultimately, the assertion that they be denied the standards of medical 
care that is available to the 'deserving' sick. My position is that of an interested 
citizen or an observing but not indifferent critic who wants to help to clarify the 
debate by critically examining the discourses used to deal with responsibilities. 
A constructivist approach 
The research presented here focuses on how responsibility is individually held and 
socially constructed. I take up Habermas's (1984, 1987, 1996) constructionist 
approach which brings together an action theory to focus on the individual as she 
makes her decisions and a social theory that observes how she uses language, 
discourse and narrative to construct and communicate knowledge (Habermas, 
1987: 136, 137, Lara, 1998). In the social sciences more generally, social 
constructionism denotes a general approach to how knowledge is formed and used 
for social effect. As Burr (1995, 3-5) points out, constructionists typically take a 
critical attitude towards knowledge, looking on knowledge as historically and 
culturally contingent and as constructed through interactions between people. This 
constructionism focuses on the social production of knowledge, the structure of the 
knowledge thus produced and the relations between this knowledge and the 
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knowledge used to organise action in the wider society. While it does not 
completely overlook the context in which this knowledge is produced, these 
contexts are not accorded a high degree of methodological priority (Outhwaite, 
1999, Delanty, 1997). By contrast, Habermas's (1996) constructivism directly faces 
the relationship between knowledge and action. 
Critical realists have disputed the radicalism of constructionism (for example, Harre, 
2002, for a review of this debate see Delanty, 1997). However, for Outhwaite 
(1999), Habermas's methodological integration of the individual's reality with the 
knowledge she develops and uses represents a compromise between 
constructionism and realism. The particular brand of constructionism that emerges 
from Habermas's (1984, 1987) work is critical of knowledge from the perspective of 
the reality of people's lives. In this sense, it represents the methodological 
foundation of Critical theory because being critical in this way means retaining a 
focus on emancipation (Brunkhorst, 1996). Criticising and appraising knowledge 
from the point of view of the real interests of everybody concerned holds open the 
possibility of constructively challenging and reconstructing this knowledge so that it 
more fully recognises everybody's interests (Rehg, 1994). 
Responsibility in Habermas's concept of the lifeworld 
The mechanics of this constructivism can be elaborated using Habermas's (1987) 
concept of the lifeworld. The reason for this is that Habermas's (1984, 1987) 
constructivism takes together a social theory in the tradition of Durkheim with an 
action theory in the tradition of Weber (Honneth, 1991). In addition, this lifeworld 
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theory (1987) presents some concepts about responsibility that have been used 
throughout this study require an explanation. 
Habermas's (1987) two level concept of society, that is, society as simultaneously a 
system and a lifeworld has been heavily criticised (Giddens, 1987, Mouzelis, 1992, 
How, 2003). This criticism ranges from its dualistic or so-called 'boxer' 
characterisation of society when society is not that simple, to ultimate justification 
for functionalism contained in the two level concept of society (Honneth, 1991), and 
its perceived idealisation of the lifeworld. Such criticisms put this model beyond 
sensible use as a social theoretic concept (Strydom, 2000), however Honneth 
(1991) and Layder (1997) continue to defend this distinction. Rather than follow this 
system lifeworld dichotomy, I focus on how responsibility plays a key role in 
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 Habermas's (1987) concept of the lifeworld. While the lifeworld forms one part of 
this two level theory of society, it is also a theory of society that resolves Durkheim 
with Weber (Honneth, 1991). The concept of the Iifeworld situates society as a 
space in which people communicate to resolve issues and stabilise social relations. 
Therefore it is based on the orientation towards solidarity and stability which, 
drawing on Durkheim, is based on the fact of morality and, drawing on Weber, 
recognises the deep-rooted nature of social conflicts (Habermas, 1987, Honneth, 
1991 ). 
Habermas (1987: 134, 135) takes up Schutz and Luckmann's (1973) concept of the 
lifeworld to articulate how an actor is both the initiator of actions for which she is 
responsible and the product of a cultural heritage that seems obscure but furnishes 
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her with the resources upon which to make decisions about actions. Indeed, 
Habermas (1987: 135) feels it is better to develop a concept of the real everyday 
lifeworld as a tool for social scientific analysis than to make use of a purely 
phenomenologically based action theory. To this end, he uses the idea of narration 
(1987: 136, 137) to develop a concept of the lifeworld that can explain how 
language, as a medium for coming to an understanding, takes care of the different 
tasks of the lifeworld. Habermas thereby identifies three functions: 
In coming to an understanding with one another about their situation, 
participants in interaction stand in a cultural tradition that they at once use and 
renew; in coordinating their actions by way of intersubjectively recognised 
criticisable validity claims, they are at once relying on membership in social 
groups and strengthening the integration of those same groups; through 
participating in interactions with competently acting reference persons, the 
growing child internalises the value orientations of his social group and acquires 
generalised capacities for action (Habermas, 1987: 137). 
Language is used to arrive at a mutual understanding of an issue with reference to 
the shared 'stock of knowledge' or tradition. It is used to coordinate action and 
thereby helps to stabilise relations of solidarity and integrate members. Finally, 
language is used to help socialise people and so is instrumental in helping the child 
develop a sense of identity. For Habermas (1987: 138) these functions of language 
help maintain what he refers to as the 'structural components of the lifeworld': 
culture, society and personality. These three components clearly parallel the action 
theoretic idea of three worlds that people act in relation to. The point, for Habermas, 
is that the components of the lifeworld are not related in a simple one-to-one with 
the processes of coming to an understanding. Instead, each reproduction process 
makes a contribution to each structural component. However, the relation between 
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culture and cultural reproduction, society and social reproductionand between 
personality and socialisation are the core functions. The following diagram 
represents these core and subsidiary functions by marking the diagonal: 
Figure 4.1 Contributions of Reproduction Processes in Maintaining the Structural 
Components of the Lifeworld 
Repr Culture SOciety Personality 
duction Oi nsions 
processes evaluation 
I nte rpretive Socialisation 
Cultural schemes fit Legitimations patterns Rationality of 
Reproductio for consensus knowledge 
n ("valid Educational 
knowledge") goals 
Legitimately 
Social Obligations ordered Social Solidarity of 
Integration interpersonal membership members 
relations 
Interpretative Motivations Interactive 
Socialis­ accomplishm for actions capabilities Personal 
ation ents that conform ("personal Responsibility 
to norms identity") 
Source: Habermas, 1987: 142, 143 
Briefly, the process of cultural reproduction is primarily about securing the 
"continuity of tradition and coherence of knowledge sufficient for daily practice" 
(1987: 140) so that knowledge can be used and renewed in a way that is in keeping 
with inherited worldviews. These interpretative schemas are also necessary to 
secure society and to communicate patterns of appropriate behaviour that people 
can internalise into their personality. The criterion of success here is the rationality 
of knowledge transmitted which, if disrupted, results in people sensing a loss of 
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meaning and an inability to orientate or legitimate themselves (1987: 139, 140). The 
process of social integration is about keeping society together. Society is integrated 
by way of the establishment and use of norms that legitimately coordinate social 
relations. Thus, the norms in question relate with both institutions that provide 
norms that govern action and the norms that organise everyday interaction. This 
process assumes the existence of a system of culturally instutionalised ideas about 
normative obligations, while such norms contribute to the creation of a social 
identity in people so that they can feel like members of a social group or society. 
The success of processes of social integration can be identified in terms of the 
strength of feelings of solidarity which, if disturbed, becomes manifest as a sense of 
anomie and social conflict (1987: 139, 140). Finally, the process of socialisation is 
about how people develop the ability to interact with others in society. People's 
ability to interact is embodied in the development within them of a personality that 
they can use to handle new situations in a way that is "in harmony with collective 
forms of life" (1987: 141, emphasis in original). If people develop an identity in this 
way, they develop the ability to interpret their cultural tradition and they internalise 
the motivation to act in accordance with accepted norms. The success of this 
process can be identified in how responsible the new personalities are and whether 
disruptions manifest in "psychopathologies and corresponding phenomena of 
alienation" (1987: 141). 
This schema, developed by Habermas (1987), has been largely accepted and 
utilised by his followers (for example, Eder, 1996). It is a theory about how society 
is reproduced and stabilised using language. On this account, responsibility plays a 
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role on the level of social integration and socialisation. Society is integrated using 
norms that establish obligations for each member of the community that are derived 
from the general culture, while the capacity of the individual to successfully interpret 
the cultural tradition and interact with others turns on their ability to take 
responsibility for action. A breakdown in the ideas and norms that people use to 
organise responsibility would, on the one hand, become manifest in the way that 
norms organise obligations and reverberate through the process of social 
integration unsettling the sense of collective identity and introducing a sense of 
social anomie and personal alienation. On the other hand, a disruption in the 
socialisation process would lead to a general diminution in the extent to which 
people take responsibility for their action. Such a disruption would reverberate 
throughout the kinds of characteristics and personalities that people in society 
develop. This would become manifest in a rupture in tradition as people can no 
longer successfully interpret received stocks of knowledge, a withdrawal of 
motivation to act in accordance with social norms, and an increase in 
psychopathologies as people develop amoral and perhaps criminal or aggressive 
tendencies (Habermas, 1987: 141-143). 
Conceptual ising responsibility 
Using Habermas's (1987) concept of the lifeworld, I have been able to 
conceptualise responsibility in two directions. The analysis is focused on the kinds 
of knowledge that people use to stabilise relationships and the reality of life in an 
insecure world. On the one hand, I use Dean's (2002) taxonomy of ideological 
discourses of responsibility, outlined in Chapter 2 above, to conceptualise the forms 
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of knowledge presented as hegemonic and to which actors in society are expected 
to adapt in some way. On the other hand, I use a framework drawn from Habermas 
(1990, 1995, outlined in Chapter 2 above) to conceptualise the way in which people 
individually rationalise their responsibilities in connection with socially constructed 
norms of responsibility. By using two separate models, I sensitise the analysis to 
both hegemonic and individual discourses of responsibility. 
Dean's (2002) taxonomy conceptualises the ways in which ideological discourses 
work to stabilise culture, society and personality by emphasising the need for useful 
knowledge, the sense in which values can orient society, the moral validity of 
values, or the capacity of the person to accept responsibility for their action. Society 
is stabilised using some combination of the following: 
• 	 a discourse of 'conditional obedience' that elicits responsible action from people 
who behave irresponsibly or strategically in light of their self-interest 
• 	 a discourse of 'civic duty' that operates using ideas about balancing rights with 
responsibilities in liberal societies 
• 	 a discourse of 'moral obligation' that calls on people to behave in in a way that 
conforms to collective loyalties and traditions 
• 	 and a discourse of 'ethical responsibility' that calls on people to behave 
responsibly through appeal to reasons, and reflexively arrived at decisions within 
a democratic society (see Dean, 2002: 200, 201, Chapter 2 above). 
Complementing this is a framework designed to understand the individual's 
attitudes towards norms and how these attitudes structure the acceptance of 
163 
-responsibility taken up from Habermas (1990, 1995). This framework enables me to 
conceptualise the way people use discourses that help them to interpret their 
situation in their culture, to draw the motivation to act in the ways society deems as 
responsible or to develop the ability to interact successfully with others. This 
framework can also be drawn into a taxonomy such as the following: 
Reflective attitude towards norms A B 
Logic: Ethical Logic: Moral 
Social discourse: 
Reformist 
Social discourse: 
Reflexive 
Individualist 
Cultural discourse: 
Civic Duty 
Cultural discourse: 
Conditional Obedience 
Cultural discourse: 
Ethical Responsibility 
Cultural discourse: 
Moral Obligation 
Collectivist 
Social discourse: 
Strateg iclcaIculative 
Socia/ discourse: 
Conformist 
Logic: Strategic/calculative Logic: Conformist 
C Unreflective attitude towards 
social norms 
D 
Figure 4.2 Taxonomy of discourses of responsibility from the actor's point of view 
The above taxonomy (figure 4.2) draws together the different discourses around a 
vertical axis that distinguishes between a critical and reflective attitude to social 
norms on the one hand and a more unreflective attitude to social norms on the 
other. The horizontal axis distinguishes between a focus on the individual and one 
more orientated towards the collective. Within these axes a taxonomy can be 
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constructed that articulates how people stabilise their relationship with others and 
society by using: 
• 	an ethical discourse about reforming (quadrant A) the norms governing the 
situation that the self or collective is in, so that she/they can secure conditions 
that are more favourable to the project of realising the good life for her/them, 
whilst being responsible means continuing to be the person she, or society they, 
claim to be 
• 	a moral discourse (quadrant B) about reflexively considering the needs of the self 
and other in the formation of social norms, so that norms can be designed that 
adequately reflect these interests. Being responsible here means attending to the 
needs of others and seriously considering all arguments in the process of 
developing social norms 
• 	a calculative discourse (quadrant C) in relation to authority and a strategic 
discourse in relation to others, so that being responsible means obeying the 
authority figure or ensuring that self and other gain equal proceeds from actions 
• 	a discourse about conforming (quadrant D) to roles on the one hand and norms 
on the other, so that being responsible means dutifully acting in accordance with 
roles or in light of the norms valued by society 
The objective in using both of these taxonomies is to critically analyse both the 
hegemonic discourses of responsibility that people are supposed to adapt to and 
the constructions that people actually use to make sense of, and deal with, their 
own responsibilities. In presenting the analysis, I make use of the three processes 
identified by Habermas (1987). Thus Chapter 5 deals with the kinds of knowledge 
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developed by New Labour to secure responsible action, thereby the norms people 
are supposed to adapt to. Chapter 6 deals with the personal relationship with norms 
adopted by the informants. Chapter 7 investigates the informant's views on the 
cultural fabric of responsibility and on social integration through welfare state 
institutions. However, first it is necessary to clarify how the empirical research 
presented here was gathered in the field. 
The research project 
The aim of this research project was to understand the social constructions of 
responsibility in a society where responsibility was deemed to be increasingly 
privatised. The research project was structured to address the question of the 
relationship between social constructions of responsibility and how these 
constructions are individually held. This was a central question that had been 
partially dealt with in the literature (Finch and Mason, 1993, Duncan and Edwards, 
1999). 
The analysis of the data presented in the following chapters takes up the 
Habermasian constructivism outlined above by first exploring the hegemonic 
construction of responsibility that people are expected to adapt to by way of an 
analysis of New Labour's press releases. The corpus of press releases consisted of 
69 press releases issued by the New Labour government between September 2000 
and February 2001 (copies of these press releases are provided in Appendix 2). A 
textual analysis of these documents was carried out, a process which contrasts with 
the second form of data collection and analysis that is based on interviews. In total, 
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31 interviews were analysed. The corpus of interviews comprises of a secondary 
analysis of 9 interviews with benefits administrators carried out by Dean and 
Rodgers (2004), and 22 interviews conducted and analysed more specifically for 
the purposes of this study. At the research design stage, it was envisaged that I 
would conduct interviews with benefits administrators within the environs of a wider 
research project conducted by Dean and Rodgers (2004). However, a number of 
difficulties were encountered in trying to access a large enough sample of benefits 
administrators to make this practical. I was granted access to the transcripts of 
Dean and Rodgers (2004) interviews, and the analysis presented in Chapter 5 of 
benefits administrators' discourses is based on these transcripts. 
The interviews were conducted as a way of accessing the constructions of 
responsibility used by different groups; by administrators in the Benefits Agency, by 
people who work for various welfare rights organisations, by ordinary members of 
the public and by benefits recipients. Through an analysis of a corpus of New 
Labour's press releases and the discourses used by administrators working for the 
Benefits Agency (Chapter 5), hegemonic constructions are detailed and explored. 
By analysing the discourses of responsibility used by members of the public, people 
who work for welfare rights agencies, and benefits recipients, I investigate the 
discourses people use to discuss their responsibilities and to present themselves 
as responsible persons (Chapter 6) and to deal with matters of responsibility in 
society and welfare (Chapter 7). While the research proposal was initially designed 
to draw comparisons between these different groups, in the analysis phase it was 
felt that there were few significant differences in the discourses used by the 
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informants drawn from these groups. Therefore, the analysis that is presented here 
is of the discourses used by the primary research informants on the one hand 
(Chapters 6 and 7 below) and of the secondary analysis of interviews with benefits 
administrators on the other (Chapter 5 below). This distinction is used in view of the 
differences in the interview schedule used in these contexts. 
The ethics of researching responsibility 
The resea.rch data presented here is taken from three sources, press releases 
made available on government websites, interviews carried out as part of this 
research, and a secondary analysis of interviews carried out as part of a related 
project (Dean and Rodgers, 2004). A number of ethical issues arise through the 
use of these data sources. 
The issue of consent was particularly important in the context of the interviews with 
administrators in the benefits agency. A related research project presented by Dean 
and Rodgers (2004: 111) aimed to carry out similar interviews (with a greater 
emphasis on dependency and rights) with the same group of people (the interview 
schedule used in the two projects are included in appendix 1 below). However, this 
research encountered difficulties when trying to gain access to these informants. 
There was the problem of the 'gatekeeper' (Bulmer, 2001: 51) in the context of a 
rapidly changing organisation. Therefore, it was felt that a secondary analysis of 
Dean and Rodger's (2004) interviews would provide a way of accessing data that 
was constructed for similar purposes, while avoiding the difficulties that Dean and 
Rodgers (2004) encountered in accessing these research informants. 
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Informed consent is particularly important in qualitative research since it means 
"that those who are researched should have the right to know that they are being 
researched, and that in some sense they should have actively given their consent" 
(Bulmer, 2001: 49). While no form of signed consent was sought from the 22 
informants interviews for this project, the interview was prefixed with a short 
exposition explaining the context and reasoning behind the study. This preamble 
went as follows: 
You've probably noticed politicians these days always seem to be talking about 
people's rights or responsibilities, and the governments of both parties have 
been changing the basis of our rights. They've been trying to make people more 
responsible for their own lives and less dependent on the state. I'm just 
wondering what you make of your rights and responsibilities. What i want to talk 
to you about are your own responsibilities; your work responsibilities, your 
responsibilities to your friends, family society whatever, and what you think you 
have a right to expect from other people or the state. 
The purpose of this preamble was to clearly demarcate the context and reasoning 
behind the study. It highlighted the context as the changing relationship between 
rights and responsibilities as discussed in political discourse and pointed out that 
the questions were about the informant's own views on their personal and social 
responsibilities. As such, I clearly identified myself as an academic researcher who 
was asking the informants questions about their views, and who was in no way 
trying to set up a duplicitous relationship (see Bulmer, 2001: 49, 50) with the 
informant. Furthermore, assurances were given to the informants that the data 
would be stored and disseminated in a way that maintained confidentiality and 
anonymity. 
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Recruiting the informants 
The informants were recruited using a purposive or non-probability technique. Such 
techniques are frequently used to explore or develop theories, to develop research 
instruments, or as a way or accessing the factors judged relevant to a study without 
incurring the cost of carrying out a large-scale study (see Arber, 2001: 61,62, 
Briggs, 1998). In this case, since the objective was to develop an understanding of 
discourses of responsibility surrounding welfare, it was felt that a small sample of 
people purposively selected because they were cash benefits recipients, welfare 
rights advisors, or members of the public more generally, was appropriate. The 
benefits recipients and welfare rights advisors were contacted through relevant 
local agencies. Of these, the informants included in the group called 'general public' 
informants were the least defined. These could have been sampled for educational 
qualification, class status, ethnicity, gender, age and occupation. However, the 
research proceeded without defining these features. This was because the 
purposive sample was not based on any list of possible candidates. Instead, the 
research process relied on snowballing. Snowballing "involves contacting a 
member of the population to be studied and asking him or her whether they know 
anyone else with the required characteristics ... The nominated people are 
interviewed in turn and asked to identify further sample members" (Arber, 2001: 
63). Snowballing is useful where the researcher is a member of existing networks 
that she can use to find people to interview. It presented difficulties for this 
researcher who, being relatively new to the area, did not have a local network of 
contacts and had to rely on the small number of work based contacts to gain 
170 
informants. This turned out to be a very inconvenient method of producing a sample 
that was supposed to be convenient. 
The interview 
In order to retain a high degree of flexibility, the interview was semi-structured using 
a topic guide, and carried out in accordance with Lofland and Lofland's (1994) 
'guided conversation'. The interview was not designed to find out the frequency with 
which certain kinds of discourses were being used, it was only designed to identify 
the kinds of discourses that people are using. For this reason, the non-standard 
interview format, where the interviewer takes a flexible approach to the interview "~tff 
" 
using a topic guide, was used (Devine, 1995). 
.. , 
Fielding and Thomas (2001) endorse Lofland and Lofland's (1994) advice to " 
develop the interview guide by "thinking over what you find problematic or 
interesting about it [the topic]" and "teasing out what you find puzzling about the 
phenomenon" (2001: 132). Fielding and Thomas (2001: 132) describe a method of 
turning these puzzlements into clusters of topicS that can be ordered into a guide 
and they emphasise the importance of designing probes. For this research, the 
topic guide was developed on the basis of two puzzles; How do people understand 
their own and other people's, responsibilities? how do people understand the 
responsibilities of the state and the individual with regard to welfare? The topic 
guide was developed in a pilot interview with a colleague. This unrecorded pilot 
interview provided an occasion where the researcher could become comfortable 
with the guided nature of the conversation and gain confidence that the topics could 
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be seen as meaningful for potential respondents. As a result of the pilot interview a 
number of alterations were made to the topic guide, such as the inclusion of 
additional prompts and a certain amount of refining of some questions (Devine, 
1995). The interview was designed to uncover moral rationalities by inviting the 
informant to discuss the context of action. As Mason (2002) explains: 
in practical terms, this means that instead of starting the from interview 
questions which invite generalities or abstractions like 'What is good 
parenting?', the researcher needs to devise questions and modes of asking 
which both anticipate and discover the range of contexts in which moralities of 
parenting get done by or in relation to the interviewee. Questions, therefore, 
might focus upon the detail of how they 'do parenting' on an everyday basis or 
at 'definitive moments' (2002: 227) 
The topic guide itself took three parts. The first part of the interview was focused on 
the informant's own background and sought basic information such as age and 
occupation. The first topic was the informant's own responsibilities. The second 
was on how they perceived that other people accepted their responsibilities. The 
third topic of conversation was intended to directly address the connection between 
individual and state responsibilities for welfare. 
The conversation directly addressed these topics. The topic of the person's own 
responsibilities was raised with the question "what would you say your 
responsibilities are?" This was explored using a range of prompts about the actual 
nature of these responsibilities, the way these responsibilities are managed and 
shared and the sense in which the informant worried about them. How people more 
generally deal with their responsibilities was raised using the question "Generally 
speaking, do you think that people take their responsibilities seriously enough?" 
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This topic was explored using the informant's own examples, concerns or 
observations. Finally, the issue of the connection between the individual's and the 
government's responsibilities for welfare was raised using the question "do you 
think it is all right to be dependent on the state?" This topic was explored in relation 
to the extent to which the state should take responsibility for the individual. 
Of these topics the final one, which raised the question of the individual's and the 
state's respective responsibilities for welfare through the lens of dependency, may 
appear as somewhat controversial. It may be argued that to raise the question of 
dependency is to bring up a theme distinct from responsibility and thereby 
somehow contaminate the data. The interview was clearly defined in a preamble as 
being about rights and responsibilities and each of the questions, up to the point 
where the issue of dependency was raised, were all directly connected with 
responsibility. Moreover, the question of dependency was initially used as a probe 
but it tended to elicit a more interesting response from the informants and appeared 
to directly deal with the question of individual and state responsibility for welfare. 
Hence the question of dependency was placed at the centre and was probed for 
concepts of responsibility and rights. 
More generally, the adoption of a qualitative approach using the guided 
conversation was favoured since it offered a way of handing over much of the 
power once held by the researcher to the respondents. The task of critical research 
is not to identify patterns or "regularities or causal connections" (Alvesson and 
Skbldberg, 2000: 110). Instead, the objective of qualitative research is to enable 
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people to form their own constructions. The interview was used as a tool to allow 
informants create and control the space in which they discuss their responsibilities. 
The data 
Initially the press releases were to be selected using the criteria that they were in 
some way connected with the cash benefits system. Press releases were sought 
that dealt with maternity benefit, disability living allowance, housing benefit and 
jobseekers allowance. However, in practice this proved quite a difficult criterion not 
merely because, strictly applied, it turned up far too few press releases, but also 
because the press releases that did deal with these benefits tended to deal with 
responsibility in a rather oblique fashion. In the end the criterion of cash benefits 
was used only as a guide, selecting press releases that in some way dealt with how 
the welfare system might affect the income of its clients. Using this broader 
definition press releases were included that were concerned with Tax Credits, 
Stakeholder Pensions, benefit fraud and the benefits system more generally. The 
press releases were accessed through the government's websites, and the corpus 
was limited to the six months between September 2000 and February 2001. In all, 
69 press releases were included in the corpus (copies of these press releases are 
provided in appendix 2 below). 
Two sets of interviews were used in this research. Since the aim of this research 
was to investigate constructions of responsibility in different locations of society with 
an emphasis on welfare, it was felt that it was important to interview welfare 
administrators, welfare advisors/advocates and welfare benefits claimants. As 
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already mentioned, at the time of this research a related ESRC funded project 
(Dean and Rodgers, 2004) encountered difficulties accessing welfare 
administrators and, as a result, the data on benefits administrators discourses is 
drawn from this work. These interviews focused on the conceptions of rights, 
responsibilities and dependency as used and deployed by welfare administrators. 
In total, 22 interviews were conducted and transcribed verbatim for this project. 
When the nine interviews with welfare benefits administrators are included, a total 
of 31 interviews were analysed. Details of the 22 informants interviewed for this 
study are listed in table 4.2 below: 
Table 4.2 A list of the interviews 
Group 
Welfare 
advisors 
Occupation 
Co-ordinator of an 
Independent Living 
Project 
Housing Association 
Manager 
Senior Case worker 
Manager of a branch of 
a large national 
charitable organisation 
Advisor for large 
national charitable 
organisation 
Disability advocate 
Benefits 
claimants 
Unemployed health and 
safety worker 
Unemployed/Disabled 
labourer 
Unemployed cleaner 
Unemployed Accountant 
Gender 
Female 
Female 
Male 
Male 
Male 
Female 
Male 
Male 
Male 
Male 
Ethnici!~ 
White 
English 
White 
English 
White 
English 
White 
English 
White 
English 
White 
English 
White 
EnBlish 
White Irish 
White 
En..[lish 
Black African 
Identifier 
WA1 
WA2 
WA3 
WA4 
WA5 
WA6 
BC1 
BC2 
BC3 
BC4 
175 
Members NHS porter Male African MP1 
of public Caribbean 
Student Male White MP2 
English 
Housewife Female White MP3 
English 
Disabled student Female East African MP4 
Asian 
Academic Female White MP5 
Enqlish 
Retired policeman Male White MP6 
Enqlish 

Student Female British Asian MP7 

Bartender Male White MP8 

Scottish 
Corporate manager Male White MP9 
English 
Quantity surveyor Male White Irish MP10 
'!ttl 
Clergyman Male White I MP11 
English 
Retired county councillor Female White MP12 .. 
, , 
Enqlish 
\ , 
While nothing statistically representative can be claimed for this sample, 
nonetheless it does include voices from various social groups. The age of the 
informants ranged from twenty-three to seventy. In terms of their ethnicity, most (15 
in total) of the informants were White English, with one person who would be 
classed as White Scottish and two as White Irish. Of the remainder of the 
informants, one was Black African, one African Caribbean, and two were Asian. 
Finally, of the nine benefits administrators, two were men, seven women, one under 
40 years of age, eight aged over 40. Seven of these administrators worked in 
senior managerial roles, two in mid level management, and one administrator was 
from a minority ethnic group, the remaining eight were white (see Dean and 
Rodgers, 2004). These informants are identified in the text using the prefix DWP, to 
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stand for the Department of Work and Pensions, with an added numeral to identify 
different respondents. 
Analysing the data 
On completion, the interviews were fully transcribed but the decision was made to 
avoid using computer software packages or conversational or discourse analysis to 
analyse the transcripts. While software packages offer many benefits in organising 
and sorting data for ease of comparison (Fielding, 2001) the effective use of these 
packages depends on the researcher developing a sense of their research 
.,~.~
objectives and priorities before beginning to analyse and code interviews (Lewins, ,,. 
.2001: 306, 307), This assumes a level of experience that was only gained through "~ ~I 
: . 
1\ . ~this study. ',. . . 
! -I ~~ 
~ 
The analysis presented here draws heavily on a particular theoretical framework. In 
this regard it does not make use of discourse analysis which, in various ways, looks 
at how discourses are constructed using descriptions in specific situations and for 
particular ends (for example, Fairclough, 1995, Van Dijk, 1999, Wooffitt, 2001). Nor 
does it make use of the concept of repertoires which, whether of the linguistic 
(Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984, Wooffitt, 1993) or moral (Dean and Melrose, 1999a) 
kind, are "sets of discursive resources with which people constructed versions of 
the world for specific social purposes in specific social situations" (Wooffitt, 1993: 
293-294). The repertoire is supposed to capture the functional and dynamic 
character of these resources by systematising the ranges of descriptions and 
references that are used to different ends. 
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Whereas a discourse analysis exposes connections between descriptions, 
situations and the interests of actors, and a repertoire analysis exposes the mental 
maps that are drawn on for particular purposes, the analysis presented here seeks 
to explore the rational structure of discourses of responsibility. In this regard it 
comes closer to the tradition of frame analysis (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, 
Snow and Benford, 1992, Johnston, 1992). The metaphor of a frame has been 
developed in the new social movement literature as a means of understanding how 
cultural knowledge is organised into "an interpretative schemata that simplifies and 
condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, ,.
, ' 
'..• 
situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present and 
past environment" (Snow and Benford, 1992: 137). Frames are essentially problem 
solving devices, schemes or models that are based on past experiences or cultural 
templates and that are drawn on to interpret or deal with current situations 
(Johnston, 1995). By using the metaphor of a frame, forms of knowledge can be 
seen as elastic, symbolic or "accentuating devices that either underscore or 
embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust or 
immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable" (1992: 
137). 
Thus a frame is supposed to capture the way in which knowledge is based on 
models or schemes that are cultural in character and held by individuals. The idea 
of the frame draws on Swidler's (1986) more abstract concept of culture as a 'tool 
kit', but takes this further by investigating how this 'tool kit' organises perceptions of 
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the world and shapes the way people relate to their interests in the light of social 
constructions. Moreover, frame analysis provides a supplementary methodological 
framework to the Habermasian schema adopted here, since it looks into the 
constructions people use to frame, make sense of and interpret their 
responsibilities. Thus, it allows for a micro-level analysis of the rational structure of 
knowledge. 
Within this general cultural approach, I carried out an analysis of responses to 
interview questions. The aim of the analysis was to highlight similarities and 
differences between the accounts of responsibility used by the different informants. 
In so doing, a range of themes were identified and analysed. Theme analysis 
(Leininger, 1985; Taylor & Board, 1984) is not without its critics. For example, 
Strauss (1987: 57) finds that theme analysis is a useful method, but that when it is 
systematically applied, it amounts to nothing more than a "particularly careful 
journalism." It is used here as a way of picking out the prevailing meanings that 
informants attached to the phenomenon of responsibility. As a process, theme 
analysis first involves collecting data in such a way that the patterns of experience 
discussed by informants, and the attitudes towards the experience, are explored in 
the interview (Constas, 1992). The various themes are then related so that all of the 
data relevant to a theme is brought together. The next step is to examine the sub­
themes, that is, to focus on the concepts or motivations that order the various 
themes. It is the analysis of these sub-themes that is presented in this study. Such 
themes are identified by "bringing together components or fragments of ideas or 
experiences, which often are meaningless when viewed alone" (Leininger, 1985, p. 
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60). The emergent themes are pieced together to form a comprehensive picture of 
the informant's collective experience of their responsibilities. In effect, theme 
analysis is a variant of an interpretative approach where the concepts, categories 
and motivations identified in the themeatic patterns are elaborated on in an 
interpretative fashion. 
Issues of consistency and cohesion in carrying out both primary and 
secondary analysis of interview data 
While the above described method of analysis was used on all of the interviews, the 
act of bringing together interview data from two projects, however related, raises 
questions about the overall coherence and consistency of the results. Even where 
the research question is very similar, and the purposes of carrying out the research 
projects overlaps in significant ways, minor differences in the ways in which the 
data is collected, in the phrasing and sequencing of questions, can and does yield "j 
distinct results. This challenges the researcher to take differences in research 
questions into account and to present any findings in such a way that the relevant 
differences are accounted for. In reflecting on, and dealing with, this challenge two 
related issues need to be considered. Firstly, with regard to the context of the 
interview the issue arises as to what extent do the interview tools differ. The second 
issue relates with the way the data is to be handled. This is a more epistemic issue 
about the nature of the constructions developed in the interviews, and how these 
can be reconstructed as a systematised form of knowledge. 
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The research through which the secondary data that is used in this work was 
produced, was a related project carried out on the basis of similar research 
questions and for similar purposes. However, the interview schedule was different 
and the interviews were carried out by a research assistant employed on the project 
(copies of both schedules are contained in appendix one). Nevertheless, the 
schedule was set up in such a way that informants were informed that the interview 
sought to elicit how these informants understood dependency, responsibility and 
rights, and responsibility was introduced as the first theme in the interview. 
Because responsibility was introduced as the first theme, the informants could 
construct their responses without the risk of bringing in issues raised in other 
contexts. Moreover, the important point is that in both sets of interviews the 
informants were invited to construct their understandings of responsibility as they 
understood it, and were allowed the space to draw on whatever aspects of 
situations, norms, morals or values they felt were relevant to the context. Since the 
focus of this work is on constructions of responsibility, this freedom to construct 
responses is of central importance. 
Conclusion 
As the above discussion has shown, this thesis makes use of a qualitative 
approach in order to explore and analyse discourses of responsibility. In my 
analysis, I take up the tools of a qualitative approach, using theme analysis to 
reconstruct the accounts of responsibility used by research informants and in the 
New Labour government's press releases. A Critical Theoretical approach has 
been adopted as a way of understanding the various kinds of discourses that are 
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used, particularly the relationship between knowledge and norms about 
responsibility which are brought to bear on situations, and interactions in everyday 
life which require some way of ordering action. Thus, the Critical Theory developed 
by Habermas (McCarthy, 1984) was used because it offers a way of integrating 
social theory and action theory. 
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Chapter 5: New Labour's Hegemonic Discourse of 
Responsibility 
Introduction 
As has already been noted, the approach taken here is to analyse the hegemonic 
discourses that people are expected to adapt to on the one hand, and those that 
people make use of in dealing with their own responsibilities on the other. In this 
chapter, one hegemonic form of discourse is addressed by analysing the 
constructions of responsibility used firstly, by the New Labour government through 
an analysis of press releases (a version of this analysis has already been 
presented in Doheny, 2004), and then by Benefits Agency administrators through 
an analysis of interview transcripts. Through this analysis, the structure and 
meaning of the discourses about responsibility that people adapt to is elaborated. 
Constructing citizens through the news media 
Within the government's publicity machine, the press release constitutes a channel 
through which information is circulated into the public sphere, where it becomes a 
text that people can use to gather information or ways of understanding issues. 
Because of these characteristics the press release is both an institutionalised 
channel through which information flows as news, and it is a text that people take 
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up and read and perhaps retell to others (copies of these press releases are 
provided in appendix 2). It can therefore exert power across time and space. If the 
government is successfully to manage the frameworks for understanding the world 
that citizens use, it is important that press release writers successfully communicate 
information that conveys the government's preferred frames. This means the press 
releases have to be written to maximise media exposure and to grab the attention 
of target audiences (Jacobs, 1999a, 1999b). As a text available in the public 
sphere, press releases consistently communicate information and New Labour's 
frameworks of understanding. It is a highly managed form of communication 
(Gaber, 2000). 
The corpus of press releases that I am about to discuss consisted of 69 statements 
relating to a variety of cash benefits, government schemes to promote labour 
market participation, and the state regulation of private pensions that were issued 
within the six month period between September 2000 and February 2001. The 
majority of the press releases were issued by the former Department of Social 
Security, while six were issued by the former Department for Education and 
Employment. All the press releases were available from government websites. 
My analysis of these texts suggests they implicitly construct for news editors four 
kinds of reader/listener/viewer, corresponding to four kinds of citizen: the Heroic 
Citizen, the Passive Citizen, the Good Citizen and the Recalcitrant Citizen. 
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The Heroic Citizen 
For the heroic citizen, the publicising role of the press releases was restricted to 
either providing information or informing about other sources of information. There 
was no need to construct elaborate discourses, rather the press release writers 
could get straight to the point (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 Press releases for Heroic Citizens 
Claim Your Pension over the Phone: New Tele-Claim service for Pensioners 
People who are about to retire can now claim their State Pension by telephone 
rather than by filling in a form Alistair Darling, Social Security Secretary, announced 
today. 
Mr Darling said: "This new service will give people about to retire active assistance 
when they claim. It will provide a smooth, efficient and accessible service. This is 
part of my aim to modernise the services that the DSS offers (DSS, 2000e). 
Or: 
Want Information on Stakeholder Pensions? Ring a New Helpline 
People who want more information on stakeholder pensions can now ring a new 
helpline for impartial information, Social Security Minister Jeff Rooker announced 
today. 
Launching the helpline Mr Rooker said: "Stakeholder pensions will, for the first time, 
offer millions of people a good value, secure and flexible second pension (DSS, 
2000c). 
Both the press releases in Table 5.1 relate to the promotion of a new kind of 
specially regulated stakeholder pension scheme designed primarily for people with 
relatively low incomes. They follow the same format. The titles bring two statements 
together, combining some kind of action with a solution. These are highly charged 
insertions into the public sphere designed to gain the attention of people who are 
actively trying to find rational solutions to problems. But the particular issues raised 
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in these attention-grabbing headlines are issues of choice and access to a 
businesslike organisation. The question of how to proceed to set up one's pension 
is answered with a telephone based service, the need for information answered 
with a helpline. The citizen whose attention is secured through issues of choice and 
access is presumed to be satisfied by a businesslike service and a route to 
information. The first two paragraphs in the body of these press releases elaborate 
further on these postulated sources of satisfaction. However, what is notable in 
each case is the rational nature of the expectation. People who are retiring can 
expect 'smooth' and 'efficient' 'active assistance' from the state. Those assessing 
their pensions options have a right to expect an option that is 'good value, secure 
and flexible'. In effect this citizen expects options, incentives and a businesslike 
service. It is very much the classical liberal citizen dressed up in consumerist 
clothes. 
The Passive Citizen 
Whereas publicity for the heroic citizen was about providing information, publicity 
for the passive citizen was about reassuring and encouraging people actively to 
participate in providing for their own welfare. This interest in encouraging 
participation pushes information provision into the background. Instead the press 
release publicises information in ways that reassure people about securing their 
own welfare themselves. The press release does this by generating space where 
the passive citizen can integrate with others into a larger society so that she feels 
safe and secure in approaching state systems for help support and information. 
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Accomplishing such a feat in a press release means using complex operations (see 
Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Press release for Passive Citizens 
Getting on the dog and bone to find out about pensions 
Shadow the sheepdog is pictured leading the line for people who want to collar a 
decent pension. 
The canine TV advert star barked out advice to those who want to know whether 
stakeholder pensions are right for them. 
With just six weeks to go before stakeholder pensions become available, Pensions 
Advisory Service (OPAS) stakeholder helpline staff are now answering calls from 
people looking for help and information. 
Shadow's guest spot on the helpline came as new research reveals four out of five 
people find the technical jargon of pensions confusing and nine out of ten want 
simple advice. 
The DSS' current pension education marketing campaign involving talking 
sheepdogs encourages people to consider their pension options as early as 
possible. A set of eight booklets is available covering the whole range of options 
including stakeholder, personal, occupational and state pensions and written in 
clear and simple English (DSS, 2001 d). 
The press release in Table 5.2 is concerned once again with stakeholder pensions, 
but describes the actions of the canine star of a television advertising campaign 
aimed at getting people to act to secure pensions (for another interpretation of this 
press release see Mann, 2001: 148). But the people this campaign is aimed at are 
not receptive to information. Indeed they find the 'technical jargon of pensions 
confusing' (DSS, 2001d) and pensions themselves boring, making the press 
release writers work even harder: 
Too often people see pensions as a complex and boring subject that they do 
not want to think about. ...The DSS had to produce a campaign very different 
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from traditional public service information - something that would keep them 
watching when they hear the word 'pension' (DSS, 2001 a). 
The sheepdog is recruited in response to this perceived apathy. In fact the above 
press release plays out the way that the sheepdog is supposed to "keep them 
[passive citizens] watching when they hear the word 'pension'" (DSS, 2001 a). This 
is a citizen who is so easily turned off thinking about her welfare that it is at first 
necessary to convey messages to her by stealth. This press release does not 
publicise information, it publicises an image of people being brought together by a 
sheepdog and directed towards the Pensions Advisory Service and an assortment 
of booklets. Therefore this citizen is assumed to operate outside, or at the margins 
of, the public sphere. She needs to be drawn into the public sphere and made to 
feel safe and secure as part of the information gathering and options evaluating 
public. 
In the case of the press release in Table 5.2, the initial emphasis is not on the 
available information but rather on 'Shadow the sheepdog' integrating the passive 
citizen into the public sphere. The sheepdog, a dog defined according to its function 
in farming sheep, is used as a metaphor for the state. The sheepdog embodies 
many of the qualities of the state. It is a friend, a protector, a herder 'leading the 
line' and though it has hunting instincts, these are subdued allowing to work in the 
best interest of sheepish citizens. Furthermore, naming the sheepdog Shadow 
familiarises it while the name describes the sheepdog state in the activity of 
shadowing. It is always there shadowing the sheep or the passive citizen. 
Metaphorically the state is familiar, reliable and always working to protect its 
citizens. But in this press release the image of the state as sheepdog is shifted so 
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that the sheepdog leads sheepish citizens towards taking on more of the burdens of 
responsibility for their own welfare themselves. Shadow 'is pictured leading the line' 
for people who 'collar' (Le. both catch and burden themselves with a restrictive 
band) 'a decent pension'. This sheepdog 'barks out advice' and talks, but it is 
communicating not with people who want information, but who want to know the 
right answer. It barks at 'those who want to know whether stakeholder pensions are 
right for them' and in talking it 'encourages people to consider their pensions'. The 
passive sheepish citizen is one who needs to be told what the right thing to do is or 
needs to be encouraged into thinking about her welfare. Significantly though, 
however much the press release writers seek to imagine the state as a sheepdog, 
the citizen is still expected to approach state agencies for information, or to pick up 
such information from the public sphere. This passive citizen who needs to be 
encouraged to think is supposed to 'call' helplines for information or pick up 
booklets. The government extends the public sphere making it receptive to this 
passive citizen, but there is still no guarantee that this citizen will enter this sphere. 
The Good Citizen 
The heroic citizen was the rational adult of the liberal imaginary and the passive 
citizen was marginally involved in matters of public welfare. But between the 
rational hero and the socially malleable passive citizen, was a good citizen who 
shared traits with both of these. Like the heroic citizen, the good citizen was 
independent and rational, actively looking for information. Like the passive citizen, 
the good citizen acts in ways that are defined socially. What differentiates the good 
citizen is also the very feature that elides her with these others. She wants to know 
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how to be responsible like the heroic citizen, but not in the individualistically rational 
sense of the hero. Rather her understanding of being responsible is negatively 
defined as not being a burden on others. This places her right between the hero, 
who is positively responsible by rationally choosing among her options, and the 
passive sheep who is influenced by the acts of others and is loosely integrated into 
society as a public sphere. For example, the press release in Table 5.3 
accompanies the one aimed at the passive citizen discussed above, but here it is 
aimed at the good citizen. 
Table 5.3 Press release for Good Citizens 
Pension Awareness Ad Blitz Begins 
Man's best friend has taken the lead in a new Government campaign to get people 
to think about planning for their pension. 
Using Oscar-winning techniques that brought 'Babe' to life the £6.5 million 
marketing campaign aims to make people aware of the need to plan for their 
retirement and consider all the pension options available to them. 
Launching the campaign Alistair Darling, Social Security Secretary, said: "Obviously 
I 
. the basic state pension will remain the foundation of income in retirement. 
"But now people want to retire on the highest possible income and they can do that 
1 by saving through an occupational pension, personal pension or - from April - the 
I stakeholder pension. Yet two out of five people in work today still have no provision 
j except the state pension. 
! "This campaign is about getting people to consider all the options for retirement." 
[jDSS,2001a). 
The press release in Table 5.3 is presented more as a discussion of the meaning 
and implications of advertising campaigns than as a piece of publicity about 
pensions initiatives. It draws the reader in by seemingly impartially observing how 
the cinematic techniques developed for the film Babe are being used in the context 
190 
of pensions. This, of course, invites discussion of this development in opinion 
essays, suggesting pensions as at least a subtopic of discussion thereby gaining 
more publicity. But publicity for whom? Publicity for those influenced by public 
opinion as it is presented in the media. The press release goes on to offer its own 
interpretation of this development. The advertising campaign is firstly presented as 
a means of increasing awareness of the need to think about pensions and plan for 
retirement. The use of an advertising campaign is set inside a narrative about the 
continuities and changes in pensions systems. There is the continuity of a state 
retirement pension as a 'foundation', while there are changes in people's 
expectations in the consumer society. Significantly, the press release writers 
respond to this by providing a rule of thumb for the good citizen: 
The introduction of the Pension Credit from 2003 will reward those with modest 
savings and a small second pension with a cash top up. So the message from 
the government is whatever you can afford to put aside, it will always pay to 
save and the more you save and the earlier you start the better (DSS, 2001 a). 
Those who want to know how to be responsible in the changing world are told 'it will 
always pay to save'. 
Perhaps more than the heroic citizen, the good citizen needs clear signals about 
how to be a responsible person. It is not enough to simply tell this citizen to save, 
she also needs to have her saving clearly rewarded: 
'For the first time ever the Pension Credit will make sure savings will be 
rewarded,' said Mr Darling. 'There is a fundamental fault in the system we 
inherited. Saving should be rewarded, not punished. The Credit will reward the 
thrift of millions of people who have worked hard to save for their retirement.' 
(DSS, 2000d). 
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The good citizen needs to have her responsible behaviour reinforced and positively 
conditioned by rewards and incentives. But however much she is rational, the good 
citizen also shares some of the sheepish traits of the passive citizen. Hence an 
initiative like pensions statements is supposed to form good responsible citizens out 
of passive citizens: 
Jeff Rooker said: 'Once people see in black and white what they will have to live 
on I think they will realise the importance of saving for their old age and I hope it 
will prompt them to review the provision they have made for their retirement.' ... 
'These statements will be one of the important factors in getting people to save 
by showing them how much pension they have built up and how much more 
they can get if they save.' '" 'Working people, who can afford it have a 
responsibility to save for their retirement. But the Government has a duty to help 
them.' (DSS, 2000b). 
Good citizens, those who want to know how to be responsible, but responsible in 
the sense of not being a burden on others, can be made of passive citizens 
convinced of the need to take responsibility or people who are responsive to a 
changing world. 
The Recalcitrant Citizen 
As we have seen, the press release serves to circulate information into the public 
sphere where it becomes a text that continues to manage the information that 
people consume. Press releases differ according to how the information being 
supplied is expected to be met by target audiences. Hence, the hero is expected to 
seek the basic point, looking for developments and sources of information, the good 
citizen wants to know how to avoid being a burden on others, the passive citizen 
needed to be reassured while being drawn into the public sphere. However, a 
fourth kind of citizen was manifest in the press releases; an unruly recalcitrant 
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citizen who would play the odds to receive, or to increase their receipt of, welfare 
benefits. The role of the media in problematising the 'abuse' of benefits has been 
extensively remarked upon elsewhere (e.g. Dean, 2001 b). What is interesting in 
this instance, however, is the way in which publicity issued in response to the 
recalcitrant citizen was aimed at restricting both her social space, and the 
administrative scope for her function. So contrary to the other citizens who received 
some positive support, the recalcitrant citizen received threats and penalties. 
One important feature of the language used in connection with the recalcitrant 
citizen was its hostility. For example, benefits agencies battle with 'criminals who 
..... hijack the identities of innocent Irish citizens to make false claims in the UK' 
(DSS, 2000a). But the recalcitrant citizen does not have to be a criminal at the 
margins of society, rather it could be a person who earns 'cash in hand whilst 
claiming, playing on the sympathy of friends to cadge free drinks' (DSS, 2001 b). 
They are of a kind who 'blights the system and takes money away from the people 
who need it most.' (DSS, 2001c). Using this kind of language, the recalcitrant 
citizen is built into a spectre that needs to be dealt with forthwith. The state battles 
the culture of the recalcitrant citizen by altering her systemic and cultural context. 
The systemic context is characterised by greater control over the gateways to 
fraudulent behaviour: 
The Government is playing its part in tackling fraud: tightening the gateways to 
benefit, improving the training of fraud investigators, modernising the 
technology to root out the cheats as well as seeking new powers to toughen the 
penalties against persistent offenders and to gather the information necessary 
to catch them (DSS, 2001b). 
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The cultural context is altered through an advertising campaign aimed at altering 
the image of the fraudster: 
We produced a series of tough ads to demonstrate that targeting fraud is 
everyone's business; we have tested them thoroughly in the North West and 
now we are ready to take the campaign nationwide (DSS, 2001 b). 
This is a battle that the state claims to be winning: 
The progress we are seeing must and will continue. Combating fraud is one of 
the reasons social security spending is under control and will remain under 
control' (DSS, 2000a). 
But the recalcitrant citizen is not just a kind of person, she is a welfare client, a lone 
parent, pensioner or disabled person (DSS, 18/01/01). Yet as a client she is denied 
a voice or any form of ontology, instead she is spoken about: 
People who work and claim benefits aren't loveable rogues, what they are doing 
is despicable. Benefit fraud costs every household in this country over £80 a 
year. People would be rightly angry if £80 was stolen from their wallets (DSS, 
2001b). 
In transforming the welfare fraudster into a spectre of greater magnitude than 
bureaucratic waste, the benefits agencies' relationship with its clients is discursively 
changed into one that is more conditional. Governing irresponsibilities legitimates 
making rights conditional as a way of insulating a system against a hostile 
environment. Consequently, obedience is tied more and more closely to the 
administration's ability to control outgoings. 
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Interpreting discourses of responsibility 
As this reconstruction of the discourses used by New Labour's press release 
writers shows, each kind of citizen is responsible in different ways, drawing the 
government towards them differently. But the reconstruction cannot by itself make 
sense of this. One way of doing so is to draw upon a theoretically derived taxonomy 
of social discourses of responsibility provided by Dean (2002). This taxonomy 
provides a useful mechanism for understanding and bringing into relief, the 
discourses of responsibility used by New Labour. 
Figure 5.1 Interpreting cultural discourses of responsibility 
systemic 
assumptionsA B 
civic ethical 
duty responsibitity 
contractarian solidaristic 
citizenship conditional moral citizenship 
obedience obligation 
c o 
agential 
assumptions 
Source: Dean 2002: 200 
Where responsibility is construed along contractual lines but using systemic ideas 
about the generalisability of being responsible, it takes the form of civic duty 
(quadrant A in Figure 5.1). A duty is firstly a private matter for the parties to a 
contract, each of whom expects the other to carry out her part of the bargain. But 
this relationship can also be generalised as the grounds for reasonably expecting 
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contract bearers to carry out their actions. So while civic duties are based on 
expectations, the reciprocal nature of these expectations means they can take a 
systematic form. 
The contractarian view of responsibility can also take on a more particularistic form 
using agential assumptions (quadrant C of Figure 5.1). Considered along these 
lines, responsibility is manifest as conditional obedience. Within the contract, as we 
saw, responsibility is curtailed to the relations existing between parties to the 
contract. But the participants have an interest in ensuring that every party 
acknowledges and acts upon her responsibilities. Looked on from this point of view, 
responsibility comes to be about eliciting obedience as much as promoting 
responsibility. The discourse focuses,not on context transcending arguments, but 
on the means to ensure individuals behave responsibly. 
Responsibility can also be conceived in a more collectivist and solidaristic light. The 
combination of solidaristic with systemic assumptions points in the direction of more 
ethical ways of thinking of responsibility. The solidaristic perspective starts by 
considering how people come together into relationships based on the force of their 
commitment to each other and their willingness to work on the meaning of this 
commitment. This perspective forms a discourse of ethical responsibility (quadrant 
B in Figure 5.1) as the issue turns on how coming together can be generalised, so 
that ideas of a solidaristic responsibility take on a more systemic form. 
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Where responsibility is considered from within a solidaristic perspective that 
emphasises how individual agency responds to social customs and cultural 
traditions, responsibility takes the form of moral obligations (quadrant D in Figure 
5.1). From this point of view, the interest in protecting, sustaining or generating 
solidarity and a sense of community means shaping the individual's sense of 
agency so that the individual acts responsibly. Moral obligations are firstly based on 
appeals to good reasons, cultural tradition, collective loyalty, or to socially accepted 
norms. But more importantly, obligations gain their force from expectations based 
on their membership of a community. 
Using this taxonomy of discourses of responsibility it is possible to analyse the links 
between the citizens projected in the press releases and to map the sort of 
discourse of responsibility used by New Labour. 
Civic duty and the heroic citizen 
New Labour's ideal is the heroic citizen, but she is not seen as a moral citizen. She 
is essentially a self-interested actor, actively seeking information, incentives, 
choices and a businesslike service so that she can decide on the best course of 
action for herself by herself. New Labour's press release writers use the repertoire 
of civic duty when dealing with this citizen. She is dealt with using both contractual 
and systemic assumptions. On the one hand she is understood as a rational adult 
who is seeking information, and on the other, the press releases publicise the 
information that this citizen is anticipated to be seeking. Effectively the heroic 
. . . . . f . f at'Ion on the best value service citizen IS dOing her duty by looking or In orm 
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available to her, while the government responds by taking up a contract whereby it 
provides this information along with a range of businesslike services. This 
reciprocity draws the state and the heroic citizen into a relationship defined by a 
civic duty where each holds rights and duties in a contract that is rational and 
systemic. 
Moral obligations and the passive citizen 
If the citizen hero is left largely to herself to look after her own interests, the passive 
citizen is made to feel part of a bigger society. This citizen is difficult to 
communicate with, she gets bored easily and is mentally overtaxed by welfare 
issues. The press release writers deal with this citizen by setting out her moral 
obligations. She is gently informed as to what the right and responsible course of 
action is, and is assured that she can do the right thing. She should follow the 
common sense embodied by the sheepdog, accept that she is part of society and 
carry out the attendant obligations. The press release writers appear careful not to 
emphasise the morally conservative tendencies of this discourse. Rather, the press 
releases focus on integrating the passive citizen into the public sphere where she 
can make rational choices, framing mora! obligation as the obligation to deal with 
ones own welfare oneself. Nevertheless, the passive citizen is shielded from the 
contractualistic and alienating tendencies of this rationality by making her feel safe 
getting information from the state. State services are presented as approachable, 
working in the best interests of this citizen, like Shadow the sheepdog. 
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The good citizen and a thin discourse of ethical responsibility 
As we have seen, the good citizen shares some of the traits of the heroic and 
passive citizens. She shares the heroic citizen's desire to be responsible, and she 
too engages in activities of evaluating choices. But the systemic assumptions about 
the nature of responsibility that she uses draw her into thinking about wider trends 
in public opinion, and make her watchful of incentives and rewards. She wants to 
know she is doing the right thing about her own welfare, and that this is accepted 
as right by like-minded individuals and the state. In this way she shares the passive 
citizen's need to be part of a collective. This use of systemic assumptions and 
solidaristic conceptions of citizenship appears to make room for an ethical 
conception of responsibility. But the ethical is limited to the good as the duty to work 
and as consumer choice. Hence a particularly 'thin' (i.e. strictly formal) sense of 
ethical responsibility is entertained in the values of work and thriftiness, values that 
are prized in civil society and the economy. 
Conditional obedience and the recalcitrant citizen 
The unruly recalcitrant citizen takes up a significant proportion of the press releases 
since she justifies a host of welfare reforms, and her existence calls for a tighter, 
better managed, welfare bureaucracy. She is characterised as a criminal, stealing 
money from good citizens, so it can be inferred that she is primarily self-interested 
although she is never given a voice. But this self-interest means she operates 
outside of a contract: the contract is imposed on her by the state that wants her to 
obey the law. Against this citizen New Labour's press release writers deployed 
concepts of conditional obedience emphasising how the recalcitrant citizen exploits 
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the social contract to her own ends. She stole from both the needy and the good 
taxpaying citizen. Consequently, the message is conveyed that the benefits system 
needs to be reformed and the cultural tolerance afforded this citizen needs to 
dissipate. This citizen is to be made responsible, that is, made to obey the welfare 
contract. 
New Labour's repertoires of responsibility 
New Labour's press release writers, then, appear to take their conceptual 
resources from a number of quadrants in Dean's taxonomy of discourses of 
responsibility. Their discourse draws heavily on the repertoires of civic duty and 
moral obligation, making use of the language of conditional obedience to justify 
reform while using very formal, thus almost meaningless, ideas of ethical 
responsibility. Consequently, New Labour brings together a liberal discourse that 
idealises the heroic citizen with a morally conservative discourse emphasising 
moral obligations to the collective. In so far as it shows little regard for more ethical 
concepts of responsibility, this discourse also sidelines a democratic politics that 
puts collectively held reasons and values at its centre. This discourse firstly 
postulates membership as membership of civil society, but in terms of the theory 
underlying this construction of responsibility it draws on a discourse that is not 
concerned with morality. 
The collective postulated in the press releases is consistently embodied as a public 
of information gathering and processing citizens. These are private people that are 
looking to make decisions about their welfare themselves, and so look for 
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knowledge that has been made publicly available to them. It is a public of private 
people that come together to form private contracts in civil society rather than to 
discuss a common issue as a public. So while New Labour seeks to integrate the 
passive citizen into a public using a discourse of moral obligation, the public it has 
in mind is one where membership is defined through contracts in civil society. 
Membership of society is reduced to membership in civil society and the economy 
rather than membership of a public of citizens or a national community. Hence the 
exclusion of a properly ethical repertoire of responsibility in the coupling of civic 
duty with moral obligation forms a powerful focus on membership in civil society. 
Overall, then, New Labour use a discourse that draws together managerial with 
security concerns. The government is supposed to operate in a business like 
manner, simultaneously providing people with relevant knowledge and information, 
and battling fraud, so that it secures a space for people to make choices about how 
they manage their responsibilities in the market and civil society. Significantly, while 
the problem of poverty makes a number of appearances in the corpus of press 
releases, it makes little impact on the structure of these discourses. The salient 
problem is the sense of security that people feel of knowing they have made good 
or rational decisions, and the sense of trust they feel in making these decisions in 
the marketplace. This is very much the discourse of market collectivism as 
propounded by Schmitz (1998, Chapter 3 above). While New Labour recognise that 
many people, in particular the passive but also the good citizens, face challenges in 
deciding on their interests in the market and engaging with the public sphere where 
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information is shared about products that might secure welfare, nevertheless, New 
Labour promote such allegiances. 
The Benefits Administrators' understandings of responsibility 
Having analysed the discourses of responsibility deployed by New Labour in their 
press releases, I will now go on to analyse the discourses used by benefits 
administrators working under New Labour's welfare regime. These 'street level 
bureaucrats' are, even more so than the benefits recipient, condemned to adapt 
their activities in light of new hegemonies (Lipsky, 1980). Therefore it is important to 
understand the discourses of these informants in order to understand how these 
actors implement the government's thinking in everyday practice. The following is 
an analysis of responses to questions concerning responsibility made to such 
bureaucrats. 
The underlying liberal subject 
The benefits administrators shared a basic way of thinking about responsibility. 
They saw the responsible person as somebody who thought about how their 
actions might impact on others, and could adapt their behaviour in light of the 
needs and interests of these others. 
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Table 5.4 Benefits Administrators' liberal conception of the responsible subject 
... in all their ways in which they interact with other people [the responsible person] 
is conscious of the effects that their actions have on other people and either avoid 
doing anything that's going to be to the disadvantage of somebody else, or weighs 
up and does things on balance in a way to minimise the amount of disadvantage 
caused to anybody else. [DWP 11] 
And: 
Its hard to say, but erm, being aware of your own actions, how they impact 
somebody else, and being willing to accept the outcome, what happens as a result 
of that. .. what you've chosen to do, so its making a conscious decision with the 
impact of how that's going to be, if not your future then somebody else's future. 
[OWP 10] 
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action that respects the rights of others. This discourse emphasises the ability to 
act, the ability to make a rational decision about a course of action and the 
responsibility to choose a course of action that will make the least detrimental 
impact of the lives of others. It wholly neglects the way people are positioned by 
policies and norms so that they cannot make such rational choices. 
By starting from this liberal conception of the subject, the benefits administrators 
could categorise people into those who do act responsibly and those who do not. 
Those who do are people like 'us': 
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Well a person that actually makes the effort to have a reasonable education if 
they can. And make an effort to get a job and make an effort to stick with that 
job. I would like to think that that is the way that I have brought my sons up to 
be. I mean they've always worked they've never relied on the state. I consider a 
responsible person as someone who looks after themselves and their family 
who doesn't expect the state to provide, which a lot of people do. rOWp 4] 
The binary 'us' versus 'them' is made around the distinction between people who 
work to realise their interests in a responsible manner, and those who 'expect the 
state to provide'. The following informants agree that making the effort to realise 
one's own interests in a responsible manner is what defines responsibility: 
Table 5.5 Benefits Administrators' conception of the irresponsible other 
I think that it is everyone's responsibility, within their own ability. Not everyone is 
capable of it though. You have to acknowledge that, erm. rOWp 9] 
And: 
If they have the means of looking after themselves then I think that the individual is 
responsible. I think a lot of people haven't got the means then that's where we 
should be stepping in, but we should only be caring for people that are not able to 
take an active role in supporting themselves. [OWP 6] 
Finally: 
I suppose I would say that someone is a responsible person if they have sufficient 
resources and I don't just mean financial. If they've sufficient resources to be quite 
self-sufficient and function on their own [pause]. And I would say that they would 
still be a responsible person if something happened to them and they had to ... they 
no longer had sufficient financial recourses at their disposal, and they had to apply 
for social security. I would still see that as responsible because I would see that as 
why the system is there, if you see what I mean, for people who perhaps something 
dramatic happens in their lives. [OWP 5] 
Within this liberal definition of responsibility, the Victorian categories of the able 
bodied and deserving poor re-emerge. Those who are not able bodied or are 
204 
genuinely deserving of state help are the people who are exempt from the 
expectation that they be responsible for their own welfare. 
One exception to this liberal discourse was used by an informant who paid attention 
to the social and policy norms people adapt to. She recognised a range of reasons 
why people might find that they were unable to behave responsibly: 
The difficulty there is what you know and what you learn, to be responsible. 
Some people. I think that it is the way that you're brought up, whether you can 
be responsible or not, and how much money you've had. You just, you don't 
know how badly things can go wrong. Then you're not going to plan and 
everything, if for most of your childhood and most of your adult life things have 
gone hunky dory. It's difficult. I think people are advised to take insurance 
especially with the mortgages which we find with our, with our. You are told that 
you should take one out and that you can't get away without doing it, and then 
what you find is that people have got away without doing it and then they claim 
and there is a waiting period before they get help and then they get into such 
trouble because they have always been in work.... [OWP 1] 
Whereas the responsible person of the liberal imaginary was a person who could 
take enough command of the own life to work to realise her interests in such a way 
that she did not negatively impact on others, the person projected by this informant 
was one who made choices in light of their knowledge and experience. This 
informant recognised how taking any kind of command over personal decisions and 
resources was difficult. She recognised how people feel able to pursue interests 
and prioritise responsibilities in light of their personal history, the history of their 
family and in relation to policy norms. All of these combined to position people and 
their scope for responsible action. Hence, responsibility was not merely a matter for 
the subject alone, but was structured by her position in society. 
205 
111"" 
Responsibilities towards clients 
The benefits administrators' views on their own professional responsibilities and 
those of their 'customers' were explored by enjoining the informants to talk about 
the point at which their responsibilities as benefits administrator ended and the 
benefits claimants began. The informants responded to this question with 
descriptions of the responsibilities associated with the role of administrator and 
claimant: 
Table 5.6 Benefits Administrators' professional responsibilities towards clients 
There are rules and regulations for every benefit. It is their responsibility if you like, 
to ensure that we have the information in order to pay them their benefits, and I 
don't think they fully appreciate that. It's also their responsibility to provide us with 
the evidence that we require and not just at the initial point but as they go along. 
With this particular benefit, its medical certificates, it is their responsibility to go to 
the doctor and get a medical certificate. But there are a lot of people who are 
dependent who don't make it their responsibility and wait for a reminder from us to 
I 
I
, 
tell them to go to your doctor and get a medical certificate. [OWP 8] 
And: 
Their responsibility is to be as open with us as possible, I mean we're not expecting 
them to give us a life history but, in terms of when they complete forms, to be as 
open on those. To make sure they know what comes out of them. That's our 
biggest problem, is that people don't always fill out the applications, and they don't. 
And that's when they get themselves into all sorts of trouble. I mean, some people 
do it on purpose and others do it quite by accident. Erm, and obviously ours is to 
make sure that we're pointing them in the right direction in terms of you know, 
ensuring they're getting the right sort of benefits, and they're going in the right 
direction to obtain these benefits. [OWP 10] 
The responsibility of claimants was to provide complete and accurate information 
while the administrators' responsibility was to provide appropriate information, help 
and guidance. The interesting point about these descriptions is that they cast the 
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claimant as a rational adult who should be aware of her various responsibilities with 
respect to the benefit they are claiming. 
Balancing the responsibilities of the state and the individual 
Issues of a normative kind were explored in the interviews with the benefits 
administrators by asking them to what extent they thought people should take 
responsibility for themselves in situations of illness, redundancy or retirement. The 
normative issues had to do with the sorts of practices instituted in society to help 
people deal with these contingencies. The informants took up a variety of positions 
on these practices. 
There were those who focused on the nature of social and policy norms. On the 
one hand, there was a feeling that the availability of choice in the area of social 
policy was a good thing because it allowed people to take responsibility for 
themselves: 
Erm, I think they should be [responsible for their own welfare]. Like health 
insurance and this sort of thing, and private pensions. Yeah, I would agree with 
that. But I think you've also got to be given the opportunity to opt out of the 
other schemes as well. [DWP 6J 
But this proved to be a minority view. One informant pointed out how: 
The actual cost of individual private companies, particularly with the need to 
make a profit and what have you, providing all this cover and service, and what 
have you for individuals is administratively far more inefficient, would you 
believe, than the Civil Service. Particularly with regard to pensions .... And I 
think really if you're saying people should take more responsibility you're asking 
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them to really pay through the nose for the same level of cover, simply on a 
matter of principle, and that's silly. rOWp 11] 
Moreover, these norms were seen as putting people into difficult situations: 
I think there's too much expectation on the ordinary working man now. The 
ordinary working man hasn't got as much money as a professional person, and 
it's the professional person that's dictating these rules by this government. ... 
You see as you get older these insurance's that they want you to have get far 
far more expensive and you just can't afford them. I don't think that there's 
anyway that a working class person with an ordinary wage can take out medical 
insurance, loss of job, mortgage, erm, AVe's and still their pay their 
occupational pension. It is not possible. rOWp 9] 
In fact, the majority of this small sample of informants felt that the policy climate 
was positioning people so that they had to adapt to norms that they found very 
difficult to accommodate in their lives. Moreover, there was an awareness of how 
choice served the interests of some people but not others. One informant 
formulated this shift towards fragmentation in acute terms: 
There is insurance out there, well for specific things, like mortgage cover and 
stuff like that if you're out of work. But the broader principle of contributing to 
something that will protect you in those circumstances, or indeed to pay for your 
retirement, comes back to well can you afford to make those contributions, of 
course the other answer to that is, can you afford not to. That's a hard one. I 
don't know that. My personal opinion, speaking as somebody who hasn't done it 
I would say yes, it is, but right now it's not a choice, now the pension scheme is 
changing. That's the first time I've ever really had to think about it, whether the 
new scheme is going to be better for me or to stay with the old one I don't know. 
If you had somebody here who actually had taken out a private provision and 
you was talking to them about it, they would definitely say "oh yes, it's a great 
idea, it will guarantee you whatever income at the age of 65." There's another 
person out there who would say, "well I don't really care, what's the point. I 
could be dead tomorrow." rOWp 3) 
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The underlying concern was that making people responsible for their own lives 
encouraged the individualisation and 'diversity of fate' identified by Beck (1992) and 
Giddens (1994). These informants resisted this diversification to only a limited 
degree, as they recognised that allowing people to make decisions about their own 
lives themselves could enable them make decisions in keeping with their actual 
interests. The discourse offered in resistance to this trend was made, not on the 
grounds of principle, but on the basis of a desire to maintain a collective contract 
and a fate everybody could share: 
Well, that also I think is a tricky one because certainly from the point of view of 
the national insurance system, if someone's working, they are making 
contributions, therefore they should be, they should have an expectation to get 
something out even if its only a retirement pension, you know, forty years down 
the line. So, I mean, talking about things like people taking out their own, 
insurance schemes. I think it's great that stuff like that, if people want to provide 
themselves with more cover they can. What I wouldn't like to see is that being 
the only thing available. [DWP 5] 
Summary of the Benefits Administrators' discourses 
My analysis of these interviews is broadly in similar to Dean and Rodger's (2004) 
analysis. This analysis has shown how the benefits administrators make use of an 
individualistic conception of individual responsibility. It has been argued that this 
conception is liberal in the broadest sense, based on the idea of the subject as an 
upstanding member of the community. The benefits administrators also used a 
concept of responsibility related with the responsibilities incumbent on the benefits 
claimant in light of her role as a claimant. However, when attention was turned to 
the matter of responsibility in society, these informants took issue with the way 
policy norms put people into potentially difficult positions. 
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Conclusion 
New Labour advances a discourse of responsibility that is tailored to the needs of 
different kinds of citizens. It is a discourse that encourages people to access 
publicly available information as private persons who secure private contracts in the 
civil society and the market. In this discourse, responsibility is about the bonds of 
the social contract supported by the weak informal solidarity generated in civil 
society and the economy, wherein each person secures their own personal interest. 
This is in contrast to the bonds of solidarity generated by the commonality of fate 
institutionalised in the social democratic welfare state. The benefits administrators 
I understand responsibility in a manner that is in keeping with this way of situating 
people. Insofar as they draw on an individualistic concept of responsibility, they 
, emphasise the way individuals can take responsibility for their own lives 
t themselves. However, they are also aware of the problems that the 
institutionalisation of choice and the diversity of fate can pose for people. To this 
extent they open New Labour's way of organising policy norms to criticism. They 
draw attention to how this discourse burdens people with decisions that previous 
generations did not have to consider and how it may have the effect of further 
pluralising an already polyphonic range of fates. 
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Chapter 6: Constructing responsibility between norm a.nd 
context 
Introduction 
In this Chapter I present the first part of the analysis of the interviews carried out as 
part of this research project. Whereas the previous chapter (Chapter 5) dealt with 
the hegemonic knowledge about responsibility being communicated to people 
through government discourse as represented by the press release and by the 
benefits agency workers, this chapter deals with the rational structures that people 
use to process norms about responsibility. Knowledge about responsibilities is 
constructed through various discourses in the public sphere including, but not 
limited to, hegemonic discourses. Among these discourses are those of the various 
religions, scientific and corporate discourses, the discourses of other politicians, 
political parties, the new social movements and so on. Nevertheless, the 
assumption here, drawn from Finch and Mason (1993) and Duncan and Edwards 
(1999) is that people deal with their responsibilities in connection with norms 
constructed within their family, their local community and whichever discourses 
appear relevant to themselves. 
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The theoretical framework that I take up from Habermas (1990, 1995 in Chapter 2, 
above) suggests that people process such norms in ways that connect with their 
own interests. In this Chapter, the relationship between these structures and social 
constructions of responsibility is explored by critically analysing the skills people 
use in interpreting the norms they feel are relevant to their responsibilities. 
Reflecting the Habermasian (1990,1995) framework, I divide the informants into 
four main discourses, the egoistic discourse, the conformist discourse, the reformist 
discourse and the reflexive discourse. However, as we shall see, the informants do 
not fit straightforwardly into any of these discourses and a number of discourses 
operate at the intersection of different discourses. 
The egoistical discourse 
For those using the egoistical discourse, others are mere objects who can be 
influenced by one's own behaviour. Like everything else, the users of the egoistical 
discourse felt that others, and the norms used to organise social action, could be 
looked on in an objective manner. For instance, the following informant described 
how he looked on various situations to decide how to act in a responsible way: 
I know it may sound odd, but I try to behave like a gentleman. So where 
necessary, certainly I try to put ladies at ease, but without being patronising or 
condescending. Um so I do. And if I can help, I will do, is the other thing. So the 
other thing is: if I can help, I will do. I assisted at a road traffic accident - if I can 
help, I will do. It may be something as simple as dialling - making sure the 
ambulance is on the way. However, I have got first aid training and I wouldn't be 
afraid to use it (8C1). 
In each case his decision on how to act was based on his observations of the 
situation and the existence of a relevant norm. He observed what he saw as the 
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reality that women can be uneasy around men and that people need help after a 
road traffic accident. In each case he also observed relevant norms - that men 
should behave like gentlemen and that people should help the victims of road traffic 
accidents. But he based his action on how acting in the relevant context might 
influence other people's perception of himself. To act responsibly was to act in 
accordance with the relevant norm because this would positively impact on their 
perception of the self. The examples he chose were examples where he, as actor, 
could be substituted by any other person and therefore everybody should act in 
accordance with the norm he considers relevant to the particular context. More 
importantly however, these are examples where he shows himself to be a 
'gentleman' or 'hero' and therefore his behaviour positively influences other 
people's perception of him. This informant further elaborates this perspective as 
follows: 
Um first of all I would choose - that when I was doing nursing - do no harm. 
Don't do anything which would harm either yourself, or society at large. Um 
which means that you don't go round mugging old ladies, you don't go round 
beating up someone just because you can't handle your drink. Um it sometimes 
also means that um you sort of kind of have to take a step back and be a little 
bit tolerant to people. Um I also try not to be too judgmental. And example is ­
remember the Twin Towers, September 11th? One of my friends died in that. 
One of my friends died in that, and I've got to remember that it was people who 
- that it was people who committed that atrocity are guilty, not the Islamic Faith 
in general. I've got to remember that there are good Muslims, rather than all 
Muslims are people who killed my friend - it wasn't. And sometimes that's 
difficult, especially when you walk down certain parts of L. and there are 
actually sort of quarters of the people that killed my friend (BC1). 
Here this informant clearly considers others as social objects. As objects, these 
others are capable of initiating and carrying out actions that might have harmful 
consequences. But the point for this informant was that these others should behave 
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responsibly because it is the right thing to do in the situation and they should not 
behave in harmful or intolerant and therefore in irresponsible ways simply because 
they know that they can act in such ways without effective reproach. This informant 
was calling on others to behave responsibly and, in effect, to develop a moral and 
responsible reputation for themselves. The egoistical discourse provided the basis 
for such a call because, for this informant, it meant showing oneself to be a moral 
and responsible person in the eyes of others. 
The egoistical discourse took a slightly different form in the discourse used by 
another informant. In this case the informant generated a norm out an interest in 
self-prese rvatio n: 
Oh I like to keep in touch with them [family] all the time, yeah. And as for myself, 
I look after myself and keep myself to myself. Go out and enjoy myself - don't 
drink, which is good. I've been six years off that. Doesn't bother me now, thank 
God, which is good [ ... ] and I knew it was getting to me, and I said "if I don't 
stop I'll be going down underneath" [ ... ] Didn't go for help - just stopped 
[drinking] and that was it. It's my own benefit I'm doing it for. With the fags, I'm 
doing it not for anyone, I'm doing it for myself, which is true enough, you know. 
Yeah - enjoy life without it. People say to you, "you can't enjoy yourself without 
a drink and a smoke" - I think that's a load of cobblers (8C2). 
Based on an assessment of the trajectory his life was on, this informant made the 
decision that he needed to stop drinking simply to continue to live. However, he did 
not identify any particular norm as relevant to the situation, a norm that, for 
example, dictated that he should not drink, drink excessively, look after his health 
and so on. Instead, he simply "stopped drinking." This was to act without recourse 
to a norm while turning the new state of being sober into a normal part of his 
existence. Acting in this way is to act egotistically because the change in behaviour 
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is brought about purely for the good of the self, as was pointed out by the informant: 
"It's my own benefit I'm doing it for." However, having acted without using norms to 
guide the change in his behaviour, and by basing this change on his own 
observation that he would soon die due to his alcoholism, this informant rhetorically 
responded to the idea that "you can't enjoy life without a drink and a smoke" as "a 
load of cobblers." In effect, this informant evaluates the kind of life he now leads as 
one that is as full and enjoyable as one that is lead by others. 
The egoistical discourse could take another form based less on strategy and more 
on calculation. But the major exemplar of calculative reasoning that appeared in the 
interviews could in no way be described as a cynical calculation of personal 
interests. Rather, this informant tried to calculate how declaring his gay sexuality to 
his parents might affect his relationship with them: 
I've thought about it a lot over the years and I've spoken to a lot of people about 
it, whether I should come out or not. Um, spoken to my sisters about it and they 
said that, occasionally they said maybe I should tell them then other times "no, 
no don't tell them yet don't tell them yet put it off they don't need to know." Um 
and I worry that because I am very close to my mother I'm sure that if I told her 
there WOUldn't be a problem at the end of the day, she'd be upset obviously 
initially and the thought of putting her through that upset I would find very 
difficult, and I don't know. It does bother me. I'm -I tend to sort of stick my head 
in the sand a little bit on these sort of things I put it in the back of my mind and I 
shouldn't really I suppose ... (MP10). 
The concern here lies with how his parents may respond to this declaration and 
how this response might fundamentally reshape his relationship with them. He was 
worried about his position in the family, a position that was jeopardised by his gay 
sexuality. In this case then, the egoistical discourse was used because the 
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informant had no other tools available for considering how to preserve his good 
relations with his parents and how to attend to their needs at the same time. He 
tried to calculate the balance between upsetting the family order and implicitly 
adhereing to, and obeying, the norms his parents accepted and valued, norms that 
of course conflicted with the norms he adopted. For this informant it was easier, 
and arguably more morally justifiable, to leave the situation as it stood and deal with 
the problems of personal authenticity and parental acceptance internally, as the 
informant's sisters advised him to do. 
While the egotistical discourse operated outside, but alongside, norms, this 
discourse could also be used in more rhetorical ways connected with personal 
desires that are nevertheless buried. In this context the egoistical discourse was 
used in conjunction with the conformist discourse where it was used to define the 
desires that were suppressed in light of roles and responsibilities: 
[Responsibility] to myself? I cant be ill, because I've got to let people down do 
you know what I mean? Because there is only one of me and there is nobody 
else that works here apart from [colleague's name] and there's only three part 
time workers so I can't be ill. I think it's a real pisser because sometimes I'd like 
to be ill. Um to myself? Yeah, that looking after myself (WA1). 
Living in a world where norms negotiated around her working life governed her 
every move, this informant felt her inclination to be responsible to herself alone was 
organised out of her own hands. The discussion of being unable to be ill implies 
both the inability to take sick days and rest, to indulge her own desires or to take 
time off work when she is actually sick. The point here though, is that this informant 
feels such a duty to conform to the expectations of those at work and to carry out 
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her work role (in line with the conformist discourse below) that her inclination to 
take days off work and look after her own interests, appear as desires that she 
needs to suppress however much she wants to indulge them. The egoist then 
appears as a person to envy, one who indulges their desires where she cannot. 
The conformist discourse 
While the egoistical discourse looked on norms as an aspect of the situation, in the 
conformist discourse norms were accepted as a legitimate mechanisms for 
organising action. The users of the conformist discourse carried out her duty either 
in light of the legitimate expectations of her fellows, or the legitimacy of the norms 
expressing the community will and community interest. For instance, the following 
informant spoke of the role he accepted as the male head of a household: 
As I said earlier on, I see my main responsibility as providing for my family, 
obviously by having reasonably good health and working hard to make money . 
... [talking about his responsibilities towards his children) It is basically more 
financially, the girls are at an age where they do largely help themselves, they 
have part-time jobs, and one of them is studying. We try to help them by 
providing groceries. My younger daughter is in Halls of Residence which is a 
little bit more difficult. My other daughter lives with my wife's sister, so she 
doesn't have to worry about finding accommodation. So my responsibility is to 
provide the groceries so they don't go hungry so to speak. (MP1) 
This informant articulated the classic concept of role conformism. In line with this 
conformism he saw his "main responsibility as providing for [his] family" thus 
positioning his responsibilities in terms of the role he adopted in relation to his 
family members. His role was to be the provider and his responsibility is to fulfil this 
role because it was what he thought was expected of him and what his duty was. 
However, the responsibilities that accompany this role have changed as his 
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children have grown and what they can legitimately expect him to provide has 
altered. Speaking in his current situation, he found his responsibilities were to help 
with his daughters day-to-day university living expenses while his provision of this 
help was met with their adoption of certain responsibilities for themselves in the 
sense that they worked part-time. This informant situated this way of distributing 
roles and responsibilities between himself, his wife, and children, in terms of a 
wider family and work culture: 
Yes coming from a financial services background I obviously do believe that we 
should all try and provide the best for the future, something that I have tried to 
instil in my children's heads. They don't always take it on. But Dad always 
drummed it into myself, and my wife from her parents, so between my parents 
and myself and brothers and sisters, they have always been able to provide for 
themselves, so we have always looked to provide for ourselves for the future. 
By buying property and also investing in pensions and savings ... (MP1). 
The idea that each individual should take responsibility for their own well-being by 
making financial provision for contingencies was an idea that had its foundations in 
the advice and guidance of his parents, and norms he internalised from working in 
financial services and was a norm he now tries to convey to his children. In effect, 
the distribution of roles and responsibilities in a particular manner within this family 
was related with, and justified in relation to, a set of norms that express the value of 
generating independent and financially secure people. 
The sense in which conforming to roles and norms altered as people's situation and 
knowledge changed was well captured by the following informant. In the following, 
he described different aspects of the duties he felt he had with respect to his 
mother: 
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Yes I think so, I've only got a mother, my father died ten years ago, but yeah I 
feel my mum is quite vulnerable, I think she is a bit sort of susceptible to people 
who want things out of her. I like to, because of my job I can advise her on lots 
of things. Benefits, because she is another one who doesn't realise what she 
can get. Because she is an old age pensioner and she doesn't know what she 
can get and I think she's helped me when I've been unemployed, I've not had a 
lot of money and now I can help her, because I'm working full time and she's 
retired (WA5). 
At this point in time, this informant's role with regard to his mother was defined by 
her vulnerability and his knowledge. He could perform the role of advisor, a role he 
felt able to perform in light of his job role as a welfare rights advisor and he could 
manage her susceptibility towards losing out to fraudsters and the state. But while 
this relationship was no longer symmetrical, with the mother depending on the son, 
this informant justifies the adoption of this role because she helped him during a 
period of unemployment. This sense of symmetry and the repayment of a debt over 
time has been remarked upon by Finch and Mason (1993) as a way in which 
responsibilities are balanced. The point here, however, is that this balance was 
achieved, not by using an idea of symmetry to justify performing roles, but by 
performing these roles in a way that conformed to a norm of helping and 
supporting. The informant observed that when he needed help she provided that 
help. Now that she needed some support, and he was in a position to provide this 
support, he offered help in line with this role. This same concept, of providing help 
to your parents when you yourself are in a position to do so, was also articulated by 
the following informant: 
We love her that's why we care for her no we love her and she's a lovely mom if 
she wasn't she wouldn't get that amount of care no she yeah that comes into it 
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as well because she was on her own bringing up four kids and she did over and 
above she could. Its not difficult to care for her because she's a nice mom and 
um you don't want to do it if you don't [laughs] (MP3). 
The justification for adopting time consuming and onerous roles and responsibilities 
in respect of her ailing mother is based on the argument that she performed an 
equally onerous role in accepting the responsibility of raising four children as a lone 
parent. 
Conforming to roles and norms frequently involved complex operations. The most 
complex arose when the roles and norms were derived from different discourses 
simultaneously. For example, the following informant performed the roles expected 
of him by the local community, his staff and clients. These separate roles called on 
him to respond in very different ways: 
... we're a charitable organisation and we rely on public money to operate and 
um, I pay my taxes and everyone else who pays their taxes or whatever is 
contributing to the cost of running this service ... so my bosses, if you like, my 
employer is a group of people, a board of trustees which is formed from 
members of the local community who, um, if you like ensure the bureau is 
operating properly and is delivering services to those people who, you know, we 
were set up to basically help. Um so that's my, if you like, that's my wider 
responsibility. Inside that there are a lot, the picture becomes more complicated, 
because equally I manage and run this place. So I am also responsible for the 
care um, parochial um pastoral care rather of my staff, their well being their 
health and safety as-well. ... Um, as I said earlier, they're doing the job basically 
for the job satisfaction and you have to ensure really that there's, you can 
maximise, its my responsibility really to maximise that for them and taking 
danger and threat out of the scenario and having a pleasant working 
environment is really all, all part of that. And then, to muddy the waters even 
further, I'm then responsible for the actual quality of the work which goes on. 
Um, we, we're here to deliver a service to the client and bad advice is worse 
then no advice we have to be able to deliver a quality service to the people. We 
have to be able to give them accurate information and present them with all the 
options that are available to them ... (WA4) 
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The roles that this informant was expected to perform in response to the different 
duties that the organisation he managed had, contributed to a complex picture of 
roles and norms. Firstly, he had a duty to the local community to ensure the 
organisation was providing the service it promised in an effective and efficient way. 
This duty was overseen by the existence of a board of trustees who expected these 
roles to be performed and to whom this informant was accountable. The second 
duty he speaks of is to the organisation's staff. Since they worked voluntarily, they 
fulfilled roles and responsibilities in the expectation that they receive a certain 
satisfaction for their work. Finally, the informant introduced the theme of the work 
the organisation does and the service it provided to clients. These clients expected 
the organisation to work to a high standard of quality and it was his duty to secure 
this quality for the client. 
Each of these roles casts the informant in a different light and in each case that he 
found he had a different role to perform in light of different norms. It was the right of 
citizens to expect the organisations that they fund to operate effectively and 
efficiently. With this norm in mind, this informant took up the role of a businesslike 
manager of a charitable organisation. It was the right of voluntary staff to work in a 
safe, clean and pleasant environment. These norms situated this informant less as 
a boss and more a 'pastoral' carer of staff. It was the right of clients to expect a 
quality service. The corresponding duty incumbent on this informant was take up 
the role of manager and ensure the delivery of a quality service. Hence, norms 
operated in the context of the community, staff and market, propelling conformity to 
relevant norms. This informant did not just respond by fulfilling the content of the 
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norm but also sought to comprehend the spirit of the norms and fulfil its 
expectations. 
Conformity to norms was not necessarily seen as a good thing. It could just as 
easily be seen as mere heteronomy or inauthenticity. In such cases, the conformist 
discourse was placed under the critical gaze that accompanied either the reformist 
or reflexive discourses. The following informant emphasised the problem of 
allowing companies to be pushed by the norms in their industry and how such 
inauthenticity undermined confidence in the commitment of companies to Corporate 
Social Responsibility [CSR] programmes. In effect, he critically appraised 
conformist discourses using a reformist discourse: 
... if you take, if you just wrote down five, twenty five FTSE companies with 
[CSR] programmes it may well be that you could identify two or three that you 
could say "I don't see the evidence here for anything more then this being a big 
PR exercise" you know. People just feeling they're in, they're a petrochemical 
their in the petrochemical industry they're the only ones not reporting, better 
start reporting. They're the only ones without a programme, better get a 
programme. I think that that's a minority rather then a majority. The majority of l, people as I say don't see it necessarily as being, like the old Joseph Rowntree, 
Cadbury um Nuffield um you know, Sam Whitbread, the kind of benign 
paternalism philanthropic you know, doing it because it's a moral obligation. I 
think most of those companies do it because there's a business case for doing 
it, and as I say there's also a business disbenefit in not doing it. It's that 
balance. I think the cynicism comes with that balance because it gets out, if 
people say "yes we're doing it because we think it's a good thing and also 
because there's a business benefit" that's wholly, that works for me. If they say 
"we're doing it because we cant afford not to" that's when you one starts to 
worry about motivation and the longevity of the programme, and um, that "can't 
afford not to" I think is a, is a, is a minority view ... (MP9). 
While conforming to norms could be based on a sense of commitment to norms 
and values, it could also be based on responses to observations of the 
222 
- - -..------------------~ ~ ­
expectations held by others. This kind of conformity worried the above informant 
since it legitimated a cynical attitude towards Corporate Social Responsibility (for 
an overview of this concept, see Carroll, 1999). To be pushed by the norms of the 
industry into such activities was to take up a role that companies had no interest in 
sustaining. Thus, it was not enough to conform to roles and norms, as such 
conformity could always be motivated by the expectations of others and not by the 
commitments of the company. However, this informant felt it was possible to 
identify authentic and inauthentic discourses by questioning the reasons they 
provide for taking up a Corporate Social Responsibility programme. He also felt that 
inauthentic commitments could be identified in the way that companies handled the 
failures or obstacles that they encountered in dealing with communities and in the 
nature and longevity of their commitment to these communities. In effect, 
conformist discourses could be interrogated critically from the point of view of the 
following kind of reformist discourse. 
The reformist discourse 
Both the egoistical discourse and conformist discourse operated by looking on 
norms as integral to the situation. The egoistical discourse observed the norms and 
acted strategically or calculatedly in respect of them. The conformist discourse 
accepted the legitimacy of norms and undertook to act with respect to them. 
However, with the conformist discourse we see an alteration because this 
perspective allows the person to begin to take a more critical attitude towards 
norms. The reformist discourse is characterised by a sense of reflection on the 
personal or communal life. This reflection is focused on how norms structure the 
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person's life, on the one hand, and the kind of life that is actually in her interests on 
the other. The person using the reformist discourse looked on themselves and the 
norms organising her life from the point of view of her clarification of her interests, 
and the norms that would organise her life were she to pursue these interests. 
From this perspective, the reformer sought to alter her life in the direction of the life 
she chose to lead. Such a critical and reformist relation to self did not, in many 
cases, mean seeking to radically reconstruct one's own life project. For the 
following informants it meant critically appropriating and reflecting upon, and 
thereby also reforming, the norms they lived by and espoused in order to continue 
to be the person they chose to be: 
I think, I'd like to feel that they [informant's children] would turn to me first rather 
then turn to say a debt agency if they had problems or get into debt. I have a 
horror of debt, and I think that's partly my age so I'd like to think they they'd feel 
they could turn to me, if they had a problem they could tell me about it and I 
could help, you know. Or at least tell them where to get help, you know, that's 
what I mean. I don't know, that may be an age thing, or it may be bringing a lot 
of things together again (MP5). 
And: 
My responsibilities would be, my main responsibility is that I have to look out for 
my children and my step daughter, I consider that highly on my list of, whenever 
they phone me up with a problem I always rush down and get involved ­
financial, a lot of the time it is emotional and we sit and talk. I really, what I really 
enjoy with them is that they talk to me a lot better than I talked to my parents, so 
if you've got a problem no matter what it is, they'll phone me up and say "Dad 
can I come and have a chat" or "I've got this, this is happening" and I like to go 
down there and just talk with them and let them come to some sort of answer, 
but just listen (MP2). 
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Both of the informants quoted above want to be good parents. However, being a 
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good parent means, to them, critically reflecting on what being a parent involves, 
and through this reflection, identifying the norms that more accurately reflect what 
they think a parent acts like, and acting according to these norms. Substantively, it 
means being the kind of person that their children can "turn to", "talk" with, or who 
"listens." The former informant reflected on her abhorrence of debt and how she 
hoped her children, now in their early twenties, would come to her rather then "a 
debt agency" if they faced financial difficulties. Of course, in articulating this fear in 
terms of "a debt agency" she realised that she overstates the possible scenario. But 
the point was to consider the possibility, however unlikely, that her children might 
find themselves in real trouble if she did not make herself into the kind of parent 
who was approachable to them and willing to help them, particularly as they 
established themselves in a home and career. The latter informant describes, with 
some energy, how he looked after his children by involving himself in their lives. He 
contrasted this kind of parent that he embodies with his own parents to emphasise 
how he works to make himself into the kind of person that his children could talk 
with. Thus, both informants identified a norm with the kind of person they want to be 
as a parent, and worked to realise this person by acting in accordance with this 
norm. The norm did not simply define a role or embody the values of the 
community, but expressed a way of life that they wanted to be associated with. The 
central meaning of responsibility is, then, continuing to be this person that their 
children can turn to. 
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These informants reflected on how they had lived inauthentic lives before learning 
to reflect critically on the norms organising their lives. For instance, in the following 
the informant reflects on the kind of person she had been in the past: 
It has made life easier for me, sharing responsibilities. I think it comes with 
education as well. I think I had this feeling when I was younger that I had to do 
everything myself so a sort of superwoman complex, and now I realise I don't 
need to. In fact it can be insulting, you know, for people if ah, you know, your 
more or less saying you know "you cant cope with your life I'm going to do it for 
you" ah which is wrong, you know. So, you know, when I talk about support I 
don't talk about taking over, I like to think I don't take over any more (MP5). 
The argument is that she uncritically accepted a wide range of roles and 
responsibilities when she was younger, which led her to try and 'do everything' 
herself. At the time of this interview, she had come to see this attitude as wrong and 
rather than take up roles and responsibilities that disempowered those around her, 
she instead tried to negotiate norms that are in the interests of each person. This is 
an ethical and reformist discourse precisely because it means working critically on 
the self and the norms she adopts to help realise the good life for herself, for her 
family and for her work colleagues. 
Whereas these two informants represent cases where the ethical and reformist 
discourse had been arrived at through a process of personal struggle and turmoil, 
the following informants represent interesting cases insofar as the people 
interviewed were, at the time of the interview, undergoing such a trauma and 
beginning to adopt this reformist discourse. For example, the following informant 
conveys the gravity of the call of his alcoholic mother who had the right to depend 
on him and the importance of realising the good for himself: 
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Informant: Well personally without looking at the bigger picture, I've got a 
certain responsibility to my mother. Um, and that's the biggest responsibility that 
I've got as a person to look after her cause she's on her own, she lives on her 
own, so that's my biggest personal responsibility. And then I've got a 
responsibility to myself as-well to make sure that I don't end up in the gutter you 
know, I let things get on top of me so I've got to make sure that I'm always, I'm 
always focused on something better to do, something you know. I'll have a go 
have a go have a go just keep me going keep me moving up rather then 
slipping down. 
Researcher: Yea, is that a danger is it? 
Informant: Um, well, I wouldn't class it. That's a tricky one um well there [laughs] 
there is there's been a history of mental illness in my family and I'm not 
suggesting that I am anyway out and round the bend, but um my mum has 
some problems as well that she has to deal with. And, ah, well basically, both 
my parents were alcoholics and my mum still is basically, chronic alcoholic. So 
um, there is the potential for me to start threading on the slippery slope you 
know end up the way they were. But I am too focused for that. And um, I am 
quite weill am a hundred and fifty percent sure that I won't ever encounter that 
problem because I have seen it and I know what it's like (MP8) 
On the one hand his social responsibilities, the call that awoke in him his self-
understanding as a moral person, was to his mother. He acknowledged this call as 
at once qualified ("I've got a certain responsibility") and onerous ("that's my biggest 
personal responsibility"). His father and only sibling had both died, leaving his 
mother with elderly parents, her son (the informant) and her brother. Since her 
parents were too old to be of help there remained just the informant and his uncle 
(the informant's mother's brother). In the face of this moral call the informant 
struggled to establish an authentic sense of self, and appeared tormented in this 
struggle. His subjectivity appeared threatened and there was a desperate attempt 
to form a narrative where he did not "end up in the gutter" by ensuring that he was 
"always focused on something better to do." This suggests that he struggled to 
make a choice about himself and keep to this choice. The trouble for this informant 
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was how to make a responsible self-choice in the midst of his recalcitrant 
responsibilities; recalcitrant both because his mothers' difficult illness and because 
he needed to earn a living in the market. 
This informant's response to these difficulties was to distinguish his desires by 
critically clarifying his interests: 
I could completely abscond from all of my responsibilities, you know I could go 
and jump on a plane tomorrow and go live with an Auntie in Greece or an 
Auntie in Adelaide and forget about it you know. But then you know, I would die 
with such a heavy conscience [laughs] you know .... In a way I am I do feel 
somehow tethered to the UK to try and you know address a situation. So in a 
way yeah, they [his responsibilities] are thrust upon me but I mean I am an 
individual and I do have, I do have ah, I do have a right I suppose to go and do 
what I like and if I want to I could just go and forget about it all you know, I could 
do am. But I suppose in a way I do have other responsibilities thrust upon me, 
like work you know. If you don't work then you're going to end up on the dole 
and you know that is a responsibility, to work. It is a, it is a big responsibility and 
you know. I didn't ask to be brought into the world but I have to I have to earn a 
living you know (MPS). 
The desire to abscond arose with the obstinate nature of his mother's alcoholism. 
F aced with a situation that seemed all but hopeless it was perfectly justifiable to 
conclude that there was nothing he could do but abandon further attempts to alter 
the situation. However, he recognised that this was his responsibility and he had to 
deal with it if he was to continue to live with himself and not be tormented by a 
"heavy conscience." Indeed, he saw his responsibility to his mother and his 
responsibility to work as having equal call on his efforts, that is, he accepted his 
own life as the basis of his individuality. The ethical and reformist structure of this 
discourse was based on these difficulties and in recognition of a number of other 
structural constraints (including the lack of work in the town where his mother lived, 
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the uninhabitable state of her home, the distance between his place of work and his 
mother's residence and his sense of estrangement from his childhood friends). 
Based on these clarifications, this informant felt he needed to make himself into the 
kind of person who could be there for his mother and, at the same time, develop a 
life for himself: 
Informant: ... I am close enough in London to be able to, I mean I went up last 
week and paid her a surprise visit and she wasn't expecting it you know. And 
caught her red handed, do you know what I mean. So, ah I am still capable of 
doing that being ... 
Researcher Why did you do that? 
Informant: Why? To let her know that I am on her case basically you know. Um I 
did it last year twice as-well. And ah and its not just me going and saying "hoo" 
you know. Its me going in and taking the situation by the scruff of the neck just 
saying "what the hell are you doing?" or words to that effect. Trying to do it 
lovingly, [laughs] and not to make her feel more neglected by me you know. 
Trying to make her feel comfortable with the fact that I'm um going to keep this, 
keep doing this, keep doing this until things start to change you know. There is 
not really much more I can do then that (MP8). 
Having taken up the point of view of norms concerning the good for himself and for 
his mother, this informant works to establish these norms in their relationship. The 
norm is one where he continues to callan her to recognise and deal with her illness 
and to call on her to reform herself by asking her "what the hell are you doing?" By 
situating this attitude as a central characteristic of his life he reforms himself in the 
interests of the good life for his mother and, at the very least, the not misspent life 
for himself. 
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The reformist discourse was used in a more dramatic way by a female Asian 
informant. In pursuing her interests she found herself in direct violation of norms 
she was supposed to conform to: 
Informant: ... Stay at home. Be a housewife, that's it, that's your responsibilities. 
But, however, you know, however, forever you know. That's what they think that 
you should be doing. Even my kids. I mean they don't agree and now I've got a 
grandchild, they want me to stay at home and look after him not go out to work 
and let her go out to work and I said "no." So they won't help me out at home. A 
lot of conflict a lot of problems. 
Researcher. Yeah? How do you feel about that? 
Informant: Upset, [begins to cry] it's just one of those things isn't it, just living in 
the wrong time for me anyway, but it doesn't matter it'll come about for them, for 
my kids. It's a" right for their wives but it's not right for me. Just the way you're 
brought up, I think isn't it. And it's the culture and the community because most 
Asian women that are born in Pakistan are staying at home they're not going 
out to work. So because I go out to work and drive the car and everything it's 
not the norm, its not acceptable. They don't like it, they think you know you're 
too independent, whereas in our culture women rely on men to do everything, 
and women don't do it themselves. Whereas, I've had to do it and I still do it and 
I want to continue and they, the kids, because I've got boys they all say "we 
work you don't need to work anymore why are you working we'll pay the 
mortgage." I don't know. A lot of conflict (MP7). 
This informant had been forced, through circumstances, to accept responsibility for 
herself and her children when her husband left them eleven years previously. Since 
her children had grown up she wanted to continue to accept responsibility for 
herself: 
They're going to be independent they're going to go off and do whatever they're 
going to do and live wherever their going to live and I'll be stuck, 1'" have 
nobody, so I need to do this (MP7). 
230 
The conflicts that arise here lie between the norms that this woman felt she was 
supposed to conform to as a member of the Asian community and the interests she 
had in securing a life for herself. She recognised that as a divorcee whose children 
were attending college, her interests lay with securing an income she could use to 
payoff her mortgage and to save for her retirement. The trouble with conforming to 
the role she was expected to perform was that she may end up living in poverty. It 
was quite possible that her children would pursue their own lives and she would be 
living alone with no savings or security. Her discourse is peppered with 
observations on how norm conformity represents so many forms of heteronomy 
and inauthenticity. She presents these norms as culturally specific conventions ("it's "." "4j~~~, ~ I 
I'"'' I 
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the culture and the community"), which, when looked upon as principles, are not III ' i: 
equally applied ("it's alright for their wives but it's not right for me"). Against this she 
appeals to her own ethical self-understanding. She wants to continue to be an .' i 
t' '1 
1~ 
~'1'1;individual who is clear about her own interests and responsibilities ("I've had to do it ~~i 
"1 'I 
[work], and I still do it, and I want to continue to do it") and push herself to be an 
authentic person and not to "be stuck" and "have nobody." 
At the time of the interview, the only course of action she felt she could pursue was 
to move to another part of the country and leave her grown up children: 
No [her responsibilities are not a terrible burden], its what you've done, I think if 

you've done it for a long time, its automatic, it's like inbuilt, you know. I went 

away to Pakistan, I've met somebody else and I'm getting a divorce from my 

husband, right. And that time I was away, I mean I was ringing the kids, they 

didn't know where I was but, I was ringing to see if they were fine. And one of 

em had an accident with a car so I knew about that, and um, but my friend that I 

had gone to visit, he says to me "they're not looking for you why are you looking 

for them?" But its because, as a parent and a mother you would and eventually 
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I'll be away from them anyway, you know. I think, we will go our separate ways 
yeah, because of this, they're not accepting that I'm going to get a divorce so 
I'm going to move on. All this is not acceptable to them so this family will split 
up, sad but, you know, they won't come round. It might take them ten years but, 
eventually they will come round, I mean, its just the way isn't it? But, children 
have to grow up, that's the way (MP7). 
While she proceeded to reform her life in line with her own interests (remarrying, 
continuing to work) and these reforms conflicted with the role she was expected to 
perform. Thus, this informant felt that the only response she could make to 
intractable and unreasonable role expectations was to leave her children. Whether 
she would do this or not is beside the point, which is that her reformist discourse led 
her to clarify her own interests in direct conflict with the role she was supposed to 
perform as an Asian woman. 
The reformist discourse involved self-clarifications and these clarifications required 
intensive labour on the part of the informant. For example, the following informant 
worked on distinctions between the good for herself and the good for people like 
herself. By generating these distinctions she could critically clarify the norms 
applicable in each case: 
Ah, one of the things that I have always felt passionate about, I don't know 
people might say its because of the condition I have, is actually fighting for and 
empowering maybe that's the wrong, we're using one of the PC terms here, 
empowering people with disabilities to actually stand up for themselves and not 
be afraid if you see what I mean. Because I myself as a person I've, first of alii 
see myself as a person I always have, but also in the other context, as I 
mentioned as a person with a disability, I know how hard it is to actually fight for 
your rights as an individual aside from the fact that you've actually got a 
secondary factor to begin with. So as that I, which I have done in the context of 
I've fought for students at this university who are themselves. So in fact this 
morning I was with a member, um a visiting lecturer who is I think [inaudible] got 
asked by the university disability officer would I actually come up and be willing 
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to be interviewed about the opportunities for disabled students at FE colleges. 
That's, you know, not just in terms of education but also their rights as a student 
with a disability in you know the social, the educational, the whole sphere. So I 
think my own, in terms of my own responsibility, not only is it my responsibility 
to myself to fight for myself, but also I think coming from a disabled person's 
perspective we all have to fight for one another. Because at the end of the day if 
we don't nothing is going to get done about it, if you see what I mean. Because 
they, society cannot expect us to just sit behind closed doors because we won't 
do it (MP4). 
This informant identified herself primarily as a person and secondarily as a person 
with a disability. As a person she was a student, a member of a family and 
somebody from an ethnic minority background. More pertinently, as a person with a 
disability she had to fight for her own rights in relation to the benefits system and 
the University she attended and she felt she should fight for the rights of other 
disabled people. Thus she clarified her responsibilities as a person with a disability 
in terms of realising the good for herself and people in similar positions. In this way, 
she did not clarify what the good life for her entails in terms of a goal or value, 
rather, this good life appeared to reside in the process of realising satisfactory 
understanding and recognition of her rights and the rights of disabled people in 
general. 
Finally, the reformist discourse is concerned with clarifying the good for the self or 
community and with working to realise this good. However, this discourse begins to 
be transformed into a reflexive discourse as the reformer who advances the good 
for herself or her group comes into contact with the good as advanced by others. 
When this happens, the reformer finds she has to put forward additional arguments 
about why her cause deserves greater attention or resources than those of others. 
The example here comes in the form of advocacy. The situation for the advocate is 
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-somewhat distinct from the person bearing a responsibility as a recalcitrant 
condition of their own life because the advocate is somewhat removed from this 
responsibility, which they nevertheless feel a responsibility to address. Additionally, 
the advocate seeks to speak on behalf of a person or a group, the members of 
which have some need that they are not in a position to demand themselves. The 
advocate, therefore, is in a position to draw together the orientation to the good of 
the people on behalf of whom she advocates and a reflexive conscience of norms: 
To myself? Well nowadays to provide for myself on a day-to-day basis, and I 
feel a responsibility towards any further seeking to the problem of dementia, 
because I see dementia as being a surge as, in 20, 30 years time as we are all 
living longer. In the old days my time would be up now, three score years and 
ten, but now I fully expect to be here in 10 years time, and the incidence of 
people living longer is very high and the percentage of people having dementia 
has remained the same .... And I see other people having to lose their homes 
to pay for care in dementia, and I don't think, well certainly when my husband 
was ill, at a time when I was in and out of day care places, I decided, my family 
and I, we sat around the table, the two boys and I, and I said "well I'll have to 
give up my job." Because when he first became ill and I got a job, we still had 
responsibilities we still had a mortgage and things like that and so I got a job 
and went back to work, but then it came to the stage when he couldn't be left 
(MP12). 
This informant presents dementia as an issue that needs to be resolved at the level 
of society. Having cared for her husband, she understands the issues involved. 
Thus, she finds herself in the position of advocate for those who suffer from, and 
those who care for sufferers of, dementia. It is her responsibility to clarify the 
interests and needs of sufferers and carers and to contribute to discourses aimed at 
finding policy solutions: 
I mean when [names husband] was ill, I just kept going, and I worried this and I 
worried that, and it nearly drove me mad because I thought it should be there 
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automatically, the help, even if I had to pay for it. But nobody wanted to tell you 
about it. And I mean, the only time I have ever been really disapPointed with 
myself, really disappointed, I was asked to go to [names University] to a 
seminar ... but I said something and one of the people there said, "oh but there 
is lots of help [for carers] out there and you only had to ask." I just went mad! 
They said you are not asking the right person, well how am I supposed to know 
who the right person is? You may be the right person, so you know, and if I 
can't find it what chance have people got who are not very articulate and pushy, 
like me. I feel for them, I was really angry and I got up and left the room. And I 
thought afterwards, "I shouldn't have done that" but it was how I felt at the time. 
Here's this person that thinks they know all about it, but not telling people. 
People pat you on the shoulder and say got to keep you fit and healthy cos you 
got a long haul ahead of you. Well that is not a lot of help to be truthful (MP12). 
The disappointment she felt stems from her awareness that more needs to be done 
to help people suffering from dementia and their carers. The seminar represented a 
forum where this informant could put forward such arguments, arguments she was 
no doubt well capable of forming as a retired county councillor. 'Storming out' 
represents a failure to act effectively as an advocate. Moreover, the anger she 
describes was in response to support structures that she found difficult to access 
and to social norms that imply that she should be doing the caring work herself. For 
her, such conventions simply did not meet with the needs and interests of the 
sufferers or their carers. Patting people on the back for doing the right thing 
represented, for her, an illegitimate dependence on norms where family members 
were expected to carry out all of the caring work with little outside support. 
Therefore, it was her responsibility to clarify these shortcomings and to argue for 
the provision of greater resources for this constituency. This informant brought the 
reformist discourse into contact with the reflexive discourse and argued for the 
reorganisation of welfare provision so that the interests of people suffering from 
dementia and their carers could be adequately recognised and fairly treated. 
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The reflexive discourse 
While the users of the reformist discourse took the perspective of an authentic 
person and looked on conformity to norms as a matter of inauthenticity, the users of 
the reflexive discourse took the perspective of an autonomous person and looked 
on this conformity as a matter of heteronomy. The distinction between these two 
perspectives is, indeed, a fine one. But whereas the person using a reformist 
discourse sought to reform her life in line with interests and concerns that she 
clarified as more adequately reflecting her own real interests, the person using a 
reflexive discourse seeks a principled moral point of view on social issues. Using a 
reflexive discourse means looking on conformity to norms as based on a 
dependency on such norms, whereas these norms need to be treated in a more 
abstractive and theoretical manner to decide whether they are worth abiding by as 
a matter of principle. This sense is well captured by this following informant: 
Because I think it's unfair that people should be at risk. I am so well off here. I 
know there's poverty, I gave a person a lift the other the day from an anti­
poverty meeting in [names town] and she is from Kenya and she said how can 
you say there is poverty in the UK. And I said uoh crumbs. I know what you are 
saying and I agree with you that way." I said "it's a very different kind of poverty 
really when compared with others." But really I have so much freedom here. We 
have the water comes in and it's clear safe water but there are so many who 
are at risk because the water is not safe and when I saw the floods in 
Mozambique and people drinking from rusty tins, water that was so muddy it 
was appalling and I found that very disturbing. I think that people deserve 
certain things that are covered is it by the UN basic rights. They need food and 
drink and clothing and warmth and medical support and education and housing 
to have any kind of quality of life and as a Christian. I'm not preaching, there's a 
verse in John, 10: 10 where Jesus said I have come that people may have life 
and have it to the full. So many people don't have much of a life. That's not 
right, that's not fair. It's not fair that people should be in pain or suffer and so if 
by giving, me giving what is a small amount for me if it can make a difference 
for others (MP11). 
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This informant contrasted his own reflexive approach to developing norms within 
his own life to deal with poverty with the discourse articulated by his Kenyan 
associate. In contrast to a discourse that challenged the legitimacy of discussing 
poverty as a social issue in a land characterised by wealth, he talked of his own 
relative wealth. The point here, though, is that he developed his argument through 
appeal to principles of justice, in specific, the principle that "people may have life 
and have it to the full." Using this principle he argued against the injustice that many 
people do not "have much of a life." Moreover, using this principle, he transformed 
the norms surrounding poverty into moral issues that could be theorised. The fact 
that Britain is a wealthy country that provides a stable political and social :~~ :-~ 
.... " '~ I 
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environment in which people can live their lives is no longer sufficient when such .!1 : 
norms are exposed to the critical gaze of principles. But he was not satisfied with 
simply critiquing social norms. Rather he went on to discuss how he has reflexively 
'11'1 
.. I ~reshaped his life in light of arguments made on the basis of principles: 
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And it does [giving small amounts makes a difference to others]. So over the 
years we've sponsored children through education and I've had a tinge about 
that because I get teased by non-Christian friends "oh you something or other" 
they say. And I know that it does sound old-fashioned and what have you. But 
it's making a bit of a difference in some people's lives. I'd want them all to have 
good education and I've changed over at long last from Nescafe to Cafe Direct, 
I was convinced by a programme I saw on television. That was it. I wonder if I'll 
like the taste of it. Because a lot of them, teas I don't like the taste of, so I had 
mixed feelings about buying this coffee. I've thought "that's okay I can live with 
that." So I've changed over. I've made a tactful decision. It's the politics of 
Nescafe. And cafe direct there aren't the middle people around so the workers 
are treated better (MP11). 
As norms become a matter of theory, life can be organised using norms that offer 
cogent arguments, rather than merely appealing to tradition. By changing the brand 
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of coffee he buys, this informant made a decision to live his life using norms based 
on arguments about the politics of the world capitalist system. Not only did he 
submit norms to the critical gaze of principles, but he also used this ability to 
critically appraise norms in order to weight up the norms he abides by when he 
went shopping and to decide in favour of foods that were more representative of the 
just life he wanted to live. Responsibility takes on a different meaning here. To be 
responsible is to live according to norms that can be justified as fair to everybody 
affected. 
The final example of a reflexive discourse more radically draws the experiences of 
individualised persons into a reflexive moral framework: 
... ah we get a lot situations coming up now for women approaching the age of 
sixty. Ah years ago, in the nineteen seventies, a lot of women were told they 
didn't need to worry about paying full national insurance themselves. They 
could pay what was called a married woman's stamp, a reduced rate of national 
insurance, and "don't worry about your pensions you can claim on your 
husband's pension." But a lot of the women didn't understand the implication of 
this. I mean it actually meant that they were not able to get a pension in their 
own rights. I saw someone just after finding out they've suddenly only got 17p a 
year, which is, they stopped paying full stamps and their husband wasn't, it was 
another 5, 10 years before he was retiring age. They were blamed for the error, 
and they have nothing, and once he was the age of 60 because they felt they 
had been misled of misinformed which they probably have. They haven't 
understood properly the implications of opting out of paying the full stamps. Um 
there's a question there about responsibility but also at the time there was huge 
responsibilities on the pensions department to make damn sure they 
understood what was happening to them. Urn, yeah I mean, responsibility, 
different people react in different ways, there are people who are totally feckless 
and don't think about what their doing with their money they don't think about 
tomorrow. Other people try and be a bit more frugal. But then the person who is 
frugal they find they are actually being penalised because if they've saved up 
money, they suddenly find they've got too much capital to claim certain social 
security benefits but they're not in a position where they are particularly 
wealthy ... (WA3). 
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This informant takes as his theme the relationship between the norms that are used 
to organise society and the interpretations that people base their decisions on. He 
draws on observations about the reality of people's lives, the ways in which people 
make decisions and the norms people are told they may conform to in order to 
expose the limitations, inadequacies and ruptures between societal norms and 
people's everyday lives. In effect, people frequently make decisions about their 
welfare that are based on misunderstandings and false interpretations of seemingly 
comprehensible norms. But he argues that while many people are indeed 'feckless', 
it can in reality be the people who are 'frugal' but misinformed or who are not able 
j' ;".:1to do enough to secure their own welfare that lose out. By placing everyday life "' . 
••
. 
. 
' 
. 
,~experiences alongside societal norms, this informant tends to emphasise the ~ 
-. 
breakdowns and ruptures on the side of the individual, while placing some of the 
onus on the state administration to adequately communicate the structure of norms. 
j, 
This represents a reflexive discourse because it treats norms as a matter of theory 4j " 
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rather than as an extant expression of collective will. Seen as theory, this informant 
can connect the universal with the particular; interrogating norms from the point of 
view of experiences. In so doing, he finds reason to criticise all sides; the 
government for not adequately helping the individual understand the decision she 
was making and then blaming her for her misunderstanding and leaving her at a 
loss; and the individual for not adequately investigating the implications of her 
decision. A policy norm, then, does not simply define roles and responsibilities. It 
also affects lives. Therefore, it goes beyond convention and becomes a matter of 
theory. To be responsible here is to understand and to deal with the ambivalent 
implications of norms. 
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Conclusion 
In this Chapter we have seen how the participants in this research presented 
themselves as responsible using a number of discourses. They acted in 
responsible ways using various relationships with social norms. The pertinent 
questions are not whether people are being responsible, but how are they relating 
with norms expressing responsible action and how are they processing these 
norms in order to perform in moral and responsible ways? 
Within the egoistical discourse both the situation and relevant norms were dealt 
with by taking using an objectifying attitude. Norms were situated as rules that 
everybody should follow because it was in the interests of each person, were not 
seen as relevant to the situation at all, or were looked on objectively and calculated 
in terms of the costs and benefits of likely outcomes. It should be noted that the use 
of this perspective was limited to personal decisions about how to lead one's own 
life in the context of the community, for example a personal struggle against 
alcoholism, or in relation to the family, while this perspective was rhetorically 
situated as about living according to the individual's own inclinations by those using 
norms more directly. In any case the egoist dealt with norms in accordance with her 
own individual interests and in a fashion that was uncritical of norms themselves. 
She was not in a position to question whether people should act in line with relevant 
norms. Rather she noted her own interests and, where appropriate, the relevance 
of particular norms and thought through the relationship between the two. 
Responsibility here means to think about personal interests first and then to act 
240 
using norms whose outcome was commensurate with the observable interests of 
others. 
The conformist discourse drew on an uncritical attitude to norms but in a collectivist 
fashion. Those using this perspective acted on their responsibilities in accordance 
with certain norms. The norms in question were family norms, norms governing the 
relationship between dependent parent and adult children or those various norms 
positioning the individual as having various roles and responsibilities. What 
distinguished the conformist discourse was how people adapted their behaviour to 
meet with the requirements of relevant norms. The power of these norms arose 
with the expectations of real others, so that the conformist discourse provides an 
example of conventional moral conduct in the sense that people conformed to the 
behaviour expectations of those close to them. However, this was primarily a 
collectivist discourse because even as responsible behaviour was acted out in 
relation to a primary group, either family or work colleagues, norms were accepted 
by taking the perspective of the collective. The informants did not conform to norms 
merely because it was what was expected of them, even if this expectation 
Ii 
I 
structured their discourse in a conformist way. They conformed to norms because 
such norms expressed the right and responsible thing to do from a more systemic 
perspective. 
The reformist discourse represents a discourse concerned with reforming either the 
individual or the group in light of a clarification of interes~s in relation to norms. The 
peculiarity of the reformist discourse is the sense in which it is concerned with 
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altering behaviour by critically moving beyond merely abiding by role and norm 
expectations, by reflecting on the interests of the person. Thus it takes back up the 
interests that were important in the context of the egoistical discourse and critically 
relates with the norms the person is expected to live by. A variety of uses of this 
discourse is reported here including discourses where the individual had already 
become critical of their unquestioned adoption of behaviours; discourses used by 
people signalling their struggle to clarify their own interests in relation to norms; 
discourses used by people who wanted to help others who are forced to abide by 
inappropriate norms. In each case, responsibility was situated using a discourse 
presenting a more authentic way of living, and which was about reforming the 
persons life in accordance with a clarification of the values that articulated the good 
life. This discourse critically appraises norms and behaviours in light of interests. 
Finally, the reflexive discourse drew together a range of competing discourses in a 
way that both recognised conflicting interests and drew attention to these conflicts. 
It was also a specifically moral discourse, that is, it was burdened with a 
consciousness of the intractable social dilemmas posed by conflicting notions of the 
good. This discourse was used in a principled moral way, autonomously applying 
ideas of justice to social contexts in a way that brought conflict clearly into relief. 
The concept of responsibility operative in this discourse was one that sought norms 
which were in keeping with the interests of all concerned. 
While nothing can be drawn from such a small sample regarding the frequency with 
which such discourses are used or regarding who is likely to carry which kind of 
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discourse, a significant point can be asserted. These informants did not derive 
constructions from hegemonic discourses. Nor did they directly accept social 
constructions. What they did was take an attitude to the responsibilities they were 
called on to accept and draw on norms in a way that seemed appropriate. 
Furthermore, the norms themselves were not simply society's norms. The content 
of a norm, and the rational structure of norms were of equal importance. Each of 
the informants accepted norms and a discourse surrounding these norms as they 
discussed how they dealt with their responsibilities. Therefore, while norms are 
important, it is the way that norms are linked with the reality of people's lives and 
how this linkage enables them accept their responsibility's that needs to be 
addressed in public and social policy. 
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Chapter 7: Society, responsibility and welfare 
Introduction 
The previous chapter established how people act on their responsibilities using 
constructions appropriate to the situation. In this chapter the analysis moves to the 
ways people relate action and discourse in more cultural and social contexts. The 
first part of this chapter deals with cultural constructions; with perceptions, of and 
perspectives on, the culture of responsibility. Thus the analysis presents popular 
social and action theories of responsibility. The second part is an analysis of the 
informants' perceptions of social integration through the institution of the welfare 
state. This is an analysis of popular theories that are normative in character. 
Observations on culture and the responsibilities of others 
The informant's reflections on responsibility in the general moral culture, was 
focused on how, and to what extent, the individual exercises her will in moral and 
responsible ways. As we have seen with Bauman (1993, 1995) and Fevre's (2000) 
work, there are strong social theoretical grounds showing that the cultural norms 
people use to guide their moral and responsible actions are threatened by capitalist 
cultural models that encourage a preoccupation with the self. Such models are 
strongly linked with market collectivism (Schmidtz, 1998) and communitarianism 
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(Etzioni, 1995). In this section this issue is explored through an analysis the 
informants responses to the question "do you think people take their responsibilities 
seriously enough." The analysis focuses on the informants' perceptions of, and 
constructions regarding, how people in general deal with their responsibilities and 
the kinds of norms organising these efforts. 
A demoralisation thesis 
The perspectives and constructions used by the informants can firstly be organised 
on the basis that shared norms have a significant structuring effect on how people 
deal with their responsibilities. In line with this, many informants felt that the welfare 
state had discouraged people from taking responsibility for their own lives. Indeed, 
one informant linked the changing nature of the state with the changing willingness 
to accept responsibility: 
Particularly I think some of the, what I would call younger middle aged group. I 
mean I think people your age [late twenties] actually do accept responsibility 
very well, and are being brought to do so more and more. But I think there is a 
generation above who feel that it'll all be all right on the night and if not then the 
state will probably be there (MP12). 
While specific inferences cannot be drawn from this statement, the indication 
seems to be that those brought up in a society formed by the New Right (Levitas, 
1986) are better able to accept their responsibilities. This idea, that the wider 
societal culture has a clear impact on individual agency, was used in a more radical 
way by other informants. In these discourses the welfare state and capitalism were 
seen to be increasingly undermining people's ability and willingness to accept 
responsibility: 
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... 1 think its very easy to think from the media that we all want a nanny state, 
and I think some people have been brought up where they feel that they have a 
right to, to, things to everything that they want to be provided. And I think that 
they, advertising am, body advertising body or the media really pushes that as­
well. The latest being this, you know, the you know, if you've had an accident 
and its not your fault all this lot, its, its, its been like that in America for a while 
and it bothers me to see it going that way ... It just all seems a little bit sordid, 
you know. I had an accident at work and it led to a Pulmonary Embolism and 
everybody kept saying uOh you've got to claim you've got to claim." It didn't 
happen on this premises but I was working, and I think "I can't" I couldn't do it. I 
couldn't claim, because I really didn't think it was their fault I tripped, you know. 
So, and I think you know there is this worry, that almost breaking your neck or 
falling down stairs is like winning the lottery, you know ... (MP5). 
The idea here is that the rise to domination of capitalism and state welfare has 
been accompanied by a rise in a calculative logic. This calculative logic is 
increasingly gaining hold of the cultural fabric and is undermining responsibility 
taking. Nevertheless, as the structure of the above story indicates, it is other people 
who use this logic and who seize upon certain caveats within the capitalist and 
state welfare systems in order to further their own desires. The informant chose not 
to sue her employer on the moral grounds that she felt she could not blame the 
University for her misfortune. But the perception is that other people do exercise 
this kind of thinking and believe it is perfectly acceptable not to accept responsibility 
for their own lives themselves. The following informant agrees, emphasising how 
this culture is transmitted: 
..... now if a girl becomes pregnant, either through lack of control of the feelings 
or when she has got a partner and they decide to raise a family, if the partner 
leaves then the responsibility towards the girl and her child, no longer falls on 
her parents or her relations. It falls upon the government and the local authority 
to provide that condition to her. And consequently you are getting a lot of these 
young children that are now the by-product of two generations that haven't had 
this senior parental assistance or control. Many of them don't know who their 
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grandmother or grandfather is, many of them don't even know who their mother 
or partners' elders are. But what they do know is they don't go hungry because 
their parents are supported through government agencies. And this is where 
those children, get, I won't say thrown onto the scrap-heap as regards to love 
and care; but they get a lot more than the children who get love and care 
through a close knitted family who looks after them in many respects. The child 
who breaks the rules and is taken away on holiday, the low-income family that 
support their children and therefore that child doesn't go away on holiday. MP6 
Thus those who reflect on how cultural and institutional frameworks impact on 
responsibility taking stress the transmission of ideas that undermine the willingness 
or ability of the individual to accept responsibility for their own determinations. This 
discourse places a large degree of store by the idea that people adapt to the norms 
of their society. It is quite distinct from the conformist discourse identified in the 
previous chapter and is more concerned with ideological and hegemonic discourse. 
In this regard it drew largely on the idea of the egotistical person, the person who 
adapts to social norms by objectifying them. However, unlike the egoistical 
discourse of the pervious chapter, this radical view identifies this person as 
operating without a sense of justice seeking only to realise her own personal 
desires and inclinations. 
The thesis that people are becoming self-interested as an adaptation to the culture 
of the welfare state also surfaces in the discourses of two of the welfare advisors 
and benefits recipients. One rights advisor described how his organisation's clients 
appeared unable to take responsibility for their own lives: 
I think there is a tendency for people to leave it to other people to look after their 
responsibilities. I think that is a tendency with a lot of clients who come in here. 
They can't really think for themselves so they need someone to phone up on 
their behalf if they are in debt with the council, or the Inland Revenue. They 
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can't actually do it for themselves. But if there is somebody sitting there with 
them then they'll sort it out. But a lot of them have got the tendency to let it go 
and leave it, and it gets worse. The bailiffs move in and we've got to try and sort 
that out for them. I don't think they take the responsibility correctly you know 
(WA5). 
What emerged from this interview was that this advisor felt his clients were unable 
to accept responsibility for their own lives and that this lack of acceptance was 
linked with the services of the welfare state and voluntary sector since these 
organisations appeared willing and able to accept responsibility on behalf of their 
clients. Another informant felt that the market and the welfare state had created a 
group of people who calculatively conspire to abuse the welfare system to their own 
ends: 
But no I don't think people take their responsibilities too easily. I think social 
housing is too accessible - which sounds very contradictory for somebody who 
has worked in it for a long time. But I think that people know how the system 
works - there's a particular group of people who know how the system works 
and use the system. And I've seen all sorts of people use it to their own benefit. 
And I've seen other people with quite high moral values, when it's been 
suggested to them by other sources that they might like to access the system 
by using particular mechanisms, they won't do it, because they don't believe 
that it's the right thing to do (WA2). 
These informants provided direct observations of how people adapted to the culture 
of the welfare state by becoming either unable to accept responsibility for their own 
lives or more strategic and egotistical in their relations with the state. From this, 
they drew the conclusion that there was a demoralisation of culture in certain 
sections of society. 
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This perspective was also shared by the benefits recipients. However, these 
informants articulated it as part of their everyday experience: 
Hmm do I think people take their responsibilities seriously enough? - No I don't. 
I think - I think it's very disheartening to think that you can walk down a street at 
night and that street is patrolled more by pimps and drug fags than it is by the 
police (BC1). 
The demoralisation of society had, for this informant, become manifest on the level 
of the street which had become a menacing place. This sense that the world was 
losing its moral fabric was also identified in the way that the self was treated by 
others: 
Well that's how you're homeless isn't it? People don't want to know you. They'll 
know you while you have money in your pocket. When you have no money in 
your pocket they don't want to know you. Which is true isn't it? (BC2) 
Not only did the street feel like a menacing place but the worth of everyday 
relationships were becoming measured in monetary terms. The self was not worth 
attending to when she had no money. Hence the erosion of a sense of moral 
responsibility for others had crept into everyday life. 
Theses on the privatisation ofmoral responsibility 
A less critical and moralistic thesis was offered by other informants. Like the 
demoralisation account, people were seen as adapting to the wider culture by 
focusing on their own interests. But this narrative took a different view of the nature 
of the culture that people were adapting to and the nature of self-interested 
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strategies. For example, one informant argued that European people are not 
interested in presenting themselves as moral and responsible role models: 
No - um no. Most people never - um you see, when I came into England 
[informant is from Nigeria] I discovered there are so many millions in this 
country. Europe has ... I think it all started from the government, the people at 
the top. You know, as I was saying, that if (you are not sure), you say a good 
leader is somebody who you need to look to, that you can say, "This person is a 
role mode!." And if you're not a role model with your way of life, with your family, 
your background, then you're not supposed to be there. Because I tell you, so 
many people are shying away and running away from their responsibility 
because they don't even know it. And until you know it, you understand, you 
cannot defend it. And some people can defend it, but because there are so 
many wills to run away from it, you understand, nobody's (concentrating) on 
what they need to do and what they are meant to do. So they just lead their life 
of some kind, they lead some kind of civilised life, some kind of life that is not 
(possibly) the way they want it ... (BC4). 
This sense that people are not concentrating on what the right thing to do is and 
making a radical presentation of themselves as a positive role model for others, but 
are instead focusing attention on the less important aspects of life was echoed by 
another informant: 
Um, I don't know. Some people are certainly quite blase about what they should 
and shouldn't be doing you know um. And there are a lot of people that just kind 
of drift through life. And in a way I suppose I am going to contradict myself, but 
there's a lot of people that are very um, altruistic responsibilities, whereby they 
only care about themselves and work, and their little kinda group and their 
responsibilities within that. There is also the wider picture of responsibilities as 
well you know, um and a lot of people do neglect that and I suppose in a way 
I'm neglecting that as well, um ... (MPS). 
This informant went on to describe these wider responsibilities as paying attention 
to relationships beyond the circle of immediate relationships and paying greater 
heed to friends. The point that these informants were making is that the concern 
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with private life and personal gratification eclipses the concern with making more 
public presentations of oneself as a moral and responsible person. Both informants 
agree that the culture promoting a concern with private life is based on how people 
focus their moral and responsible on the personal sphere. Thus, it is not that 
capitalism or the welfare state is to blame. Blame is instead placed on people's 
unwillingness to enter into more public spaces where people might perform as 
moral heroes and present themselves as responsible in a more publicly relevant 
way. The former respondent was quite clear about the nature of such moral self 
presentations, while the latter informant went to great pains to describe how this 
might look within his own life as a being there for a wide group of friends. 
Theories ofmoral authenticity 
A more personal perspective was used by informants who sought to draw attention 
to how people made decisions about their own responsibilities based on their 
individual interests. They described responsibility as something that is rooted in 
how the individual processed their world and negotiated their way through life: 
... I think there are some people who don't take their responsibilities seriously 
enough. There are some people who have got the balance right, and there are 
some people who take it too seriously for their own good - and possibly for the 
good of some of the people round about them. In that if you present an image 
that taking responsibility is terribly onerous and it's a major problem, that 
(laughs) could very well put off people from taking responsibility and then going 
to the other extreme (WA6). 
The point here is that the degree to which people accept responsibility is connected 
with how people perceive those who take on numerous responsible roles. On this 
account, the individual avoids accepting responsibilities, not because she is it 
251 
calculative or dangerous, but because she sees the effects on people's well-being 
of taking on too many responsibilities. This perspective shifts attention onto the 
politics of the everyday where people present themselves in terms of the 
responsibilities they shoulder and where the image of the responsible person is 
linked with stress and poor health, an image that might dissuade others from taking 
up some of the burden. While this still makes use of the idea that individual's want 
an easy life, it does not ascribe to the self a calculative outlook, but instead takes 
issue with those who adopt responsibilities and then dramatise the arduousness of 
the associated tasks. Such arduous tasks were articulated by a professional 
welfare advisor as follows: 
I mean we could, I could give you examples of people who don't and people 
who take you know, too much [responsibility]. A classic example is, are the 
pensioners ... they're living just above the poverty line, but they've got 3 or 4 
thousand pounds in the bank but that money their saving for they're funerals. 
So you've got that level you know, where people are taking their responsibility 
even beyond the grave um, seriously. And then you've got the other end, 
aspect, you know, of the client who has come in because the child support 
agency are, are chasing him for maintenance for his child, and he doesn't see 
why he should be paying anything at all, um, because he doesn't see the child 
for example. So you've got somebody who, who is unwilling to accept any 
responsibility you know, for an individual they've created and, and in between 
those two extremes you've got the vast majority of the population [laughs] really 
(WA4). 
These informants see accepting responsibility as connected with how the individual 
interprets the world and the responsibilities that they have towards themselves and 
towards others. Responsibility taking is, then, very much connected with what the 
person is willing to accept as their responsibility and to what degree she is able to 
resolve herself to the resulting burdens and consequences. While it is possible to 
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make judgements about the value of accepting responsibility, responsibility 
ultimately rests with the person and their resolve to accept or reject it. 
Underscoring these arguments is a conception of the subject as a person who can 
accept responsibility and who can resolve herself to accept the consequences of 
the tasks associated with this responsibility. In effect, the person who decides that 
she does not want to bear the burden of certain responsibilities in view of the 
detrimental effects she sees that such responsibilities have on others has made 
that decision based on insight into consequences and on her own decision about 
the kind of person she wants to be or the personal well-being she wants to 
maintain. This is to use a conception of authenticity that is well captured by the 
following informant: 
That's, that's an individual thing, I think anyway. Because I, as a person who is 
individual take my responsibilities very seriously, yes. But then again I can't sit 
here and say well "{sighs] I don't know do you take" you know. I can't, I can't 
predetermine and sit here and judge you and say yeah, "I think Shane takes 
them very seriously" because you know that's an individual thing. Its, you know, 
I'm the kind of person who does who has and who will probably continue to, but 
you may not be if you see what I mean. So that to me that's an individual thing, 
in some ways you might say a personal question (MP4). 
This represents a radical version of the authenticity focused theory. Ultimately, 
people process their own responsibilities themselves within their own minds and in 
their own lives and much of this processing is impenetrable to the observer. Within 
their lives people may interpret their actions as authentic and responsible, however 
it is difficult to judge this as an outside observer. 
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A perspective on the social ordering of responsibility 
A further theory was identified in the transcripts. The thrust of this theory was that 
social structures that could facilitate responsible action were not in situ. For 
example, the following informant described various ways in which people were 
unable to accept responsibility for their own welfare themselves: 
... a lot of people cant afford to [accept enough responsibility for their own 
welfare themselves] because of their family situation. They've got families 
they've got children they simply haven't got enough money coming in to set 
aside after meeting the housing costs. And if they have any children ... so it is 
very difficult. But then other people do um, because they have no famiiiarity with 
the benefits systems, somebody's been made redundant they get a large 
redundancy package, 1520 thousand pound redundancy package, and they 
spend the money obviously. Um, they payoff debts, they go abroad on a 
holiday, they pay for a daughter's wedding all sorts of things and then they 
come back to the benefits agency and attempt to claim social security benefit 
and the social security can refuse them if they think they have deliberately 
deprived themselves of capital in order to gain from the benefits system (WA3). 
By separating how people enact their responsibility from policy norms, this 
informant draws attention to the ways in which people see themselves as behaving 
in a responsible manner, even if this action is constructed differently by the relevant 
welfare agencies. In this discourse, the social becomes a disordered place full of 
the competing claims of reason. One person's responsibility is another person's 
irresponsibility. Moreover, this informant draws attention to how people try to do the 
responsible thing but cannot because of family circumstances, or actually do the 
right thing by their family but are treated as irresponsible by the benefits agency. 
The point in either case is that the individual is unable to accept, or is unaware that 
she contravenes, norms concerning responsible behaviour. 
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This perspective introduced the idea that the adoption of responsibility was a 
phenomenon that was socially situated and structured: 
Um, I think everybody is responsible for themselves and you know if they are 
sane and with it, they do, and if they are not, you know, they are not. They've 
got a depression or different things, different factors affect they way they think 
and perhaps they don't. Like people that are alcoholics and that are on the 
streets and that, they are not really aware that they are any trouble to anyone 
else their just giving themselves pain (MP7). 
This argument, that everybody takes responsibility for themselves unless they are 
otherwise impeded by certain weaknesses itself appears quite weak. It operates on 
the basis of the humanist argument outlined by Bauman (1993, 1995, Chapter 3 
above) wherein people are innately able to be there for others. Taking a more 
rationalist point of view, the following informant argued that many people are 
impeded from taking their responsibilities by their own determinations, limitations, 
social structures, or a combination of each: 
But it's, I think generally people aren't so responsible. I think, generally people 
aren't equipped for life. They're not prepared. They don't learn how to make 
decisions. How best to make decisions. Whether it's over health, men are awful 
at putting things off to the last minute before going to a doctor. It's shopping, I 
know it's easy for me I've got a car so I can. I've got lots of choices, I can go to 
ALDI and this sort of thi.ng you know ... I know people who are not mobile, as 
has always been the case, they miss out on these sorts of things. Equally the 
poorer people miss out and they don't have the storage space, whether it's in a 
freezer or a cupboard even. They don't have the spare cash when it says buy 
one get one free. Or buy two and get one free. Or whatever it is. They can't do 
that (MP11). 
While this informant accepts that people are not "so responsible", the idea that this 
is because they are unwilling or unable to accept their responsibilities does not 
enter his mind. Instead he identifies a range of social issues that impede people 
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accepting their responsibility. By extension, people could come to take more 
responsibility for themselves if they did "learn how to make decisions." By refusing 
to accept that the other is innately dangerous this perspective held out the 
possibility of developing in everybody the ability to adopt responsibility for their own 
lives. 
This is a quintessentially social discourse because here the informant refuses to 
emphasise responsibility as either a cultural or a personal issue. The fact that 
people are unable to adopt their responsibilities or cannot act on them in a 
meaningful way, is neither related to culture nor the individual. Instead this theory 
places greater responsibility on the rest of society to institute practices that help 
people deal with their responsibilities or that help them become capable of acting 
on them in a meaningful way. 
Popular theories of responsibility and society 
These discourses call attention to the sophisticated perspectives that people took 
on the general issue of responsibility in society. The demoralisation discourse is 
concerned with the way in which privately focused thinking is combined within 
individualistically oriented action contexts. On this account, both capitalism and the 
welfare state position people in a way that encourages them to adapt their 
behaviour to social and policy norms. On the one hand, these norms can promote 
an individualistic and egotistic thinking that encourages people to abuse these 
norms for their own personal gain. On the other, these norms relate with people in 
their private context and have the effect of inadvertently transmitting ideas that 
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promote an individualist logic. These issues combine to separate society into two; 
those who adapt to, and egocentrically capitalise on, these tendencies and those 
who do not. Demoralisation is the name given the process of egotistical adaptation. 
While the demoralisation theory placed emphasis on a social theory that maintains 
that people act in response to social discourses, the privatisation discourse 
emphasised action theory. In this theory, it is through people's actions that social 
narratives are formed and the issue lies with how people are focusing their 
attentions in the private sphere. Thus the privatisation theory is concerned with both 
the private way in which people act on their responsibilities and how this privacy 
nevertheless has effects on collective social narratives. 
Action theory also formed a significant component of the discourse by advocating 
on behalf of authenticity. This was very much an action theory because it both 
emphasised how people accept responsibilities in their own lives according to their 
own interests and also drew attention to the rationale that people use as they 
decide whether to accept certain responsibilities. 
Finally, the theory of responsibility that drew attention to how society is 
inadequately organised to facilitate people accepting full responsibility for 
, themselves, brought an action theory together with a social theory. On this account, 
,i 	 people behave in an irresponsible manner either because they are unaware of the 
responsibilities they accrue in specific contexts or because they are unable to 
adequately deal with these responsibilities. However, this discourse did not argue I 
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that people's lack of appreciation for their responsibilities was a matter for the 
individual alone. Rather it drew attention to how society needed to be organised to 
help and not stigmatise such people. 
Social constructions of welfare responsibilities 
In this section of the analysis, attention is drawn to issues that are normative in 
character. As we have seen informants, in their own lives, used discourses around 
responsibility that were appropriate to their personal situation, While they theorised 
responsibility in a variety of complex ways, they shared the underlying view that 
people are not inclined to be socially responsible, In this section, I explore the 
question of the connection between responsibility and the state welfare system is 
explored through the informants' views on dependency and responsibility. 
The individualistic discourse 
The individualistic discourse sought to combine the need to attend to the other with 
a sense of suspicion about the motivations of the other. Adherents to this discourse 
drew together a justification for the state taking responsibility for the welfare of 
others with suspicions of the morality of those accepting state welfare benefits, For 
example, the following informant distinguished between the welfare state as an 
institutional 'safety net' attending to the needs of clients and the institution as a 
'system' vulnerable to abuse by unscrupulous individuals: 
Um [welfare dependency is justifiable] only when it's necessary, absolutely only 
when it's necessary, Because that's what it is there for, in my opinion anyway. 
It's a safety net really, or it should be a safety net ". and it should only be a 
safety net and it should not be a system that's abused for example by people 
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who can be better off on the state rather then go out and work, you know. If 
they are provided accommodation by the council you know and given X amount 
of pounds every week, you know, that should only be an interim, you know, 
arrangement. And it, you know, it should be, you shouldn't have to be 
dependent on the state at all, you know. But some people do abuse it (MP8). 
The individualistic discourse was supportive of a minimal welfare state, a state that 
attended to the basic needs of its citizens but was mindful of how it could be 
abused. While this led this informant to start specifying limits to the attention paid to 
the needs of claimants, this discourse could also identify groups of people who, it 
was felt, should be working: 
You know, guys for example - I'm not picking on men - but people who could 
be out there working but aren't because there are ways round not working. And 
a lot of them haven't got the education to be in even reasonably paid jobs. So 
the sort of jobs they're going to get are £4 or £5 an hour aren't they, delivering 
stock, clearing up ... But is that a reason not to work? Haven't people always 
done jobs that - you know, think about people going down the tin mines and the 
coalmines and awful Victorian factories and all that sort of thing, you know. 
Nobody's suggested anybody goes back to them and drops dead at 30 with 
some horrendous cancer or something, you know, but at the same time - I 
suppose that's where Working Family Tax Credit came from, you know, pushing 
up low paid jobs to decent (WA2). 
This informant expected the person coming to the state for help to take up their part 
in the welfare bargain and emphasised how the role the claimant played had public 
implications, although it was carried out in private. Thus both of the above 
informants were concerned with how benefits claimants were not fulfilling their part 
of the bargain, that is, working or seeking work, and were neglecting their 
responsibilities for private reasons. The former informant identified these reasons 
as connected with disincentives to work and the desire to not work, while the latter 
informant identified the kind of work that benefits recipients were likely to attain as 
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poorly paid and unattractive. Both, nevertheless, felt that this was insufficient 
grounds to claim benefits rather than work. Thus, welfare dependence was deemed 
acceptable in limited cases: 
Yes, in some instance obviously. If there is an illness that you've got that 
prevents you from doing a days work or whatever, then yeah. I believe you 
should [depend on the state1. I've been on incapacity benefit and I've gone into 
those places and I've been on the dole for about six weeks, and I have to admit 
I found it a bit. .. I would have thought actually about sixty or seventy percent of 
the people there could have been working, and were scamming it, and they 
came in with the weirdest clothes and the weirdest haircuts they could come in 
with and they adopted this attitude, and they seemed to have these bad backs 
that would come and go whenever they got jobs, because I would sit and listen 
to them. But, I don't think you can take it away because of the few that ruin it, 
but perhaps more, stricter policy on checking those people out (MP2). 
The individualistic discourse's suspicion of the motives of benefits claimants led 
adherents to seek greater policing of the benefits system. The suspicion raised in 
this discourse was focused on an attitude of mind that was perceived in others and 
never in the discourse carriers: 
... um I think the state has to look after people to a certain degree, but I'm 
totally against the nanny state where people tend to think that uOh don't worry 
about it, the state will look after me, they'll give me a house, they'll give me this 
and whatever." I keep coming back to the old thing, there has to be a safety net, 
but people should be encouraged to stand on their own two feet. I am a 
capitalist I believe in capitalism, I've discussed it for hours and hours and hours 
with [partner's name] because he is very much a socialist and we've bounced 
the argument back and forth and there's very much for socialism and, yeah.1 
understand his perspective. But I think we wouldn't be where we are today If 
people didn't sort of have a little bit of perhaps selfishness wher~ they wa~t to 
be a bit selfish, but in the long run, by being selfish they are paYing more Into 
the system in taxes which go to help other people. Money going round helps 
everybody, but yeah, there has to be urn there has to a safety ~et it~ ver~ 
important, very important, but its more of a safety net, but I don t believe In 
people just sort of depending totally on the state (MP10). 
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Thus, the nanny state was also seen as undermining the entrepreneurial attitude 
associated with capitalism. In effect, the individualistic discourse took issue with the 
decommodification of the citizen because commodification was in the interests of 
the progress and contributed to the betterment of society and the economy. 
Finally, the discourse used by one of the informants pointed to a sense of jealousy 
regarding benefits claimants. She too shared a sense of suspicion, but it was tinged 
with a sense of envy with the purportedly hassle free lives of the benefit recipient: 
If you have to be [dependent on the state], like people who are ill and people 
who have disabilities and things, then they have to be yeah, its okay. People 
who are well and have got to the stage where they've got enough money to get 
by and they don't need to work, then they shouldn't be on the, they shouldn't be 
on the benefit. But how can you get 'em off. If you've made everything so 
expensive, because if you pay and you've got all the bills, you worked and 
you've got all the bills, and you're unemployed you've still got the same bills but 
your managing from your dole money to pay those bills even if its at three 
pounds a week, you're getting by and you've got all the spare time. As we're 
working, we've got no money, we're paying instalments the same, but we've got 
no time either, so we're really worse off than the ones that are signing on. At 
least they've got their time to themselves, haven't they? (MP7) 
For this informant the difficulty lay with commodification and the pressures to work. 
She wanted a less pressurised life and postulated that those on welfare were 
having their expenses paid but had more spare time. 
In sum, the individualistic discourse accepts the need to attend to the needs of 
others, but is suspicious of the motivations and attitudes adopted by the other. It is 
a discourse that expresses a concern with the ease with which welfare claimants 
can benefit from claiming welfare and with how the welfare state promotes an 
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unscrupulous, calculative attitude to the detriment of the entrepreneurial attitudes of 
the capitalist. 
The associative discourse 
The associative discourse was concerned with responding to the needs of citizens. 
It featured integrationist and inclusivist language and talked about bringing people 
into the networks and associations that comprised society. This discourse was 
predicated on the view that while there were people abusing the system, these 
were in the minority. Rather, it was more important to help those on welfare: 
I believe, like, I think most sensible people believe there has to be a safety net. 
There are a ... there's a cohort of people who for whom these opportunities will 
never be able to be taken up. That has to be the case, whether they're disabled 
in some way whether they've got ah, a difficult history of disadvantage or 
whether they're actually just blighted by where they live and the family they live 
in. Um and I think that's a much smaller group of people then perhaps, its 
getting smaller isn't it, there's a smaller group of people than you imagine. I 
think there are there are routes back to re-engagement for a very large number 
of people. We fund a lot of programmes looking at that, getting, youngsters 
particularly, but also work with families, to get back into um self-sufficiency 
really. So I, I do, I do worry about, or I am concerned about the degree to which 
we are able as a society and as a ... with government policy, the degree to 
which we are able to get sufficient numbers of people back into productive work, 
or productive training, or into a situation where they can actually pay for their 
own roof over their heads and feed themselves, put food on the table, and um 
live a, live a decent life (MP9). 
The associative discourse focused on the possibility of integrating individuals into 
the networks and associations of society. In tune with this viewpoint, this informant 
focuses on how individuals can be integrated into society and how society, through 
the organs of the state and business, can help people become 'self-sufficient'. The 
idea that some people cannot be expected to help themselves, and so must be 
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granted unconditional help while others can be helped to help themselves, was 
echoed by the following informant: 
But that amount of money [the social security budget] is controlled to some 
degree. There is an element, I don't know of the exact figure, but I don't think 
there are that many people out there who are sponging on the state. I think that 
some of it is hype. There are people who are not willing to work, but not the 
numbers. I don't really totally agree with some of the numbers that they come 
up with. Some people are unemployed for very good reason, there are others 
who can get up off their backside and do a bit of work. I mean ... I don't think 
that they can say "well we should scrap it." I think they should look at the civil 
list and see the amount of money they are pumping in there, before they 
actually look at the people who are unemployed. That is where my argument 
would actually lie. If we are not prepared to cut the civil list then why should we 
cut the unemployment benefit for these people who, for whatever reason, are 
unable to find a job (MP1). 
Thus, the associative discourse could take on a reformist discourse, identifying 
actors in the social order that commanded resources that, it could be a.rgued, could 
be better spent helping welfare claimants. The associative perspective, then, 
adopts the point of view that people should be helped to integrate into society 
through work or training. It accepts that many people cannot be expected to 
integrate and therefore will need to depend on the state for help. However, it 
focuses on how the social order can be organised to entice or to encourage people 
to participate in social networks or associations organised around paid work. In this 
regard it considers how society can be organised to achieve this aim a.nd presents 
ideas like the reallocation of resources from the 'civil list' or the co-ordination of 
government policy and private action. 
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The associative discourse was used by one of the benefits claimants to attach 
himself to the wider society and to talk about the needs of welfare dependents. For 
him, welfare was the responsibility of: 
... th~ state. This is why I'm trying desperately to get back into work, so I can 
contribute more ~o the ~tate, to provide those who are in a worse advantage, 
place than I am In. Um If you - if you are rock bottom - I'm obviously not 
because some of the stories I hear downstairs make me totally aware of that ­
um then it should be a case of we should help - we will help you help yourself. 
"So you may want to apply for a job - fine OK. We'll give you - it's up to you to 
apply for the job, but if you need help with telephones to actually ring for the job 
or if you need help with letters, CV's and writing implements, paper, stationery, 
that sort of thing, we'll help you" - very much like what they do downstairs. If you 
need - but it's things to help you help yourself (8C1). 
The argument that society should help people help themselves was here couched 
within an argument that it was the duty of anybody who can work to work in order to 
contribute to this task of helping through enabling. The basic idea was that by 
contributing, the individual was helping the state and all of those voluntary and 
I 
statutory bodies empower people and enable them to help themselves. However, it 
I 
was nevertheless important to reproduce the kind of attitude whereby people took I 
responsibility for themselves, a responsibility that on the associative account, it was 
possible to generate under the tutelage of the state: 
... I think in terms of their [the New Labour government] concentrating on 
education, I really believe, you know, the state can have a positive role. Um, 
education and child care, preschool child care, education for our young people, 
very, very important issues, you know. If you can get that right you can create a 
generation of people that are capable of looking after themselves, urn so you 
know, you can concentrate on those. And then of course, the o~her ~~d of the 
scale is they take student grants away so people can't ~o.to uniVersities any 
more, you know, working class families. I, you know, t~ls IS a ~abour ,. 
';Y government, I can't really tie the two. Why are they dOing that. Urn, I can t tie 
those two things together (WA4). I 
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The argument here was that the New Labour government was facilitating children 
develop the skills and abilities to become autonomous responsible citizens, but was 
withdrawing help for people to complete this socialisation through a University 
education. This draws attention to the way in which people need to internalise 
knowledge and skills over the extended socialisation process characteristic of the 
human species and how it was important that a society help people develop the 
attitudes and skills for them to participate fully in these social networks. In effect, 
the associative discourse did not shy away from the onerous task of incorporating 
new generations into the associations and networks of society and could find fault 
with any regime that withdraws what it saw as the necessary support mechanisms. 
To summarise, the associative discourse sought to respond to the needs of the less 
well off in society by working to integrate them into the networks of society. The 
routes to integration that were identified as important were paid employment and 
education. Moreover, the associative discourse focused on the networks and 
associations that make up society and considered the routes through which people 
were incorporated into these associations. In this regard, the associative discourse 
was supportive of the role it envisioned that the government could playas a 
facilitator of this incorporation. 
The participative discourse 
The participative discourse drew on a need to evaluate the context of the call for 
help and to respond appropriately. The participative discourse went beyond the 
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focus of the associative perspective on the problem of whether to respond and 
investigated the situation that the other was in and how this situation might be 
altered. Thus, for example, the following informant dealt with the question of welfare 
dependency by describing the situation of the elderly person's call for help and 
through these descriptions she conveyed ideas about how these situations might 
be altered: 
If you are old, and you have no other means, I think the state should have a 
means of supporting you. There should be a means of supporting you properly, 
rather than supporting everybody to a lower degree. As I say people with 
houses [elderly people] don't want to sell them because they want to leave 
them to their family, but the value is there for, which would last quite a long time 
in care [if this value was invested in care], although I know it is very expensive 
now. That is why I think there should be more opportunity for [elderly] people in 
private housing for [elderly people] not to have to rely necessarily on the local 
authority to provide them with old people's accommodation. But they should be 
able to put their own on a private basis with the same warden facility on board 
which would reduce some of the state money going into old people's flats ­
elderly person's dwellings you have to call them now. So, yeah I think it is all 
right for there to be something there that the state picks up, but I think people 
should be encouraged either by tax breaks, or by the facility being encouraged 
by the local authority, for these places to be available as a matter of course 
(MP12). 
By describing the situation in which many elderly people find themselves and by 
describing how this situation can be dealt through an accommodation between the 
market and the state, this informant could layout a course of action that adequately 
responded to the needs of the elderly. Thus the participative perspective could 
draw together descriptions of contexts with policy frameworks and consider how 
they might interact. For example, the following informant endorsed New Labour's 
approach to dependency by considering it in terms of a description of welfare 
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dependence that emphasised the willingness of the benefit claimant to become 
self-sufficient: 
I'm, I'm a believer, I'm not a get on your bike philosopher, but I do believe that 
am, I do believe in the Gordon Brown philosophy that more and more people 
should be encouraged to look after themselves and be shown the way to that. 
Um, I think welfare state, dependence on the welfare state is dangerous. I was 
out of work for a year and living on benefit and it was the most uncomfortable 
place to be really, I didn't want to be there and I suspect a lot of people don't. 
Um, so, I think policies should be built around giving people, giving people the 
chance to become self-sufficient again. And I think the tax regime, the different 
tax incentives that have been introduced in the kind of family credit area to try 
and encourage, discourage welfare dependency and encourage, even at low 
pay, encourage people back into, into work, is the right one. (MP9) 
This informant's discourse was used as an example of the associative discourse 
above since he felt that people should be helped integrate into society. But here he 
made use of a discourse premised on the experience of dependency based on a 
description of it.as 'uncomfortable', and coupled this discourse with the idea of the 
benefit recipient striving to become self-sufficient. By using the tools of this 
description and projection of the benefit recipient, this informant could evaluate how 
incentive schemes might provide an adequate response to the needs of benefits 
claimants, in particular for those benefits reCipients who sought help to find their 
way out of state dependence. The point about this combination of a description with 
a projection of subjectivity is that it allowed the informant to evaluate the interaction 
of policy and context. In effect, by using a participative discourse, this informant 
could consider how the subject could find herself able to take "the chance to 
become self-sufficient" and not merely consider the programmes and values that 
formed the focus of the associative discourse and that were aimed at enticing this 
subject "back to re-engagement." 
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The following informant took a more radical perspective on how society helped 
generate welfare dependency: 
Y".hat I think the state should do is what I. One of the things that really, really 
'rn~ated me and really upset me was um, back in the eighties the big miners 
strike and then there was, ah, there was, there was the one in the nineties ah 
when a lot of pits got closed. Now what you end up with is ... You end up with 
almost whole villages dependent on the state, and that the, that cannot be 
cheaper then employing people in all sorts of terms. In terms of the social, 
social good. I mean its all sociological implications there you know ... I used to 
be on support for I think about two months, and I hated it, I hated the fact that I 
had to do, you've got this big um admin built-up, sector built-up around policing 
it and, you, you're just getting charity ._. you're just given it and 1 think you 
know, that surely it would have been better to run the mines than, there's all 
sorts of debates about whether their actually making a loss, but I think its better 
to employ people then to give them, to make them charity cases (MP5). 
By taking up the perspective of the subject, this informant adopted the participative 
discourse and related the structure of the norms she was supposed to adopt to, 
with the kinds of positions this adoption placed her in. This informant used the 
participative discourse to challenge the properties of a society that not only allowed 
people become dependent on the welfare state, but also turned this dependency 
into an industry. Thus rather than consider how norms could be altered to be more 
in keeping with the interests of the subject, this informant considered the wider 
social discourses that prized economic liberalisation to such an extent that society 
was willing to "make them [coal miners] into charity cases." 
The participative discourse used descriptions as tools with which to evaluate the 
connection between policy and context. In this way the participative discourse took 
a more public position than the individualist or associative discourses because it 
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looked at need as a call for help that arises from contexts in a more structural way. 
Thus the participative discourse had tools at its disposal with which to discuss 
issues and to participate, even merely as commentators, on the formation of moral 
calls as public concerns. 
The deliberative discourse 
The deliberative discourse described and evaluated the context of the moral call 
, 
not merely to develop ideas about how to respond, but also to examine the values 
underpinning action. This perspective was wrought with much agonising over the 
meaning and values society uses in taking responsibility for others: 
I struggle with the phrase dependent on the state because I believe that there's 
a togetherness in this and just as in a credit union the first thing that is needed 
is to form a common-bond. Or work out what's the common, what is it that binds 
us together. If we are together in a nation then I feel that's there's a 
responsibility for each other. Some will need an ambulance at some stage ... 
It's not a person's fault and I know its very much a British thing you know you 
punish the victim .. , and that's very very sad and so people are made to feel 
doubly bad when they are needing benefit and I don't look on people as being 
just dependent on the state. They are receiving the help that they need to have. 
And it's not a brilliant lifestyle for crying out loud. The difference between the 
average income and state benefit is enormous and it's no lUxury at all. (MP11) 
Ultimately, on the deliberative discourse, the point of welfare is to help those who 
are in need. For this informant, this means avoiding using conceptions that blame 
or stigmatise the person in need of help and accepting that they do need this help 
and putting the help provided to them in perspective. The deliberator, then, carefully 
adopts constructions that highlight the reasons for, and value of, helping people. 
Put another way, the deliberator brings together the idea that society should help its 
needy with the particular case of the call for help, to support the validity of the call. 
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This form of argument, one that brings the universal and the particular together, is 
also used by the following informant. However, she uses her own life history as a 
case in point: 
I don't think any of us are going to be ever not be dependent on the state, or we 
are dependent, or as I see 'interdependent' if you see what I mean. Because ... 
we have to abide, depending on the context, we have to abide by certain laws 
and so on and so forth. So, whichever way we look at it we are going to be 
dependent. But the fact is, is that I would ideally like not to be so dependent, or 
for those within the welfare context, whether it's the powers above or you know 
the little people down there i.e. I don't know the little people the practitioner or 
whatever you want to call them. It's for them to realise that ah, at the end of the 
day there is more to it than, you know, there is more to an individual persons life 
then being solely dependent on, and being dictated by, the state. (MP4) 
Users of the deliberative discourse could see her life history as an expression of the 
particular related to the universal. This informant talks about the interdependence of 
social life in order to present the state of dependency as normal. Within this, she 
reflects on her own position as dependent on the welfare state and concedes that 
she would "like not to be so dependent." Her argument is that she is a moral person 
willing to try to not be so dependent but she admits she does need help from the 
•
I 
state welfare system. Thus, she calls on the welfare administration to recognise her 
11 
I, as a person who is also dependent on the state, rather then as one who is 
i categorised wholly in terms of dependence. In this way, her own life history becomes the principle tool she uses to relate the interdependent subject; the 
subject who is also dependent on the state, and the state that categorises 
dependency and dictates to the dependent. 
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-Finally, a central feature of the deliberative discourse was how it engaged with 
principles and values, particularly those promulgated by the state. This perspective 
could identify values and their effect on contexts of action, for instance: 
'Make sure you have jobs' [reflecting on own choice of words] maybe not the 

word "make sure" but create an economy where there is enough work for 

people without actually saying "Okay you can you can work for a minimum 

wage." In many ways, yes, that's okay but in, for other people the state wants 

Britain to be healthy and thriving in which to make sure that it creates jobs. I 

don't know how else to say it some people just got it. I don't see, I don't think 

this um, this legislation that children can work at sixteen I don't think that's right 

because they've missed out on Saturday jobs when they're fourteen so they 

haven't got that motivation when their sixteen. I think that's wrong and that's 

because of the legislation. 0NA1) 

hI'.. 1 
Here this informant weighs up the promulgation of a value for work. However, she I 
queries the promotion of this value without allowing children to be socialised into it. 
Thus she takes up the value for work and examines it in relation to how people 
come to adopt this value and to use it in the context of their own lives. For her, the 
value needs to be internalised by each new generation. Preventing children from 
working until they are sixteen curtails their ability to internalise this value and their 
willingness to work when they get older. In effect, she interrogates how society 
structures the transmission of the value for work and identifies a distinction between 
expecting people to work and failing to facilitate their development of a value for 
work. 
The deliberative discourse was used by the welfare advisors as a means of 
examining the relationship between policy and real life context using welfare 
values. For example, the following informant again emphasised the 
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interdependence of social life to argue against a stigmatising concept of 
dependency and to argue for the value of providing welfare to the welfare 
dependent: 
Yes, yes I think there are some people for whom there isn't much of an option 
[but to depend on the welfare state]. And obviously (laughs) in the sector I work 
with, there are quite a number of people in that situation. But then equally those 
people may have a dependency but many of them are also giving as well. I had 
people come to this organisation who financially are dependent on the state 
who are doing things which they're giving back in kind. Um so they're 
dependent and they're - and they've got people who in a way are also 
dependent on them. And I see absolutely no problem with dependency. Equally, 
there are some people who need to be dependent on the state. I mean in a way 
I suppose you can say a child who for some reason or another loses both 
parents will become dependent on the state - lost a home, someone to care for 
them to make sure they've got their education. Absolutely, there are certain 
circumstances at certain times when that's OK. (laughs) This may sound stupid 
nowadays, but in my days of grants, I got a mixture of dependence. I mean the 
state paid my fees and my parents paid my keep (WA6). 
By examining the concept of dependency, this informant stressed the complex 
nature of interdependency. To be dependent does not always mean that a 
dependent person is lazy or unwilling to help others, however, is a part of how 
people adopt responsibilities towards each other. In this light, being dependent on 
the state is just another form of responsibility taking, so dependency should be 
valued and understood in the wider terms of interdependency. Even so, the values 
currently promoted by the New Labour government could be understood as 
reasonable from within the deliberative discourse: 
... there is a responsibility of the benefits system to assist people who are not 
able to assist themselves up to a point. But obviously the jobcentre marks the 
demarcation of with respect to people in order to claim benefits they've got to 
be actively seeking work to satisfy them otherwise the jobcentre will penalise 
you by cutting your benefit or stopping your benefit if they are not satisfied that 
272 
4 
you are looking for work. So there is a balance, in that respect, for them on that 
side of the jobcentre where they are making sure that people still adhere to their 
responsibilities .... The urn government is obviously recognising the size of the 
social security bill. Its getting higher and higher and they are expecting people 
to be responsible for themselves to get into work so the government needs to 
remove the gateways, goalposts and try to get people more into their attitudes. 
But um there is always going to be some, your always going to have some 
members of society that are not going to be able to work for reasons particularly 
social, either their age or health or disability ... (WA3) 
The welfare rights advisor describes the policy framework as balancing rights and 
responsibilities. He accepts the requirement that people take responsibility for 
themselves in light of the spiralling social security bill and understands the 
advancing liberal project of instilling certain work related values in people. 
Nevertheless, noting the limits of this project, he accepts that people should take 
responsibility for themselves. 
The deliberative discourse engaged with the norms used to organise welfare. 
These norms were examined by dealing with the connection between the values 
promoted by norms and the reality of people's lives. Such connections were 
examined by using the individual's own life history as an example of how this 
relationship was constructed, either through observations on the lives of others, or 
by taking wider issues into consideration. Using such perspectives, the deliberative 
discourse could arrive at a number of different conclusions about the nature and 
justice of contemporary norms. 
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Interpretation of discourses on welfare and responsibility 
The discourses on welfare and responsibility outlined above can be summarised 
using the following taxonomy: 
Figure 7.1 Taxonomy of discourses on welfare and responsibility 
PublicA B 
Participative Deliberative 
Individual Social 
Individualist Associative 
C 0Private 
The individualist discourse (quadrant C, above) accepts the need for a welfare state 
to attend to the needs of others, but is suspicious of these others. The other is seen 
as a private person who tends to make use of their position for their own ends and 
thus as an individual exploiting their freedoms as participants in the social contract. 
The associative discourse (quadrant D above) also perceives these others as 
private persons and is conscious of their capacity to exploit the welfare contract, but 
chooses to focus on the need to respond to the proponents of these calls by 
integrating them into society. By contrast, the participative and deliberative 
discourses (quadrant A and B respectively) are aware that the call of the other is a 
public concern that requires detailed attention to the particular context of the call for 
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help. The participative discourse places emphasis on this context, seeking ways of 
responding to the call by developing detailed descriptions of the situation of the call. 
By developing these descriptions, the bearer of the participative discourse is in a 
position to comment on policy decisions, while she focuses attention on how these 
frameworks interact with the particular and the individual. The deliberative 
discourse takes a more social, and indeed, personal, perspective because those 
using this discourse examine the ideas guiding policy. The deliberator was 
conscious of the particular situation and of the vulnerabilities of the other, but 
carefully deliberated the norms organising the welfare discourses that were used to 
respond to this call. 
The normative discourses contrast with the concerns people aired about the trends 
that they identified about responsibility in society. However, this contrast is not 
logically incompatible. While the informants felt that people were taking 
responsibility for their own welfare in more private ways, their normative discourses 
can be understood as a response to this trend. The individualistic discourse was 
based on the feeling that people do in fact look after themselves and prioritise their 
own needs. The associative discourse sought ways of drawing people into civil 
society and the market to remedy this individualism. Users of the participative 
discourse presented the good for themselves and for people like them to the 
decision-makers as a means of securing extra resources and more appropriate 
norms. The deliberative discourse was concerned with the norms underscoring this 
trend, in some cases accepting the validity of these norms and in others pointing 
out how extra or, more appropriate, norms were needed. Each discourse responds 
to the rising importance of an ethics of responsibility. 
Conclusion 
When taken together with the call for a more public conception of responsibility, 
these discourses on welfare and responsibility reveal a deficiency in conceptual 
tools used to deal with responsibility. The informants want a discourse that 
articulates how to deal with responsibility in a more public manner, a discourse that 
can overcome the difficulties of privatisation and demoralisation in such a way that 
it recognises the struggle involved in accepting responsibility and a discourse that 
shows how this is always a social and personal matter. In their discussions of 
welfare and responsibility, these informants made use of discourses that were 
suspicious of the other's motivations, they wanted the other to join with the wider 
society and so consider her outside of society, or they battled to have certain 
responsibilities recognised and the mode of adopting responsibility understood and 
not demonised. 
Cancl usian: Reconstructing responsibility? 
Introduction 
Throughout this study I have made use of a Habermasian constructivism (1984, 
1987, 1996) to critically clarify the research findings. This constructivism is based 
on a distinction between the context structuring individual action, and the norms 
that the individual brings to bear on this context. Therefore, this constructivism 
draws a distinction between the action context and social norms, focusing on how 
norms and action interconnect. In their discourse of welfare responsibilities, New 
Labour constructs a discourse that is promotes models of action for the individual to 
follow as she acts to secure her responsibilities. That is, New Labour have 
produced a number of action models that they exhort people to use to accept their 
responsibilities. However, the models themselves are not critically clarified in 
relation to norms. Rather, these models are offered for the subject to follow. In 
effect, New Labour focuses on individual contexts of action without also connecting 
their constructions with wider norms that might offer justifications. Of course, 
justifications are provided by champions of New Labour's Third Way (Giddens, 
1998,2000, Blair, 1998, DSS, 1998), but as we have seen such moral justifications 
are not dealt with in the press releases that are produced by the government as a 
way of communicating with the public. On the other hand, as I have shown the 
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members of the public, welfare advisors, and welfare benefits recipients all 
discussed the way they accepted their responsibilities by relating their structural 
context with wider social norms. While the benefits administrators discussed the 
responsibilities of their clients in terms of the welfare contract, they nevertheless 
also connected individual contexts of action with a more normative account of 
society. The effect of this was to draw together the reality of action contexts with 
social norms that were used to critically think about how responsibility was 
accepted. 
This disjuncture between New Labour's discourse and the discourses of the 
research informants derives, I argue, from New Labour's unwillingness to engage in 
discourse on social norms. The research informants were willing and able to think 
about the way they accepted their responsibilities in a critical way, and reflect on 
this acceptance in terms of social norms. By contrast, New Labour are 
characteristically unwilling to engage in the same kind of critical reflection, 
preferring to offer models of action that can be used to woo (Lister, 2001) people in 
the direction of responsibility-taking rather than critically reflect on the norms 
guiding the models of action they proffer. In the following, I will further reflect on this 
disjuncture. It has to be accepted that the models offered by New Labour are in 
keeping with research informants' observations on contemporary moral cultures. 
However, the way the informants made use of discourses that critically engage with 
norms is not acknowledged by New Labour's discourse. However, the research 
conducted here demonstrates how informants make use of more critical kinds of 
discourses. This lays a strong foundation for the claims made by commentators like 
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Fiona Williams (1999, 2001) who argue that alternative discourses offering norms 
with a more critical dimension can be used in the context of welfare. Moreover, I 
argue that New Labour are right to use discourses that set out people's 
responsibilities in relation to their individual interests, but these responsibilities need 
to be constructed critically in relation to social norms. This argument forms the 
theme of the following sections where I argue for a kind of discourse that opens a 
process of critically reflecting on norms that can work with New Labour's Third Way 
emphasis on the economy and civil society. In these sections I set out, and defend, 
a discourse I call 'correlative discourse', that is, a discourse in which ethics and 
morals are seen as correlative phenomenon and that brings to light how these 
aspects of situations correlate. 
Discourses of Responsibility 
Like any other discourse, responsibility is constructed in light of particular needs 
and interests. New Labour's discourse of responsibility constructs responsible 
people in relation to civil society and the market. The informants recruited for this 
study used a variety of discourses to construct their responsibilities in relation to 
their own personal or professional lives. More broadly, they discussed the 
responsibilities of the state in relation to their perception of how other people accept 
their responsibilities. In effect, they show how responsibility is construed in light of 
particular interests and in relation to relevant norms. By approaching responsibility 
in terms of discursive relationships with norms, a critical theoretical understanding 
of discourses of responsibility can emerge. 
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As already noted, New Labour constructs a discourse to people that situates people 
as agents responsible for their own welfare in civil society and the market. Four 
different kinds of agents were identified, the heroic, the passive, the good and the 
recalcitrant citizen. The argument that responsibility for welfare is being constructed 
in line with ethics and ideas of the good, conceived from the point of view of the 
individual, group, or community, was substantiated by the corpus of New Labour's 
press releases. I have shown how the ethical concepts used by New Labour are 
concepts that draw people together based on their shared perception of their need 
to deal with their responsibilities as individuals in civil society and the market. As 
such, New Labour seeks to promote this consciousness by providing the heroic 
citizen with the information she seeks to help her make decisions, providing the 
passive citizen with the confidence to enter the market, and providing the good 
citizen with the reassurance that, in working, she is doing the right thing. In each 
case the emphasis is placed on the ways the individual works to realise the good 
for herself by securing her own welfare responsibilities through civil society and the 
market. Of course, I acknowledge that these are constructed rhetorically in view of 
the recalcitrant citizen's self-interested manner of securing her own responsibilities. 
The effect of this combination is to promote the practice of accessing publicly 
available information as private persons looking to make private contracts in civil 
society. Responsibility as such comes to be about the bonds of the social contract 
supported by the weak informal solidarity generated in civil society and economy, 
rather than bonds of solidarity generated as members of a society or of the public 
sphere. But the problem with this is not simply one of membership, more 
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importantly this approach tends to reduce responsibility to the status of one social 
good among many, and empty of moral meaning. 
The moral meaning of a discourse of responsibility would emerge from a stress on 
some form of solidarity amidst diversity. As feminists (Young, 1990, Fraser, 1997), 
critical theorists (Honneth, 1995) and postmodernists Leonard, 1997) have pointed 
out, such a solidarity would need to respect difference and the interdependence of 
members of society. My analysis of a corpus of New Labour's press releases has 
shown how the New Labour government neglect such a morality in favour of a 
focus on the particularity of an individualised life. This is in keeping with the New 
Labour project "[t]o help all individuals and families to realise their full potential and 
live a dignified life" (DSS, 1998: 80). In philosophical terms this means taking up a 
deontological ethics which is an ethics that underlies discourse ethics. Apel (1998: 
193, 194) has admitted his discomfort in endorsing a deontological ethics, since this 
means accepting a moral discourse that does not guarantee happiness to 
everybody. But Apel (1998) endorses this kind of ethics because he feels it is the 
only realistic option in diverse societies. He argues that such an ethics needs to be 
complemented by some form of moral theory and he bases his on discourse which 
he develops through the concept of co-responsibility (Apel, 1987a, 1998, Kettner, 
1996). The difficulty with New Labour's discourse is that it endorses deontology 
without also offering any kind of moral discourse offering the public models of 
agency rather than discourses that they can engage with. The problems that this 
causes are clearly visible to the interview informants. The discourse ethical 
corrective to the focus on individual and ethical interests is based on the use of a 
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reflective discourse as a way of opening up the moral and normative dimensions of 
social problems (Habermas, 1990). 
The analysis of the welfare benefits administrators discourses brought to light a 
stress on a liberal conception of the citizen, a person who is rational and capable of 
identifying her own responsibilities and dealing with them. The administrators also 
drew on a discourse that respected difference and defended choice and the 
fragmentation of welfare in light of the radical differences they saw in people's lives. 
But they were not satisfied with this discourse and in response to this unease they 
also drew on discourses calling attention to how choice mitigated against the 
interests of poorer and more vulnerable people in society. Their discourse can 
therefore be read as a call for a fairer way of organising policy norms. In effect they 
are demanding a method that respected difference but serves the interests of 
fairness for everyone. Of course, these respondents were far from equivocal on this 
need, nor were they comfortable with taking together a discourse that respects 
difference and universality. 
While the government constructs a discourse that offers models of individual 
agency to people, and the benefits administrators discuss the merits and demerits 
of the fragmentation of welfare and the introduction of choice and market based 
provision, the remaining informants discussed their responsibilities in relation to 
norms. Finch and Mason (1993) have shown how people accept their 
responsibilities in certain culturally structured ways, and Duncan and Edwards 
(1999) demonstrated that responsibilities are individually held and socially 
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constructed. Here, the nature of these individually held and socially constructed 
• 
responsibilities was shown as structured through a relationship between the reality 
of people's lives and the kinds of rationalities they offered to justify and explain how 
they accepted their responsibilities in specific ways. Their rationalities that were 
constructed in relation to some wider social construction. In each of these 
discourses, action was related with norms that contained universalising tendencies, 
so that individual interests were related with moral concepts. 
In dealing with these interviews and the rationalities they highlighted, four kinds of 
discourses were identified. Informants using the egoistical discourse observed 
norms and related these norms to her own interests. The egoist accepted 
responsibilities that furthered these interests and justified her acceptance by calling 
attention to whatever discourse seemed relevant. She was egotistical insofar as 
she accepted responsibilities that she felt everybody should equally accept 
because it was equally in each person's interests. Thus, even as this discourse was 
focused on personal interests, it was constructed in relation to a moral discourse. 
The conformist discourse was based on an acceptance of responsibilities because 
the individual felt that it was her duty to do so. She accepted responsibilities that 
were hers in light of her role and the legitimate expectations others had of her. 
Therefore, the interest users of this discourse had, in being there for others, was 
constructed in relation to a moral discourse about the will of the community. This 
will was seen as suffiCiently legitimate that its norms could be conformed with. In 
the reformist discourse responsibilities were accepted in a different and more 
critical way. In using this discourse, the individual discussed her responsibilities in 
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light of the norms organising her activities and sought to change these norms so 
that they better reflected her real interests. This represented a more ethical 
discourse because it was concerned with clarifying the real interests or the good for 
the self or for people like the self, members of a group or community. But the 
reformist discourse connected with a moral discourse insofar as concepts of justice 
were used to make the argument for individual interests, and that others in society 
had interests that equally deserved recognition. Finally, in the reflexive discourse, 
conforming to norms was seen as dependence on norms, and acceptance of 
responsibilities was based on arguments that appeared legitimate insofar as they 
signalled a better way of organising action. But those using this discourse also 
recognised how the acceptance of responsibilities in light of arguments depended 
on the ability to make a rational choice that comes with education and insight. This 
was a more moral discourse because it engaged directly with issues of universality 
and related the reality of people's lives with principles of justice. Thus, in each case, 
responsibilities were accepted by the individual and in relation to a moral discourse. 
The informants accepted their responsibilities for their own personal reasons and 
equally, legitimised their mode of acceptance in light of moral discourses. 
The importance of wider social discourses came to the fore as people were 
enjoined to talk about the nature of responsibility in society. Here the informants felt 
that it was not that people were less willing to accept responsibility themselves, but 
that there are various kinds of discourses in circulation that gave people permission 
to accept responsibility for their own lives only. To explain this they referred to other 
discourses that cast people as irresponsible when the reality was they did not have 
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the tools to accept the kinds of responsibilities expected of them. Variations on 
these concerns were identified with a number of discourses central to out 
understanding of modernity. The first Of these was a demoralisation thesis 
(Bauman, 1993, Fevre, 2000), wherein people take up discourses where they 
accept no responsibility for themselves. Secondly, there was a privatisation thesis 
th at took issue with the way people are not enjoined to present a moral and 
responsible image of themselves to others. Third was a theory defending the 
authentic discourses people use to identify their own interests and abilities and 
accept responsibilities accordingly. Finally, a social discourse was used that drew 
attention to the fact that people might be behaving irresponsibly because they do 
not have the skills or resources to accept responsibility in a the sense of a liberal 
citizen. By informally identifying these discourses, the informants drew attention on 
the one hand to the norms constructed in various discourses and took issue with 
these norms because they provided people with norms that could legitimate 
irresponsible or narrowly responsible action. Or, on the other hand, the informants 
drew attention to the way people did in fact accept their responsibilities in light of 
legitimate personal interests or were hindered from accepting their responsibilities 
in full by the structure of their lives. 
Having identified various discourses that were operative in the way people 
accepted their responsibilities, they took up a more normative discourse where 
asked about welfare state policies. In this context, the informants discussed 
constructions of responsibility that they felt should be offered by the welfare state to 
ensure that people accepted their responsibilities. Included, was an individualist 
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discourse that anticipated a social construction that placed the will to help benefits 
recipients alongside a call on those in receipt of benefits to better themselves 
through paid work. Those using this discourse felt it was important to help people 
but they were also suspicious of the motives of benefits recipients. Therefore, on 
the individualist discourse, it was important to police individual recipients to ensure 
they observed their part in the welfare bargain. Alongside this was an associative 
discourse that sought modes of helping people in receipt of welfare by integrating 
them into society. This discourse focused on socialising people to accept the values 
and norms of the wider society and to become able to accept their responsibilities 
for their own welfare themselves. Therefore it set out the values of society in order 
to incorporate people into the associations that comprised civil society and the 
economy where people could accept their responsibilities. A participative discourse 
was used to build as full a description as possible of the life situation of those in 
need of state help in order to formulate the most appropriate responses. This was a 
discourse that critically related reality with norm to contribute towards the discursive 
shaping of norms that would better serve the reality of people's lives. I referred to 
this discourse as participative because it set out to critically comment on the norms 
that effected people's lives. Finally, there was a deliberative discourse that brought 
together the reality of peoples' lives and the values underpinning social and policy 
norms to demonstrate how these norms needed to be re-evaluated. This discourse 
did not simply engage in critically evaluating the suitability of a norm to the reality of 
people's lives, it was also used to engage the norms themselves to examine these 
norms both in terms of principles of justice and fairness, and also in terms of the 
contradictions obtaining between norms. 
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These discourses represent the constructions that the informants felt ought to be 
used in mainstream and ideological discourse. In effect, the informants felt that 
welfare discourses needed to place a greater emphasis on morality. The informants 
constructed discourses designed to emphasise the morality of responsibility by 
emphasising the responsibilities of claimants and their role in the welfare bargain. 
These included the values that welfare recipients were expected to internalise to 
become responsible for themselves and to show their adherence to the collective 
will; the moral responsibility of the person who, by defining her life in accordance 
with her own reflexive awareness of her personal will, wants to contribute to the 
critical clarification of other people's will; and the responsibility of society to critically 
develop norms that better reflect the interests of members of society and that are in 
keeping with principles of justice and fairness. In each of these ways, morality is 
brought to bear on individual interests. Moreover, by bringing such a morality to 
bear, the individual interest is altered. It is no longer something that is conceived as 
entirely private, but is understood as related with socially constructed norms that 
always already have universalising tendencies, and thus a moral element. 
From poverty to security, morality to ethics 
In his study of contemporary morality, Smart (1999) concludes by drawing Levinas 
(1988), Bauman (1993) and Lyotard (Lyotard and Thebaud, 1985) together to 
obseNe: 
There can be no moral life without the choices, responsibilities and risks which 
are an inescapable corollary of ambivalence. No moral life without the 
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uncertainty of ambivalence, but equally no moral life without the prospect of 
what Levinas refers to as 'something which cannot be realised but which, 
ultimately, guides all moral action' (1988: 178), and Lyotard describes as a 
'horizon' to regulate our perspectives and to guide us (Smart, 1999: 189). 
He shows how morality presents us with ambivalence, inconsistency, and 
uncertainty because it charges us to reflect on universality, diversity, and plurality in 
the knowledge that there can be no ideal that is not also an illusion. Nevertheless, 
even in a world where orientations to the good receive greater weight than moral 
universal orientations, there remains the need for moral guides to organise action. 
Echoing these sentiments, Leonard (1997) concludes his work on "Postmodern 
Welfare" by taking together the good for the self and the group with the orientation 
towards justice for all, to elaborate on the possibilities of an emancipatory project 
for welfare. Leonard (1997) argues that these divergent interests can be drawn 
together into a politics that recognises how ethical discourses require moral 
discourses to secure funding and a new kind of solidarity might emerge: 
This would be an organised solidarity founded on a common interest in the 
development of policies which benefited all of the identities (class, gender, race, 
age, etc.) while retaining a commitment to diversity and forms of organisation 
which enabled that diversity to be continuously expressed (Leonard, 1997: 176, 
emphasis in original). 
However, as Honneth (1995) points out, it is difficult to translate the rationale of 
collective moral solidarity into the language of personal or group interests and 
notions of the good because: 
The abstract guiding ideas of modern societies provide so little in the way of a 
universally valid system of reference with which to measure the social worth of 
particular traits and abilities that they must always be made concrete through 
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suppler::ental cultural interpretations before they can be applied in the sphere of 
recognitIon (Honneth, 1995: 126). 
Equally, writing on the politics of identity as articulated in sociology and social 
theory, Calhoun (1995) notes how the political values espoused by the politics of 
identity are those that are attractive to researchers. In effect, it is not enough to 
celebrate a politics of identity that focuses on the emancipatory ideals of certain 
social movements without also taking into account other trends towards 
exclusionary and enclave politics (see also Jordan, 1998). Therefore, as Apel 
(1987a, 1998) has already made clear, if there is to be an emancipatory potential to 
the concept of responsibility, this potential needs to be clearly understood in both 
moral and ethical terms. 
Of course, many writers have emphasised the link between ethical and moral 
discourses. But the argument has been made most astutely by feminist writers who 
have carried out a sustained analysis of how arguments made for the needs and 
rights of women gain a public resonance when made in moral and universal terms 
(Lara, 1998, Fraser, 1997). Williams (1999) discusses the critique of the welfare 
state instigated by "those political energies in civil society which have centred upon 
forms of welfare activity or activism since the late 1960s" (1999: 668). For Williams 
(1999, 2000), these social movements have given expression to a new political 
vocabulary that could be taken over from civil society by the state. Each of these 
principles of recognition and respect (interdependence, care, intimacy, bodily 
integrity, identity, transnational welfare and voice) can intersect with redistribution 
"to provide a shared vocabulary with which to write our individual and collective 
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welfare scripts" (Williams, 2000: 350). In effect, discourses that articulate the 
interests of individuals and groups can be linked with moral discourses and impact 
beyond the interests of the proponents of a discourse alone. To Williams's (1999, 
2000) list I want to add responsibility in terms of Apel's (1987, 1998) concept of co­
responsibility because this clearly articulates the moral dimension of responsibility 
taking in a way that is linked with the interests of individuals and groups, but which 
retains a solidly moral dimension. 
As noted earlier, within academic social policy, responsibility has been a concept 
frequently used, but infrequently researched. This is in spite of the way in which the 
meaning of responsibility has changed from a concept that had universal moral 
appeal within a solidaristic version of citizenship, to a concept that is tied to the 
individual's own responsibilities to secure their own welfare themselves in 
accordance with their own life course (Roche, 1992, Lund, 1999, Dwyer. 2000). It is 
precisely because life politics has emerged as a political issue (Beck, 1994, 
Giddens, 1998) that the way in which people forge discursive links between their 
own individual interests and the wider moral order is in need of systematic 
investigation. Based on this systematic understanding of discourses of 
responsibility, my argument in this concluding chapter is that an emancipatory 
project for welfare remains a real possibility. I position myself alongside all of those 
feminists, environmentalists and postmodernists and hold that the interests of the 
individual and the group can be realised through discourses that connect with 
issues of collective solidarity. But the concept of solidarity that I wish to defend is 
distinct from Leonard's (1999) "organised solidarity" in the sense that the distinctive 
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feature of the research informants discourse was the process of considering their 
responsibilities themselves and not merely in terms of the outcomes. It is for this 
reason that I position myself squarely within the tradition of Frankfurt School Critical 
theory with its focus on the normative dimension. In this tradition of social theory, 
people are understood as "being endowed with normative expectations vis-a-vis 
society" and therefore: 
... every society requires justification from the perspective of its members to the 
extent that it has to fulfil a number of normative criteria that arise from deep­
seated claims in the context of social interaction (Honneth, 2003: 129). 
Throughout this study I have emphasised the importance of the social dimension of 
responsibility and shown how this is based on how the individual can accept her 
responsibilities in light of the values organising responsibilities in society. It is now 
necessary to relate this social dimension to my call for a correlative discourse of 
responsibility. 
The need for a correlative discourse of responsibility 
The informants, of course, accepted their responsibilities for a variety of reasons 
including self-interest and because their responsibilities formed part of the 
recalcitrant material of their lives. But they discussed this acceptance in relation to 
norms that could be justified in discourse. Each of the different kinds of discourses 
they used made room for different kinds of justifications and different kinds of 
reasons. Their interests were related with moral conceptions and concepts of 
justice, which they felt best suited their interests. The egoist drew on a symmetrical 
notion of justice wherein everybody gained comparably from the observance of 
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norms. The conformist made use of a moral discourse in which the norms of the 
community were accepted as legitimate. Here interests were merged with the 
interests of the community. The reformist discourse sought to realise what it saw as 
the good life for herself within the wider society since her version of the good life 
was not recognised in this society. Finally, the reflexive discourse brought 
principled ideas of justice to bear on societal norms and sought to advance the 
interests of justice in an unequal society. Each in her own way, then, drew interests 
together with a moral discourse, and went about considering norms in terms of this 
morality. It is in light of this that I will now focus on the relationship between ethics 
and morals in relation to discourses of responsibility. 
To this extent, New Labour's Third Way mix of communitarian and market 
collectivist ideas about responsibility offers a discourse that is adequate. These 
discourses converge on the individual and force her to adapt her behaviour in light 
of her individually held perception of her welfare responsibilities. The market 
collectivist approach expects her to take a greater interest in her own 
responsibilities where she can take ownership of these in the market (Schmidtz, 
1998). The communitarian approach complements market collectivism by 
encouraging the individual to accept her social responsibilities herself because this 
will help improve the society she lives in (Etzioni, 1995). Thus, the benefits of 
locating responsibility in the market and civil society draw attention to ethics and the 
advancement of the good for the self through direct ownership of welfare 
responsibilities in the market, and direct benefits in the community. The Third Way 
twist on these discourses, as articulated by Giddens (1998, 2000), is to provide a 
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framework for achieving the aims of market collectivism and communitarianism. 
The Third Way is a discourse that draws people's attention to their responsibilities, 
and seeks to make people capable of dealing with these responsibilities themselves 
(Driver and Martell, 1997, Prabhakar, 2002). What makes these discourses 
insufficient is that none of them offer the scope to engage in discourse about the 
norms themselves. 
Connecting interests with a moral discourse is precisely what the informants did 
when they drew on social norms to justify the way they accepted their 
responsibilities. It is this gap that a discourse ethical approach to discourses of 
responsibility identifies, and that critical theory offers the tools of analysis and 
redress. By demonstrating how the individual makes use of social norms to discuss 
her responsibilities, the importance of discourse comes to the fore. This conceptual 
result contrasts with Bauman's (1993, 1995) work. While many informants actively 
dealt with their responsibilities to others, and made the effort 'to be there for the 
other' as Bauman (1993, 1995) theorises, this was of lesser importance to the 
informants than how they justified and rationalised responsibility. While these 
informants would endorse Bauman's (1993, 1995) perception of an unwillingness to 
be there for the other in the wider culture, this was not something they saw in 
themselves. Rather, the informants discussed how they were there for others in 
relation to wider social norms, and therefore without having to rely on their own 
individual moral will as Bauman (1993, 1995) also theorises. 
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Goodin's (1998) contribution has been to restate the arguments for a moral 
collectivism in a society where collectivism has been obliterated in favour of 
individualism. Some form of collectivism is necessary if society is to retain some 
kind of core and collective fate. However, to realise this collectivism even in the 
weak form defended by Goodin (1998), a discourse is needed that combines an 
appreciation of the ethical and the moral dimensions of responsibility. In view of the 
argument made by the benefits administrators, it seems that there is little point 
arguing that people would be better off pooling risks and resources in the state 
when the diversity of life styles and life chances means that a great many people 
feel they can better secure their welfare in the market. However, a politics that is 
focused on an ethics of individual responsibility is not immune to moral calls. All a 
focus on the good means is that concerns are narrowed to those that relate with the 
good for the self or the group. By taking the formal conception of morality used in 
discourse ethics (Habermas, 1990, 1993, 1996, Apel, 1998), conflicts and collisions 
of ethical constructs can be understood as moral issues and dealt with in a moral 
way. In principle, market collectivism and communitarianism can be combined with 
discourse ethics through a shared concern with ethics and the orientation towards 
the goods, while discourse ethics can add a formal conception of morality that 
opens up a moral and normative space. 
Using discourse ethics in this way calls attention to the correlative nature of morals 
and ethics. It takes up the idea that the individual tries to realise the good for herself 
but highlights how this good has a moral dimension. While the elements of the 
correlative features of a discourse of responsibility have been identified in this work 
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in the various discourses research informants use in relation to their personal 
responsibilities and in their discourses on wider welfare responsibilities, the 
components of this discourse and how it might be structured as an ideology have 
yet to be explored. This concept of a correlative discourse is distinct from Fevre's 
(2000) call for a 'recombinant morality' because it assumes that people are 
appreciative of the nuances of moral, ethical and pragmatic reasons and that moral 
reasoning is seen as a very important form of reasoning (see also Finch and Mason 
(1993) on the importance of moral reputations). Further, the correlative discourse 
differs from the recombinant morality in that the correlative discourse is aimed at 
articulating an ideological form of knowledge that recognises the diversity of 
situations in which people find themselves and negotiate the good for themselves, 
and the social and moral dimension of this action. 
The correlative discourse can tentatively be conceived along the lines of Apel's 
(1987, 1998) ethics of co-responsibility. Insofar as the ethics of co-responsibility is 
essentially an ethics that takes responsibility for the consequences and side-effects 
of norms (Apel, 1998: 204), then it specifies the conditions through which 
responsibility can be accepted. These conditions are based on a discourse, that is, 
a procedure for arriving at decisions about norms that engages all affected using 
arguments. By engaging people in such real empirical discourses the meaning of 
co-responsibility can be attained, that is: 
the best possible agreements concerning real interests and the optional 
empirical orientation on the consequences and effects of following norms may 
be reached. (Apel, 1998: 205. emphasis in original) 
295 
The correlative discourse would work to make explicit both the moral and ethical 
reasons for settling on a specific course of action. It would do this because it 
accepts that moral arguments are always in some way bound up with ethical 
arguments, and by looking at how these different kinds of reasons intersect and 
correlate without looking for any kind of correspondence or necessary connection. 
The correlative discourse would work to highlight the moral and ethical dimensions 
of arguments, to bring to light the way in which a moral reason is positioned in 
relation to the needs, interests and ideas of the good held by those affected by a 
decision, and how these different kinds of reasons are situated by norms. This 
correlative discourse would not seek to achieve this by reaching for any new 
vocabulary, but by in each case working to narrate agreements in such a way that 
the diverse interests needs and ideas of the good are drawn together and 
accommodate in a norm that also expresses the relevant moral norms. In this way 
the correlative discourse would make people aware of the reasons that their 
interests have been compromised in some way through appeal to the moral norm 
that appeared most appropriate given that others had interests and reasons of their 
own that needed to accommodate. In this way the correlative discourse would 
foster the values of tolerance, co-responsibility and citizenship. 
However, further work is needed to develop this kind of discourse. In specific, it is 
necessary to look at the way in which responsibility is distributed and accepted in 
and through the discourses already in progress among the various publics 
operating in the welfare public sphere. Gamson and Modigliani (1987) have 
analysed the way in which the anti-nuclear lobby developed constructions relating 
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to nuclear fuels that became taken for granted way people think about nuclear 
energy. They did this by identifying the 'critical moments' when an issue comes to 
prominence in discourse, the kinds of constructions that the various actors promote 
and the discursive strategies they employ to have their constructions gain power 
(Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, Snow and Benford, 1992 Johnston, 1995). In a 
similar way, Eder (1996) and Strydom (2002) have paid close attention to the 
individuals and organisations who become involved in discourses and the 
processes of 'frame competition' (Eder, 1996, Snow and Benford, 1992) through 
which nature (Eder, 1996) and risk (Strydom, 2002) have been socially constructed. 
A research project that takes up this kind of methodology in the context of 
discourses on welfare and responsibility would be in best placed to analyse the way 
norms that distribute responsibility in various ways are arrived at. While such a 
project could analyse the forms of knowledge that are developed and 
communicated more widely in the public sphere, the objective of such a research 
project would be to look at how the various actors came to a discourse with 
interests and needs that they somehow comprised on in favour of the wider social 
interest. By identifying norms that express a discursive co-responsibility for action 
and consequences, such a project could both highlight the value of co-responsible 
resolutions and could closely analyse the processes through which responsibility for 
welfare is constructed in contemporary discourse. By highlighting the value of co­
responsible decisions, such a project could contribute to discourses that value the 
moral as well as ethical dimension of responsibility taking, and thereby help to 
construct an ideology that is more suited to the discourses used by the informants 
informing this research than the ideology that is currently employed by New Labour. 
297 
REFERENCES 
Alasuutari, P. (1998) An Invitation to Social Research. London: Sage. 
Alvesson, M. and Sk6ldberg, K. (2000) Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for 
Qualitative Research. London: Sage. 
Ambrose, P. (2001) '''Holism' and urban regeneration." IN. S. Balloch and M. Taylor 
(ed.) Partnership Working: Policy and Practice. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Apel, K.O. (1979) Towards a Transformation of Philosophy. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. 
Apel, K.O. (1984) Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic 
Perspective. London: MIT Press. 
Apel, K.O. (1987a) "The problem of philosophical foundations in light of a 
transcendental pragmatics of language." IN. K. Baynes, J. Bohman T. and 
McCarthy (eds.) After Philosophy: End or Transformation? London: MIT Press. 
Apel, K.O. (1987b) "The problem of a macroethic of responsibility to the future in 
the crisis of technological civilisation: an attempt to come to terms with Hans 
Jonas's "principle of responsibility." Man and World, 20: 3-40. 
Apel, K.O. (1998) "Limits of discourse ethics? An attempt at a provisional 
assessment." IN. E. Mendetia (ed.) Ethics and The Theory of Rationality: 
Selected Essays of Karl-Otto Ape/. Volume 2. New Jersey: Humanities Press. 
298 
• 
Ape\, K.O. (2001) "On the relationship between ethics, international law and 
politico-military strategy in our time: a philosophical retrospective on the Kosovo 
conflict." European Journal of Social Theory, 4(1): 29-40. 
Arber, S. (2001) "Designing samples." IN. N. Gilbert (ed.) Researching Social Life. 
(2nd edition). London: Sage. 
Arendt, H. (1978) The Life of the Mind. London: Harcourt Brace. 
Bauman, Z. (1992) Modernity and Ambivalence. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Bauman, Z. (1993) Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Bauman, Z. (1994) The Individualised Soc;ety. London: Polity Press. 
Bauman, Z. (1995) Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Bauman, Z. (2001) "The Great war of recognition." Theory, Culture and Society, 
18(2-3): 137-150. 
Bauman, Z. (2001) "The Great War of Recognition." Theory, Culture and Society, 
18(2-3): 137-150. 
Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage. 
Blair, T. (1997) Speech at Aylesbury Estate Southwark, 2 June 1997. Quoted by 
Jones, C. Novak, T. (1999) Poverty, Welfare and the Disciplinary State. London: 
Routledge. 
Blair, T. (1998) Leading the Way: A New Vision for Local Government. London: 
Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Bradley, H. (1996) Fractured Identities: Changing Patterns of Inequality. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Briggs, J. E. (1998) Strikes in Politicisation. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
299 
Brunkhorst, H. (1996) "Critical theory and empirical research." IN. D.M. Rasmussen 
(ed) The Handbook of Critical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Brunkhorst, H. (1996) "Critical Theory and Empirical Research." IN. Rasmussen, 
D.M. (ed) The Handbook of Critical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Bulmer, M. (2001) "The ethics of social research." IN. N. Gilbert (ed.) Researching 
Social Life. (2nd edition). London: Sage. 
Burden, T. Cooper, C. and Petrie, S. (2000) 'Modernising' Social Poicy: Unravelling 
New Labour's Welfare Reforms. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Burr, V. (1995) An Introduction to Social Constructionism. London: Routledge. 
Calhoun, C. (1995) "The politics of identity and recognition." IN. Critical Social 
Theory: Culture, History, and the Challenge of Difference. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Carroll, A.B. (1999) "Corporate social responsibility: evolution of a definitional 
construct." Business and Society, 38(3): 268-295. 
Clarke, J. and Newman, J. (1997) The Managerial State: Power, Politics and 
Ideology in the Remaking of Social Welfare. London: Sage. 
Commission on Social Justice (1994) Social Justice: Strategies for National 
Renewal. London: Vintage. 
Constas, M.A. (1992) "Qualitative ana'lysis as a public event: the documentation of 
category development procedures." American Educational Research Journal, 
29(2): 253-266. 
Coote, A. and Mattinson, D. (1997) Twelve Good Neighbours: The Citizen as Juror. 
London: Fabian Society. 
Cunningham, S. and Lavalette, M. (2004) '''Active citizens' or 'irresponsible truants'? 
School student strikes against the war.l! Critical Social Policy. 24(2): 255-270. 
300 
.... 
Davies, S. (1997) "Two conceptions of welfare: voluntarism and incorporationism." 
Social Philosophy and Policy, 14(2): 39-68. 
de Certeau, M. (1988) The Practice of Everyday Life. London: University of 
California Press. 
Deacon, A. and Mann, K. (1999) "Agency, modernity and social policy." Journal of 
Social Policy, 28 (3): 413-35. 
Dean, H. (2001 a) "Working parenthood and parental obligation." Critical Social 
Policy, 21(3): 267-286. 
Dean, H. (2001 b) 'Defrauding the community? The abuse of welfare'. IN. M. May, 
R. Page and E. Brunsdon (eds.) Understanding Social Problems: Issues in Social 
Policy. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Dean, H. (2002) Welfare Rights and Social Policy. Harlow: Pearson Education. 
Dean, H. and Doheny, S. (2001) "Human rights, social responsibility and the 
squeeze on welfare citizenship." Paper presented to the annual conference of the 
Social Policy Association, Reconstituting Social Policy: Global, National, Local, 
Queen's University Belfast, 24-26 July. 
Dean, H. and Rodgers, R (2004) "Administering rights for dependent subjects." IN. 
H. Dean (ed) The Ethics of Welfare: Human Rights, Dependency and 
Responsibility. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Dean, M. (1991) The Consititution of Poverty: Towards a Genealogy of Liberal 
Governance. London: Routledge. 
Delanty, G. (1997) Social Science: Beyond Constructivism and Realism. 
Buckingham: Open University Press. 
301 
-Devine, F. (1995) "Qualitative methods." IN. Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (eds.), 
Theory and Methods in Political Science. London: Macmillan. 
l 
• Doheny, D. (2004) "Responsibility and the welfare state: in search of moral 
p• 
f" 
sensibility." IN. H. Dean (ed.) The Ethics of Welfare: Human Rights, Dependency 
•~: and Responsibility. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Doyal, L. and Gough, I. (1991) A Theory of Human Need. London: Macmillan. 
Driver, S. and Martell, L. (1998) New Labour: Politics after Thatcherism. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
DSS (2000a) "Uk and Ireland agree partnership to tackle transnational benefit 
fraud." DSS Press Release, 9 October. 
DSS (2000b) "Rooker says pension statements will get more people to save." OSS 
Press Pelease, 16 October 
DSS (2000c) "Want information on stakeholder pensions? Ring a new help line." 
DSS Press Release, 3 November. 
DSS (2000d) "Radical pension reform: the Government is doing more to reward 
saving for retirement." DSS Press Release, 9 November. 
DSS (2000e) "Claim your pension over the phone: new tele-claim service for 
pensioners." DSS Press Release, 27 November. 
DSS (2001 a) "Pensions awareness ad blitz begins." DSS Press Release, 11 
January. 
DSS (2001 b) "TV campaign against benefits cheats goes nationwide." DSS Press 
Release, 14 Feburary. 
DSS (2001 c) "Local authorities sign up for housing benefit support: £2.1 m funding 
to train 900 new fraud investigators." DSS Press Release, 9 November. 
302 
DSS (2001 d) "Getting on the dog about bone to find out about pensions." DSS 
Press Release, 22 Feburary. 
DSS, (1998) New Ambitions for our Country: A New Contract for Welfare. London: 
HMSO. 
Dwyer, P. (1998) "Conditional Citizens? Welfare rights and responsibilities in the 
late 1990s." Critical Social Policy, 18(4): 493-517. 
Dwyer, P. (2000) Welfare Rights and Responsibilities: Contesting Social 
Citizenship. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Eder, K. (1996) The Social Construction of Nature. London: Sage. 
Edwards, R., Ranson, S., and Strain, M. (2002) "Reflexivity, towards a theory of 
lifelong learning." International Journal of Lifelong Education, 21 (6): 525-536. 
Ericson, R., Barry, D., and Doyle, R. (2000) "The moral hazards of neo-liberalism: 
lessons from the private insurace industry." Economy and Society, 29(4): 532­
558. 
Eriksen, E.O. and Weigard, J. (2003) Understanding Habermas: Communicative 
Action and Deliberative Democracy. London: Continuum. 
Esping-Anderson, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Etzioni, A. (1995) The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the 
Communifarian Agenda. london: Fontana Press. 
Etzioni, A. (2001) "SuNey article: on social and moral revival." Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 9(3): 356-371. 
Fairclough, N. (1995) Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language. 
London: Longman. 
303 
.. 
Fevre, R. (2000) The Demoralisation of Western Culture: Social Theory and the 
Dilemmas of Modern Living. London: Continuum. 
Fielding, J. (2001) "Coding and managing data" IN. N. Gilbert (ed.) Researching 
Social Life. (2nd edition). London: Sage. 
Fielding, N. and Thomas, H. (2001) "Qualitative Interviewing" IN. N. Gilbert (ed.) 
Researching Social Life. (2nd edition). London: Sage. 
Finch, J. and Mason, J. (1993) Negotiating Family Responsibilities. London: 
Tavistock/Routledge. 
Finlayson, G. (1994) Citizen, State, and Social Welfare in Britain 1830-1990. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Fitzpatrick, T. (1998) "The rise of market collectivism." IN. E. Brunsdon, H. Dean, 
and R. Woods (eds.) Social Policy Review 10. London: Social Policy Association. 
Forester, J. (1999) The Deliberative Practitioner. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Foucault, M. (2000) The Essential Works: Ethics - Subjectivity and Truth. London: 
Penguin. 
Fraser, D. (1984) The Evolution of the Welfare State. London: MacMillan. 
Fraser, N. (1997) Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" 
Condition. London: Routledge. 
Fraser. N. (2004) "Social justice in the age of identity politics: redistribution, 
recognition, and participation." IN. A. Honneth, and N. Fraser (eds.) 
Redistribution or Recognition? A Political- Philosophical Exchange. London: 
Verso. 
F reid son, E. (2001) Professionalism, the Third Logic: On the Practice of 
Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
304 
Freundlieb, D. (2000) "Rethinking critical theory: weaknesses and new directions." 
• 
Conste!lations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, 7(1): 
80-99. 
Gaber, I. (2000) "Government by spin: an analysis of the process." Media, Culture 
& Society, 22(4): 507-518. 
George, V. and Wilding, P. (1985) Ideology and Social Welfare. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. 
Giddens, A. (1987) Social Theory and Modem Sociology. Oxford: Polity Press. 
Giddens, A. (1994) Beyond Left and Right. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Giddens, A. (1998) The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Giddens, A. (1999) "Risk and responsibility." The Modern Law Review, 62(1): 1-10. 
Giddens, A. (2000) The Third Way and its Critics. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gilbert, G. N.and Mulkay, M. J. (1984) Opening Pandora's Box: A Sociological 
Analysis of Scientists' Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gilbert, N. (2002) The Transformation of the Welfare State: The Silent Surrender of 
Public Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Glennerster, H. (2000) British Social Policy since 1945. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Goodin, R. E. (1998) "Social welfare as collective social responsibility." IN. D. 
Schmidtz, and R.E. Goodin (eds.) Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility: 
For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gouldner, A. W. (1975) For Sociology: Renewal and Critique in Sociology Today. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
305 
w 
Greener, I. (2002) "Agency, social theory and social policy." Critical Social Policy, 
22(4): 688-705. 
Griffin, C. (1998) "Lifelong learning and social democracy." Jnternationa/Journai of 
Ufelong Learning, 18(5): 329-342. 
Griffin, C. (1999) "Lifelong learning and welfare reform." International Journal of 
Lifelong Learning, 18(6):431-452. 
Habermas, J. (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 1. Reason and the 
Rationalisation of Society. London: Heinemann. 
Habermas, J. (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 2: The Critique of 
Functionalist Reason. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Habermas, J. (1995) Postmetaphyscial Thinking: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 

Habermas, J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 

Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Harre, R (2002) "Social reality and the myth of social structure." European Journal 
of Social Theory, 5(1): 111-123. 

Heidegger, M. (1962) Being and Time. London: SCM Press. 

Heller, A. (1999) A Theory of Modernity. Blackwell: Oxford. 
Heron, E. (2001) "Etzioni's spirit of communitarianism: community values and 
welfare realities in Blair's Britain." IN. R. Sykes, C. Bochel and N. Ellison (eds.) 
Social Policy Review 13: Developments and Debates: 2000-2001. Bristol: The 
Policy Press. 
Hewitt, M (2002) "New Labour and the redefinition of social security." IN. M. Powell 
(ed.) Evaluating New Labour's Reforms. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
306 
Hills, J. and Lelkes O. (1999) "Social security, selective universalism and patchwork 
redistribution." IN. R. Jowell, J. Curtice, A Park and K. Thomson (eds.) British 
Social Attitudes: Who shares New Labour's values? Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Hoggett, P. (2001) "Agency, rationality and social policy." Journal of Socia/ Po/icy, 
30(1): 37-56. 
Honneth, A. (1991) Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Honneth, A. (1994) "The social dynamics of disrespect: on the location of critical 
theory today." Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic 
Theory, 1(3): 255-269. 
Honneth, A. (1995) The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammer of Social 
Conflicts. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Honneth, A. (2001) "Recognition or redistribution? Changing perspectives on the 
moral order of society." Theory, Culture and Society, 18(2-3): 43-55. 
Honneth, A. (2003) "Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser." 
IN. Fraser, N. and Honneth, A Redistribution or Recognition? A Po/jtical­
Philosophical Exchange. London: Verso. 
How, A (2003) Critical Theory. Hampshire: Palgrave. 
How, AR. (2001) "Habermas, history and social evolution: moral learning and the 
trial of Louis XV!." Sociology, 26(5): 177-194. 
Howarth, D. (2000) Discourse. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Hutton, W. (1996) The State We're In. London: Vintage. 
Inglis, D. and Hughson, J. (2003) Confronting Culture: Soci%gical Vistas. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
307 
Jacobs, G. (1999a) "Self-reference in press releases." Journal of Pragmatics, 31 (2): 
219-242. 
Jacobs, G. (1999b) Preformulating the News: An Analysis of the Metapragmatics of 
Press Releases. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 
Jessop, B. (2002) The Future of the Capitalist State. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Johnston, H. (1995) "A methodology for frame analysis: from discourse to cognitive 
schemata." IN. H. Johnston and B. Klandermans (eds.) Social Movements and 
Culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Jonas, H. (1976) "Responsibility Today: The Ethics of an Endangered Future." 
Social Research, 43(1): 77-97. 
Jonas, H. (1984) The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the 
Technological Age. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Jones, P. and Cullis, J. (2003) "Key parameters in policy design: the case of 
intrinsic motivation." Journal of Social Policy, 32(4): 527-547. 
Jordan, B. (1998) The New Politics of Welfare: Social Justice in a Global Context. 
London: Sage. 
Kellner, D. (1989) Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Kennett, P. (2001) Comparative Social Po/icy: Theory and Research. Buckingham: 
Open University Press. 
Kettner, M. (1996) "Karl-Otto Apel's contribution to critical theory." IN. D.M. 
J 
I 
Rasmussen (ed.) The Handbook of Critical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Kierkegaard, S. (1987) Either/Or. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
308 
• 
Knorr Cetina, K. (1999) Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge. 
London: Harvard University Press. 
Kymlicka, W. (1990) Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Lara, M. P. (1998) Moral Textures: Feminists Narratives in the Public Sphere. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Layder, D. (1997) Modern Social Theory: Key Debates and New Directions. 
London: UCL Press. 
Le Grand, J. (1997) "Knights, knaves or pawns? Human behaviour and social 
policy." Journal of Social Policy, 26(2): 149-69. 
Le Grand, J. (2003) Motivation, Agency and Public Policy: Of Knights, Knaves, 
Pawns and Queens. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Leach, R. (2002) Political Ideology in Britain. Hampshire: Palgrave. 
Leininger, M. M. (1985). "Ethnography and ethnonursing: models and modes of 
qualitative data analysis." In M. M. Leininger (ed.), Qualitative Research Methods 
in Nursing. Orlando, FL: Grune & Stratton. 
Leonard, P. (1997) Postmodern Welfare: Reconst;tuting an Emancipatory Project. 
London: Sage. 
Levinas, I. (1988) 'The paradox of morality: an interview'. IN. R. Bernasconi and D. 
Wood (eds.) The Provocation ofLevinas: Rethinking the Other. Quoted in Smart, 
B. Facing Modernity: Ambivalence, Reflexivity and Morality. London: Sage. 
Levitas, R. (1986) "Competition and compliance: the utopias of the New Right." IN. 
R. Levitas (ed.) The Ideology ofthe New Right. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
309 
Levitas, R. (1998) The Inclusive Society: Social Exclusion and New Labour. 
I London: MacMillan. I Lewins, A. (2001) "Computer assisted qualitative data analysis" IN. N. Gilbert (ed.) 
i Researching Social Life. (2nd edition). London: Sage. 
Lipsky, M. (1980) Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public 
Services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Lister, R. (2001) "New Labour: a study in ambiguity from a position of ambivalence." 
Critical Social Policy, 21 (4): 435-447. 
Lofland, J. and Lofland, L. (1994) Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative 
Observation and Analysis. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Lund, B. (1999) '''Ask not what your community can do for you': obligations, New 
Labour, and welfare reform." Critical Social Policy, 19:4,447-462. 
Lund, B. (2002) Understanding State Welfare: Social Justice or Social Exclusion. 
London: Sage. 
Lyotard, J-F. and Thebaud, J-L. (1985) Just Gaming. Quoted in Smart, B. Facing 
Modernity: Ambivalence, Reflexivity and Morality. London: Sage. 
Macintyre, A. (1988) Whose Justice? Which Rationality? London: Duckworth. 
Mann, K. (2001) Approaching Retirement: Social Divisions, Welfare and Exclusion. 
Bristol: Policy Press. 
Mannheim, K. (1991) Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of 
Know/edge. London: Routledge. 
Marshall, T.H. (1950) Citizenship and Social Class, and other Essays. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
310 
Mason, J. (2002) "Qualitative interviewing." IN. T. May (ed.) Qualitative Research in 
Action. London: Sage. 
McCarthy, T. (1984) The Critical Theory of JOrgen Habermas. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
McLaughlin, E. Trewsdale, J. and McCay, C. (2001) "The rise and fall of the UK's 
first tax credit: the working families tax credit 1998-2000." Social Policy and 
Administration, 35(2): 163-180. 
Mead, G.H. (1964) Selected Writings. Quoted in Habermas, J. (1995) Post-
metaphysical Thinking. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Mead, L.M. (1986) Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship. New 
York: Free Press. 
Mestrovic, S. (1997) Postemotional Society. London: Sage. 
Miles, M. B. and Huberman, A. M. (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis: Second 
Edition. London: Sage. 
Mill, J. S. (1991) Utilitarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Minnich, E. K. (1989) "To judge in freedom: Hannah Arendt on the relation of 
thinking and morality." In: G. T. Kaplan and C. S. Kessler (eds.), Hannah Arendt: 
Thinking, Judging, Freedom. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Mouzelis, N. (1992) "Social and system integration: Habemas's view." British 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 43: 267-288. 
Murray, C. (1984) Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Newman, N. (2002) Modernising Governance: New Labour, Policy and Society. 
London: Sage. 
311 
O'Neill, C. (2003) Citizens' Juries and Social Learning: Understanding the 
Transformation of Preference. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: University of Luton. 
Offe, C. (1985) Disorganised Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations of Work 
and Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Outhwaite, W. (1999) "The myth of modernist method." European Journal of Social 
Theory, 2(1): 5-25. 
Payne, G. (ed.)(2000) Social divisions. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Pierson, C. (1998) Beyond the Welfare State: The New Political Economy of 
Welfare. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Piper, A. (2000) "Some have credit cards and others have giro cheques: 
'individuals' and 'people' as lifelong learners in late modernity." Discourse and 
Society, 11(4): 515-542. 
Player, S. and Pollock, A.M. (2001) "Long-term care: from public responsibility to 
private good." Critical Social Policy, 21 (2): 231-255. 
Poovey, M. (1995) Making A Social Body. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Quoted in. N. Rose (1999) Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. 
Prabhakar, R. (2002) "Capability, responsibility, human capital and the Third Way." 
Political Quarterly, 51-57. 
Prideaux, S. (2001) "New Labour, Old Functionalism: The Underlying 
Contradictions of Welfare Reform in the US and the UK." Social Policy and 
Administration, 35(1): 85-115. 
Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
312 
Rehg, W. (1994) Insight and Solidarity: The Discourse Ethics of JOrgen Habermas. 
Berkeley, CA: California University Press. 
Ring, P. (2002) "The implications of the 'new insurance contract' for UK pension 
provision: rights, responsibilities and risks." Critical Social Policy, 22(4): 551-571. 
Roche, M. (1992) Rethinking Citizenship: Welfare, ideology and change in modern 
society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Rodger, J. (2000) From a Welfare State to a Welfare Society: The Changing 
Context of Social Policy in a Postmodern Era. London: Macmillian. 
Rodger, J. J. (2003) "Social solidarity, welfare and post-emotionalism." Journal of 
Social Policy, 32(3): 403-21. 
Rose, N (1999) Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rose, N (2000) "Government and control." British Journal of Criminology, 40: 321­
339. 
Rouse, J. and Smith, G. (2002) "Evaluating New Labour's accountability reforms." 
IN. M. Powell (ed.) Evaluating New Labour's Welfare Reforms. Bristol: The Policy 
Press. 
Rowlingson, K. (2002) "Private pension planning: the rhetoric of responsibility, the 
reality of insecurity." Journal of Social Policy, 31 (4): 623-642. 
Sartre, J-P. (1948) Existentialism and Humanism. London: Eyre Methuen. 
Sayer, A. (1992) Methods in Social Science. London: Routledge. 
313 
Schmidtz, D. (1998) "Taking responsibility." IN. D. Schmidtz and R. E. Goodin (ed.) 
Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility: For and Against. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Schutz, A. and Luckmann, T. (1973) The Structures of the Lifeworld. London: 
Heinemann. 
Seidman, I. E. (1991) Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for 
Researchers in Education and Social Sciences. New York: Teachers College. 
Selbourne, D. (1994) The Principle of Duty: An Essay on the Foundations of the 
Civic Order. London: Sinclair-Stevenson. 
Sevenhuijsen, S. (1998) Citizenship and the Ethics of Care. London: Routledge. 
Sevenhuijsen, S. (2000) "Caring in the third way: the relation between obligation, 
responsibility and care in Third Way discourse." Critical Social PoHcy, 20(1): 5-37. 
Silber, I.F. (2003) "Pragmatic sociology as cultural sociology: beyond repertoire 
theory?" European Journal of Social Theory, 6(4): 427-451 
Skeggs, B. (1997) Formations of Class &Gender. London: Sage. 
Smart, B. (1999) Facing Modernity: Ambivalence, Reflexivity and Morality. London: 
Sage. 
Smith, D. (1999) Zygmunt Bauman: Prophet of Postmodernity. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Snow, D. A. and Benford, R. D. (1992) "Master frames and cycles of protest." IN. A. 
D. Morris and C. M. Mueller (eds.) Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. London: 
Yale University Press. 
314 
Starr, P. (1989) "The meaning of privatization," IN S. B. Kamerman and A. J. Kahn 
(eds.) Privatization and the Welfare State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Steedman, P. (1991) "On the relations between seeing, interpreting and knowing." 
IN: F. Steier (ed.) Research and Reflexivity. London: Sage. 
Stoker, G. (1995) "Introduction." IN. D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.) Theory and 
Method in Political Science. London: Macmillan. 
Strauss, A. L. (1987) Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Strydom, P. (1999) "The challenge of responsibility for sociology." Current 
Sociology, 47(3): 65-82. 
Strydom, P. (2001) "The Problem of Triple Contingency in Habermas." Sociological 
Theory. 19(2): 165-186. 
Strydom, P. (2002) Risk, Environment and Society. Buckingham: Open University 
Press. 
Sullivan, M. (1996) The Development of the British Welfare State. London: Prentice 
Hall. 
Swidler, A. (1986) "Culture in action: symbols. and strategies." American 
Sociological Review, 51 (April): 273-286. 
Taylor, S. J., and Bogdan, R. (1984). Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: 
The Search for Meanings. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (1991) Social Change, Social Welfare and Social Science. 
London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
315 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2000) "Knights, knaves and gnashers: professional values and 
private dentistry." Journal of Social Policy, 29(3): 375-95. 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2001) "Risk, contingency and the Third Way: evidence from the 
BHPS and qualitative studies." Social Policy and Administration, 35(2): 195-211. 
Thane, P. (1982) The Foundations of the Welfare State. London: Longman. 
Titmuss, RM. (1970) The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Townsend, P. (1979) Poverty in the United Kingdom. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Tronto, J. (1993) Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. 
London: Routledge. 
Turner, M. and Balloch, S. (2001) "Partnership working between service users and 
statutory social services." IN. S. Balloch and M. Taylor (ed.) Partnership Working: 
Policy and Practice. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Vail, J., Wheelock, J., and Hill, M. (2000) Insecure Times: Living with Insecurity in 
Contemporary Society. London: Routledge. 
van Dijk, T.A. (1999) Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach. London: Sage. 
Waddan, A. (2003) "Redesigning the welfare contract in theory and practice: just 
what is going on in the USA?" Journal of Social Policy, 32(1): 19-35. 
Wainwright, H. (2003) Reclaim the State: Experiments in Popular Democracy. 
London: Verso. 
Ward, S. (2000) "New Labour's pension reforms." IN. H. Dean, R. Sykes and R. 
Woods (eds) Social Policy Review 12. Newcastle: Social Policy Association. 
Williams, F. (1989) Social Policy: A Critical Introduction - Issues of Race, Gender 
and Class. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
316 
Williams, F. (1999) "Good-enough principles for welfare." IN. Journal of Social 
Policy, 28(4): 667-687 
Williams, F. (2000) "Principles of recognition and respect in welfare." IN. G. Lewis, 
S. Gewirtz and J. Clarke (eds.) Rethinking Social Policy. London: Sage. 
Woodward, K. (2002 ed) "Concepts of identity and difference." IN. K. Woodward 
(ed) Identity and Difference. London: Sage. 
Wooffitt, R. (1993) "Analysing accounts." IN. N. Gilbert (ed.), Researching Social 
Life. London: Sage. 
Wooffitt, R. (2001) "Analysing factual accounts." IN. N. Gilbert (ed.) Researching 
Social Life. (2nd edition). London: Sage. 
Young, I.M. (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Young, J. (1999) The Exclusive Society: Social Exclusion, Crime and Difference in 
Late Modernity. London: Sage. 
317 
APPENDIX 1: Interview instruments 
Topic guide used for interviews with benefits recipients, members of the 
public and welfare benefits advisors. 
Preamble 
You've probably noticed politicians these days always seem to be talking about 
peoples rights or responsibilities and the governments of both parties have been 
changing the basis of our rights. They've been trying to make people more 
responsible for their own lives and less dependent on the state. I'm just wondering 
what you make of your rights and responsibilities. What I want to talk to you about 
are your own responsibilities; your work responsibilities, your responsibilities to your 
friends, family society whatever, and what you think you have a right to expect from 
other people or the state. 
Could you tell me a little bit about yourself 
Age, occupation, family, social Activities/ social or family network, ethnicity, 
education 
What would you say are your responsibilities? 
Emotional responsibilities 
Childcare, elderly, disability, neighbourhood, family/ partner/ children 
Financial responsibilities 
Pensions, provide for dependents 
What would you say are your most important responsibilities? 

Family, work? 

What would you say are your least important responsibilities? 

Do you share these responsibilities with other people? 

318 
Family, friends, colleagues, neighbours 
How do you feel about these responsibilities? 
Do you think that you have too many responsibilitiesl that the burden of 
responsibilities are not evenly shared? Is this fair? 

Generally speaking, do you think that people take their responsibilities 

seriously enough? 

Do you find that your responsibilities are thrust upon you, or do you willingly 
take them on? 
Do you worry about your responsibilities? 
Do you think that other people or the state should do more to alleviate your 
worries? 
Should the state protect you from unreasonable responsibilities or demands? 
Does this mean that it is alright to be dependent on the state? 
Generally speaking, what do you think the state should be responsible for? 
Regulating welfare? Provide welfare? Ensure a good welfare system? Health, 
education, housing, social security, pensions. Opportunities for employment? 
Conditions for prosperity? 
How much responsibility should the state take for people? 
What do you think your rights as a citizen are? 

Social care, health, pensions, work, unemployment, legal aid, education, housing, 
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To what extent should people be made to pay for things like health education 
social care? 
To what extent should the state pay for these? 
Some people have been saying that the governments of the two parties have 
been changing peoples social rights, and giving them too many 
responsibilities. Do you think that the government is right to do this? 
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Topic guide used in interviews with benefits administrators. 
NOTE: This topic guide was developed specifically for the project reported in Dean 
and Rodgers (2004), and the interviews were carried out by the Research Assistant 
on this project, Ruth Rodgers. Details of this are provided in Chapter 4 above. 
PREAMBLE: 
Thank you for agreeing to talk to me. As you know, we are interested in finding out 
about how benefits administrators/social care professionals feel about the issues 
of dependency, responsibility and rights - and the relationship between these 
things. We're keen to hear your particular perspective as a welfare 
administrator/professional. We're not concerned with highly abstract ideas, but the 
practical everyday meaning of things. Also, I'd just like to emphasise that everythIng 
you tell me will be treated in confidence: we are independent researchers and not 
connected to the department. You will never be identified as having taken part in 
the research and, although - with your agreement - I would like to tape-record our 
conversation, nobody outside our research team will ever hear this. By the way, 
would you like to have the tape back when we've finished, or shall we just destroy 
it? Oh and of course you don't have to answer any thing you don't want to and we 
can stop whenever you want to. [switch on tape and microphone] 
1) Could you begin by telling me something about your professional 
background and present role. Not your whole life history but enough to 
introduce yourself and outline what your job entails. [NOTE: allow participant 
free rein to describe themselves. Do not prompt to elicit exhaustive information, 
only as necessary to sustain a few minutes' conversation.} Thanks for that. I'll 
need to confirm a few basic details with you before we finish, but for now, 
that's great. 
2) Now, you may remember that in the letterlleaflet that was first sent to you, 
we set out a number of broad questions. The first was 'When is it acceptable 
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for people to be dependent on the welfare state?' Could we talk about that a 
bit. 
Key prompts (as appropriate): 
• 	 What do you mean by dependency? Do you have an image - an idea in your 
head - of what a dependent person is? 
• 	 Do you expect some day to be dependent? ... Is there any sense in which 
you would say that you're dependent now on other people (e.g. on your 
employer, (your clients, or your family)? 
• 	 Have you ever felt dependent as an adult? 
• 	 Would you say your clients are dependent? ... Are there different kinds of 
dependency? 
• 	 Is there a difference between being dependent on an employer/relative or 
spouse and being dependent on the state for benefits/care? 
• 	 When do you think it is acceptable to be dependent? 
• 	 Turning the question on its head, how would you describe an 'independent' 
person? Do you consider yourself to be 'independent'? 
3) The next main theme or question, if you remember, is 'To what extent 
should people be responsible for their own welfare?' 
Key prompts (as appropriate): 
• 	 What do you understand by the idea of responsibility? Do you have an image 
- an idea in your head - of what a responsible person is? 
• 	 Would you say that you are a responsible person? .... Are you responsible 
when you look after yourself or when you look after other people? 
• 	 What about your responsibilities towards your clients? Where would you say 
your responsibility ends, and your clients begins? 
• 	 What would you say are the responsibilities of your clients? ... Are there 
different kinds of responsibility? 
• 	 Obviously the present government places a lot of emphasis on the idea that it 
is people's responsibility to work. 
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- How far do you think we can take that? (for example, should people 

take jobs for which they're overqualified or in which they will be 

underpaid in order to be considered responsible?) 

- Can you be responsible without working? 

- When should people be allowed not to work? 

• 	 To what extent should people be responsible for themselves in case they fall 
sick, or are made redundant, or when they retire? 
• 	 Again - turning the question on its head, what do you understand by 
irresponsibility? How would you describe an irresponsible person? 
• 	 When people are irresponsible, what should society/the state do? Should 
such people be helped any way, or left to fend for themselves? 
I 4) The third of the themes we wanted to ask about related to the question ­'Should people's rights as human beings include the right to such things as state benefits, pensions and social care? Obviously, this is a more involved 
sort of question, so can I unpack it a bit: 
(a) First of all, do you suppose that people have human rights - just by 
virtue of being human? (Don't worry. This isn't some sort of general 
know/edge test, we're just interested to know whether all the recent information 
about the Human Rights Act made any sense to people). 
Prompts: 
• 	 One view is that the only rights we have are the rights we're given by law - by 
the statutes passed by Parliament. Or are there rights we should have 
whether or not the law has granted them to us? 
• Is it possible to define the rights that every human being has? 
(b) So in what circumstances do people have the right to be dependent on 
other human beings? 
Prompts: 
• One view is that people have rights only if they meet certain 
responsibilities? 
323 
• 	 Should dependent people and responsible people have the same rights or 
different rights? 
(c) One persons rights give rise to another persons responsibility. To what 
extent do you feel responsible for the rights of people who are 
dependent? 
Prompts: 
• 	 Would you say you are comfortable - or even pleased - that tax payers' 
money (and your time) is spent: 
(Do you feel this personally, or because of the job that you do?) 
(How strongly do you feel this?) 
- paying benefits to people who are unemployed? ~ .' ..:.. - paying benefits to people who are disabled? 1 
- paying pensions to people who have retired?l 

~ 
- providing social care for people who are disabled? 
.~ 
- providing social care for people who are elderly? 
- paying benefits/providing support for informal carers? 
• 	 Now, this is probably a difficult question, but are all these things the right of 
the people who receive them? 
• 	 Are they the responsibility of the people who pay for/provide them? 
• 	 Would you be comfortable or pleased to receive these things yourself? Why? 
• 	 I know this is an even more difficult question, but let me try it anyway: which 
do you suppose is the bigger responsibility - working or caring? 
5) I want to move on now from asking what you think about dependency, 
responsibility and rights as broad underlying principles, and ask what you 
think about the meaning all this might have for the future of the welfare state. 
Can I show you this card? [Present Flash Card /.] This is a standard question 
that is asked each year as part of the British Social Attitude Survey. However, 
can you tell me what you think your answer would be and, more importantly, 
why? 
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6) Here's another card. [Present Flash Card II.} This has got four statements 
on it. Can you read them ail, before telling me which you agree or disagree 
with and, in particular, which you agree with the most. 
7) Following from that, can we talk just for a moment about the so called 
'welfare statel - by which I mean not just the benefits system and social care, 
but education, housing, and the NHS. 
• 	 What do you think is going to become of the welfare state? 
- Is it going to carry on much as it has for the last 50 years? 
- Is it going to disappear? 
- Is it going to change radically? 
• If the welfare state were to disappear or be cut right back, how would you 
feel about that: 

- For yourself? 

- For your family/children? 

- For other people? 

8) Okay that's great. One last thing, can I just check over your personal 
details. [Produce Checklist.] You'll see that this is completely anonymous, but 
we do need to be able to see the differences between people with different 
circumstances/ backgrounds. [Complete checklist with participant.] 
Many thanks for your help. As a matter of interest, is there anything else you'd like 
to tell me? Anything you think I should have asked or anything that's just occurred 
to you while we've been talking? 
[Switch off tape and microphone. Say thank you again and goodbye] 
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FLASH CARD I 
With which of the following statements do you most agree? 
A B C 0 
We should pay less in 
taxes and spend less 
on services like health, 
education, social 
benefits 
and services 
We should keep taxes 
and spending on these 
services at the same 
level as now 
--­ - --­
We should pay more in 
taxes and spend more 
on services like health, 
education, social 
benefits 
and services 
Don't know 
W 
N 
0) 
Ii 
--
FLASH CARD II 

Please read the following statements and, for each of them, say whether you: 

A B C D E 

Strongly Agree Neither agree Disagree Strongly 

Agree nor disagree disagree 

0) 
N 
-..j 
1. 	 People can usually avoid poverty if they are talented or hard working, and if they 
seize the opportunities that are made available to them. 
2. 	 It is unacceptable that anyone should be poor and society should aim to prevent 
people from falling into poverty. 
3. 	 Some people will always be poorer than others, but society should support people 
who are poor by helping them as far as possible to support themselves. 
4. 	 Keeping out of poverty is mainly a matter of good luck, looking after yourself and 
your family, and keeping out of trouble 
w 
I\.) 
00 
-APPENDIX 2: Corpus of Press Releases 

http://www .dwp.g ov. uk/mediacentre/dss/press 
releases/2000/octl09-10-00-1.asp 
9th October 2000 
UK and Ireland Agree Partnership 
to Tackle Transnational Benefit 
Fraud 
The United Kingdom and Ireland today agreed 
to closer working arrangements to tackle the 
problems of transnational benefit fraud 
through increased information sharing and 
closer co-operation. 
In a move to forge a closer working 
partnership between the two countries, a 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
by Alistair Darling, Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and Dermot Ahern, Ireland's 
Minister for Social, Community and Family 
Affairs. 
Welcoming the formal agreement, Mr Darling 
said: "The signing of this Memorandum of 
Understanding shows our Governments' 
commitment to catching the cheats who 
exploit and cheat our social security systems. 
"The criminals who think they can get away 
with claiming in both countries, or hijack the 
identities of innocent Irish citizens to make 
false claims in the UK should take note: 
Government has a zero tolerance approach to 
fraud, benefit cheats will be brought to 
justice." 
Officials from Ireland, Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland will be working in partnership 
to agree joint initiatives to combat fraud and to 
encourage the free flow of information on 
benefit fraudsters. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Govemment ofthe United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of Ireland 
concerning co-operation and mutual 
assistance in the administration of social 
security programmes was signed at the 
Queen Elizabeth Conference Centre in 
London on Monday 9 October 2000, 
during the visit to London of Irish Minister 
Dermot Ahern to attend the OECD Conference on 
"Best Practices in Tackling Poverty and Social 
Exclusion". 
2. 	 The Memorandum affirms both Governments' 
commitment to implementing the Resolution of the 
Council of the European Union of 22 April 1999 on 
a Code of Conduct for improving co-operation 
between authorities of the Member States 
concerning the combating of transnational social 
security benefit and contribution fraud and 
undeclared work. A Management Committee of 
officials from Great Britain, Northern Ireland and 
Ireland will meet regularly to decide on a 
programme of work. 
************************************************** 
http://VNIW.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentre/dss/pressreleases/ 
2000/0ctl26-10-00-1 .asp 
26th October 2000 
SFI Report: Westminster City Council 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (BFI) report of its 
inspection of Housing and Council Tax Benefit 
administration and counter fraud activity by 
Westminster City Council was published today by the 
Secretary of State for Social Security. 
Inspectors found a number of good practices and 
initiatives such as the Council's work with the 
Department of the Environment & Region's Roug~ 
Sleepers Unit and work undertaken to Improve liaison 
arrangements between the Benefit Service and the 
Housing Department. 
The BFI reports that the Council has a strong client side 
team to manage its contracted out benefit 
administration and counter fraud work. This team 
includes determination officers who undertake rigorous 
checks. However, the complex management framework 
and associated organisational arrangements has led to 
inefficiencies and delays in processes. The report notes 
that significant work will be required by the Council 
before it can give an assurance that the right amount of 
benefit goes to the right person in every case. 
Inspectors identified other areas requiring improvement 
including the levels of verification being applied to 
claims that did not meet the minimum standards of the 
Verification Framework. The Council's benefit claim 
form requires enhancement so as to reduce the number 
of requests made to claimants for further inf~rmation. 
Also formal liaison arrangements should be Improved 
with private sector landlords. 
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Inspectors report the Council's strong counter 
fraud stance is supported by elected 
members. Performance in fraud investigations 
would be improved if the Council set targets 
for investigations and monitored outcomes to 
address concerns over delays in clearing 
investigation cases. 
There is potential for the Council to make 
greater use of statutory powers, such as 
Inspectors powers, the recovery of 
overpayments from private landlords and to 
register debts with the court. 
The BFI makes a number of recommendations 
to address weaknesses and help the council 
to improve administration and counter fraud 
activity for Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
Benefit. 
BFI inspects agencies and local authorities 
and is working to raise standards and spread 
good practice. Through its recommendations 
improvements can be identified to safeguard 
current systems and inform design for the 
future. 
Social Security Minister Jeff Rooker 
announced the publication of the report in 
response to a Parliamentary Question from 
Paul Goggins MP. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to 
inspect social security benefits 
administration and counter-fraud activity 
within DSS agencies and local authorities, 
to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good 
practice. 
2. 	 Each inspection report is considered by 
the Secretary of State who decides 
whether any further action is appropriate. 
The Secretary of State has powers to 
issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
3. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to 
inspect the 30 highest benefit spending 
councils. This Councils declared total 
benefit expenditure for 1998/99 was 
£105m. 
4. 	 Media copies of the report can be 
obtained from the DSS Press Office on 
020 7238 0866. A copy of the report can 
be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.dss.gov.uk 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dss/press 
releases/2000/octl26-1 0-00-2 .asp 
26th October 2000 
BFI Report: Bristol City Council 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (SFI) report of its 
inspection of Housing and Council Tax Benefit 
administration and counter fraud activity by Bristol City 
Council was published today by the Secretary of State 
for Social Security. 
Inspectors report that the Council keeps the public 
informed about access to benefits, and has a well 
designed claim form. The report comments positively 
on the way the Council implemented the Verification 
Framework and the structured training and 
development programme that is provided for staff. In 
addition the Council has had some success in 
prosecuting benefit fraudsters. 
However, Inspectors report serious deficiencies in the 
administration of benefits and efforts to counter benefit 
fraud. Concern is raised about weaknesses in the 
assessment, control and payment of benefit. 
Management checking was found to be inadequate with 
no effective assurance that claims are determined 
correctly from the outset. 
The report notes the Council had no specific policy for 
the recovery of benefit overpayments and poor 
management in the classification of overpayments and 
recovery of debts. 
Management information was also found to be poor 
with no effective means of measuring and monitoring 
performance at a corporate level. The Council could not 
provide SFI with details of debts recovered because of 
its inability to reconcile information between different 
accounting systems. This led Inspectors to question the 
integrity of the data being used to claim DSS subsidy. 
The BFI's report includes recommendations to help the 
Council further improve its administration and counter 
fraud activity of Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
Benefit. 
BFI inspects agencies and local authorities and is 
working to raise standards and spread good practice. 
Through its recommendations improvements can be 
identified to safeguard current systems and inform 
design for the future. 
Social Security Minister Jeff Rooker announced the 
publication of the report in response to a Parliamentary 
Question from Paul Goggins, MP. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The SFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to inspect 
social security benefits administration and counter­
fraud activity within DSS agencies and local 
authorities, to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good practice. 
2. 	 Each inspection report is considered by the 
Secretary of State who decides whether any further 
action is appropriate. The Secretary of State has 
powers to issue directions to a local authority to 
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secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
3. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to 
inspect the 30 highest benefit spending 
councils. 
4. 	 Media copies of the report can be 
obtained from the DSS Press Office on 
020 7238 0866. A copy of the report can 
be found on the internet 
atjavascriptif(confirm(.http://www.bfi.dss. 
gov.ukl \n\nThis file was not retrieved by 
Teleport Pro, because it is addressed on 
a domain or path outside the boundaries 
set for its Starting Address. \n\nDo you 
want to open it from the 
server?') )window.location=.http://www.bfi. 
dss.gov.ukl' www.bfi.dss.gov.uk 
*************************************.************ 
http://www.dwp.g ov . uk/med iacentre/dss/press 
releases/2000/octl23-1 0-00-1 .asp 
23rd October 2000 
More Financial Help for Families 
and Children 
From today children in more than 1.6 million of 
Britain's poorest families will benefit from 
increases in the child allowance for Income 
Related Benefits (lRBs). The allowance is 
raised by £4.35 from £26.60 per week to 
£30.95 per week. 
The estimated cost of the increase is about 
£300m from now until the end of March 2001 
and about £700m for 2001/2002. 
The increase of child allowance for IRBs will 
benefit an estimated 3 million children. 
Secretary of State for Social Security, Alistair 
Darling said: 
"Today's increase clearly demonstrates our 
continued determination and commitment to 
eradicate child poverty. 
"By directing help to where it is needed most 
we are carrying out our promise to tackle 
poverty and social exclusion head on. Today's 
increase gives extra support to over 1.6 million 
families in the greatest need to help them 
provide a better standard of living for their 
children - it is further evidence of our pledge to 
deliver opportunity for all. 
"Coupled with the equivalent increases in the 
Working Families' Tax Credit and Disabled 
Person' Tax Credit we will continue to make 
work pay for those who can and provide 
support for those who cannot." 
The new increase applies to the child personal 
allowances in Income Support, Jobseekers Allowance 
(Income based), Housing benefit and Council Tax 
Benefit. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The increase was announced in the Budget on 
21st March 2000. 
2. 	 It comes into force today. The increase will be 
made automatically to families in receipt of an IRB 
which includes the relevant child allowance. The 
increased rate will be paid from the first full benefit 
week that starts on or after Monday 23rd October 
2000. 
3. 	 The increase applies to the rate of child allowance 
in the IRBs paid up to the September after the 
child's sixteenth birthday. 
4. 	 This increase builds on improvements in previous 
budgets. The allowance for children under 11 was 
increased by £2.50 per week in November 1998 
and by £4.70 per week in October 1999. From April 
2000 the rate for children aged under 11 was 
brought up to the amount of the rate for children 11 
- 16. 
*************************************************71 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentre/dss/pressreleases/ 
2000/octl16-10-00-1.asp 
16th October 2000 
Rooker Says Pension Statements Will Get 
More People To Save 
Jeff Rooker. Social Security Minister, today presented a 
Kiss FM employee with their first combined pensions 
statement. 
Emap, one of the pilot partners currently working with 
the DSS on combined pension statements, issued them 
to over 2,000 employees including staff from Kiss FM 
and Smash Hits. 
The statement sets out an individual's estimated 
income in retirement by giving an estimate of both state 
and private pension provision. 
Jeff Rooker said: "Once people see in black and white 
what they will have to live on I think they will realise the 
importance of saving for their old age and I hope it will 
prompt them to review the provision they have made for 
their retirement. 
"These statements will be one of the important factors 
in getting people to save by showing them how much 
pension they have built up and how much more they 
can get if they save. 
"Working people, who can afford it have a responsibility 
to save for their retirement. But the Government has a 
duty to help them. This is why from April 2001 we will 
introduce stakeholder pensions that will offer a low cost. 
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flexible and secure pension option. We will 
also introduce the Pension Credit in 2003 
which will reward people who have saved for 
the first time." 
The Government hopes that up to 15 million 
working people will be receiving combined 
annual pension statements by 2005. 
Ralph Turner, Emap's Group Benefits 
Manager, said: "Our staff deserve to know 
about their future pension entitlements. This 
will allow them to make informed choices 
about their future and make proper provision 
for their old age. We are really pleased to be 
co-operating with the Government with this 
very important pilot. 
In addition to Emap the DSS is also working in 
partnership with a number of companies on 
pilot schemes for the delivery of annual 
combined pensions statements including NPI, 
Sainsburys, AXA/Sunlife and Prudential. 
*********************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentreJdssJpress 
releases/2000/octl05-10-00-1.asp 
5th October 2000 
BFI Report: Nottingham City 
Council 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorateis SFI) report 
of its inspection of Housing and Council Tax 
Benefit administration and counter fraud 
activity by Nottingham City Council was 
published today by the Secretary of State for 
Social Security. 
Inspectors found the Council's staff committed 
to battling against arrears of work and striving 
to overcome long term problems associated 
with a shortfall in staff resources and 
deficiencies in management and control. 
In the area of benefit processing there was 
some effective work but several areas of 
deficiency. There was a need for the Council 
to introduce a structured regime of checking 
so as to gain necessary management 
assurance about security, accuracy and 
quality. Remedial action was required to 
ensure better control over benefit claims so 
that changes in claimants circumstances could 
be antiCipated and overpayments avoided. 
Also for more active management involvement 
and for security concerns and audit 
recommendations to be addressed promptly. 
Despite a steer from the Council's elected 
Members in 1997 that effective action should 
be pursued against fraudsters, counter fraud 
work was found to be particularly weak. To address this 
the SFI recommended a thorough review of all counter 
fraud operations. 
Inspectors acknowledge in their report that the Council 
had already undertaken some remedial action during 
the time they were working on site. The Council has 
provided the BFI with a list of actions it has taken or 
plans to take in response to the inspection. 
The BFI makes a number of recommendations to 
address weaknesses and help the council to improve its 
administration and counter fraud activity for Housing 
Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
BFI inspects agencies and local authorities and is 
working to raise standards and spread good practice. 
Through its recommendations improvements can be 
identified to safeguard current systems and inform 
design for the future. 
Notes for editors 
The BFI is an independent unit within the Department of 
Social Security set up to inspect social security benefits 
administration and counter-fraud activity within DSS 
agencies and local authorities, to report to the 
Secretary of State for Social Security, and to promote 
good practice. 
Each inspection report is considered by the Secretary 
of State who decides whether any further action is 
appropriate. The Secretary of State has powers to issue 
directions to a local authority to secure 
acceptable/minimum standards in performance. 
This inspection is part of a programme to inspect the 30 
highest benefit spending councils. This Councilis 
declared total benefit expenditure for 1999/2000 was 
£98.6m. 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentre/dss/pressreleases/ 
2000/0ctl05-10-00-2.asp 
5th October 2000 
BFI Report: Burnley Borough Council 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorateis (BFI) report of its 
inspection of Housing and Council Tax Benefit 
administration and counter fraud activity by Burnley 
Borough Council was published today by the Secretary 
of State for Social Security. 
BFI reports that at the time of its inspection the Council 
provided a poor service to claimants particularly in the 
time taken to process many claims. Plans had been 
prepared by the Council for clearing arrears of work, but 
Inspectors pointed to a need for these plans to be 
implemented as a matter or urgency. 
Weaknesses were found in the way the Verification 
Framework had been applied and a failure to ensure all 
as ­
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appropriate references had been made to the 
Rent Officer. 
Inspectors report that the work of the counter 
fraud section was not managed effectively. 
There was a need for the Council to use its 
fraud database to analyse risk categories and 
for offenders to be prosecuted where 
appropriate. 
The report notes that little action had been 
tal<en by the Council to address potential 
problems associated with private landlord 
cases which make up a high proportion of the 
claims caseload and represent one of the 
highest risk areas. A need was identified for 
the Council to introduce effective liaison 
arrangements with its local landlords and for 
relevant information to be collected so that 
risks can be assessed. 
The BFI makes a number of recommendations 
to address weaknesses and help the council 
to improve its administration and counter fraud 
activity for Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
Benefit. 
SFI inspects agencies and local authorities 
and is working to raise standards and spread 
good practice. Through its recommendations 
improvements can be identified to safeguard 
current systems and inform design for the 
future. 
Notes for editors 
The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to inspect 
social security benefits administration and 
counter-fraud activity within DSS agencies 
and local authorities, to report to the Secretary 
of State for Social Security, and to promote 
good practice. 
Each inspection report is considered by the 
Secretary of State who decides whether any 
further action is appropriate. The Secretary of 
State has powers to issue directions to a local 
authority to secure acceptable/minimum 
standards in performance. 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentre/dss/press 
releases/2000/oct/03-10-00-1.asp 
3rd October 2000 
Darling Announces More Financial 
Help for Carers 
£191 million extra financial help for carers was 
announced today by Alistair Darling, Secretary 
of State for Social Security. The package is 
the result of the review of financial support for carers. 
The details are: 
• 	 £2 per week rise in the carer premium paid with 
Income related benefits such as Income Support; 
• 	 extension of claims to Invalid Care Allowance (ICA) 
to carers aged 65 years and over (at present 
claims can only be made up to the age of 65); 
• 	 increase in the ICA earnings threshold from £50 to 
the level of the National Insurance Lower Earnings 
Limit (LEL), currently £67. This means that carers 
will be able to earn £67 per week, after deduction 
of certain expenses, before it affects their benefit. 
This limit will in future rise in line with the LEL; 
ICA will continue for up to eight weeks after the 
death of the person being cared for. 
Commenting, Alistair Darling said. 
"Community care depends on the selfless work and 
dedication of carers. 
"The new measures I have announced today mean that 
over the next three years over 300,000 carers could 
benefit financially. 
"For the first time carers over the age of 65 will be able 
to claim the Invalid Care Allowance. Those carers 
without a retirement penSion and some on a low rate 
will be entitled to it, and those on a low income will 
receive the carer premium." 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The package means that: 
.. 	 over 200,000 people will benefit from the £2 
increase per week Carer Premium; 
• 	 around 50,000 will benefit from extending 
claims to over 65s. 
• 	 carers will be able to earn £67 a week after 
allowable expenses without their ICA being 
withdrawn. All carers who are able to combine 
working and caring could benefit by this 
measure. 
• 	 Up to 10,000 people could benefit from 
allowing leA to continue for eight weeks after 
the disabled person has died. 
2. 	 The present weekly rate is £40.40 Additions: 
dependent adult £24.15 eldest child £ 9.85 children 
£11.35 
3. 	 Around 387,000 people receive the benefit at a 

cost of £854milfion annually. 

4. 	 Carers who receive the benefit will be credited into 
the Government's State Second Pension. 
5. 	 Invalid Care Allowance overlaps with benefits such 
as the Retirement Pension and Bereavement 
Benefit. However opening up claims to carers over 
the age of 65 will give those on income related 
benefits such as Income Support access to the 
Carer Premium for the first time. 
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30th November 2000 
Appointment of a new chairman of 
the Occupational Pensions 
Regulatory Authority (OPRA) 
The Right Honourable Alistair Darling, 
Secretary of State for Social Security, today 
announced the appointment of Harriet 
Maunsell OBE as the new Chairman of the 
Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority 
(Opra) from 1 April 2001. Mrs Maunsell 
succeeds Mr John Hayes CBE who retires on 
31 March 2001. 
The Chairman of Opra leads the organisation 
by playing a key role in enforcing compliance 
with occupational pensions legislation and 
helping to ensure that the interests of all 
members of occupational schemes are 
safeguarded. 
In answer to a Parliamentary Question from Dr 
George Turner (North West Norfolk) Mr 
Darling said: 
"I am pleased to announce that following the 
recommendation of an advisory panel 
established to select suitable candidates I 
have appointed Harriet Maunsell OBE to serve 
as Chairman of the Occupational Pensions 
Regulatory Authority (Opra) for a period of five 
years from 1 April 2001. Mrs Maunsell has 
been a member of Opra since 1997 and was 
for five years Deputy Chair of the 
Occupational Pensions Board." 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 Opra is an independent statutory body 
established under the Pensions Act 1995 
and is responsible for regulating 
occupational pension schemes. 
Operations started on 6 April 1997. 
Opra's primary role is to protect members' 
interests where people who run 
occupational pension schemes do not 
meet their legal obligations under the 
Pensions Act. It has the power to 
investigate schemes considered to be at 
risk, can prohibit or disqualify trustees 
and impose fines on wrongdoers. Opra 
also has responsibility for maintaining a 
register of pension schemes. 
2. 	 The appointment is from 1 April 2001 to 
31 March 2006. Section 1 (2) of the 
Pensions Act 1995 requires the Secretary 
of State to appoint a chairman of the 
Authority. The post is salaried and is part­
time at three days a week. In addition to 
the Chairman, there are currently nine 
other Board members. All are part-time, attending 
about two days a month. They are entitled to claim 
a daily allowance. 
3. 	 Harriet Maunsell, 57, is a lawyer who, after an early 
career with Courtalds Ltd, spent 20 years with 
Lovells, a leading international law firm. She retired 
in 1997 having been a partner for 17 years. Since 
1987 Mrs Maunsell has successively been a 
member of the Occupational Pensions Board and 
Opra; serving as Deputy Chair of the OPB for five 
years (including three months as interim Chair). 
She is a former member of the Occupational 
Pensions Advisory Service (OPAS) and a co­
founder and first chairman of the Association of 
Pensions Lawyers. Mrs Maunsell has not carried 
out any political activity in the last five years and 
does not hold any other public appointments. 
4. 	 The appointment has been made in accordance 
with the principles of the Commissioner of Public 
Appointments' Code of Practice for Public 
Appointments. The post was advertised and an 
executive search was carried out by consultants. 
An advisory panel - comprising the two senior 
officials of the Department of Social Security, 
Opra's Chairman and an independent member ­
interviewed candidates and made 
recommendations to the Secretary of State. 
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30th November 2000 
DSS Research Report 126 - 'First effects 
of ONE - Part A: Survey of clients, and 
Part B: DSS Research Report 127 ­
'Qualitative research with clients' and 
'Why not ONE: views of non-participants 
The ONE service was launched in four pilot areas in the 
UK in June 1999, and in a further 8 areas in November 
1999. New benefit claimants of working age in these 
areas access the benefit system though ONE and meet 
with a personal adviser to identify and remove barriers 
to work. ONE involves closer working across a range of 
welfare providers with the aim of delivering an personal 
and streamlined service to clients and helping clients 
consider the possibilities of work and training. Since 
April 2000 participation in a personal adviser meeting 
has been a condition of receipt of benefit for new 
clients. Clients will also be required to meet with their 
personal adviser at specified trigger points when 
changes in their circumstances mean that a wo:k­
focused meeting may be of help. The service Will be 
piloted until March 2002. 
The first evaluation reports published today, explore the 
experience of clients between June 1999 and March 
2000, when participation was voluntary for non-JSA 
clients (findings relate to those who chose to take part). 
The reports are based on a survey of jo~s~ekers, I~ne 
parents and sick or disabled clients beglnnmg a claim 
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for benefit in the ONE pilot and control areas, 
and depth interviews with both clients who 
chose to take part in ONE and those declined. 
The main findings are: 
• 	 Most clients expressed positive views 
about the idea of integrated help with 
work and benefits offered by the ONE 
service. In particular clients were positive 
about claiming benefits in one location, 
and having a personal adviser with whom 
they could maintain regular contact. Most 
participants agreed that they had been 
treated well by staff, and had had their 
individual needs taken into account (over 
80% of participating lone parents and sick 
or disabled clients, and 74% of 
jobseekers agreed they had been treated 
as an individual). 
• 	 ONE has changed many participants 
attitudes to work by providing a tailored 
service. For some this has been achieved 
by talking about work as a longer term 
goal and signposting options that could 
help them towards the labour market. 
Advice from personal advisers has 
improved clients' self confidence in 
finding work and helped them to improve 
both the quantity and quality of jobsearch. 
• 	 Participants had discussed a range of 
work-related issues with staff such as 
jobsearch, training and educational 
opportunities and in-work benefits. They 
were also more likely to have received 
help with other benefits. The 'better-off 
calculation,1 had been influential in 
encouraging lone parents to consider 
work. 
• 	 It is too early to determine the 
effectiveness of ONE in moving people 
into work. When differences in client 
characteristics were taken into account, 
lone parents in the pilot areas were more 
likely to be in work 4-5 months after 
beginning their claim than those in control 
areas, although there was no difference 
at this early stage for sick and disabled 
clients or jobseekers. 
• 	 Thirty one per cent of lone parents and 
21% of sick or disabled clients beginning 
a claim for benefit said that they attended 
a meeting with a personal adviser 
(attendance was a condition of claiming 
benefit for jobseekers, but voluntary 
during this phase for non-JSA clients). 
Some of the reasons people did not 
participate in ONE were a belief that 
seeking work was not relevant to the 
client in the long term, and a perception 
that the timing of the intervention was 
inappropriate for them at the present time. 
Some clients did not participate because 
they experienced process problems such 
as failing to receive a letter inviting them to have a 
personal adviser interview. 
• 	 Not all clients recalled the explanation of ONE or 
an invitation to attend a personal adviser meeting 
when they began their claim. There was a lack of 
understanding about the concept and the process 
of ONE among non-participants. In particular some 
clients did not understand that a work-focused 
meeting had a wider purpose than getting people 
immediate entry (or re-entry) into employment. 
Some clients voiced concern about the 
requirement to participate, and some expressed a 
fear that those who were incapable would be 
forced into jobs. 
• 	 Lone parent participants who attended a personal 
adviser meeting were more likely to have a child 
over 3, be literate and numerate, be in good health, 
and have a driving license than non-participants, 
and less likely to be black or from an ethnic 
minority group. Sick or disabled participants were 
more likely to be aged under 25, to live with a 
partner with no children, have no qualifications, 
and have no job or business to return to after 
illness, and less likely to be black or from an ethnic 
minority group or to report mental illness or 
disability at the time of interview. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 'First effects of ONE - Part A: Survey of clients and 
Part B: Qualitative research with clients' and 'Why 
not ONE: views of non-participants' are published 
on 30th November in the Department of Social 
Security's Research Report Series (reports 126 
ISBN 1 841232815 and 1271SBN 184123282 
3). Reports are available from CDS (0113 399 
4040) priced £38.50 and £25.00 respectively. Free 
report summaries are available from the DSS 
Social Research Branch (0207 962 8558). 
2. 	 The survey of clients was conducted by the Office 
of National Statistics, BMRB International and the 
Policy Studies Institute. The qualitative research 
with participants was carried out by Ecotec 
Consulting limited. The research with non­
partiCipants was carried out BMRB International. 
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29th November 2000 
Alastair Darling Announces a Fair and 
Just Scheme for Inherited SERPS 
Alistair Darling, Social Security Secretary, today 
announced the Government's proposals for a "fair and 
just" scheme to put right the scandal of Inherited 
SERPS. 
Under the new scheme everyone over state pension 
age on 5 October 2002 will be exempt from the change 
introduced by the last Government to halve the SERPS 
entitlement available to bereaved spouses. 
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In addition the new rules will give time to those 
within ten years of state pension age to 
prepare for the changes. 
Mr Darling said: "Millions of people were given 
wrong, misleading or incomplete information 
about changes to SERPS introduced by the 
last Govern ment in 1986. 
"This problem should have been sorted out 14 
years ago. What happened in the years after 
1986 was a series of colossal blunders which 
were inexcusable and caused untold distress 
to millions of people. 
"In March I announced that we have already 
deferred the change in the inheritance rule by 
2 years until October 2002. No one will be 
affected by the policy change before that date. 
The new proposals mean: 
• 	 All men and women over state pension 
age on 5 October 2002 will be exempt 
from the changes. They will be able to 
pass on 100% of their SERPS 
entitlement, as now. 
• 	 The new rules will only apply to men and 
women who are now ten years or more 
away from state pension age. 
• 	 For men and women, who are within 10 
years of their state retirement age, the 
changes will be phased in. 
Mr Darling said when he had deferred the 
introduction of the change in the inheritance 
rule he had promised to consult widely on a 
protected rights scheme. This was designed to 
provide redress to people who were given 
wrong or incomplete information. 
"Over the past few months I have become 
increasingly convinced that such a scheme 
would not work in the way we intended and 
therefore not provide a fair and just solution to 
the problems. 
"We could not be sure it would reach all those 
who had been misinformed particularly the old 
and vulnerable. It would also be difficult to 
safeguard such a scheme against fraud and 
abuse. 
"The proposals I am setting out today are 
designed to give adequate notice of the 
changes to SERPS rules and provide 
transitional arrangements for people 
approaching retirement age and provide 
proper redress for millions of people already 
over retirement age. 
"We have had to deal with a series of colossal 
blunders committed under the previous 
administration. 
"I have already made arrangements to make sure this 
kind of thing can never happen again by tightening up 
procedures and bringing policy and operational 
responsibility for pensions together into a single 
organisation." 
The Secretary of State added that the very small 
number of people who have evidence that they were 
clearly misinformed by the Department and who are not 
fully covered by the above proposals will have access 
to the usual departmental procedures for dealing with 
maladministration. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The DSS will write this week to all those people 
who have contacted the Department already to set 
out the position. 
2. 	 The table below illustrates how the Inherited 
SERPS scheme will be phased in for people 
reaching state pension age between 2002 and 
2010. 
% SERPS passing Date when 

to surviving contributor reaches 

spouse state pension age 

100% 5.10.2002 or earlier 

90% 6.10.2002 - 5.10.2004 

80% 6.10.2004 - 5.10.2006 

70% 6.10.2006 - 5.10.2008 

60% 6.10.2008 - 5.10.2010 

50% 6.10.2010 or later 
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29th November 2000 
Fall in Fraud and Error Shows Tide 
Turning against Benefit Cheats" Darling 
The first substantial fall in fraud and error shows the 
tide is turning against benefit cheats, Social Security 
Secretary Alistair Darling said today. 
Mr Darling welcomed the latest figures from 
independent statisticians showing a 6.5 per cent 
reduction in fraud and error as evidence of progress in 
combating fraud. 
'We inherited a system where tackling fraud and error 
was not taken seriously, in which fraud was not 
recorded before 1995. 
"This Government has taken a zero tolerance stand 
against fraud and error, tightening the benefit regime to 
make sure the right money is paid to the right people," 
he said. 
"We are well on target to meet our commitment to 
reducing fraud and error by 10 per cent by March 
2002." 
Mr Darling added: "The progress we are seeing must 
and will continue. Combating fraud is one ofthe 
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reasons social security spending is under 
control and will remain under control. 
'We are committed to reducing fraud and error 
by 25 per cent by March 2004 and by 50 per 
cent by March 2006. That can only happen if 
we intensify our vigilance against fraudsters. 
"A major award from Spending Review 2000 
has given the DSS the necessary money to 
make a significant investment in the most up­
to-date IT. With modern computer equipment 
and the extra staff we are putting into the front 
line we will bear down on fraud and error 
wherever it occurs. 
"I also want fraudsters to know that we intend 
to toughen the penalties against persistent 
offenders as well as increase the powers 
available to investigators. 
The reduction in fraud and error in Income 
Support and Jobseekers' Allowance benefit 
payments is revealed in the latest annual 
review by the Department of Social Security's 
Analytical Services Division. 
The report demonstrates that fraud and error 
fell from 9 per cent to 8.4 per cent of benefit 
paid between April 1999 to March 2000 ­
saving around £60 million. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 We have halved the number of cases 
where IS/JSA claims are paid out without 
sufficient evidence. In 1997, 2 out of 5 
IS/JSA claims were paid without enough 
evidence. Since then the gateway to 
Income Support and JobSeekers' 
Allowance has been strengthened. 
Claimants must now produce more 
evidence before IS/JSA is paid. 
2. 	 Cautions for fraud trebled in the year in 
the 12 months to February this year and 
the DSS prosecuted more than 20,000 
cases in 1999-2000 - a rise of 45 per cent 
on the previous year. 
3. 	 In the Fraud Act 1997 powers were 
introduced under Sections 20 and 21 to 
prevent fraudulent claimants using the 
Royal Mail's post redirection 
arrangements to submit benefit claims 
from false addresses. 
4. 	 We are introducing nationwide a 
successful pilot scheme for the issue of 
National Insurance numbers. The scheme 
involves using detailed databanks to 
permit sophisticated investigation of 
claims. 
5. 	 We have established a new unit to 
improve intelligence to combat fraud. The 
National Fraud Intelligence Unit combines 
the expertise of organised fraud 
investigations with that of other agencies 
nationwide, including the police and local 
authorities. 
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29th November 2000 
Fraud and Error in Claims for Income 
Support and Jobseeker's Allowance from 
October 1998 to September 1999 and from 
April 1999 to March 2000 
Public Service Agreement Progress on Fraud and 
Error 
For the period April 1999 to March 2000, the estimated 
fraud and error overpayment on IS and JSA was £1.32 
billion annually, or 8.4% of the benefit paid. This 
represents a statistically significant reduction since the 
baseline. 
The Department of Social Security (DSS) has PSA 
targets to reduce fraud and error by 10% by March 
2002, 25 per cent by March 2004 and by 50 per cent by 
March 2006. The baseline from which progress is 
measured is the level over the 12-months from October 
1997 to September 1998. This baseline is 9.0% and 
was published in a Government Statistical Service 
(GSS) report in October 1999. The 10% target 
reduction therefore translates to an 8.1 % level of fraud 
and error by March 2002. 
The Public Service Agreement target measure is the 
estimated percentage of benefit overpaid due to fraud 
and error, including official error, in Income Support and 
Jobseekers Allowance. Public Service Agreement 
figures are constructed from a combination of surveys. 
Uncertanties in the Estimates 
Results derived from the analysis of a sample of IS and 
JSA claims, rather than of alliS and JSA claims, are 
subject to statistical uncertainties. These uncertainties 
have been quantified and are presented in the results 
as 95% confidence limits. These define the range within 
which we can be 95% certain that the true value lies. 
Further sources of uncertainty have not been 
quantified. Fraud is by its nature a covert activity, and it 
is possible that some frauds and errors on sample 
cases will not have been uncovered. In addition, there 
are instances where fraud was suspected but was not 
admitted and could not be proven. 
Fraud and Error in Claims for Income Support and 
Jobseeker's Allowance from October 1998 to 
September 1999 and from April 1999 to March 2000. 
Issued by Department of Social Security 
Analytical Services Division 
Contact: James Lind 0113 232420 
Notes for editors 
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27th November 2000 
Claim Your Pension over the 
Phone: New Tele-Claim service for 
Pensioners 
People who are about to retire can now claim 
their State Pension by telephone rather than 
by filling in a form Alistair Darling, Social 
Security Secretary, announced today. 
Mr Darling said: "This new service will give 
people about to retire active assistance when 
they claim. It will provide a smooth, efficient 
and accessible service. This is part of my aim 
to modernise the services that the DSS offers. 
"By using the new tele-claim service they can 
give their details over the phone - it is an easy, 
quick and safe way to claim your pension. 
"The DSS has already modernised the way it 
offers services to pensioners. In addition to 
this new tele-claim service, the MIG electronic 
claim form has already ensured that 
thousands of pensioners have received extra 
money quickly and with the minimum of fuss. 
Tele-claim services are the way ahead." 
This service is what customers want - a 
survey from the pilot that operated in London 
showed that 97% of people who used the 
service gave it 8 out of 10 or better. 
Mr Darling said: "I can also announce that we 
are working towards cutting down the 38-page 
MIG claim form so that it is easier for 
pensioners who do not want to use the 
electronic version of this claim form to get the 
money they are entitled too". 
People approaching retirement are 
automatically contacted four months before 
they retire. Instead of having to use a claim 
form (BR1), there will be three options: 
• 	 Ring the National Tele-Claim Service and 
give their details over the phone, 
• 	 Ring the National Tele-Claim service and 
request the claim form; or 
• 	 Complete a tear-off slip to receive a form 
in the post. 
The service helps pensioners by: 
• 	 Reducing the need to keep going back to 
customers for more information, speeding 
up the rate at which claims are cleared. 
• 	 Enabling the collection of accurate and 
complete information first time. We have 
to go back to customers for more 
information in fewer than 2% of cases, compared 
with 40% previously. 
• 	 Reducing the need for customers to supply 
evidence of birth, marriage or divorce that the 
Department has previously seen and verified for 
other purposes. 
"We recognise that pensioners are a distinct group of 
people with their own needs. So we are currently in the 
process of setting up a new pensions organisation for 
Summer 2001 ," continued Mr Darling. "It will provide a 
new and radically better service for today's pensioners 
so that for the first time they will be able to obtain all 
social security services from a single accessible point." 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 From July 1997 to July 2000 a pilot service ran in 
the Greater London Area. 
2. 	 The service is available from 7am to 7pm Monday 
to Friday on 0845 300 1084. Only people who have 
received their retirement pack should ring as it 
does not deal with general inquiries about 
pensions. For general enquiries ring the Pensions 
Information Line on 0845731 3233. 
3. 	 The service is available for textphone users on 
0845 300 2086. 
4. 	 The MIG electronic claim line is 08000281111. 
5. 	 A picture of Alistair Darling talking to customers 
who have used the service is available on the full 
UK and Ireland Newswire Circuit from Two Ten 
Communications (02074908111). 
************************************'iIr************* 
http://www.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dss/pressreleases/ 
2000/nov/21-11-00-3.asp 
21 st November 2000 
Statutory Maternity Pay Rule Change for 
Women Affected By Commissioner's 
Decision 
Hugh Bayley, Social Security Minister, today 
announced a rule change to restore Statutory Maternity 
Pay entitlement (SMP) for the future to women who 
would have lost out as a result of a Commissioner's 
decision earlier this year. 
The change means that women, who have satisfied the 
SMP employment and earnings tests but who 
subsequently are dismissed or whose employment is 
ended without their consent before they have started 
their maternity leave, will once again be entitled to 
SMP. 
Mr Bayley said: "We want pregnant women to get 
maternity pay when they stop work. These rules protect 
the health of the mother and her child. 
"A recent Commissioner's decision meant that some 
pregnant women who left their job, for reasons that had 
nothing to do with their pregnancy, could not get 
maternity pay. 
338 
"The Government has acted quickly by laying 
these regulations to close that loophole." 
The new rules came into force on 17 
November 2000 and apply to women 
expecting babies on or after 4 March 2001, if 
they are dismissed or their employment is 
ended without their consent on or after 19 
November 2000. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 Statutory Maternity Pay is paid by 
employers for up to 18 weeks to pregnant 
employees who have been employed by 
them continuously for 26 weeks into the 
qualifying week (the 15th week before the 
week the baby is expected) and who earn 
on average at least £67 a week. They 
must also cease work wholly or partly 
because of their pregnancy. A woman 
gets 90% of her average earnings for the 
first 6 weeks and £60.20 a week for the 
next 12 weeks. 
I 
2. The requirement to stop work was always 
thought simply to mean that a woman 
could not work for her employer and at 
the same time receive SMP from him. 
The Commissioner's decision said that 
the requirement in fact meant that a 
woman would not be able to get SMP if 
1\ 	 she had left work for a reason totally 
unconnected with her pregnancy. 
3. 	 Women who stop work because of their 
pregnancy (even partly because of their 
pregnancy) were not affected by the 
Commissioner's decision and continued 
to get SMP. The new regulations "The 
Statutory Maternity Pay (General) 
(Modification and Amendment) 
Regulations 2000" mean that women who 
are dismissed or whose employment is 
ended without their consent, for example, 
because of redundancy, will once again 
be able to get SMP from their employer. 
4. 	 It is not possible for the regulations to 
restore SMP entitlement to the very few 
women who might resign their job 
voluntarily for reasons totally 
unconnected with their pregnancy. We 
expect that the number of women who 
give up their job late in pregnancy for 
reasons which are nothing to do with their 
pregnancy will be very small. They may 
qualify for Maternity Allowance instead. 
MA is the state benefit paid to pregnant 
women who fail to qualify for SMP. It is 
paid for 18 weeks at the same rate as flat 
rate SMP. 
5. 	 Employers are reimbursed for 92% of the 
SMP they payout. Smaller employers 
(those whose gross National Insurance 
liability in the previous tax year was 
£20,000 a year or less) recover 105%. 
6. 	 Stephen Byers, the Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry, is undertaking a review of maternity 
pay and parental leave entitled 'Work and Parents: 
Competitiveness and Choice". He is consulting 
extensively with parents, employers and Trade 
Unions and will publish a green paper towards the 
end of 2000. 
7. 	 Both women and employers may obtain more 
information from their local Inland Revenue 
National Insurance Contributions Office. Employers 
may phone the Employers' Helpline on 08457 
143143. 
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14th November 2000 
Photocall to Mark First £200 Winter Fuel 
Payment 
The first £200 Winter Fuel Payment cheque will be 
presented to north London pensioners George and 
Louise Hepburn by Social Security Secretary Alistair 
Darling. 
Around 11.5 million people will receive the Winter Fuel 
Payment in the coming weeks. 
The photocall is on: 
Tuesday 14 November 2000 
At: 9am 
In: 
Richmond House 
79 Whitehall 
London SW1A 2NS 
Please ring Lisa Mackenzie on 020 7238 0752 if you 
intend to send a photographer or camera crew along. 
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14th November 2000 
Alistair Darling Hands Out the First £200 
Winter Fuel Payment 
Winter Fuel Payments will start arriving on people's 
doormats from today, Social Security Secretary Alistair 
Darling announced. 
Mr Darling presented George and Louise Hepburn, a 
pensioner couple from north London, with a £200 
cheque. 
Mr and Mrs Hepburn are two of 11.5 million people who 
will receive their Winter Fuel Payment in the coming 
weeks. 
Mr Darling said: 
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"Pensioners should not have to worry about 
keeping their homes warm over the winter 
months. And this money will go a long way 
towards helping 11 million pensioners keep 
warm this winter." 
A Winter Fuel Payments help line is open from 
8.30am to 4.30pm, Monday to Friday: 08459 
151515. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 Payments will be made to all eligible 
households in England, Scotland and 
Wales. 
2. 	 For the first 2 winters of the scheme 
(1997198 and 1998/99) eligible 
households received £20 whilst the 
poorest pensioners, those receiving 
Income Support, received £50. Winter 
Fuel Payments were increased to £100 
for eligible households for winter 
1999/2000. A further increase was 
announced in the Budget to £150 for the 
coming winter and this amount was later 
increased to £200 in the Pre Budget 
Report in November 2000. 
3. 	 For winter 1999/2000 around 10 million 
pensioners in over 7.5 million households 
benefited from Winter Fuel Payments. 
4. 	 On 16 December 1999 following an 
European Court of Justice ruling, Alistair 
Darling announced that the Winter Fuel 
Payment would be equalised so that most 
men and women who are aged 60 and 
over during the qualifying week would be 
eligible for a payment. Under this new 
criteria people would also be eligible for 
backdated payments from the start of the 
scheme. 
5. 	 The eligibility criterion is that during the 
specified week the household has an 
occupant ordinarily resident in Great 
Britain or Northern Ireland aged 60 or 
over. The need to be in receipt of a 
qualifying benefit, which existed prior to 
16 December 1999, has been removed. 
6. 	 Exclusions from the scheme include 
people who during the qualifying week 
were living permanently in residential care 
and receiving Income Support; receiving 
free in-patient hospital treatment for over 
52 weeks; detained in custody and 
sentenced; and people subject to 
immigration control. 
7. 	 The qualifying weeks since the 
introduction of the scheme have been: 
1997198 - week ending 11 January 1998 
1998/99 - week ending 15 November 1998 
1999/00 - week ending 26 September 1999 
2000/01 - week ending 24 September 2000 
8. 	 Under the new scheme, and incorporating 
the rise to £200 as announced in last 
week's Pre Budget Report, this coming 
winter expenditure will increase to £1.8 
billion annually. For past winters, the cost of 
making backdated payments is estimated to be up 
to £150 million. 
9. 	 As a result of the extension of the scheme up to an 
additional 1.5 million people will be eligible for a 
Winter Fuel Payment this year, and up to 1.9 
million people will be eligible for backdated 
payments. All claims for backdated payments 
returned for processing by 3 November 2000 will 
be paid before Christmas 2000. 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dss/pressreleases/ 
2000/nov/13-11-00-1.asp 
13th November 2000 
New Measures to Help Disabled People 
Back to Work - Hodge and Bayley 
Minister for Disabled People, Margaret Hodge, and 
Social Security Minister, Hugh Bayley, today 
announced that a national network of Job Brokers is 
being set up to offer people on Incapacity Benefits the 
support, guidance, and preparation they need to find 
paid work and move off benefit dependence. 
The Job Brokers will be unique. This New Deal will be 
delivered largely by the voluntary and private sectors 
and will match employers to potential employees 
currently on Incapacity Benefits. A prospectus outlining 
what we want Job Brokers to achieve is launched 
today. 
Mrs Hodge said: 
"Disabled people are seven times as likely as non­
disabled people to be out of work and claiming benefits. 
People in receipt of Incapacity Benefits are the largest 
group of economically inactive people in Britain - one 
million would like to work and 400,000 could work now 
given the right support. 
"We're taking action to help disabled people achieve 
that aim. Through the extension of the New Deal for 
Disabled People, a network of Job Brokers will offer 
people on Incapacity Benefits the guidance and support 
they need to find paid work. It will also offer help and 
advice to employers in meeting the needs of disabled 
employees." 
'We've piloted a range of approaches across the 
country to find out what works best. We've worked with 
both the private and voluntary sectors to create new 
opportunities for disabled people, such as: 
• 	 The Eastern Valleys pilot in Wales has helped over 
750 long-term sick and disabled people back to 
work. This included a man who had been on 
Incapacity Benefit for five years after a. spinal injury 
- the pilot helped him to gain a PSV driver licence 
and get a job with his local bus company. 
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• Centrica, a private sector gas company, 
took on around fifty disabled people in 
their call centre as part of an innovative 
pilot scheme. 
• Pilot schemes in Bristol and Bath have 
helped disabled people start up their own 
businesses - these range from toy 
production to kitchen fitting and art 
dealership. 
"Job Brokers will build on that experience by 
helping to match employers to potential 
employees. It's going to have a dramatic 
impact on the lives of thousands of disabled 
people." 
Hugh Bayley said: 
"The support of employers is critical to the 
success of this New Deal. We have well­
motivated disabled people who want to work 
and well-motivated employers who want to 
hire them; now we want job brokers to bring 
them together. The Prospectus we have 
launched today is inviting private, voluntary 
and public sector organisations to consider 
bidding to become job brokers and help us 
match the abilities and potential of disabled 
people to employers. 
"Job Brokers will work closely with employers 
to help disabled people prepare to move into, 
or back into work. Job Brokers will need to 
understand the local labour market and be 
aware of the needs of disabled people. They 
will match jobs available with the skills needed 
to fill them, and help develop skills for those 
who do not already have them. Job Brokers 
will work with people with a disability or long 
term illness entitled to incapacity benefits." 
The prospectus paves the way for an invitation 
to tender for organisations that are interested 
in delivering the extension of the New Deal for 
Disabled People. The Invitation to Tender 
document will be available on 27 November 
2000. 
Notes for editors 
1. Education and Employment Secretary 
David Blunkett pledged to build on the 
success of the New Deal by offering 
Government help to people on long term 
illness or disability. This pledge was 
announced as part of a keynote speech at the 
Policy Studies Institute seminar on 
Wednesday 11 October (see PN 434/00). 
2. In March 2000 the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer announced that the Government 
intended to extend the New Deal for Disabled 
People. This will form a part of the 
Government's programme to introduce 
comprehensive civil rights. The programme 
has included the Disability Discrimination Act, 
the creation of the Disability Rights Commission, the 
introduction of the Disabled Person's Tax Credit and, in 
England, the introduction of Joint Investment Plans for 
Welfare to Work. 
3. New Deal for Disabled People is being jointly 
developed by the Department of Social Security, the 
Department for Education and Employment and the 
Employment Service. To date it has involved the 
following measures: 
• 	 twenty four Innovative Schemes to test new ways 
of helping disabled people who want to work; 
• 	 Personal Adviser Service pilots in twelve locations 
to help disabled people overcome particular 
barriers to work. 
4. The New Deal for Disabled People will be extended 
on a national basis, with services for disabled clients 
beginning from July 2001. It will start to introduce for 
the first time: 
• 	 A voluntary gateway to engage those flowing onto 
incapacity benefits; 
• 	 Client choice in selecting a job broker; 
• 	 Encouragement for innovation on the part of job 
brokers; and 
A focus on outcomes that achieve lasting paid 
employment for long-term sick and disabled 
people. 
5. The prospectus launched today outlines the key 
elements of the extension of New Deal for Disabled 
People and paves the way for an Invitation to Tender 
for organisations which are interested in delivering this 
New Deal. The Invitation to Tender will be available on 
27 November 2000. Copies will be available on The 
New Deal for Disabled People website via a link from 
http://www.disability.gov.uk or from: 
Jobseekers Disability Services 6 
3rd Floor, Rockingham House 
West Street 
Sheffield 81 4ER 
************************'***************"*********** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentre/dss/pressreleases/ 
2000/nov/10-11-00-1.asp 
10th November 2000 
Cash Help for Cancer Sufferers in 
Coventry 
People with cancer in Coventry may be miSSing out on 
extra financial help. which could make a big difference 
to their lives. They will, however, have the opportunity 
to check out their entitlement to benefits and other cash 
help by speaking to experts at 2 day Advice and 
Information Event being organized by Coventry 
Benefits Agency. The event will be held at the 
Radiotherapy and Oncology Centre at Walsgrave 
Hospital on Tuesday 14 November and Wednesday 
15 November between 9.30 and 4.00pm. 
Last year's event saw over 100 people receiving advice 
and information. It is expected that this years two day 
mega-event will reach an even wider audience. Staff 
from the Coventry Benefits Agency office at Cofa Court 
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and from the Midlands Disability Benefits 
Centre will be on hand over the two days to 
give advice and information and carry out 
benefit check-ups for patients, carers, friends 
and relatives. 
The event will raise awareness of disability 
benefits, including Disability Living Allowance, 
Attendance Allowance and Carer's Allowance. 
Geraldine Fisher, Information Officer for 
Coventry Benefits Agency says "This is the 
second year in which we have been invited to 
run this advice and information event for 
cancer sufferers at Walsgrave Hospital. This 
event has been organised to give people the 
opportunity to talk to friendly benefits advisors 
who will carry out personal benefit 
calculations." 
For further details contact:­
Pat Sever, Benefits Agency Press Offices 
on 01216262991 or 0374 402 051 (Mobile). 
Notes for editors 
not finished waiting for complete version 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentre/dss/press 
releases/2000fnov!09-11-00-2.asp 
9th November 2000 
Radical Pension Reform: The 
Government is doing more to 
reward saving for retirement 
• 	 Weekly income for single pensioners of 
not less than £100 and £154 for couples 
from 2003. 
• 	 5.5 million pensioners better off from the 
Pension Credit alone and 3 million better 
off from tax changes. 
• 	 Two thirds of pensioners who will gain are 
women. 
More than half of all pensioner households will 
benefit from the introduction of the Pension 
Credit, Alistair Darling announced today. 
"For the first time ever the Pension Credit will 
make sure savings will be rewarded," said Mr 
Darling. "There is a fundamental fault in the 
system we inherited. Saving should be 
rewarded, not punished. The Credit will 
reward the thrift of millions of people who have 
worked hard to save for their retirement. 
"The Credit builds on the long term reforms 
the Government has already made. Our aim is 
to end pensioner poverty and ensure that all 
pensioners share in the rising prosperity of the 
nation. We are building a coherent and 
sustainable strategy for pensioners." 
Mr Darling continued: "A penSioner with £20 of 
occupational pension on top of their state pension can 
find themselves just a pound or two better off than 
someone who saved nothing. That's unfair, unjust and 
it's going to stop. 
"That's why we are introducing the Credit - so for the 
first time in the history of the welfare state saving will be 
rewarded. When it starts from 2003 the Credit will 
reward all those with weekly incomes up to £135 for 
single pensioner, or £200 for couples. That means 5.5 
million pensioners - half of all pensioner households in 
this country - will be better off as a result of the Credit." 
The Credit will guarantee a minimum income, which by 
2003 will be at least £100, or £154 for couples. On top 
of that for every pound saved, penSioners will receive 
an additional cash credit. This means extra cash of 
between £1 and £23 a week on top of the Basic State 
Pension depending on the amount of savings and other 
income. 
"The changes we are making will be of particular 
advantage to women," Mr Darling said. "On average, 
women have smaller occupational pensions and live 
longer than men. So they'll be much better off under the 
Credit; in fact two thirds of those who will benefit from 
the Credit are women. 
"We are also scrapping capital limits completely. And 
we're no longer assuming that pensioners can get a 
ludicrous 20% return on their savings". 
All tax paying pensioners tell us about their incomes 
once a year. The poorest pensioners have to tell the 
benefit system about changes every week. "I propose 
to get rid of the weekly means test," Alistair Darling 
said. "Instead the Credit will be based on an income 
assessment that is more like the tax system. 
"When you retire, a calculation has to be made about 
your state pension. At the same time we will work out 
how much a pensioner is entitled to under MIG and the 
Credit. After that, any adjustments only need to be 
made when circumstances change significantly. 
"The message is clear - save whatever you can afford 
to put by. It will now always pay to save." 
And, although most pensioners pay no tax at all, for 
those who do, in 2003 the Government will raise the 
pensioners' tax allowances by £240 over an above 
inflation. On current forecasts, that means the 3 million 
pensioners who pay tax will be £1 a week, in real terms, 
better off because of these tax changes. 
The Pension Credit will be introduced from 2003. To 
ensure that pensioners get a fair deal until then the 
Chancellor announced transitional arrangements 
yesterday. 
zn .....>.....~.:. 
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The Retirement Pension for a single pensioner 
will rise by £5 for a single pensioner in 2001 
and by £3 the year after. For couples, the 
figures are £8 and then £4.80. 
Mr Darling continued: "The Government will 
be spending £8.5 billion more on pensioners 
over the lifetime of this Parliament, that's over 
£5 billion more than they'd have got from an 
earnings link. In fact from next year, the 
poorest third of pensioners will get five times 
more than they would have done under the 
earnings link." 
Notes for editors 
! 
1. The Consultation will end on 28 February 
2001. All comments should be sent to 
The Pension Credit Consultation Team, 
DSS, 5th Floor, The Adelphi, 1~11 John 
Adam Street, London, WC2N 6HT or 
pension-credit­
team@ms41.dss.gsi.gov.uk 
2. 	 How will pensioners gain from the 
Pension Credit? The tables below show 
how much credit you will receive for every 
pound above the Basic State Pension. 
3. 	 The Consultation Document is on the 
DSS website at 
http://www.dss.gov.uklpublications/dss/20 
OO/pencred/ 
or from 
Welfare Reform (Pension), 
Freepost (HA4441), 
Hayes, 
UB31BR, 
telephone: 0208867 3201, fax: 0208867 
3264. 
*****'****************************************'***** 
http://w.JN.I.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dss/press 
releases/2000/nov/03-11-00-1.asp 
3rd November 2000 
Want Information on Stakeholder 
Pensions? Ring a New Helpline 
People who want more information on 
stakeholder pensions can now ring a new 
helpline for impartial information, Social 
Security Minister Jeff Rooker announced 
today. 
Launching the help line Mr Rooker said: 
"Stakeholder pensions will, for the first time, 
offer millions of people a good value, secure 
and flexible second pension. 
"Stakeholder pensions will be available from 
April 2001 and very soon people are likely to 
be receiving information from companies 
I 
 providing stakeholder pensions. 

I 
1 
"This helpline will provide impartial information for 
people who want to know more about stakeholder 
pensions before deciding on their pension choices." 
The helpline will be run by OPAS • the Pensions 
Advisory Service - and funded by the DSS and the 
Financial Services Authority. The stakeholder pensions 
telephone helpline is 0845 601 2923. Calls are charged 
at local rates. The line is open between 8.30am­
6.30pm, Monday to Friday. 
Trained staff will talk to callers so they have a better 
understanding of what stakeholder pensions will 
involve. Callers might ask about: 
• 	 How stakeholder schemes must operate and the 
rights of members; 
• 	 What their employer may be required to do; and 
• 	 The relationship between a stakeholder pension 
and existing pension arrangements. 
"People who can save for their future have a 

responsibility to do so" Mr Rooker continued. "If you 

want to enjoy your retirement you need to plan for your 

future as early as possible. This helpline will help you 

understand more about what is on offer." 

Malcolm McLean, Chief Executive of OPAS said: "Our 

staff are ready and able to help people find out about 

stakeholder pensions. The service will aim to help 

people understand what is on offer in a clear, easy to 

understand way." 

The line will not provide specific financial advice, and 

will not market stakeholder pensions or schemes. 

Notes for editors 

Questions from employers about stakeholder pensions 

should be directed to the Inland Revenue Employers' 

helpline on 0845 7143 143. 

************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov. u k/med iacentre/dss/p ress releases/ 
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2nd November 2000 
BFI Report: London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (BFI) report of its 
inspection of Housing and Council Tax Benefit 
administration and counter fraud activity by the London 
Borough of Tower Hamlets was published today by the 
Secretary of State for Social Security. 
This was the BFI's second inspection of the Council and 
followed publication of its first report in July 1999. This 
inspection referred back to the BFI's earlier work, 
measured progress made since 1999 and considered 
the Council's current performance. 
Inspectors report that the Council had responded 
positively to the BFI's first inspection report and 
recommendations. Performance in benefit 
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administration is now monitored more 
rigorously and the Council is working closely 
with the Benefits Agency. Despite deciding not 
to adopt the Verification Framework 
Inspectors report positively on the Council's 
efforts to ensure only those who are eligible to 
benefit, receive it. The Council is now in a 
strong position to implement the Verification 
Framework should it choose to do so. 
The report makes particular mention of the 
way benefits staff and those dealing with 
homeless people work together. This is 
acknowledged to be a difficult area for which 
the Council's efforts are commended. 
Counter fraud staff are active in investigating 
fraud and levying sanctions on fraudsters. 
Other measures provided by legislation have 
been adopted including administrative 
penalties and the use of the Council's own 
legal department to prosecute fraudsters. 
The BFI identify potential for further progress 
to improve the security of benefit 
administration by increasing the number of 
home visits to claimants and targeting counter 
fraud activity against claimants who fail to 
declare income or change of address. 
The BFl's report includes recommendations to 
help the Council further improve its 
administration and counter fraud activity for 
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
BFI inspects agencies and local authorities 
and is working to raise standards and spread 
good practice. Through its recommendations 
improvements can be identified to safeguard 
current systems and inform design for the 
future. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to 
inspect social security benefits 
administration and counter-fraud activity 
within DSS agencies and local authorities, 
to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good 
practice. 
2. 	 Each inspection report is considered by 
the Secretary of State who decides 
whether any further action is appropriate. 
The Secretary of State has powers to 
issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
3. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to 
inspect the 30 highest benefit spending 
councils. This Council's declared total 
benefit expenditure for 1999/2000 was 
£123m. 
4. 	 Media copies of the report can be obtained from 
the DSS Press Office on 020 7238 0866. A copy of 
the repo rt can be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.dss.gov.uk. 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dss/pressreleases/ 
2000/nov/02-11-00-2.asp 
2nd November 2000 
8Ft Report: City Of Edinburgh Council 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (BFI) report of its 
inspection of Housing and Council Tax Benefit 
administration and counter 'fraud activity by the City of 
Edinburgh Council was published today by the 
Secretary of State for Social Security. 
Inspectors originally visited the Council in May and 
June 1997 as part of a series of trial inspections but 
their findings were not published. This inspection 
referred back to the BFl's earlier work, measured 
progress made since 1997 and considered the 
Council's current performance. 
The BFI reports on a lack of progress made by the 
Council on the main issues identified in their original 
visit. The reports main conclusion is that the Council is 
not as effective in tackling fraud and error as it should 
be. In particular it has no strategic approach to 
combating fraud and error and there are serious 
weaknesses in internal security. 
A failure to clear claims speedily enough had resulted in 
backlogs of work and concerns are noted about the 
standards of verification being applied to claims. 
The approach of the Fraud Unit is mainly reactive with 
little concerted effort directed towards proactive work. 
There was scope for the Council to make better use of 
management information and the poor quality of 
counter fraud casework had brought about premature 
closure of investigations. There had also been a 
widespread failure to prove fraudulent intent. 
The report acknowledges improvements made by the 
Council in the physical merger of Housing Benefit and 
Council Tax Benefit administration which addressed a 
number of the BFl's earlier concerns. There had been 
general improvement in the interface arrangements with 
the Benefits Agency. The Council had also taken 
forward initiatives in the purchase of a fraud information 
system, piloted the National Benefit Fraud Hotline and 
seconded a number of staff to the Benefits Agency to 
promote joint work on prosecutions. 
The SFI concluded that for the Council to demonstrate 
clearly its commitment to efficient administration of 
benefits, and particularly tackling fraud and error, it will 
need to develop a coherent strategy, which would 
translate into clear objectives and performance targets. 
This approach would also require the endorsement of 
the Council's senior officers and elected Members. 
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The BFI makes a number of recommendations 
to address weaknesses and help the council 
to improve its administration and counter fraud 
activity for Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
Benefit. 
SFI inspects agencies and local authorities 
and is working to raise standards and spread 
good practice. Through its recommendations 
improvements can be identified to safeguard 
current systems and inform design for the 
future. 
Social Security Minister Jeff Rooker 
announced the publication of the report in 
response to a Parliamentary Question from 
Jim Cunningham MP. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to 
inspect social security benefits 
administration and counter-fraud activity 
within DSS agencies and local authorities, 
to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good 
practice. 
2. 	 Each inspection report is considered by 
the Secretary of State who decides 
whether any further action is appropriate. 
The Secretary of State has powers to 
issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
3. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to 
inspect the 30 highest benefit spending 
councils. 
4. 	 Media copies of the report can be 
obtained from the DSS Press Office on 
020 7238 0866. A copy of the report can 
be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.dss.gov.uk. 
*'************************************************* 
http://www.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dssJpress 
releases/2000JdecJ21-12-00-1.asp 
21st December 2000 
New Arrangements Announced to 
Protect the Pensions of People 
who have lived in Australia 
Jeff Rooker, Social Security Minister, today 
set out the arrangements he is putting in place 
to protect the pensions of people with periods 
of residence in Australia on their return to live 
in the UK. 
Answering a PQ from Mrs Liz Blackman 
(Erewash) he said: 
"I am pleased to announce we are putting 
arrangements in place to protect the pension position of 
those people who have periods of residence in 
Australia, on their return to live permanently in the UK. 
We are protecting such periods of residence up to and 
including 5 April 2001 for the purposes of basic state 
pension and bereavement benefits. 
"We shall, in advance of Primary Legislation, top up the 
pensions of people with periods of residence in 
Australia before 6 April 2001 with an extra statutory 
payment if they have less than the full rate of basic 
pension. We will do this when they claim their pension 
in the normal way." 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 For more information people can ring 0191218 
7777. 
2. 	 The Australian Government has given notice to 
end the Social Security Agreement from 1 March 
2001. 
3. 	 Under the terms of the Agreement, when someone 
returns to live permanently in the UK, periods of 
residence in Australia can be treated as periods for 
which National Insurance contributions have been 
paid. The termination of this Agreement would 
mean that those relying on its terms could have 
received lower rates of basic state pension. 
4. 	 Extra statutory payments will be made to people 
with periods of residence in Australia before 6 April 
2001 if they have less than the full rate basic 
pension. These will be paid with their pension 
when they claim their pension; a separate claim is 
not necessary. There is no extra cost to public 
funds as payments would have been made if the 
Agreement with Australia had continued .. 
*********************1t**************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov. u kJ mediacentreJdss/p ressre leasesJ 
2000JdecJ19-12-00-1.asp 
19th December 2000 
BFI Report Leeds City Council 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (BFI) report of its 
inspection of Housing and Council Tax Benefit 
administration and counter fraud activity by Leeds City 
Council was published today by the Secretary of State 
for Social Security. 
Inspectors report that the council's processing of new 
claims quickly, contributed significantly to the good 
quality of service provided to claimants. The BFt found 
effective use was being made of management 
information to manage the workload of new claims. 
The council has implemented the Verification 
Framework, but the BFI found weaknesses in claims 
verification and consider that the council could strike a 
better balance between clearing claims quickly and 
verification checks. 
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The report notes that, despite the council's 
commitment to tackling fraud, inspectors 
found significant weaknesses in the standards 
of its fraud investigations. The BFI makes 
recommendations of the council to improve 
the quality of its investigation work and to 
develop a corporate counter fraud policy and 
strategy with measurable targets. 
The BFI's report includes recommendations to 
help the Council further improve its 
administration and counter fraud activity of 
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
BFI inspects agencies and local authorities 
and is working to raise standards and spread 
good practice. Through its recommendations 
improvements can be identified to safeguard 
current systems and inform design for the 
future. 
Social Security Minister, Jeff Rooker 
announced the publication of the report in 
response to a parliamentary question from 
Bob Blizzard MP. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to 
inspect social security benefits 
administration and counter-fraud activity 
within DSS agencies and local authorities, 
to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good 
practice. 
2. 	 Each inspection report is considered by 
the Secretary of State who decides 
whether any further action is appropriate. 
The Secretary of State has powers to 
issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
3. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to 
inspect the 30 highest benefit spending 
councils. 
4. 	 Media copies of the report can be 
obtained from the DSS Press Office on 
02072380866. A copy of the report can 
be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.dss.gov.uk 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dss/press 
releases/2000/dec/19-12-00-2.asp 
19th December 2000 
SFI Report London Borough Of 
Newham 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (BFI) report 
of its inspection of Housing and Council Tax 
Benefit administration and counter fraud 
activity by London Borough of Newham was published 
today by the Secretary of State for Social Security. 
Inspectors found that Newham had some good working 
practices including their customer enquiry service and 
secure benefit payment processes. 
The council contracted out benefits administration in 
1999 with a stated aim to improve services and reduce 
costs. The BFI found this aim had not been achieved 
and the council was keenly aware of deficiencies in its 
benefit operations. The report notes that a programme 
of improvement being undertaken by the council and 
the contractor was having some success in clearing 
backlogs of work, dealing with delays and addressing 
inefficiencies. Deficiencies were found in the council's 
benefits claim form and in IT security. 
The BFI's report notes the council had not had a 
counter fraud manager for nearly two years. This factor 
together with an ineffective prosecution policy had 
compromised the success of Newham's counter fraud 
work. Newham's fraud investigations were found to be 
poor. A corporate anti-fraud and corruption statement 
and prosecution policy was ineffective and there had 
been no prosecutions. The council had recognised the 
need to overhaul and promote its counter fraud work. 
The report notes the appointment of a new counter 
fraud manager, a policy on whistle blowing and an 
investigators, code of conduct. In addition an action 
plan had been developed to tackle other weaknesses. 
The BFI's report includes recommendations to help the 
Council further improve its administration and counter 
fraud activity of Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
Benefit. 
BFI inspects agencies and local authorities and is 
working to raise standards and spread good practice. 
Through its recommendations improvements can be 
identified to safeguard current systems and inform 
design for the future. 
Social Security Minister Jeff Rooker announced the 
publication of the report in response to a Parliamentary 
Question from Bob Blizzard MP. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to inspect 
social security benefits administration and counter­
fraud activity within DSS agencies and local 
authorities, to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good practice. 
2. 	 Each inspection report is considered by the 
Secretary of State who decides whether any further 
action is appropriate. The Secretary of State has 
powers to issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
3. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to inspect 
the 30 highest benefit spending councils. 
4. 	 Media copies of the report can be obtained from 
the DSS Press Office on 0207238 0866. A copy of 
--------..__••.g2.~r; 
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19th December 2000 
8Ft Report London Borough Of 
Waltham Forest 
Th~ ~enefit ~raud Inspectorate's (SFI) report 
of Its inspection of Housing and Council Tax 
Be~~fit administration and counter fraud 
activity by London Borough of Waltham Forest 
was pu?lished today by the Secretary of State 
for Social Security. 
Insp~ctors :ound the council had clear aims to 
provldea high quality benefits service but that 
these alms were not always being met. 
Benefits administration was contracted out in 
1999 and since then backlogs of work had 
developed on a number of occasions. This 
had ~ffected th.e level of service being 
provided to claimants. In addition the BFI 
reports the council was failing to meet the 
reqUirement to process claims within 14 days 
and there had been frequent breaks in paying 
benefit. 
The report notes the council had some good 
counter fraud practices in place, including 
comprehensive guidance on fraud 
~nvestigation work. However, many 
Investigations were failing to properly establish 
fraud and therefore weekly benefit savings 
were being incorrectly claimed. The council 
~ad a prosecution policy but this only existed 
In draft form and no use was being made of 
administrative penalties. 
The BFI reports positively on the council "one 
stop shop" service to claimants, the 
effectiveness of its benefit claim form and its 
comprehensive complaint's procedure. In 
addition, Inspectors found the council provided 
a good service to existing claimants by 
ensuring they were invited to make a further 
claim at the right time. 
The BFI's report includes recommendations to 
help the Council further improve its 
administration and counter fraud activity of 
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
BFI inspects agencies and local authorities 
and is working to raise standards and spread 
good practice. Through its recommendations 
improvements can be identified to safeguard 
current systems and inform design for the 
future. 
Social Security Minister Jeff R . . ­publication of the re . ocker ar.nc,Jth"ed the 
Question from Bob BPI~rt In response to a Pari!amen!arl 
Izzard MP. 	 ' 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 '6he SFI is an independent unit WIthin the 
e~artment of SOCial securih, set U" to I'"s"'er+ 
SOCial S 'ty b :'.."" ,,"'-,f e?~n. enefits administration ar,::i :::ounter­
raud ~CtlVlty within DSS agencies and !;::cal 
~ut~ontles, t? report to the Secretary of State for 
oCla~ Securl.!Y, and to promote good practice. 
2. 	 ~ach inspection report is considered by the 
e~ret~ry of State who decides v.'hether any fU:iher 
action IS a~propriate. The Secretary of State has 
powers to Issue directions to a ;oeal authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
3, 	 This inspection is part of a programme to inspect 
the ~O hlg~est benefit spending cOllndls. 
4. 	 Media caples of the report can be obtained from 
the DSS Press Office on 020 7238 0866. A copy of 
the report can be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.dss.gov.uk 
******************************************'111**1<.***'* 
hUp://www.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dss/pressre!easesl 
2000/dec/19-12-00-4.asp 
19th December 2000 
Social Security Fraud Bill 
!he Social Security Fraud Bill published today wi!1 
Introduce new powers to investigate, punish and deter 
benefit fraud. 
Obtaining and sharing information 
Clauses 1 and 2 build on curren1 iegisla~ion in the 
Social Security Administration Act 1992. 
Clause 1 will provide for authorised officers in DSS and 
local authorities to require information from specified 
private and public sector organisations. Enquiries will 
be made only where there are reasonable grounds to 
do so; ego where it is suspected that a person is 
committing benefit fraud. The organisations from whom 
information will be required include banks; building 
societies; credit reference agencies; private sector 
fraud prevention associations; providers of credit (such 
as credit card companies); insurance companies; utility 
companies; telecoms companies; and educational 
establishments (including the Student Loans Company 
Ltd and the Universities and Colleges Admissions 
Service). The measures will also provide for speCifically 
authorised DSS officers to require information in bulk 
from utilities companies about the quantity of services 
supplied to residential propert[es. It will only provide for 
information about addresses to be obtained. It does not 
provide for information to be obtained about named 
persons. The DSS intends to match this information 
against benefit records - for example, when a person 
claims benefit from an address yet consumes no 
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electricity or water there, it would arouse 
suspicion that he did not in fact live there. 
Clause 2 will provide for specifically 
authorised officers in DSS to obtain 
information by having on-line access to 
databases where facilities already exist. For 
example, credit reference agencies allow on­
line access to their databases. Local authority 
officers will also have this facility, but only with 
the Secretary of State's consent. 
Clause 3 will give the Secretary of State and 
local authorities the power to pay certain 
information providers if the Secretary of State 
considers it reasonable to do so. The DSS 
does not normally pay for information where it 
is obtained under statute. For example, 
existing powers to obtain information from 
employers about employees allow DSS and 
local authorities to obtain information from the 
private sector without payment. However, 
payment to certain information providers 
where they are able to demonstrate a greater 
claim for payment may be considered. These 
include: 
• 	 Credit reference agencies whose core 
business is to sell information. 
• 	 Telecommunications companies, which 
perform unique data processing services, 
and 
• 	 Utilities where they will be asked to 
provide information in bulk, where new 
software may be needed. 
Clause 4 contains measures to back up better 
and more routine exchange of social security 
information with other countries. The power 
will be to supply information to other countries 
where a mutual agreement was in place, and 
only where the other countries concerned 
have adequate safeguards against improper 
use of that information. 
Clause 5 is designed to replace the current 
requirement that the Secretary of State (or the 
Northern Ireland Department) specifies the 
nature, manner and form of benefit 
administration and benefit policy information to 
be supplied by local authorities, through 
regulations, with a less administratively 
cumbersome requirement to do so by use of 
directions. It will give the powers needed to 
make sure that local authorities provide the 
information necessary to ensure efficient and 
secure running of the Housing Benefit and 
Council Tax Benefit schemes. 
Loss of benefit provisions 
Clauses 6 to 12 will provide powers to 
withdraw or reduce certain benefits for 13 
weeks from those convicted twice for benefit 
fraud. An underlying entitlement to benefit will 
remain to ensure that the link between benefit and other 
welfare provisions such as free prescriptions and 
school meals is maintained. This will help to ensure that 
the proposal did not adversely affect the dependants of 
the fraudster. 
The measures will be underpinned by a fallback 
scheme to pay a reduced level of benefit to prevent 
hardship. Excluded from the list of sanctionable benefits 
will be: 
• 	 Child Benefit and Guardian's Allowance (because 
they are paid for a third party). 
• 	 Retirement Pension and Graduated Retirement 
Pension (where fraud by pensioners is virtually 
non-existent). 
• 	 Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) and Statutory Maternity 
Pay (SMP) (because they are a form of pay). 
• 	 Maternity Allowance (MA) (to ensure equity with 
SMP cases). 
Attendance Allowance and Disability Living 
Allowance (because they provide for exceptional 
living costs). 
The decision to withdraw benefit will carry the right of 
appeal to a tribunal on a question of fact and law. There 
will be a three-year linking rule between the date of 
initial conviction and the date of the next offence, even 
though the date of the second conviction may be some 
time later. Where the offences link, the person will be 
subject to a benefit sanction within a period of three 
years beginning from the date of the second conviction. 
Penalties as an alternative to prosecution 
Clause 13 introduces powers that will facilitate closer 
working between DSS and local authorities in the 
operation of the administrative penalty system. At 
present, where a benefit offence results in 
overpayments of Housing Benefit and/or Council Tax 
Benefit and another benefit, and both the DSS and the 
local authority decide to offer an administrative penalty, 
each handles the process separately. This means two 
interviews and two sets of papers for the claimant. The 
aim is both to make the system easier for those 
persons who may be subject to more than one penalty, 
and to streamline administrative procedures. 
Clause 14 Introduces a new discretionary power, which 
will provide for the payment of a financial penalty of 
between £1,000 and £5,000, as an alternative to 
prosecution, in circumstances where the Secretary of 
State or local authority has sufficient evidence to 
institute proceedings against an employer for an 
offence relating to benefit fraud. The intended effect is 
to punish employers who operate in the "informal 
economy" and to discourage others from doing so. 
Offences 
Clause 15 will tighten and clarify the powers in the 
1992 Administration Act, so that an offence occurs 
when a change of circumstances affecting entitlement 
to benefit arises and, providing it is not a change from 
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____ ----------
which there is an exemption specified in 
regulations from the obligation to notify, there 
is a knowing or dishonest failure to report that 
change. 
Clause 16 will correct an omission from the 
Social Security Administration (Fraud) Act 
1997: that legislation amended section 116 (2) 
ofthe Social Security Administration Act 1992 
(SSM 1992) to enable prosecution for 
dishonest representation in England and 
Wales without time limitation. However, the 
same was not achieved for Scotland. This 
measure will correct the omission by 
disapplying the time limitations specified in the 
SSM 1992 respect of proceedings in 
Scotland. 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dss/press 
releases!2000/dec!12-12-00-1.asp 
I 
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12th December 2000 
I £80 Million Boost For North West Carers; £80 million of extra Government help will be 
provided for carers in the North West Social 
Security Minister Hugh Bayley announced 
today. 
1 Speaking at the Carers' Voices Conference in Liverpool, Mr Bayley praised the tireless work i 	 of carers: 
i 
"Carers are so important. When the Prime ~ j 	 Minister launched our carers' strategy last 
year he promised we would review carers' 
benefits, and today I can announce that an 
extra £80 million will be paid to carers in the 
North West over the next three years, helping 
around 50,000 people. 
'We are increasing benefits for the poorest 
carers on Income Support, giving more help to 
carers who do some paid work, and allowing 
pensioners to claim carers' benefits for the first 
time, which will help pensioners on the 
minimum income guarantee." 
The North West shares in the estimated 
£500m national cash injection for older carers, 
poorer carers and those in part-time 
employment. The package includes: 
• 	 From April 2001, increasing the carer 
premium in income related benefits by 
£10 on top of the normal uprating - the 
weekly premium will rise from £14.15 to 
£24.40, an increase of over 70% for over 
200,000 carers nationally; 
• 	 From April 2001, increaSing the ICA 
earnings threshold from £50 to the level 
of the National I nsurance Lower Earnings Limit 
(LEL). This means that carers will be able to earn 
£72 per week, after deduction of certain expenses, 
before it affects their benefit. This limit will in future 
rise in line with the LEL and; 
subject to legislation: 
• 	 Extending of claims to Invalid Care Allowance 
(ICA) to carers aged 65 years and over (at present 
claims can only be made up to the age of 65) and; 
• 	 Entitlement to ICA will continue for up to eight 
weeks after the death of the person being cared 
for. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 Around 390,000 people receive these benefits at a 
cost of £854 million annually. 
2. 	 Around 50,000 people receive these benefits in the 
North West at a cost of £80 million annually. 
3. 	 Invalid Care Allowance overlaps with benefits such 
as the Retirement Pension and Bereavement 
Benefit. However opening up claims to carers over 
the age of 65 will give those on income related 
benefits such as Income Support access to the 
Carer Premium for the first time. 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp . gov. u k!med iacentre/dss!press releases! 
2000/dec!11-12-00-1.asp 
11th December 2000 
Darling Acts to Clear Delays in Housing 
Benefit Service 
An action team is to be sent out to work with struggling 
local councils to clear delays in paying Housing Benefit 
(HB) - Social Security Secretary Alistair Darling 
announced today. 
The team will draw on experts from top performing 
councils, the DSS and management specialists to give 
support to authorities which have built up backlogs in 
paying out the benefit. 
It is part of a wide-ranging package of radical measures 
announced by Mr Darling designed to: 
• 	 bring swift improvement in struggling councils 
• 	 raise standards across the board 
• 	 streamline HB making it easier for councils to 
administer and simpler for people to claim 
• 	 lay the foundations for long-term fundamental 
reform of HB 
The Secretary of State announced that councils are to 
be given a three-year £24 million settlement to help 
them plan ahead. 
Mr Darling said: "Councils are receiving the first 
increase in core funding since 1993 but the extra cash 
wilt be linked to a stringent contract to ensure high 
standards of perfonnance. 
"There are 409 individual councils administering 
Housing Benefit. Some do their job well - others are 
..~tSt;~.... 
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failing miserably to provide the service that the 
public expects. 
"Today I am publishing the results ofa further 
series of inquiries by the Benefit Fraud 
Inspectorate which demonstrates the stark 
contrast in quality of service that different 
councils currently provide. There is no excuse 
for such difference in standards of 
performance. 
"The poor performers have to become as 
good as the best and they have to do so 
quickly. 
"In April we set out options for reforming 
Housing Benefit in the Green Paper "Decent 
Homes for All". The overwhelming response 
was a demand for action to sort out the mess 
in administration - more than 70 per cent of 
respondents wanted immediate action to 
tackle delays and backlogs," Mr Darling said. j "Any delay in paying benefits creates an 
unacceptable burden of worry for people­
many old and vulnerable. i 
"Delays also damage the ability of Housing 
Benefit to get people back to work - they lack 
confidence in a system and worry that their 
rent will not get sorted out quickly if they have 
to make a new claim." 
Mr Darling is also proposing: 
• 	 the development of a new process for 
claiming the benefit to cut out multiple 
form-filling; 
• 	 changes to rules to ease the problems 
faced by young people in getting 
accommodation and to encourage 
landlords to rent to young adults; 
• 	 simplifying the rules including making it 
easier to claim HB when starting work, 
speeding up payments if a job ends after 
a short period and simpler reviews for 
pensioners. 
As part of the drive to ease the burden on 
local authorities the DSS is also discussing 
with representatives of Registered Social 
Landlords - such as Housing Associations ­
proposals they have volunteered for assisting 
with elements of HB administration. 
Mr Darling's package is on top of action to 
tackle fraud and drive down error - including 
more generous financial rewards to local 
authorities who act to prevent fraud entering 
the system and a fraud hotline that is to be 
piloted with 10 local councils from January. 
He said: "Housing Benefit helps over 4 million 
people keep a roof over their heads. Our 
priority is to put it on a sounder footing and to 
eradicate complexity from the system. These 
changes will create the right conditions for longer-term 
reform." 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentre/dss/pressreleases/ 
2000/dec/11-12-00-2.asp 
11th December 2000 
SFI Report: Borough Of Greenwich 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (SFI) report of its 
inspection of Housing and Council Tax Benefit 
administration and counter fraud activity by the London 
Borough of Greenwich was published today by the 
Secretary of State for Social Security. 
The BFI reports that the council is one of the best 
performing authorities SFI have inspected so far. 
Inspectors commended the high standard of verification 
of claims, including effectively applying the Verification 
Framework, rigorously applying statutory checks on 
National Insurance Numbers and regularly completing 
management checks on determinations. 
In addition, inspectors find the council makes positive 
efforts to ensure claims information is correct by liaiSing 
with landlords and visiting claimants. 
The report notes the council's effective monitoring 
mechanisms which include performance indicators and 
Internal Audit assurance to elected Members. 
SFI found officials and elected members are committed 
to countering fraud and had fostered a counter fraud 
culture within the council. Inspectors considered the 
council could build on this by setting a clear target for 
reducing fraud and error, and increasing the use of 
counter fraud sanctions. In addition counter fraud 
activity could be better co-ordinated against claimants, 
who fail to declare that they no longer live in council 
property or their income. 
The SFI's report includes recommendations to help the 
Council further improve its administration and counter 
fraud activity of Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
Benefit. 
SFI inspects agencies and local authorities and is 
working to raise standards and spread good practice. 
Through its recommendations improvements can be 
identified to safeguard current systems and inform 
design for the future. 
Social Security Minister Baroness Hollis announced the 
publication of the report in response to a Parliamentary 
Question from Baroness David. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to inspect 
social security benefits administration and counter­
fraud activity within DSS agencies and local 
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authorities, to report to the Secretary of 
State for Social Security, and to promote 
good practice. 
2. 	 Each inspection report is considered by 
the Secretary of State who decides 
whether any further action is appropriate. 
The Secretary of State has powers to 
issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
3. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to 
inspect the 30 highest benefit spending 
councils. 
4. 	 Media copies of the report can be 
obtained from the DSS Press Office on 
020 7238 0866. A copy of the report can 
be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.dss.gov.uk. 
**********************"k*************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentre/dss/press 
releases/2000/dec/11-12-00-3.asp 
11th December 2000 
SFI Report: Borough Of Lewisham 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (BFI) report 
of its inspection of Housing and Council Tax 
Benefit administration and counter fraud 
activity by the London Borough of Lewisham 
was published today by the Secretary of State 
for Social Security. 
Inspectors found Lewisham provides a high 
quality customer service. In particular the 
council's public enquiry service, which 
includes a video conferencing system, which 
allows members of the public to see and talk 
to council officers is the best the BFI has so 
far seen. 
The BFI commends the council for its 
introduction all recent government initiatives 
designed to secure benefits administration, in 
particular the council's implementation of the 
verification framework in October 1998. The 
report notes this was achieved without the 
backlogs and frustrations reported by other 
London Boroughs. Inspectors also found the 
council's verification work to be very thorough. 
The report provides some very positive 
findings about the councils counter fraud 
performance. In addition where fraud is 
detected the council actively pursues 
prosecutions or administrative penalties. 
The BFI's report includes recommendations to 
help the Council further improve its 
administration and counter fraud activity of 
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
BFI inspects agencies and local authorities and is 
working to raise standards and spread good practice. 
Through its recommendations improvements can be 
identified to safeguard current systems and inform 
design for the future. 
Social Security Minister Baroness Hollis announced the 
pu blication of the report in response to a Parliamentary 
Question from Baroness David. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to inspect 
social security benefits administration and counter­
fraud activity within DSS agencies and local 
authorities, to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good practice. 
2. 	 Each inspection report is considered by the 
Secretary of State who decides whether any further 
action is appropriate. The Secretary of State has 
powers to issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
3. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to inspect 
the 30 highest benefit spending councils. 
4. 	 Media copies of the report can be obtained from 
the DSS Press Office on 020 7238 0866. A copy of 
the report can be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.dss.gov.uk. 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dss/pressreleases/ 
2000/dec/11-12-00-4.asp 
11 th December 2000 
SFI Report: London Borough Of Islington 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (BFI) report of its 
inspection of Housing and Council Tax Benefit 
administration and counter fraud activity by the London 
Borough of Islington was published today by the 
Secretary of State for Social Security. The Council 
contracted out its benefits service in October 1998. 
The reports main conclusion is that partly due to failings 
in the contract, but mainly due to the Council's inability 
to manage and enforce it, claimants in Islington are 
receiving an extremely poor benefits service.lnspectors 
found long delays in claims being processed and report 
there would be considerable difficulties for anyone 
wanting to make an enquiry on the progress of their 
claim. The BFI found counter fraud work had been in 
decline due to under resourcing and lack of managerial 
control, and offered minimal deterrence to fraudsters. 
The report also notes the high number of complaints to 
the Council and the Local Government Ombudsman 
which had been sustained over a period of 2 years. 
The report contains a number of fundamental 
recommendations reflecting the gap between the poor 
quality service provided and that which claimants can 
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reasonably expect. Inspectors also 
commented that it will require a great deal of 
commitment from the council to achieve full 
implementation of their recommendations. 
BFI inspects agencies and local authorities 
and is working to raise standards and spread 
good practice. Through its recommendations 
improvements can be identified to safeguard 
current systems and inform design for the 
future. 
Social Security Minister Baroness Hollis 
announced the publication of the report in 
response to a Parliamentary Question from 
Baroness David. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to 
inspect social security benefits 
administration and counter-fraud activity 
within DSS agencies and local authorities, 
to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good 
practice. 
2. 	 Each inspection report is considered by 
the Secretary of State who decides 
whether any further action is appropriate. 
The Secretary of State has powers to 
issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
3. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to 
inspect the 30 highest benefit spending 
councils. 
4. 	 BFI undertook their inspection of the 
London Borough of Islington during June 
2000. 
5. 	 Media copies of the report can be 
obtained from the DSS Press Office on 
020 7238 0866. A copy of the report can 
be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.dss.gov.uk. 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dss/press 
releases/2000/dec/11-12-00-5.asp 
11th December 2000 
SFI Report: London Borough Of 
Ealing 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (BFI) report 
of its inspection of Housing and Council Tax 
Benefit administration and counter fraud 
activity by the London Borough of Ealing was 
published today by the Secretary of State for 
Social Security. 
The Council has contracted out its benefit 
administration and customer service activity to 
an external supplier, but retained counter fraud work in 
house. 
The BFI reports that during their inspection in March 
2000, the council had backlogs of work in many areas 
which had led to a deterioration in claims processing 
and customer service. The report notes that the council 
and the contractor were working together to resolve 
problems in service delivery and were committed to 
clearing the backlogs. 
Inspectors report the council had an effective checking 
regime that provides a high level of assurance that 
benefit determinations are correct. Weaknesses were 
identified in the council's post opening procedures, 
claim form, and referrals of housing association claims 
to the Rent Officer. 
The Council's verification of evidence for new claims 
was found to be fairly robust, but renewal claims 
verification was weak by comparison. 
The report concludes that the council has an above 
average counter fraud operation with a committed and 
motivated Housing Benefit investigation team. However 
the effectiveness of its counter fraud efforts were 
reduced because of delays in administration work and 
poor management of overpayment recovery. Inspectors 
also considered the council could make better use of 
the full range of debt recovery methods which are 
available. 
BFI inspects agencies and local authorities and is 
working to raise standards and spread good practice. 
Through its recommendations improvements can be 
identified to safeguard current systems and inform 
design for the future. 
Social Security Minister Baroness Hollis announced the 
publication of the report in response to a Parliamentary 
Question from Baroness David. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The SFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to inspect 
social secLlrity benefits administration and counter­
fraud activity within DSS agencies and local 
authorities, to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good practice. 
2. 	 Each inspection report is considered by the 
Secretary of State who decides whether any further 
action is appropriate. The Secretary of State has 
powers to issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
3. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to inspect 
the 30 highest benefit spending councils. 
4. 	 Media copies of the report can be obtained from 
the DSS Press Office on 020 7238 0866. A copy of 
the report can be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.dss.gov.uk. 
************************************************** 
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releases/2000/dec/04-12-00-1.asp 
4th December 2000 
Winter Fuel Payments will be paid 
by Christmas 
All automatic Winter Fuel Payments will be 
paid by Christmas. This is confirmed in the 
final phase of a national advertising campaign 
starting today. 
The half page ads reassure people that they 
will receive automatic payments before 
Christmas if they were 60 or over during the 
week 18-24 September 2000*. 
The ads explain that payments are being 
made on a rolling programme and that people 
need not worry if they have not yet received 
their payment. Over eight million payments 
are being made over the next few weeks in 
the run up to Christmas. 
Social Security Secretary Alistair Darling said: 
"This year, the Government has doubled the 
Winter Fuel Payment to £200 to help 
pensioners meet the cost of heating during the 
cold winter months. 
"Eight and a half million cheques have already 
been received or will arrive before Christmas 
so that pensioners need not fear turning up 
their heating to keep warm this winter." 
Other features of the campaign include: 
• Advertising over two weeks between 4 
December and 17 December. 
• Insertion in five national titles:- the Sun, 
the Mirror, the Daily Mail, the Express and 
the Daily Telegraph. 
• A minimum of one insertion in five 
Sunday papers:-the Sunday People, the 
Sunday Express, the Mail on Sunday and 
the Sunday Telegraph. 
• Regional advertising in Northern Ireland 
in the Sunday Post, the Belfast 
Telegraph, the Irish News and the Belfast 
and Ulster Newsletter. In Scotland ads 
will appear in the Daily Record, the 
Herald and the Edinburgh Evening News. 
In Wales a full page bilingual ad will 
appear in the Wales on Sunday, the 
South Wales Echo, the Western Mail, the 
South Wales Evening Post and the Post­
Cardiff. 
*Automatic payments are made to people 
who are 60 or over during the qualifying 
week and who received a payment last 
year and their benefit circumstances have 
not changed, or were getting a social 
security benefit (not Housing Benefit, 
Council Tax Benefit or Child Support). Otherwise 
claims for this winter's payment need to be made. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 Payments will be made to all eligible households in 
England, Scotland and Wales and Northern 
Ireland. 
2. 	 For the first 2 winters of the scheme (1997/98 and 
1998/99) eligible households received £20 whilst 
the poorest pensioners, those receiving Income 
Support, received £50. Winter Fuel Payments ~ere 
increased to £100 for eligible households for winter 
1999/2000. A further increase was announced in 
the Budget to £150 for the coming winter and this 
amount was later increased to £200 in the Pre 
Budget Report in November 2000. . 
3. 	 For winter 199912000 around 10 million pensioners 
in over 7.5 million households benefited from 
Winter Fuel Payments. 
4. 	 On 16 December 1999 following an European 
Court of Justice ruling, Alistair Darling announced 
that the Winter Fuel Payment would be equalised 
so that most men and women who are aged 60 
and over during the qualifying week would be 
eligible for a payment. Under this new criteria 
people would also be eligible for backdated 
payments from the start of the scheme. . 
5. 	 The eligibility criterion is that during the specified 
week the household has an occupant ordinarily 
resident in Great Britain or Northern Ireland aged 
60 or over. The need to be in receipt of a qualifying 
benefit, which existed prior to 16 December 1999, 
has been removed. 
6. 	 Exclusions from the scheme include people who 
during the qualifying week were living permanently 
in residential care and receiving Income Support; 
receiving free in-patient hospital treatment for over 
52 weeks; detained in custody and sentenced; and 
people subject to immigration control. 
7. 	 The qualifying weeks since the introduction of the 
scheme have been: 
1997/98 - week ending 11 January 1998 
1998/99 - week ending 15 November 1998 
1999100 - week ending 26 September 1999 
2000/01 - week ending 24 September 2000 
8. 	 Under the new scheme, and incorporating the rise 
to £200 as announced in the Pre Budget Report, 
this coming winter expenditure will increase to £1.8 
billion annually. For past winters, the cost of 
making backdated payments is estimated to be up 
to £150 million. 
9. 	 As a result of the extension of the scheme up to an 
additional 1.5 million people will be eligible for a 
Winter Fuel Payment this year, and up to 1.9 
million people will be eligible for backdated 
payments. All claims for backdated payments . 
returned for proceSSing by 3 November 2000 Will 
be paid before Christmas 2000. 
Winter Fuel Payments Helpline: 08459 15 15 15 
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http://www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentre/dss/press 
releases/2000/dec/01-12-00-1.asp 
1st December 2000 
Pension Sharing Measures 
Implemented 
From today couples getting divorced will be 
able to apply to the courts to share their 
pension rights between them. 
Alistair Darling, Social Security Secretary, 
said: "For the first time ever divorcing couples 
will have the option of sharing pensions in 
deciding how best to deal with their 
matrimonial assets during a divorce. It will 
particularly help women who are getting 
divorced after many years of marriage to be 
secure in the knowledge that they will not 
have to start saving for their retirement from 
scratch." 
Pension sharing will: 
provide an option to help achieve a fair 
division of pension assets on divorce; 
increase flexibility and choice for 
divorcing couples; 
give greater scope for divorcing 
couples to achieve a "clean break" on 
divorce; 
provide the opportunity for a better and 
more secure retirement income for 
those receiving a share of pension 
rights. 
Mr Darling continued: "The introduction of 
pension sharing was a Manifesto commitment 
and we are now delivering on our promise. 
"Marriages break down for a variety of 
reasons. Our aim is to ensure that marital 
assets can be divided fairly when a couple 
divorce. Pension sharing will give divorcing 
couples certainty and clarity because the 
person receiving a share of pension rights 
acquires an asset in their own right." 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 Pension sharing will apply only to those 

divorce proceedings which begin on or 

after 1 December 2000. Pension sharing 

does not apply to divorce or nullity 

proceedings that commenced before 1 

December. 

2. 	 Pension sharing will for the first time give 
divorcing couples with pension rights the 
option of sharing these rights as part of 
the matrimonial settlement. Pension 
sharing will cover rights held under the 
State Earning Related Pension Scheme 
(SERPS) and the Stakeholder Pension, or 
the State Second Pension, when these are 
introduced, as well as those held in occupational 
and personal pensions. 
3. 	 Pension sharing will be available alongside existing 
methods of dealing with pension rights on divorce: 
offsetting and earmarking. Earmarking has had 
significant limitations because title to the pension 
rights remains with the spouse in whose name the 
rights accrued. Unlike earmarking pension sharing 
allows a "clean break" following divorce. This 
means for example that a former spouse who 
benefits from a pension share will keep her share 
of pension rights regardless of any subsequent 
changes in her former husband's circumstances. 
4. 	 To assist the Department in taking forward the 
work on pension sharing a Consultation Panel was 
set up in 1997. This included representatives of the 
Joint Working Group on Occupational Pension 
Schemes, as well as the Pensions Management 
Institute, members of the legal profession, 
Fairshares and the Diplomatic Spouses 
Association. On June 1998 the Government 
published its proposals in "Pension sharing on 
divorce: reforming penSions for a fairer future" 
along with draft legislation. The draft legislation 
was subject to detailed pre-legislative scrutiny 
including an examination by the Social Security 
Select Committee. The "open" legislative process 
broke new ground and has been warmly 
welcomed. 
5. 	 Pension Sharing legislation was included in the 
Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 which 
received Royal Assent on 11 November 1999. The 
main Regulations were laid on 19 April 2000 
following a consultation exercise. 
6. 	 Pension sharing will be available in England & 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dss/pressreleases/ 
2001/jan/30-01-01-1.asp 
30th January 2001 
BFI Report: Borough Of Wandsworth. 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (BFI) report of Its 
inspection of Housing and Council T~~ Benefit 
administration and counter fraud actIVIty by the London 
Borough of Wandsworth was published today by the 
Secretary of State for Social Security. 
BFI Inspectors found a number of good practices and 
initiatives and considered Wandsworth council had 
strong management and staff with high levels o~ 
experience and knowledge. The report notes thiS w.as 
significant to the improvements made by the counCil by 
bringing the Revenues and Benefits Service back In­
house during November 1998. 
The council was found to be achieving commendable 
levels of verification and had implemented the 
Verification Framework. Inspectors report that some 
improvements would be needed to fully meet its 
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required standards and thereby strengthen the 
council's assurance that the right amount of 
benefit goes to the right person. 
The SFI noted that others councils could learn 
from Wandsworth's innovative use of an 
Intranet that supports staff with guidance and 
procedures. 
The SFI reports that Wandsworth has a strong 
corporate commitment to countering benefit 
fraud and had successfully prosecuted 
fraudsters and applied sanctions. Inspectors 
considered that the council needed to improve 
arrangements for the management of 
overpayment recovery. SFI understands that 
improvements are underway. 
The SFI's report includes recommendations to 
help the Council further improve its 
administration and counter fraud activity of 
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
BFI inspects agencies and local authorities 
and is working to raise standards and spread 
good practice. Through its recommendations 
improvements can be identified to safeguard 
current systems and inform design for the 
future. 
Social Security Minister Jeff Rooker 
announced the publication of the report in 
response to a Parliamentary Question from 
Chris Pond, MP. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The SFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to 
inspect social security benefits 
administration and counter-fraud activity 
within DSS agencies and local authorities, 
to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good 
practice. 
2. 	 Each inspection report is considered by 
the Secretary of State who decides 
whether any further action is appropriate. 
The Secretary of State has powers to 
issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
3. 	 !his inspection is part of a programme to 
Inspect the 30 highest benefit spending 
councils. 
4. 	 Media copies of the report can be 
obtained from the DSS Press Office on 
020 7238 0866. A copy of the report can 
be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.dss.gov.uk 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentrefdssfpress 
releases/2001/jan/30-01-01-2.asp 
30th January 2001 
Cutting Bureaucracy Down To Size To 
Deliver Better Government For Older 
People 
Alistair Darling is cutting down to size the bulky 40-page 
form which pensioners fill in to claim extra money. 
The Minimum Income Guarantee form will be slashed 
down to just 10 pages, he told the Better Government 
for Older People conference in London today. 
Mr Darling said: 'We want to make it as easy as 
possible for pensioners to claim every penny they are 
entitled to - to take the strain out of making a claim. 
"The existing claim form is unnecessarily long and too 
complicated. There is no reason why it should be so 
and I have told my department to cut it down to size. I 
only want to include the questions we really need to 
ask," he added. 
The draft new MIG form will go out for consultation with 
relevant organisations so it is ready for use later this 
year. 
Mr Darling, Chair of the Inter-Ministerial Group for Older 
People, Cabinet Office Minister Ian McCartney and 
DETR Minister Hilary Armstrong attended the BGOP 
conference to give the Government response to the 
programme's report. 
Mr Darling said: "Just because something has been 
done the same way for years doesn't mean it is right or 
it can't be changed. The Government will work together 
in partnership with others, nationally and locally, to cut 
through red tape to make life easier for older people." 
The Social Security Secretary also announced several 
important joined-up Government strategies that will put 
serving older people better first, including: 
• 	 A new housing strategy which will help older 
people get affordable housing that meets their 
needs. 
• 	 Helping transport operators and local authorities to 
improve transport for older people thanks to an 
audit of older people's transport needs published 
today. 
• 	 Pilots for a new one-stop-shop for information on 
social care, health, housing and social security 
benefits called Care Direct. 
Mr McCartney said: "The Better Government for Older 
People programme has been at the cutting edge of 
innovation to provide better services for older people at 
a localleve!. Older people's commitment to the 
Programme provides a sharp contrast with the 
stereotypical and negative way they are sometimes 
portrayed. 
'We will continue to work to put older people at the 
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centre of government activity, ensuring that 
they playa full and active role," Mr McCartney 
added. 
Ms Armstrong said: "Our housing strategy for 
older people will help older people live 
independently and enjoy a better quality of life. 
Older people want a joined-up approach to 
meeting their needs for housing, care and 
security and this is what we must offer." 
Health Minister John Hutton said of Care 
Direct: "This is a significant step forward in 
helping people to get the information they 
need to make informed decisions and choices 
about their care. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 Better Government for Older People 
(BGOP) was launched in June 1998, as 
part of the Government's modernising 
government initiative. Its aim is to improve 
public services for older people by better 
meeting their needs, listening to their 
views and encouraging and recognising 
their contribution. 
2. 	 BGOP comprises a partnership between 
central and local government, the 
voluntary sector and academics and 
includes Age Concern, the Local 
Government Association, Help The Aged 
and Carnegie Third Age Programme. 
3. 	 BGOP set up 28 pilots across the UK, 
testing integrated inter-agency strategies. 
The pilots are: Bolton, Borders, Bury, 
Coventry, Devon, Hackney, 
Hammersmith and Fulham, Harrow, 
Hartlepool, Kensington and Chelsea, 
Lambeth, Middlesbrough, Newcastle 
upon Tyne, North Down, North Yorkshire, 
Nottinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Rhondda 
Cynon Taff, Sheffield, Solihul, South 
Lanarkshire, Stirling, Warwick, Watford, 
Waverley, Wolverhampton, Ynys Mon, 
York. 
4. 	 The Minimum Income Guarantee is worth 
at least £78.45 for single pensioners and 
£121.95 for couples. The DSS last year 
set up a special help-line for pensioners 
who want to get their MIG form filled in 
electronically rather than fill in the 40­
page form themselves. 
5. 	 "Building on partnership: The Government 
response to the recommendations of the 
Better Government for Older People 
Programme" is published by the DSS for 
the Inter-Ministerial Group for Older 
People. Copies are available free from 
The Welfare Reform Orderline (OP), 
Freepost (HA4441), Hayes UB3 1BR or 
by phoning 020 8867 3201 (textphone: 
02088673217. Lines are open Monday 
to Friday, 8am to 5pm, please quote OP2. 
************************************************** 
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29th January 2001 
Evaluation of Earnings Top Up 
Seven reports are published today by the Department 
for Social Security. Six present final results from the 
Evaluation of Earnings Top Up (ETU), the seventh 
provides a synthesis and summary of findings. 
ETU was an in-work benefit available to low paid 
workers without children. It was piloted from October 
1996 to October 1999 in eight areas across Britain. This 
large scale evaluation, spanning five years, was 
undertaken by researchers from the Policy Studies 
Institute the Institute for Employment Research at the 
Universi'ty of Warwick and the Centre for Rese,arch in 
Social Policy at the University of Loughborougn, 
The evidence from the evaluation suggested that ETU 
helped secure in work some people who had previously 
experienced poor labour market attachment, helped 
reduce the numbers entering unemployment and 
increased the numbers leaving unemployment. ETU 
met need and went some way to reducing hardship for 
those who received it. The percentage of eligible 
workers taking it up was however low, in part reflected 
by low awareness. 
Key findings from the evaluation are: 
ETU performance and take-up 
• 	 ETU was well administered, and for those who 
received it, ETU met a need and went some way to 
reducing hardship_ 
• 	 Although the target of 20,000 claims set for ETU 
was exceeded in the first year, the take-up rate 
among eligible workers was low: just is pel' cent in 
1997, rising to 23 per cent in 1999. The take-up 
rate for Scheme B (paid at a higher rate) was much 
higher than for Scheme A: 30 per cent compared 
with 14 per cent Eligibility under Scheme A was 
confined to a small band of the lowes! incomes, 
• 	 Five underlying causes of low take-up were 
identified: 
• 	 Geographical density - eligible workers were 
too sparsely scattered to support IOformai 
information networks which prompt them to 
claim. 
• 	 Social isolation - many of those eligible were 
too isolated from the sociai netvrorks thaI would 
prompt claiming a new in-work benefit 
• 	 Critical mass - geographical scatter and socia! 
isolation meant that the density of eligible people 
in most places was weH below the critlca! mass 
needed to form an active customer base for a 
new in-work benefit. 
• 	 Skills transfer - claiming ETU was both need­
driven, and associated independen!!y With prior 
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experience of claiming income-tested 
benefits, especially Housing Benefit 
and Family Credit. 
• 	 Publicity - too few unemployed people 
and low-paid workers were aware of 
ETU. PubliCity was limited to non­
electronic media and stopped 
altogether after only six months. 
Impact on Employment 
ETU secured in work a group who had 
had poor work histories throughout the 
1990s. These ETU workers showed signs 
of maintaining this improvement, with 
rates of labour market participation on a 
par with existing workers. 
• 	 ETU caused small decreases in the rate 
of inflow to unemployment and, in 
addition, small increases to the rate of 
departure from unemployment. These 
effects were larger for younger and older 
single workers looking for unskilled work. 
• 	 There is some slight evidence of a 
substitution effect - some of the gains for 
unskilled workers may have been at the 
expense of better-paid low skilled 
workers. 
• 	 Workers who went onto ETU directly from 
Job Seekers' Allowance remained on 
ETU for longer (with more renewals) than 
other claimants, and may have been 
protected from subsequent 
unemployment. 
Longer-term unemployed 
• 	 Barriers to work, such as having little 
human capital and poor health, were 
considerable among the longer-term 
unemployed people in these areas. These 
problems intensified for those who failed 
to find work over the three years of the 
pilot. 
• 	 There was no evidence that ETU helped 
longer-term unemployed people 
overcome these barriers and move into 
work faster. 
Job retention 
• 	 There was no evidence overall that ETU 
significantly improved workers chances of 
staying in work, either by working in an 
ETU area or by directly claiming ETU. 
However, recipients said they found ETU 
helpful in getting and keeping jobs, 
especially the self-employed. 
• 	 Although workers in ETU areas aged over 
40 years remained in work longer, on 
average, compared with those in control 
areas, this was not statistically 
attributable to ETU. 
• 	 Most of the expenditure on ETU was on 
people who would have done/taken the 
jobs they did, working the same hours for the same 
wages regardless of ETU. 
Recruitment 
• 	 There was no overall impact of ETU on employers' 
recruitment or retention. Knowledge of ETU among 
employers was patchy, and most did not feel 
equipped to advise employees about the benefit. 
• 	 There was some evidence that ETU was 
encouraging recruitment to shorter hours (16-29 
per week) among semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. 
Wage effects 
• 	 The evidence on employers' wage setting 
behaviour was mixed. Employers themselves said 
that ETU played no part in the wages they set. 
However, entry wages for new low-paid recruits in 
Scheme B areas grew more slowly than elsewhere. 
• 	 The end of the pilot did not sustain interim findings 
that workers in ETU areas were being paid less 
and the unemployed expected less. There was 
some evidence (based on small numbers) that 
older longer-term unemployed people in ETU areas 
who took up work did so at lower entry wages. 
• 	 ETU had no adverse effects on the levels of wages 
received by FC recipients in the pilot areas. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 ETU was an in-work benefit available to low paid 
workers without children. It was piloted from 
October 1996 to October 1999 in eight areas 
across Britain. Two versions of ETU were piloted, 
Scheme A and Scheme B. Each provided typically 
£20-30 to single people and £35-45 to couples but 
differed in their range of qualifying incomes. 
Schemes A and B were each piloted in a large 
urban area, a large town, a seaside town and a 
rural area. Four corresponding areas were selected 
as Control areas. 
2. 	 The evaluation began priorto implementation, with 
baseline data collection, and continued throughout 
the duration of the pilot. The evaluation included: 
• 	 surveys with employers, low paid workers in 
work and medium term unemployed people; 
analysis of administrative data and local labour 
market information; and 
• 	 qualitative interviews with ETU recipients, 

unsuccessful applicants, employers, self­

employed and BNES staff. 

3. 	 The evaluation was conducted by researchers at 
the Policy Studies Institute (PSI), the Centre for 
Research in Social Policy (CRSP) at 
Loughborough University and the Institute for 
Employment Research (IER) at the University of 
Warwick. 
4. 	 Interim findings from the evaluation were published 
in May 2000, DSS Research Reports No. 112 and 
113. 
5. 	 Seven reports from the Earning Top Up Evaluation 
are published on 29 January: 
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II 
• 	 Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Synthesis 
Report (Marsh, A., 2001, Department of 
Social Security Research Report No. 
135). 
• 	 Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Effects on 
Unemployed People (Smith, A, 
Dorsett, R. and McKnight, A, 2001, 
Department of Social Security 
Research Report No. 131). 
Earnings Top-up Evaluation: 
Employers' Reactions (Lissenburgh, S., 
Hasluck, C and Green A, 2001, 
Department of Social Security 
Research Report No. 132). 
• 	 Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Qualitative 
Evidence (Heaver, C., Roberts, S., 
Stafford, B. and Vincent, J. 2001, 
Department of Social Security In-house 
Research Report No. 133). 
• 	 Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Effects on 
Low Paid Workers (Marsh, A, 
Stephenson, A., Dorsett, R and Elias, 
P., 2001, Department of Social Security 
Research Report No. 134) 
• 	 Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Staff 
Views (Vincent J., Heaver, C., Roberts, 
S. and Stafford, B., 2001, Department 
of Social Security In-house Research 
Report No. 74) 
• 	 Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Local 
Labour Market Conditions (Green A E., 
2001, Department of Social Security In­
house Research Report No. 75) 
6. 	 The reports are available from Corporate 

Document Services, Leeds. Copies of the 

report summaries are available from the 

DSS Social Research Branch 

*************************'************************* 
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25th January 2001 
Research Backs Move To 
Transform Services For Older 
People 
Older people want a modern and joined-up 
benefit service that fully meets their needs, 
says a report published today. 
The research found that older people want: 
• 	 New, local joined up services including 
health, social services and voluntary 
groups. 
To be on first name terms with a single, 
friendly and knowledgeable contact who 
acts on their behalf during a clairn. 
Different ways of providing help to 
different people - using roadshows, 
telephone advice lines, home visits or new IT. 
Pensions Minister Jeff Rooker welcomed the research, 
which supports work already underway to transform the 
way the DSS serves older people. 
Mr Rooker said: "This research has given the 
Government a clear message that older people expect 
a quality service from all public sector organisations. 
DSS is making radical changes to the way it operates to 
ensure that people's needs are put first. 
"That is why we have already announced we will set up 
a separate organisation dedicated to dealing with 
pensions and meeting pensioners' interests. A one size 
fits all approach to the benefits service is no longer in 
tune with what people want." 
The independent research published by the DSS today 
explores public reactions to the Benefits Agency's 
Better Government for Older People (BGOP) 
programme. 
Eight prototypes were set up to test new ways for the 

benefit agency to work with providers from local and 

central government and the voluntary sector at a local 

level. 

Notes for editors 
1. 	 DSS Research Report (No. 136) 'Modernising 
Service Delivery: The Better Government for Older 
People Prototypes' is published today. It assesses 
new methods of service delivery for pensioners, 
combining BA services with local providers. 
2. 	 The Better Government for Older People (BGOP) 
programme was established by the Cabinet Office, 
along with partners from central and local 
government and the voluntary and private sectors. 
It aims to improve public services for people aged 
over 50 and 28 pilots were set up across the UK. 
3. 	 The independent research was carried out among 

staff, customers and stakeholders to assess 

attitudes to the BA BGOP prototype services 

including information surgeries, home visits, 

roadshows, telephone advice lines and new 

information technology services. A combination of 

depth interviews and focus groups were used. 
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29th January 2001 
Evaluation of Earnings Top Up 
Seven reports are published today by the Department 
for Social Security. Six present final results from the 
Evaluation of Earnings Top Up (ETU), the seventh 
provides a synthesis and summary of findings. 
ETU was an in-work benefit available to low paid 
workers without children. It was piloted from October 
1996 to October 1999 in eight areas across Britain. This 
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large scale evaluation, spanning five years, 
was undertaken by researchers from the 
Policy Studies Institute, the Institute for 
Employment Research at the University of 
Warvvick and the Centre for Research in 
Social Policy at the University of 
Loughborough. 
The evidence from the evaluation suggested 
that ETU helped secure in work some people 
who had previously experienced poor labour 
market attachment, helped reduce the 
numbers entering unemployment and 
increased the numbers leaving 
unemployment. ETU met need and went some 
way to reducing hardship for those who 
received it. The percentage of eligible workers 
taking it up was however low, in part reflected 
by low awareness. 
Key findings from the evaluation are: 
ETU performance and take-up 
• 	 ETU was well administered, and for those 
who received it, ETU met a need and 
went some way to reducing hardship. 
• 	 Although the target of 20,000 claims set 
for ETU was exceeded in the first year, 
the take-up rate among eligible workers 
was low: just 18 per cent in 1997, rising to 
23 per cent in 1999. The take-up rate for 
Scheme B (paid at a higher rate) was 
much higher than for Scheme A: 30 per 
cent compared with 14 per cent. Eligibility 
under Scheme A was confined to a small 
band of the lowest incomes. 
• 	 Five underlying causes of low take-up 
were identified: 
• 	 Geographical density - eligible 
workers were too sparsely scattered 
to support informal information 
networks which prompt them to 
claim. 
• 	 Social isolation - many of those 
eligible were too isolated from the 
social networks that would prompt 
claiming a new in-work benefit. 
• 	 Critical mass - geographical scatter 
and social isolation meant that the 
density of eligible people in most 
places was well below the critical 
mass needed to form an active 
customer base for a new in-work 
benefit. 
• 	 Skills transfer - claiming ETU was 
both need-driven, and associated 
independently with prior experience 
of claiming income-tested benefits, 
especially Housing Benefit and 
Family Credit. 
• 	 Publicity - too few unemployed 
people and low-paid workers were 
aware of ETU. Publicity was limited 
to non-electronic media and stopped 
altogether after only six months. 
Impact on Employment 
• 	 ETU secured in work a group who had had poor 
work histories throughout the 1990s. These ETU 
workers showed signs of maintaining this 
improvement, with rates of labour market 
participation on a par with existing workers. 
• 	 ETU caused small decreases in the rate of inflow 
to unemployment and, in addition, small increases 
to the rate of departure from unemployment. These 
effects were larger for younger and older single 
workers looking for unskilled work. 
• 	 There is some slight evidence of a SUbstitution 

effect - some of the gains for unskilled workers 

may have been at the expense of better-paid low 

skilled workers. 

• 	 Workers who went onto ETU directly from Job 

Seekers' Allowance remained on ETU for longer 

(with more renewals) than other claimants, and 

may have been protected from subsequent 

unemployment. 

Longer-term unemployed 
• 	 Barriers to work, such as having little human 
capital and poor health, were considerable among 
the longer-term unemployed people in these areas. 
These problems intensified for those who failed to 
find work over the three years of the pilot. 
• 	 There was no evidence that ETU helped longer­

term unemployed people overcome these barriers 

and move into work faster. 

Job retention 
• 	 There was no evidence overall that ETU 
significantly improved workers chances of staying 
in work, either by working in an ETU area or by 
directly claiming ETU. However, recipients said 
they found ETU helpful in getting and keeping jobs, 
especially the self-employed. 
e 	 Although workers in ETU areas aged over 40 years 
remained in work longer, on average, compared 
with those in control areas, this was not statistically 
attributable to ETU. 
• 	 Most of the expenditure on ETU was on people 
who would have done/taken the jobs they did, 
working the same hours for the same wages 
regardless of ETU. 
Recruitment 
• 	 There was no overall impact of ETU on employers' 
recruitment or retention. Knowledge of ETU among 
employers was patchy, and most did not feel 
equipped to advise employees about the benefit. 
• 	 There was some evidence that ETU was 
encouraging recruitment to shorter hours (16-29 
per week) among semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. 
Wage effects 
• 	 The evidence on employers' wage setting 
behaviour was mixed. Employers themselves said 
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that ETU played no part in the wages they 
set. However, entry wages for new low­
paid recruits in Scheme B areas grew 
more slowly than elsewhere. 
• 	 The end of the pilot did not sustain interim 
findings that workers in ETU areas were 
being paid less and the unemployed 
expected less. There was some evidence 
(based on small numbers) that older 
longer-term unemployed people in ETU 
areas who took up work did so at lower 
entry wages. 
• 	 ETU had no adverse effects on the levels 
of wages received by Fe recipients in the 
pilot areas. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 ETU was an in-work benefit available to 
low paid workers without children. It was 
piloted from October 1996 to October 
1999 in eight areas across Britain. Two 
versions of ETU were piloted, Scheme A 
and Scheme B. Each provided typically 
£20-30 to single people and £35-45 to 
couples but differed in their range of 
qualifying incomes. Schemes A and B 
were each piloted in a large urban area, a 
large town, a seaside town and a rural 
area. Four corresponding areas were 
selected as Control areas. 
2. 	 The evaluation began prior to 
implementation, with baseline data 
collection, and continued throughout the 
duration of the pilot. The evaluation 
included: 
• 	 surveys with employers, low paid 
workers in work and medium term 
unemployed people; 
• 	 analysis of administrative data and 
local labour market information; and 
• 	 qualitative interviews with ETU 
recipients, unsuccessful applicants, 
employers, self-employed and BNES 
staff. 
6. 	 The evaluation was conducted by 
researchers at the Policy Studies Institute 
(PSI), the Centre for Research in Social 
Policy (CRSP) at Loughborough 
University and the Institute for 
Employment Research (lER) at the 
University of Warwick. 
7. 	 Interim findings from the evaluation were 
published in May 2000, DSS Research 
Reports No.112 and 113. 
8. 	 Seven reports from the Earning Top Up 
Evaluation are published on 29 January: 
• 	 Earnings Top-up Evaluation: 
Synthesis Report (Marsh, A., 2001, 
Department of Social Security 
Research Report No. 135). 
• 	 Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Effects 
on Unemployed People (Smith, A., 
Dorsett, R. and McKnight, A., 2001, 
Department of Social Security Research 

Report No. 131). 

Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Employers' 

Reactions (Lissenburgh, S., Hasluck, C and 

Green A., 2001 , Department of Social Security 

Research Report No. 132). 

• 	 Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Qualitative 
Evidence (Heaver, C., Roberts, S., Stafford, B. 
and Vincent, J. 2001, Department of Social 
Security In-house Research Report No. 133). 
• 	 Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Effects on Low 
Paid Workers (Marsh, A., Stephenson, A., 
Dorsett, R and Elias, P., 2001, Department of 
Social Security Research Report No. 134) 
• 	 Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Staff Views 
(Vincent J., Heaver, C., Roberts, S. and 
Stafford, 8., 2001, Department of Social 
Security In-house Research Report No. 74) 
• 	 Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Local Labour 
Market Conditions (Green A E., 2001, 
Department of Social Security In-house 
Research Report No. 75) 
7. 	 The reports are available from Corporate 
Document Services, Leeds. Copies of the report 
summaries are available from the DSS Social 
Research Branch 
************************************************** 
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23rd January 2001 
Rooker introduces changes to 
stakeholder pension regulations 
Minor amendments to the stakeholder pension scheme 
regulations were laid in Parliament today by Pensions 
Minister Jeff Rooker after requests by pension 
providers. 
Stakeholder pension schemes will be available to the 
public from 6th April 2001, providing a new pension 
option for millions of people on moderate earnings who 
cannot join an occupational pension scheme. 
Announcing the amendments, Mr Rooker said: "The 
government promised to introduce stakeholder 
pensions within this Parliament and we are firmly on 
track for their successful implementation in April 2001. 
The new schemes will make a real difference to the 
lives of millions of tomorrow's pensioners. 
'We consulted extensively on the details of the 
stakeholder pension regulations before they were laid 
and we have continued to listen to the views of those 
involved in setting up schemes. 
"We set out last year the areas where we propose to 
make some changes to the regulations. These 
amendments begin to implement the changes and, in 
particular, we have brought in two changes that 
concern the registration of schemes. The changes will 
360 
-

allow schemes that want to take advantage of 
the revised rules to register with Opra as soon 
as the regulations come into force on 14 
February 2001. The further changes we plan 
to make to the regulations will be brought in 
shortly. 
"The main changes in these amending 
regulations are: 
to permit contract-based stakeholder 
schemes to apply the same membership 
restrictions as are presently permitted for 
trust-based schemes; 
• 	 to allow the authorised corporate director 
of an open-ended investment company to 
act as a stakeholder scheme manager 
(provided they have the appropriate 
authorisation from the Financial Services 
Authority). 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The regulations SI 2000/104 are available 
on the internet at: 
www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk.Printed 
copies are available from the Stationery 
Office. 
2. 	 The regulations amend the Stakeholder 

Pension Scheme Regulations 2000 (SI 

2000/1403), which were laid before 

Parliament on 25th May 2000. 

3. 	 The main proposed changes to the 
regulations were announced in a letter 
from DSS officials to the Association of 
British Insurers and to the Association of 
Unit Trusts and Investment Funds, on 2nd 
November 2000. The regulations laid 
today make two main changes which 
directly affect the registration of 
stakeholder pension schemes, to allow 
schemes to register under the new rules 
as soon as possible. A further set of 
changes to the regulations will be laid 
shortly. 
4. 	 The main changes in these regulations 
are: 
• 	 to permit contract-based stakeholder 
pension schemes (those run by an 
authorised scheme manager) to 
restrict membership by reference to: 
• 	 employment with a particular 
employer, or in a particular trade or 
profession; 
or 
• 	 membership of a particular 
organisation; 
to permit the authorised corporate 
director of an open-ended investment 
company to act as a stakeholder 
scheme manager. 
5. 	 The change to the regulations on 
membership restrictions permit contract­
based schemes to adopt the same 
restrictions as trust-based schemes. No 
stakeholder pension schemes can restrict their 
membership on the basis of financial status or level 
of contributions. 
6. 	 Stakeholder pension schemes have been able to 
register with the Occupational Pensions Regulatory 
Authority since 2nd October 2000. As at 23 
January 2001, 26 schemes have already 
registered. 
7. 	 The main further changes to the regulations (as 

announced in the letter of 2nd November) are: 

• 	 to replace the requirement to disclose the 
monetary amount of charges taken from each 
scheme member with a requirement to 
disclose the percentage rate of charges (with 
the intention of reintroducing the requirement 
to show money charges in three years' time); 
• 	 to allow schemes to set different statement 
years for different members of the scheme (for 
the purposes of issuing annual statements to 
members); 
• 	 to only require schemes to accept 
contributions in the form of cheques, standing 
orders and direct debitlcredit (giving them the 
option of declining contributions in other 
forms); 
• 	 to clarify the treatment of dealing costs in 
collective investment schemes; 
• 	 possible changes to ensure members of trust­
based schemes receive the same pre-sale 
information and have the same cancellation 
rights as members of contract-based 
schemes; 
• 	 to modify the provisions governing the 
appointment and role of the reporting 
accountant in schemes. 
...************************************************* 
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11th January 2001 
Pension Awareness Ad Blitz Begins 
Man's best friend has taken the lead in a new 
Government campaign to get people to think about 
planning for their pension. 
Using Oscar-winning techniques that brought 'Babe' to 
life the £6.S million marketing campaign aims to make 
people aware of the need to plan for their retirement 
and consider all the pension options available to them. 
Launching the campaign Alistair Darling, Social 
Security Secretary, said: "Obviously the basic state 
pension will remain the foundation of income in 
retirement. 
"But now people want to retire on the highest possible 
income and they can do that by saving through an 
occupational pension, personal penSion or - from April _ 
the stakeholder pension. Yet two out of five people in 
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work today still have no provision except the 
state pension. 
"This campaign is about getting people to 
consider all the options for retirement." 
"The introduction of the Pension Credit from 
2003 will reward those with modest savings 
and a small second pension with a cash top 
up. So the message from the government is 
whatever you can afford to put aside, it will 
always pay to save and the more you save 
and the earlier you start the better." 
Too often people see pensions as a complex 
and boring subject that they do not want to 
think about. 
The DSS had to produce a campaign very 
different from traditional public service 
information - something that would keep them 
watching when they hear the word 'pension'. 
"These adverts are humorous and clever and 
the use of real-life working dogs talking should 
grab people's attention and get them thinking 
about the options to save for their retirement," 
said Mr Darling. 
The campaign, which includes TV, press and 
cinema advertising, is designed to appeal to a 
wide audience - from twenty-somethings who 
think they can put off planning for a pension to 
those closer to retirement who want to know 
how much pension they have built up and how 
they can boost it. 
Mr Darling said: "Since 1997 the pensions 

landscape has changed dramatically. 

"Eighteen million people will gain from our 
reform of the state earnings related pension 
(Serps) and stakeholder pensions will provide 
a good value, secure and flexible second 
pension for millions of moderate and high 
earners who do not have access to an 
occupational scheme. 
"Yet two out offive people in work today still 
have no provision except the state pension. 
Now there are more options to encourage 
them to save and to start saving early and this 
campaign will set out the choices. 
The ad campaign is accompanied by a series 
of leaflets - including an introductory booklet 
and seven other guides that cover specific 
pension issues in more detail, including 
women and pensions and stakeholder 
pensions. 
Although the campaign aims to raise general 
awareness, it will also carry some specific 
messages, including the fact that women's 
state pension age is changing between 2010 and 2020 
when it will be equalised at the age of sixty five. 
Mr Darling said a DSS survey published today 

highlighted the need for a pensions campaign. 

"Almost half of the working age respondents said that 
they had no more than a 'patchy' knowledge of 
pensions. 
"This research also shows that 41 % of the stakeholder 
target group said they were very orfairly likely to take 
out a stakeholder pension and 14% said they needed 
more information. This campaign and a stakeholder 
helpline will help provide the information they need." 
To order copies of the guide call DSS Pensions on 
0845731 32 33. Textphone users can call 0845 604 
0210. You can also visit the website at 
www.pensionguide.gov.uk. People who want to find out 
more about stakeholder pensions can ring a helpline 
(8.30-6.30 Mon-Fri) for impartial information on 0845 
601 2923. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The campaign will run from January to March and 
will include television, cinema, consumer 
magazines and national press advertisements. 
2. 	 Stakeholder pensions will be available from April 

2001. Stakeholder pensions schemes are aimed 

particularly at moderate earners - between about 

£10,000 and £20,000 a year - who cannot join an 

occupational scheme. But they will be open to 

others as well. 

3. 	 "Pensions 2000: Public Attitudes to Pensions and 

Planning for Retirement" which presents findings 

from a survey examining attitudes towards 

pensions amongst 1700 adults in Britain was 

published today in the DSS Research Report 

series. 

4. 	 Stills from the advert are available on the internet 

at www.pensionguide.gov.uk/ 

************************************************** 
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2001/jan/09-01-01-1.asp 

9th January 2001 
15 million extra for 6,000 severely 
disabled children 
An extra 15 million per year will be available to three 
and four year olds who are severely disabled, Social 
Security Minister Hugh Bayley detailed today. 
Expanding o~ his answer to a parliamentary question. 
Mr Bayley said: 
"Chil?re~'s early years are crucial for their opportunities 
later In life, but all too many youngsters with severe 
disabilities suffer from some form of social exclusion 
This has to end. . 
------__,.R.f~~:.M·--__....__ 
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"Therefore, from April this year we are 
dropping the age of entitlement for the £38.65 
per week higher rate mobility component of 
Disability Living Allowance (DLA) from five to 
three years of age. 
"This will provide an extra 15 million a year to 
help around 6,000 severely disabled 
youngsters who cannot walk, or have severely 
limited walking ability. 
"Almost all of the under fives who are likely to 
be immediately eligible for the extra money 
are receiving the care component of DLA from 
this Department. From today we are writing to 
their families to encourage them to apply for 
the new £38.65 weekly entitlement. 
"This cash boost will enable some of their 
families to buy a car on favourable terms from 
the Motability scheme. 
"Access to reliable transportation can be a real 
lifeline for severely disabled children in those 
all important early years giving them easier 
access to education, social activities and will 
vastly improve their quality of life and that of 
their carers. 
"By the age of three, most children are able to 
walk. We are helping those youngsters who by 
that age cannot walk because of their severe 
disability, or have very limited walking ability. 
"This change will help to reduce the 
disadvantage or lack of opportunity that many 
severely disabled children face." 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The new rules come into force on 9 April 
2001 benefiting around 6,000 children. 
2. 	 Entitlement to the higher rate mobility 
component of DLA depends primarily on 
inability, or virtual inability to walk. 
3. 	 Receiving the higher rate mobility 
component can give access to the 
Motability scheme. 
4. 	 Motability is a charitable organisation 
incorporated by 
Royal Charter. It was established in 1977 
and was set up as 
a partnership between Government, 
charitable and private 
sectors to help disabled people obtain 
vehicles on 
favourable terms by using their Disability 
Living Allowance 
Higher Rate Mobility Component or War 
Pensioners Mobility 
Supplement. 
************************************************** 
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11 th January 2001 
Publication of DSS Research Report No. 
130 
Pensions 2000: public attitudes to 
Pensions and Planning for retirement 
A new report, published today by the DSS, examines 
public attitudes to planning for retirement and penSions, 
including stakeholder pensions. 
The report is based on analyses of interviews with 

almost 1700 adults aged 16 and over in Britain, who 

were surveyed using the National Statistics Omnibus 

Survey in March 2000. 

The main findings are: 
Pensions knowledge and attitudes to pensions and 
retirement 
Seven in ten working age respondents said they had 

given at least some thought to their income in 

retirement. Almost half had no more than a 'patchy' 

knowledge of pensions. Those who reported giving 

most thought to their retirement were more likely to 

report a good knowledge of pensions. 

Public opinion was divided on who should be mainly 

responsible for ensuring that people have enough to 

live on in retirement: 42 per cent thought it should be 

the government, 50 per cent the individual/their family. 

Very few thought that it should be employers (four per 

cent). Those most likely to think that the individual 

should be responsible were also those in a better 

position to provide for themselves 

Pension provision 
52 per cent of employees belonged to an occupational 
scheme and 19 per cent had a current personal 
pension. Overall, 29 per cent of employees had no 
current non-state provision - 40 per cent of these were 
women working part time. 
59 per cent of self-employed people interviewed 
currently had a personal pension. 
Those most likely to have some form of non-state 
provision were men, working fuJI time, middle aged and 
on higher incomes. 
Stakeholder pensions 
The stakeholder target group made up just under half 
(44 per cent) of all those in employment who had no 
non-state penSion provision. Most of the target group 
was concentrated in the lower half of the stakeholder 
income range. 
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Around a quarter of working age adults had 
heard of stakeholder pensions, mainly those 
with better pensions knowledge. 29 per cent of 
the 'target group' were aware of stakeholder 
pensions. This figure can be seen as a 
baseline figure for awareness, a year before 
they become available to the public. 
41 per cent of the stakeholder 'target group' 
said that they were very/fairly likely to take out 
a stakeholder pension; 14 per cent said that 
they needed more information. 
Confidence in pensions 
People with occupational or personal pensions 
were broadly confident that their pension 
arrangements would pay the pensions and 
benefits that they expected on retirement, 
although people with occupational pensions 
were more confident in this respect than those 
with personal pensions. 
Just under half of working age respondents 

were confident that they would get some form 

of pension from the state when they retired ­
those approaching retirement were most 

confident in this respect. 

Notes for editors 
1. 	 Pensions 2000. Public Attitudes to 
Pensions and Planning for Retirement is 
published on 10 January in the 
Department of Social Security's Research 
Series (Report No. 130 ISBN 1 84123 
295 5). The report is available from 
Corporate Document Services, price 
£33.00). Free summaries are available 
from Jim Hughes at the DSS Social 
Research Branch (020 7962 8562). 
2. 	 The author of the report is Victoria 
Mayhew, of the Department of Social 
Security Social Research Branch. 
3. 	 The report is based on analyses of a 
module of questions placed on the March 
2000 National Statistics (formerly the 
Office for National Statistics) Omnibus 
Survey, which interviewed around 1700 
members of the general public aged 16 
and over in Great Britain. The report 
examines pension provision and attitudes 
towards pensions and saving for 
retirement one year before the launch of 
stakeholder pensions. 
*******************.....**...************************** 
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4th January 2001 
Two years of achievement with NDLP 
Over 74,000 lone parents have moved into work thanks 
to the New Deal for Lone Parents, Alistair Darling 
revealed today. 
And 21,504 have gone into education or training since 
the start of the programme. 
Paying tribute to all the lone parents who have made a 
fresh start with NDLP, Social Security Secretary Mr 
Darling said: 
"The NDLP is giving options and choices to women and 
men who without it would be left without any help. 
These figures show that the NDLP is working. 
"Lone parents everywhere have begun to realise their 

full potential thanks to this Government's commitment 

to helping lone parents to help themselves, improving 

not only their own prospects but also those of their 

children. 

"NDLP is changing people's lives. And NDLP is just one 
of a host of Government initiatives helping lone parents 
- the Working Families' Tax Credit, the Lone Parent's 
Benefit Run On and the National Childcare Strategy are 
all key policies that are knocking down the barriers to 
work. 
"This Government pledged to help lone parents - we 

have delivered on our promises. Mums and dads from 

all over Britain are now reaping the rewards." 

The Social Security Secretary was speaking as the first 

full two-year's results for NDLP were published. 

Employment and Equal Opportunities Minister Margaret 
Hodge also congratulated lone parents on their 
achievements: 
"I am delighted that so many lone parents have chosen 
a brighter future with NDLP - I congratulate every lone 
parent who is now in work as a result of taking the 
plunge and talking to one of the national network of 
specially trained personal advisers. 
"NDLP is a success - it doesn't take me to say that ­
each and every individual story of achievement speaks 
for itself. And NDLP is not just about those lone parents 
who have already moved into work - NDLP is there to 
make sure that lone parents thinking about making the 
change can get the help with jobsearch, training 
opportunities and childcare that they need. Almost 90% 
of lone parents who come along for an initial interview 
join the programme - a ringing endorsement. 
"Lone parents have everything to gain from NDLP. 
Many lone parents will be surprised by the help and 
support on offer, and joining NDLP could well be the 
first step towards making 2001 a year to remember." 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 NDLP is a voluntary programme open to all lone 
parents on Income Support. A national network of 
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around 800 Personal Advisers offer 
comprehensive help and advice on 
jobsearch, training, childcare, benefits, 
and financial support. NDLP began 
nationally in October 1998. 
2. 	 NDLP is a joint DSS/DfEE policy. It is 

carried out by the Employment Service 

with the support of the Benefits Agency. 

3. 	 In addition to the 68,560 lone parents who 
have moved into work since October 
1998, a further 6,271 lone parents were 
helped into work during the earlier phases 
of the programme prior to national roll out. 
4. 	 In addition to the 18,560 lone parents who 
have moved into education or training 
since October 1998, a further 2,944 
entered education or training in the earlier 
phases prior to roll out. 
5. 	 Full details of the results of NDLP are 
available in a Government Statistical 
Service press release 'New Deal for Lone 
Parents: Statistics'. A copy of this press 
release has been placed in the House of 
Commons library. Press copies are 
available from DfEE Press Office on 020 
79255392. 
6. 	 Joining NDLP is simple. Lone parents can 
contact their local Jobcentre or call the 
NDLP information line free on 0800868 
868. 
************************************************** 
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22nd February 2001 
Getting on the dog and bone to 
find out about pensions 
Shadow the sheepdog is pictured leading the 
line for people who want to collar a decent 
pension. 
The canine TV advert star barked out advice 
to those who want to know whether 
stakeholder pensions are right for them. 
With just six weeks to go before stakeholder 
pensions become available, Pensions 
Advisory Service (GPAS) stakeholder helpline 
staff are now answering calls from people 
looking for help and information. 
Shadow's guest spot on the helpline came as 
new research reveals four out of five people 
find the technical jargon of pensions confusing 
and nine out of ten want simple advice. 
The DSS' current pension education 
marketing campaign involving talking 
sheepdogs encourages people to consider 
their pension options as early as possible. A 
set of eight booklets is available covering the whole 
range of options including stakeholder, personal, 
occupational and state pensions and written in clear 
and simple English. 
The recent research commissioned by the DSS shows 
19 per cent of people who don't have a pension scheme 
have not done so because they haven't thought about it 
or got around to it. 
But over half of those without a pension plan to take 
one out. And two thirds plan to take some action, 
whether getting further advice or a pension, within the 
next year. 
The survey suggests that the pensions education 
message appears to be getting across. An impressive 
97 per cent of people believe it is better to start paying 
into a pension sooner rather than later. And 93 per cent 
believe it is important to get impartial advice. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 Stakeholder pensions, offering the choice of 
flexible, transparent and low-cost pensions to 
about five million people who did not have it before. 
The framework for stakeholder has been set by the 
DSS but the first products from different pension 
providers will be available from April 6. 
2. 	 Copies of a photograph of Shadow on the 
stakeholder helpline will be available electronically 
for media who request it. 
3. 	 The stakeholder helpline, offering independent 

advice on stakeholders to the public, is run by 

Pensions Advisory Service (OPAS). You can call 

the number 0845 601 2923 Monday to Friday 

between 8.30am and 6.30pm. 

4. 	 The COl research was commissioned by DSS and 
carried out by independent researcher RSGB, the 
findings based on 622 interviews with working 
adults between 25 November and 10 December 
2000. 
************************************************** 
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16th February 2001 
DSS Pledges To Continue Battle Against 
Benefit Fraud 
Social Security Secretary Alistair Darling today 
welcomed a report by the National Audit Office that 
acknowledges the work being done to tackle benefit 
fraud. 
"These findings show we are on track to meeting our 
targets to reduce fraud and error in Income Support and 
Jobseeker's Allowance by at least 10 per cent by March 
2002, 25 per cent before March 2004, rising to 50 per 
cent by March 2006," Mr Darling said. 
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"But we know that this is only the start and we 
still have major steps to take. I accept that not 
everything is perfect. This is a long-term 
battle." 
The NAO highlights the estimated £50 million 
saved thanks to our tough approach in 
tackling fraudsters and the reduction of 
administrative errors. The total loss in Income 
SUpport and Jobseeker's Allowance has fallen 
from an estimated £1.37 billion in 1998/1999 
to an estimated £1.32 billion in 1999/2000. 
Mr Darling added: 'We are committed to year 
on year progress. That means making sure 
those on the front-line are better trained and 
equipped to do the job we ask of them. This 
involves tightening the gateways and 
modernising our technology. A massive task 
that will not be achieved overnight. 
"The message is clear - there is zero­

tolerance for benefit fraud. The work currently 

being developed at the national Fraud 

Intelligence Unit will combine with highly 

trained specialist investigators to track down 

and stop benefit cheats." 

The Fraud Bill currently being considered by 

Parliament sets the scene for the DSS to 

obtain powers to tackle persistent benefit 

fraudsters by withdrawing benefits. 

Powers for gathering information from banks, 
building societies and credit reference 
agencies where there is reason to believe 
benefit fraud exists, included in the Fraud Bill, 
will further ensure that the challenging targets 
on fraud and error are met. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The reports by the Comptroller and 
Auditor General on the accounts 
produced by the DSS - Appropriation 
Accounts 1999-2000 - Class XII Vote 1: 
Social Security Expenditure and 
Administration and Department of Social 
Security Consolidated Resource Account 
for 1999-2000 - are available from the 
NAO's website www.nao.gov.uk. Hard 
copies are available from the Stationery 
Office on 08457023474. 
2. 	 DSS has halved the number of cases 
where IS/JSA claims are paid out without 
sufficient evidence. In 1997, two out of 
five ISfJSA claims were paid without 
enough evidence. Since then the gateway 
to Income Support and Jobseeker's 
Allowance has been strengthened. 
Claimants must now produce more 
accurate and relevant evidence before 
IS/JSA is paid. 
3. 	 DSS prosecuted or sanctioned more than 22,000 
people in 1999-2000 - a rise of 60 per cent on the 
previous year. 
4. 	 In the Fraud Act 1997 powers were introduced 
under Sections 20 and 21 to prevent fraudulent 
claimants using the Royal Mail's post redirection 
arrangements to submit benefit claims from false 
addresses. 
5. 	 Nationwide, DSS is introducing a successful pilot 
scheme for the issue of National Insurance 
numbers. The scheme involves using detailed 
databanks to permit sophisticated investigation of 
claims. 
6. 	 From 2003, we will be substantially cutting 
administration costs by paying more benefits 
directly in to bank accounts. Not only is this 
approach cheaper it will also save over £1 00 
million a year resulting from order book and giro 
fraud. 
************************************************** 
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15th February 2001 
Local Authorities Sign Up for Housing 

Benefit Support: £2.1 m Funding to Train 

900 New Fraud Investigators 

The first wave of local authorities (LAs) to sign up for 
the expert assistance of the new Housing Benefit Help 
Team were announced by Alistair Darling, Secretary of 
State for Social Security today. 
Mr Darling confirmed that Bristol, East Ayrshire, Hull 

and Lambeth are the first authorities to have the new 

expert team working with them to help their efforts to 

improve HB administration. 

Mr Darling also announced an extra £2.1 m for training 

up to 900 new local authority fraud investigators: 

'We are determined to drive up the standard of housing 
benefit administration across the country. 
"The extra money for training fraud inspectors will 
provide another valuable weapon in the fight against 
housing benefit fraud which blights the system and 
takes money away from the people who need it most." 
"Our priority is a fast, secure and efficient system for 
delivering housing benefit. The Help Team, funded by 
the DSS, will be working in partnership with councils 
and local authority associations to make that happen. 
"Bristol, East Ayrshire, Hull and Lambeth are the first 
authorities to use the expertise of the team. 
"We expect this to be the first wave of partnerships 
throughout the country that will help improve housing 
benefi~ delivery and help to clear backlogs. It will also 
establish and share vital best practice procedures, and 
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help to signpost indicators for improvements 
to the system as a whole. 
The Help Team is made up of housing benefit 
experts from other top-performing councils, a 
secondee from the DSS, and the Improvement 
Development Agency (IDeA). The team will be 
co-ordinated by management consultants. 
Hull will be the first council to work with the 
team, followed by Lambeth, Bristol and East 
Ayrshire. The team started preparatory work 
this week and will be in Hull later this month. 
The team will form a close partnership with the 
LA and support them in developing an 
improvement plan, reviewing plans already in 
eXistence, as well as helping to determine an 
implementation strategy and set tangible 
measures of success. 
Cllr Paul Bettison, chair of the LGA's housing 
executive added: 
"The LGA is very pleased to be involved in the 
establishment of the jOint local-central 
government Housing benefit Team. 
"Local and central government can be a highly 
effective and positive way of tackling some of 
the difficulties experienced by certain local 
authorities. Local government is committed to 
this agenda and I am delighted that a number 
of councils have already invited the new team 
in to work with them. 
"This is the first partnership working with local 
government as outlined in the response to the 
housing green paper. I hope we can build on 
this joint working as we implernent wider 
changes t improve and simplify the housing 
benefit system." 
This team is part of the government's strategy 
for improving the delivery of HB and driving 
fraud and error out of the system. Other 
measures include: 
• 	 the development of a new simplified form 
for claiming the benefit 
• 	 remote access terminals (RATS) for 
nearly all LAs which cut out the 
bureaucracy of nearly 10 million pieces of 
paper 
• 	 changes to the single room rent to help 
young people find suitable 
accommodation and help encourage 
landlords to rent to young people 
• 	 more generous financial rewards for local 
authorities who prevent fraud from 
entering the system 
• 	 a fraud hotline piloted with 10 LAs from 
January 2001 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The Expert Team consists of HB experts from 
Redbridge and Leeds councils, the DSS, IdeA, Cap 
Gemini and Ernst & Young. The teams will be with 
each LA for about a month at the most intensive 
phases (analysis and support). There will be more 
work to do after this period and future support will 
be provided by the team for each LA. 
2. 	 The Help Team will work with the LAs on a rolling 
basis and with more than one LA at one time, but 
at certain times there will be dedicated one on one 
support. 
3. 	 A total of £2m has been committed for this initiative 
by the Department for the next twelve months. 
4. 	 All LA Chief Executives will be written to in the next 
week with information on how the can get involved 
with either utilising the team or providing staff from 
their own LA to work on the team. 
5. 	 £2.1 m will be made available to train 900 Housing 
benefit fraud investigators from local authorities. 
The training is under the Professionalism in 
Security (PINS) project. 
6. 	 The PINS project progresses the government's aim 
of developing a highly skilled anti-fraud profession 
as set out in the policy document "A new contract 
for Welfare: Safeguarding Social Security" ... 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dss/pressreleases/ 
2001/feb/14-02-01-1.asp 
14th February 2001 
TV Campaign Against Benefits Cheats 
Goes Nationwide 
A hard-hitting N advertising campaign 'Targeting 
Fraud' is to go nationwide, Alistair Darling announced 
today. 
The Social Security Secretary said: "This Government 
is determined to use every means available in its drive 
to beat benefit cheats. TV advertising will form a vital 
part of that campaign. 
'We have already seen a 6.5 per cent reduction in fraud 
and error in Income Support and Jobseeker's 
Allowance. In cash terms that's a saving of around £60 
million but we must continue to bear down on cheating 
wherever it occurs. 
"I said in May that the Government was committed to a 
national advertising campaign targeting fraud. 
"We produced a series of tough ads to demonstrate that 
targeting fraud is everyone's business; we have tested 
them thoroughly in the North West and now we are 
ready to take the campaign nationwide." 
Mr Darling said that the TV advertising campaign 
piloted in the North West had achieved a positive effect 
on public attitudes to benefit fraud. 
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'We know from the experience of the 'don't 
drink and drive' campaign that shifting public 
attitudes takes time. This anti-fraud campaign 
has to be part of a long-term public 
information programme that will help the 
Government meet its target of reducing fraud 
and error in Income Support and JobSeeker's 
Allowance by 50 per cent by 2006." 
The campaign will consist of three 40-second 
TV commercials portraying typical examples 
of benefit fraud such as a dole cheat earning 
cash in hand whilst claiming, playing on the 
sympathy of friends to cadge free drinks. 
"The Government is playing its part in tackling 
fraud: tightening the gateways to benefit, 
improving the training of fraud investigators, 
modernising the technology to root out the 
cheats as well as seeking new powers to 
toughen the penalties against persistent 
offenders and to gather the information 
necessary to catch them. 
"But the public has a part to play too - and 

these ads show that benefit cheats are 

stealing money from us all," said the Social 

Security Secretary. 

"People who work and claim benefits aren't 

loveable rogues, what they are doing is 

despicable. Benefit fraud costs every 

household in this country over £80 a year. 

People would be rightly angry if £80 was 

stolen from their wallets." 

"Stealing from the benefits system is no 

different. People who think turning a blind eye 

to benefit fraud is OK need to think again." 

The public can report suspicions of fraud 

anonymously to the National Benefit Fraud 

Hotline on 0800 854440. 

Notes for editors 
1. 	 Fraud in the benefits system is estimated 

to cost at least £2 billion a year. 

2. 	 Details of the campaign can be found on 
the campaign website at 
www.targetingfraud.gov.uk. 
3. 	 The National Benefit Fraud Hotline was 
introduced in 1996. 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.9ov.ul</mediacentre/dss/press 
releases/2001/feb/01-02-01-1.asp 
1 st February 2001 
£10,000 Ex-Gratia Payments Sent 
Out To Prisoners Of War And Other 
Captives Of The Japanese 
From today, over 14,000 payments of£10,OOO will be 
issued to former prisoners of the Japanese or their 
surviving spouses in recognition of the unique 
circumstances of their captivity during the Second 
World War. 
Social Security Minister Hugh Bayley said: "More than 
14,000 Far Eastern prisoners or their surviving spouses 
will be receiving their £1 0,000 payments from today. 
"The War Pensions Agency staff have done a brilliant 
job contacting them and processing their claims in just 
two months. 
"An effective partnership approach has helped action 
these payments, with WPA enlisting the help and 
advice of key ex-service organisations and charities. 
The Royal British Legion, Far Eastern Prisoners of War 
Association, the Japanese Labour Camp Survivors 
Association and the Association for British Civilian 
Internees Far East Region have used their combined 
expertise to help us process the claims." 
The General Secretary of the Royal British Legion, Ian 
Townsend, said: "The War Pensions Agency has done 
a wonderful job in processing so many claims so 
quickly for the first batch of payments of the 
Government ex-gratia payment. It is really good to hear 
how the WPA staff have become so involved in 
understanding the FEPOW story." 
The War Pensions Agency has worked in conjunction 
with the MoD, Cabinet Office, Foreign Commonwealth 
Office and the Treasury, to share information and 
expertise to make these payments. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 Those who are entitled to receive the payment are 
the following British groups held prisoner by the 
Japanese: 
• 	 Former members of HM Armed Forces who 
were made prisoners of war. 
• 	 Former members of the Merchant Navy who 
were captured and imprisoned. 
• 	 British civilians who were interned. 
• 	 Certain other former military personnel in the 
colonial forces, Indian Army, and Burmese 
armed forces, who received compensation in 
the 1950s under UK auspices, by virtue of 
their inclusion on the UK lists of former 
prisoners of war submitted to the International 
Red Cross at the time, will also be eligible. 
• 	 Where a person who would have been entitled 
to this payment has died their surviving 
spouse will be entitled to receive it. 
2. 	 The new ex-gratia payment scheme arises from a 
review which the Prime Minister initiated following 
a meeting with the Secretary General of the Royal 
British Legion to discuss the subject on 10th April 
2000. 
3. 	 The unique nature of the Far Eastern Prisoners' 
captivity was recognised in the 1950s when they 
became eligible for modest compensation paid 
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from Japanese assets under the provision 
of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty of 
Peace with Japan. 
4. 	 There is no final date for making a claim. 
The War Pensions Agency, based in 
Blackpool, is responsible for 
administering the ex-gratia payment 
scheme and will continue to deal with any 
claims for as long as they continue to be 
received. 
5. 	 The Agency may be able to arrange 
interviews with some of the Far Eastern 
Prisoners of War who have made claims 
for the ex-gratia payment. For further 
information, please contact the Agency 
Press Officers, details below. 
6. 	 The Agency has introduced new 
arrangements to deal with the payments 
and has published a leaflet explaining 
how the scheme works, including details 
of how to claim. The leaflet and claim 
form, are available at the WPA website on 
www.dss.gov.uk/wpa/index.htm. 
Alternatively, claim forms and information 
can be obtained by telephoning the 
Agency's free telephone Helpline. Contact 
telephone numbers are as follows: 
Free telephone number for UK callers is: 
0800 169 22 77 
Telephone number for overseas caller is: 
0044 1253 866043 
Fax number for overseas callers is: 0044 
12532014 
**'************************************************ 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentre/dss/press 
releases/2001/mar/30-03-01-1.asp 
30th March 2001 
Countdown to stakeholder 
pensions: Get Information on 
Stakeholder Pensions before 6 
April 
In less than one week's time stakeholder 
pensions will be available to consumers 
Alistair Darling reminded people today. 
"From 6 April stakeholder pensions will go on 
sale. For the first time, millions of people will 
have access to a good value, secure and 
flexible second pension. 
"Very soon people all over the country will be 
considering stakeholder pensions as part of 
their pension planning. 
"People who want to know more .a~out . 
stakeholder pensions before deciding on their 
pension choices can get simple, imp.a~!al 
information by ordering our leaflet, VIsiting our 
website or ringing a help line." 
You can order copies of 'Stakeholder Pensions: Your 
Guide' by ringing 
0845 7 31 32 33. Or have a look at the website: 
www.pensionguide.gov.uk. 
Impartial advice on stakeholder pensions is also 
available at the OPAS helpline on 0845 601 2923. 
***************************************'*********** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dss/pressreleasesf 
2001fmar/30-03-01-2.asp 
30th March 2001 
Darling Says Change Will Bring Better 
Service 
Wide-ranging reforms to the Department of Social 
Security mean a better service to the public and more 
money available for the govemment's priorities­
families and pensioners, Alistair Darling said today. 
Big changes in the way the Department is run has 
meant more staff and resources for the front line, 
delivering the right money to the right people as quickly 
as possible. The reforms are highlighted in the DSS 
Departmental Report published today. 
Mr Darling said: "The past year has been an important 
transition period for the DSS as we move from getting 
the right policies in place to focusing on how those 
policies are delivered on the ground. 
"Social security spending is now under control for the 
first time in three decades as a result of lower 
unemployment and the government's efforts to help 
people into work as well as our sustained campaign to 
bring down fraud and error. 
"This year and next we are saving £4 billion on the 
costs of unemployment-related benefits compared with 
1997. That means we can spend more where it is 
needed: tackling child and pensioner poverty and 
providing more help for people with severe disabilities 
and their carers." 
"We've begun to turn the corner in the fight against 
fraud and error. New figures published last year 
revealed for the first time a significant fall in the amount 
of fraud and error in Jobseeker's Allowance and Income 
Support. 
"That 6.5 per cent reduction puts us on target to meet 
our commitment to cutting fraud by half in five years' 
time." 
Mr Darling added: 'We have already freed up money by 
cutting over 2,500 jobs at the centre of the DSS and 
switching those resources to support front-line delivery. 
"And we've delivered a number of early improvements 
to services including: 
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iIii 
the introduction of a national tele-claims 
service for the Retirement Pension 
• 	 improving the letters the Department 
sends to customers 
and cutting down the size of the Minimum 
Income Guarantee claim form from 40 
pages to just 10 pages of clear, easy to 
understand questions. 
"Later this year we plan to launch the new 
working age agency bringing together the 
Employment Service and those parts of the 
Benefits Agency dealing with people of 
working age. This will mark a further step 
forward in creating a culture in which more 
opportunities and choices are matched by a 
greater responsibility on the part of individuals 
to help themselves. And this year we will also 
launch a dedicated new service for 
pensioners. 
"As we prepare for the new organisations, we 
are already taking important steps to 
modernise delivery and improve our customer 
service. We're investing in moderniSing the 
department's outdated computer systems. 
Staff and customers will start to see the 
benefits later this year. 
"All these - and other changes - are helping to 
ensure the right people get the right money as 
quickly as possible. 
'We've made progress over the last year. As 
we look to the year ahead, we will continue 
the process of changing the DSS - change for 
the purpose of improving services for our 
customers." 
Notes for editors 
Copies of the Departmental report are 
available from the DSS Press Office on 020 
7238 0788 or on the DSS website at 
www.dwp.gov.uk 
************************************************** 
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27th March 2001 
Countdown to Stakeholder 
Pensions Begins 
Alistair Darling will tomorrow meet pension 
industry leaders to discuss the launch of 
stakeholder pensions. 
With just over a week to go before stakeholder 
pensions 'go live' Alistair Darling, 
Social Security Secretary said: "Stakeholder 
pensions will provide new and better options 
for middle and high earners. There are now 
over 30 pension providers in the field and the new low 
cost stakeholder pensions will go on sale in just 10 
days time. 
"Stakeholder pensions will change the face of how 
people save for their future. Because they are flexible 
and value for money they are a good deal for lots of 
consumers who do not have other pension options 
available to them. 
The breakfast meeting with pension providers is the first 
in a series of meetings Mr Darling will hold directly with 
the industry. 
"I am looking forward to talking with people who are 
actively involved in stakeholder pensions" he said. "The 
Government will continue to work with the industry to 
make sure that everyone who can save has the 
opportunity to do so". 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 Stakeholder pensions go live on 6 April 2001. They 
will be provided by financial services companies, 
such as insurance companies, banks, investment 
companies and building societies. 
2. 	 The register of stakeholder pensions is available at 
www.stakeholder.opra.gov.uk 
************************************************** 
htlp://www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentre/dss/pressreleases/ 
2001/mar/23-03-01-1.asp 
23rd March 2001 
8FI Report: London Borough of Hackney 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (BFI) report of its 
inspection of Housing and Council Tax Benefit 
administration and counter fraud activity by London 
Borough of Hackney is published today by the 
Secretary of State for Social Security. 
The BFI report that the standard of service provided to 
benefit claimants over the past three years has been 
very poor. At the time of their inspection, inspectors 
found significant backlogs of outstanding work which 
had led to substantial delays in dealing with new and 
renewal claims. The council had outsourced its benefits 
services in 1997 but failed to invest sufficient resources 
in the client side management. The contract with the 
supplier did not contain adequate provision for dealing 
with problems and there had been a failure to arrest 
declining performance. 
Inspectors found that a poorly designed claim form and 
very poor performance in processing was having an 
effect on other parts of the council's benefits service 
which has led to a sharp increase in the numbers of 
complaints to the Local Government Ombudsman. The 
report notes some measures were introduced to 
improve customer service. However inspectors 
considered the effectiveness of these measures was 
seriously undermined by long waiting times and many 
telephone enquiries not being answered. 
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Inspectors found that the council had failed to 
comply with the requirement to notify 
claimants of their benefit entitlement and 
subsequent changes. There were major 
concerns about the council's performance for 
preventing and recovering overpayments. 
Every aspect of this area of work was found to 
be poor and the level of debt owed to the 
council had grown to £17.8m by 1999/2000. 
The report notes the introduction of a strong 
management structure in the council's counter 
fraud unit and a number of good practices. But 
inspectors considered that limited resources 
were resulting in poor quality fraud 
investigations and a failure to make full and 
proper use of all investigative practices and 
powers. 
During their inspection, the BFI noted that 
considerable effort was being made to 
address some of the significant weak areas of 
performance. 
The BFl's report makes recommendations to 
help the council address weaknesses and to 
improve the administration and counter fraud 
activity of Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
Benefit. 
SFI inspects agencies and local authorities 
and is working to raise standards and spread 
good practice. Through its recommendations 
improvements can be identified to safeguard 
current systems and inform design for the 
future. 
Social Security Minister Jeff Rooker 
announced the publication of the report in 
response to a Parliamentary Question 'from 
Paul Goggins MP. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to 
inspect social security benefits 
administration and counter-fraud activity 
within DSS agencies and local authorities, 
to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good 
practice. 
2. 	 The process for inspection at London 
Borough of Hackney included an initial 
fact finding stage, an on-site visit and 
report generation and clearance. The 
inspection period was February 2000 to 
September 2000. The on-site phase took 
place in June 2000 and July 2000. 
3. 	 Each inspection report is considered by 
the Secretary of State who decides 
whether any further action is appropriate. 
The Secretary of State has powers to 
issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
4. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to inspect 
the 30 highest benefit spending councils. 
5. 	 Media copies of the report can be obtained from 
the DSS Press Office on 02072380866. A copy of 
the report can be found on the intemet at: 
www.bfi.gov.uk 
************************************************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uklmediacentre/dss/pressreleases/ 
2001!marf23-03-01-2.asp 
23rd March 2001 
SFI Report: Glasgow City Council 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (BFI) report of its 
inspection of Housing and Council Tax Benefit 
administration and counter fraud activity by Glasgow 
City Council is published today by the Secretary of 
State for Social Security. 
Inspectors found a number of weaknesses and poor 
standards of performance across all areas of benefit 
administration and counter fraud work. The BFI reports 
the council had serious delays with appeals and review 
boards, inconsistent and ineffective work practices in 
gathering claims evidence and in making referrals to 
the Rent Officer. 
The report notes the council's lack of effective 
performance targets, inadequate management 
information, weaknesses in checks and controls and 
the poor management and recovery of benefit 
overpayments. Inspectors expressed serious concerns 
about the council's ability to manage and deliver a 
secure benefits service. 
The council has a detailed counter fraud and corruption 
policy and inspectors consider it undertakes some good 
counter fraud work. However, the quality of its 
investigations needs to be improved. 
The report notes that the need for major improvements 
has been recognised and the council was committed to 
a programme of change that will involve overhauling its 
structures and processes. Inspectors particularly 
commend the council for undertaking a ground­
breaking data matching initiative in an attempt to flush 
out internal fraud and for their participation in a number 
of new DSS initiatives. 
Chris Bull, director of the SFI, said: "BFI recognises the 
size of the task and that the necessary changes will be 
difficult However, I am very encouraged by the 
council's commitment to tackling the issues this 
inspection has identified. If Glasgow's plans are carried 
out there will be a significant improvement to the quality 
and security of benefit services." 
The BFl's report makes recommendations to help the 
council address weaknesses and to improve the 
administration and counter fraud activity of Housing 
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Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
Social Security Minister Jeff Rooker 
announced the publication of the report in 
response to a Parliamentary Question from 
Paul Goggins MP. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to 
inspect social security benefits 
administration and counter-fraud activity 
within DSS agencies and local authorities, 
to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good 
practice. 
2. 	 The process for inspection at Glasgow 
City Council included an initial fact finding 
stage, an on site visit and report 
generation and clearance. The inspection 
period was from March 2000 to October 
2000. The onsite visit phase of the 
inspection took place in July 2000 and 
August 2000. 
3. 	 Each inspection report is considered by 
the Secretary of State who decides 
whether any further action is appropriate. 
The Secretary of State has powers to 
issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
4. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to 
inspect the 30 highest benefit spending 
councils. 
5. 	 Media copies of the report can be 
obtained from the DSS Press Office on 
020 7238 0866. A copy of the report can 
be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.gov.uk 
****************************'********************** 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentre/dss/press 
releases/200 1/mar/23-03-01-3.asp 
23rd March 2001 
SFI Report: Sheffield City Council 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (SFI) report 
of its inspection of Housing and Council Tax 
Benefit administration and counter fraud 
activity by Sheffield City Council is published 
today by the Secretary of State for Social 
Security. 
Inspectors found a number of weaknesses 
and poor standards of performance in the 
administration of its benefit service, leading to 
backlogs of work and lengthy delays in 
processing benefit claims. 
In contracting out its benefit administration 
and counter fraud work the council has yet to 
realise the expected improvements in service 
delivery. 
Inspectors report that although there is some good 
counter fraud work, it is not focused and management 
controls are largely ineffective and provide little 
assurance. Inspectors found investigation work to be of 
poor quality and insufficient to tackle the estimated level 
of fraud in the council's area. 
The council has recognised that improvements are 
required and is developing an action plan to address 
the issues raised by the inspection. Some remedial 
action had already taken place by the time the 
inspection finished. 
Chris Bull, director of the BFI, said: "BFI recognises the 
size of the task facing the council and is encouraged by 
its commitment to tackling these issues. The council 
has responded positively to our inspection, and its 
plans if carried through, will significantly improve the 
quality and security of benefit services." 
The report also notes that although the council has a 
detailed counter fraud and corruption policy, it needs to 
improve the quality of its investigations. 
The BFI's report makes recommendations to help the 
council address weaknesses and to improve the 
administration and counter fraud activity of Housing 
Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
Social Security Minister Jeff Rooker announced the 
publication of the report in response to a Parliamentary 
Question from Paul Goggins MP. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to inspect 
social security benefits administration and counter­
fraud activity within DSS agencies and local 
authorities, to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good practice. 
2. 	 The process for inspection at Sheffield City Council 
included an initial fact finding stage, an on site visit 
and report generation and clearance. The 
inspection period was from March 2000 to 
September 2000. The onsite visit phase of the 
inspection took place in June 2000 and July 2000. 
3. 	 Each inspection report is considered by the 
Secretary of State who decides whether any further 
action is appropriate. The Secretary of State has 
powers to issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
4. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to inspect 
the 30 highest benefit spending councils. 
5. 	 Media copies of the report can be obtained from 
the DSS Press Office on 020 7238 0866. A copy of 
the report can be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.gov.uk 
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22nd March 2001 
New Work Rules For People On 
Incapacity Benefits 
New, fairer and more flexible work rules to 
help people receiving incapacity benefits to 
get back into work were announced today. 
The aim is to help those who want to try small 
amounts of work while on incapacity benefits 
without the fear of losing their benefit 
entitlement. 
The changes will replace the current 
therapeutic work rule from April 2002. The 
new rules will allow claimants to work for a 
year for up to 16 hours a week with earnings 
up to £60.50 (April 2001 rate). 
The new rules provide a stepping stone to full 
time work for people receiving Incapacity 
Benefit, Severe Disablement Allowance and 
Income Support based on incapacity. 
In addition, benefit recipients will be allowed to 
earn ~p to £20 a week for as long as they 
remain on the benefit. This will help those who 
wish to work on a limited basis in order to 
have social contact. 
In answer to a Parliamentary Question from 
Anne Begg MP (Aberdeen South), Hugh 
Bayley, Social Security Minister said: 
"From April 2002, we propose to introduce 
new rules for people who receive Incapacity 
Benefit, Severe Disablement Allowance and 
Income Support based on incapacity who 
want to undertal<e some form of paid work 
which may ease their way back into full-time 
employment. We are aware of concerns that 
the current therapeutic work rules may be of 
limited use where it is difficult to demonstrate 
that a particular job would be beneficial to a 
person's medical condition. The current rules 
also do not help someone who wants to work 
on a limited basis in order to have social 
contact if they do not satisfy the therapeutic 
requirement. This is why we have reviewed 
~he current position and are introducing some 
Improvements. 
"Under the proposed changes, the therapeutic 
work rules will cease to exist. Instead we 
intend to introduce rules which will allow any 
person receiving incapacity benefits to: 
a. 	 work for less than 16 hours a week and 
up to £60.50 for up to six months; with a 
six month extension for those working 
with a Personal Adviser, Job Broker or Disability 
Employment Adviser; 
b. 	 work for maximum earnings of £20 a week with no 
time limit and no hours limit. 
"Claimants who undertake sheltered work or are 
~ndergoing a hospital treatment programme which 
Includes work, will, as now, be able to earn up to 
£60.50 a week (April 2001 rates) with no limit on the 
number of hours they work. 
'We believe that these rules are much fairer than those 
that currently exist. Because we are opening up the 
rules to anyone on incapacity benefits we are giving 
more people the opportunity of trying paid work. This, 
together with our other measures to help people find 
suitable work, will enable people to move off benefits 
and into work. Also, by allowing all claimants to do 
some paid work without time limit, we will be 
encouraging those who are otherwise excluded to take 
part in activities which will help them feel part of, and 
play. ~ more active role in, their local community. 
Additionally, of course, there are the rules which we 
already have in place to allow claimants to try full-time 
work or training and return to benefit at the same rate if 
they have to give up that work or training. 
"These changes do not affect the position whereby 
people receiving Incapacity Benefit or Severe 
Disablement Allowance may do unpaid voluntary work 
for an unlimited period." 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 Present therapeutic work rules allow benefit to 
continue if the claimant undertakes work on the 
advice of their doctor and:­
i. 	 it is confirmed that the work, which must be 
done for less than 16 hours a week on 
average, will help to improve, or prevent or 
delay deterioration in, the condition which 
causes the person's incapacity for work; or 
ii. 	 it is part of a treatment programme done under 
medical supeNision while the claimant is an 
in-patient or regularly attending as an 
outpatient of a hospital or similar institution; or 
iii. 	 it is done while the claimant is attending an 
institution which provides sheltered work for 
people with disabilities. 
In all cases earnings, after the deduction of 
allowable expenses, must not exceed £59.50 a 
week (£60.50 from April 2001). 
Applications to do the work under categories a. and 
b. above will be subject as now to the requirement 
that the nature of the activity undertaken should not 
call the person's incapacity into question. 
2. 	 It is estimated that around 1-2% of Incapacity 
Benefit (IB) claimants do therapeutic work. 
• 	 907,597 claims were made in 199912000 
• 	 The caseload in August 2000 was 2.3 million 
• 	 Expenditure: £7 billion 
• 	 Short- term lower rate (first 28 weeks) £50.90 
(£52.60 April 2001) 
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• 	 Short-term higher rate (up to 52 
weeks) £60.20 (£62.20 April 2001 ) 
• 	 Long-term rate (over 52 weeks) 
£67.50 (£69.75 April 2001 rate) 
I B at long term rate is paid after 196 days 
of sickness to special rules cases 
(terminally ill and highest rate care 
component DLA). People whose capacity 
to work is restricted by illness or disability 
can be entitled to: 
• 	 Incapacity Benefit if they have the 
right NI contributions record; 
• 	 If not, they might be entitled to 
Income Support paid on grounds of 
incapacity; Income Support can also 
be paid in addition to Incapacity 
Benefit depending on income level 
and, 
• 	 Those who do not qualify for Income 
Support can still get the credits on 
grounds of incapacity, 
• 	 Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
benefit can also be paid in addition to 
Incapacity Benefit and/or is 
depending on income level 
**************"************************************ 
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20th March 2001 
BFI Report: Newcastle City Council 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (SFI) report 
of its inspection of Housing and Council Tax 
Benefit administration and counter fraud 
activity by Newcastle City Council is published 
today by the Secretary of State for Social 
Security. 
Inspectors originally visited the council in 
August 1997 as part of a series of trial 
inspections but their findings were not 
published. This inspection referred back to the 
SFI's earlier work, measured progress since 
1997 and considered the council's current 
performance. 
Inspectors report that the Council has 
responded positively to the BFI's first 
inspection report and recommendations. In 
particular the BFI was pleased to note there 
were no backlogs at the time of their on-site 
inspection, despite the high volume of work, 
large caseload and transient population. 
The report identifies noticeable improvements 
in the council's benefit administration. In 
particular, its verification, claim form and 
liaison with the Benefits Agency, Rent Service, 
private sector landlords and Housing 
Associations. 
Inspectors also note that substantial progress has been 
made in counter fraud work. The council now 
undertakes its own prosecutions and introduced a 
computerised fraud management system. 
The report acknowledges a significant improvement has 
been the development of a joint protocol between 
Internal Audit and District Audit, which ensures both 
teams are working together to ensure maximum audit 
coverage and effectiveness. 
The BFI's report makes recommendations to help the 
council address weaknesses and to improve the 
administration and counter fraud activity of Housing 
Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
Social Security Minister Jeff Rooker announced the 
publication of the report in response to a Parliamentary 
Question from Jim Cousins, MP. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to inspect 
social security benefits administration and counter­
fraud activity within DSS agencies and local 
authorities, to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good practice. 
2. 	 The process for inspection at Newcastle City 
Council included an initial fact finding stage, an on­
site visit and report generation and clearance. The 
on-site visit phase of the inspection took place in 
March 2000 and April 2000. 
3. 	 Each inspection report is considered by the 
Secretary of State who decides whether any further 
action is appropriate. The Secretary of State has 
powers to issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
4. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to inspect 
the 30 highest benefit spending councils. 
5. 	 Media copies of the report can be obtained from 
the DSS Press Office on 020 7238 0866. A copy of 
the report can be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.dss.gov.uk 
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20th March 2001 
SFI Report: Sandwell Metropolitan 
Borough Council 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (BFI) report of its 
inspection of Housing and Council Tax Benefit 
administration and counter fraud activity by Sandwell 
Metropolitan Borough Council is published today by the 
Secretary of State for Social Security. 
Inspectors report that the Council has responded very 
positively to the BFI's first inspection report and has 
.... 
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been particularly active in taking steps to 
tackle fraud and error. 
This is the 8FI's second inspection of the 
Council and followed publication of its first 
report in August 1999. This inspection referred 
back to the BFl's earlier work and measures 
progress made since 1999. 
BFI reports that the council has implemented 
most of its recommendations and that this has 
led to improvements in its overall benefit 
administration and counter fraud performance. 
Centralisation of its benefit processing has 
helped the council reduce backlogs and 
improve clearance times. 
Inspectors note the council had approved a 
prosecution policy and together with training 
for its fraud officers this has led to the council 
conducting a large number of successful 
prosecutions. Inspectors found the council had 
the best performing fraud section of the 30 
highest spending local authorities the BFI had 
inspected to date. 
The report concludes the council has achieved 
a lot in a short space of time and that this is 
commendable. However, there is still room for 
further improvement and in particular 
improving verification of claims. 
The BFI's report makes recommendations to 
help the council address weaknesses and to 
improve the administration and counter fraud 
activity of Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
Benefit. 
Social Security Minister Jeff Rooker 
announced the publication of the report in 
response to a Parliamentary Question from 
Adrian Bailey, MP. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to 
inspect social security benefits 
administration and counter-fraud activity 
within DSS agencies and local authorities, 
to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good 
practice. 
2. 	 The process for inspection at Sandwell 
Metropolitan Borough Council i~clu~e.d an 
initial fact finding stage, an on-site VISit 
and report generation and clearance. The 
inspection period was from March 2000 
to October 2000. The on-site visit phase 
of the inspection took place in July 2000 
and August 2000. 
3. 	 Each inspection report is considered by 
the Secretary of State who decides 
whether any further action is appropriate. 
The Secretary of State has powers to 
issue directions to a local authority to secure 
acceptableJminimum standards in performance. 
4. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to inspect 

the 30 highest benefit spending councils. 

5. 	 Media copies of the report can be obtained from 
the DSS Press Office on 020 7238 0866. A copy of 
the report can be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.dss.gov.uk 
*************************************************"* 
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15th March 2001 
Rooker Makes Changes to Stakeholder 
Pensions Regulations 
Regulations were laid today amending the Stakeholder 
Pension Schemes Regulations. 
The Pensions Minister Jeff Rooker, commented: 
"The Government made a commitment to work with the 
pensions industry to ensure that stakehol~er pensions 
offer a realistic and effective second pension option. To 
demonstrate this commitment the Government has 
today laid amending regulations to make changes of a 
practical and technical nature. The changes make the 
stakeholder regulations more effective, and include 
provisions which take account of the views of the 
pensions industry, including organisations setting up 
stakeholder pension schemes. 
"Stakeholder pension schemes can now finalise their 
preparations for the launch of stakeholder pensions on 
6 April 2001. 
"Some of the changes in these amending regulations 
are that: 
schemes will be able to stagger the issue of annual 
benefit statements over the year, rather than 
having to issue them all at once; 
• 	 schemes will only have to accept contributions 
made by cheque, standing order, direct credit and 
direct debit, and will be able to decline 
contributions in other forms; 
• 	 instead of telling members each year of the cash 
amount of their charges, schemes will be required 
to state the percentage amount of the charge (but 
in three years we will reintroduce the requirement 
to show the monetary amount of charges); 
• 	 to clarify the treatment of dealing costs incurred in 
relation to investment in collective investment 
schemes; 
• 	 to modify the provisions governing the appointment 
and role of the reporting accountant in schemes." 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The full title of the regulations is The Stakeholder 
Pension Schemes (Amendment) (No.2) 
Regulations 2001 [S.1. 20011934] 
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2. 	 The regulations are available on the 
internet at www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk. 
Printed copies are available from the 
Stationery Office. 
3. 	 The regulations amend The Stakeholder 
Pension Schemes Regulations 2000 [S.1. 
2000/1403] ("the main regulations"). The 
main regulations were also amended by 
The Stakeholder Pension Schemes 
(Amendment) Regulations 2001 [S.1. 
2001 1104]. 
4. 	 The proposed main changes in the 
regulations were announced in a letter 
from DSS officials to the Association of 
British Insurers and to the Association of 
Unit Trusts and Investment Funds, on 2 
November 2000. 
5. 	 The main changes in these regulations 
are: 
• 	 to only require schemes to accept 
contributions in the form of cheques, 
standing orders, direct debit and direct 
credit (giving them the option of declining 
contributions in other forms); 
to amend the definition of "contract of 
insurance" so that it covers all relevant 
classes of contract, and to make it more 
watertight; 
to require that scheme manager (and any 
fund manager) must take advice about 
the merits (or otherwise) of retaining 
investments (in addition to obtaining 
advice prior to making the investments); 
• 	 to modify the provisions governing the 
appointment and role of the reporting 
accountant in schemes; and to make 
changes to the content of the scheme's 
annual declaration, and to the statement 
by the reporting accountant confirming 
the annual declaration; 
to clarify that the existing law on 
suspension and forfeiture of pension 
rights applies to stakeholder pensions 
and overrides limits in the stakeholder 
regulations on reductions in members' 
rights; 
• 	 to clarify the treatment of dealing costs 
incurred in relation to investment in 
collective investment schemes; 
• 	 to provide for an additional ground on 
which an occupational stakeholder 
scheme may refuse contributions; 
• 	 to allow schemes to issue annual 
statements over the year rather than 
issuing them all at once; 
• 	 to require that the annual statement 
shows the percentage charge on the 
member's fund rather than the actual 
amount of the charge; 
• 	 to revise and clarify the exemptions 
regarding employers providing access to 
stakeholder schemes; 
• 	 to provide that an employee who is excluded from 
being an active member of the employer's 
occupational pension scheme because he ceased 
to be a deferred or active member of it, will not be 
classed as a relevant employee for stakeholder 
access requirements; 
to change and clarify provisions governing payroll 
deductions and the information to be provided to 
employees about payroll deductions. 
************************************************** 
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8th March 2001 
BFI Report: Metropolitan Borough Of 
Wirral 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (BFI) report of its 
inspection of Housing and Council Tax Benefit 
administration and counter fraud activity by the 
Metropolitan Borough ofWirral was published today by 
the Secretary of State for Social Security. 
The BFI reports that the council provides a customer­
orientated benefits service. However, this is being 
hampered by weaknesses in their administration and 
counter fraud activity. 
Inspectors found the standards of verification for new 
and renewal claims was very poor and the council had 
considerable backlogs of work. This had significantly 
reduced the responsiveness of the benefits service and 
the level of assurance the council could give to the 
accuracy and validity of its benefit payments. 
The report notes that counter fraud activity had been 
neglected. Due to a lack of resources, investigation 
work was of poor quality and insufficient to tackle the 
estimated level of fraud in the council's area. However, 
inspectors note that the council recently approved the 
recruitment of additional investigation officers. 
Additionally the control and management of 
overpayment recovery was found to be poor, leading to 
a low recovery rate. 
BFI notes that despite having a number of well-written 
strategic and policy documents, not all of these had 
been put into practice. Inspectors recommend the 
council reviews its internal audit coverage of 
administration and counter fraud activities as they were 
found to be insufficient to give an assurance of the 
integrity of the benefits system. 
The BFI's report makes recommendations to help the 
council address weaknesses and to improve the 
administration and counter fraud activity of Housing 
Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
SFI inspects agencies and local authorities and is 
working to raise standards and spread good practice. 
Through its recommendations improvements can be 
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identified to safeguard current systems and 
inform design for the future. 
Social Security Minister Jeff Rooker 
announced the publication of the report in 
response to a Parliamentary Question from 
David Taylor MP. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to 
inspect social security benefits 
administration and counter-fraud activity 
within DSS agencies and local authorities, 
to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good 
practice. 
2. 	 Each inspection report is considered by 
the Secretary of State who decides 
whether any further action is appropriate. 
The Secretary of State has powers to 
issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
3. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to 
inspect the 30 highest benefit spending 
councils. 
4. 	 Media copies of the report can be 
obtained from the DSS Press Office on 
020 7238 0866. A copy of the report can 
be found on the internet at: 
www.bfLgov.uk 
************************************************* 
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8th March 2001 
BFI Report: City Of Bradford 
Metropolitan District Council 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (BFI) report 
of its inspection of Housing and Council Tax 
Benefit administration and counter fraud 
activity by City of Bradford Metropolitan 
District Council was published today by the 
Secretary of State for Social Security. 
Inspectors were particularly pleased with the 
number of high quality customer service 
initiatives, including joint working with the SA 
and other organisations and the sharing of 
good practices with other local authorities. 
The BFI reports that the council was struggling 
to cope with backlogs of assessment work, 
and inspectors consider it is important that it 
not only clears arrears, but prevents them 
from recurring. The council was introducing 
measures to resolve the backlogs, but these 
measures need to be consolidated into one 
overall plan. 
Inspectors consider that the council needs to improve 
its administration of benefit appeals. In particular by 
ensuring backlogs are reduced, statutory timescales 
are met and management checking is improved. 
SFI found good Counter fraud work, including 
commendable risk analysis of local fraud. Investigations 
were well conducted in an ordered and methodical way. 
The council has a sound prosecution policy and has 
successfully issued administrative penalties. However, 
BFI concluded the council needs to increase the use of 
its inspectors' powers. 
The Council has already acknowledged many of the 
issues raised in this report. It has taken immediate 
action to deal with some of them and has addressed 
others in a long-term plan. This is an encouraging 
response. 
BFl's report makes recommendations to help the 
council address weaknesses and to improve the 
administration and counter fraud activity of Housing 
Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
Social Security Minister Jeff Rooker announced the 
publication of the report in response to a Parliamentary 
Question from David Taylor MP. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The SFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to inspect 
social security benefits administration and counter­
fraud activity within DSS agencies and local 
authorities, to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good practice. 
2. 	 BFI inspects agencies and local authorities and is 
working to raise standards and spread good 
practice. Through its recommendations 
improvements can be identified to safeguard 
current systems and inform design for the future. 
3. 	 Each inspection report is considered by the 
Secretary of State who decides whether any further 
action is appropriate. The Secretary of State has 
powers to issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
4. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to inspect 
the 30 highest benefit spending councils. 
5. 	 Media copies of the report can be obtained from 
the DSS Press Office on 020 7238 0866. A copy of 
the report can be found on the internet at: 
www.bfi.gov.uk 
************************************************** 
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6th March 2001 
SFI Report: Liverpool City Council 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate's (8FI) report of its 
inspection of Housing and Council Tax Benefit 
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administration and counter fraud activity by 
Liverpool City Council was published today by 
the Secretary of State for Social Security. 
Inspectors found a number of weaknesses 
and poor standards of performance in the 
administration of the benefit service, leading to 
substantial backlogs of work and lengthy 
delays in processing benefit claims. 
In addition the council's lack of effective 
performance targets, inadequate management 
information, weaknesses in checks and 
controls and poor management and recovery 
of benefit overpayments led to serious 
concerns about its ability to manage and 
deliver a secure benefits service. 
The council has recognised that major 
improvements are required in the way it 
delivers its benefits service and has stated it is 
committed to a significant change programme 
that will involve overhauling its systems, 
structures and processes. 
Chris Bull, Director of the BFI commented that 
"BFI recognises the size of the task facing the 
council and is very encouraged by its 
commitment to tackling these issues. The 
council has responded very positively to our 
inspection, and its plans if carried through, will 
significantly improve the quality and security of 
benefit services. "The report also notes that 
although the council undertakes some good 
counter fraud work, it is not focused so 
significant effort is being wasted. 
The BFl's report makes recommendations to 
help the council address weaknesses and to 
improve the administration and counter fraud 
activity of Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
Benefit. 
BFI inspects agencies and local authorities 
and is working to raise standards and spread 
good practice. Through its recommendations 
improvements can be identified to safeguard 
current systems and inform design for the 
future. 
Social Security Minister Jeff Rooker 
announced the publication of the report in 
response to a Parliamentary Question from 
Paul Goggins MP. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 The BFI is an independent unit within the 
Department of Social security set up to 
inspect social security benefits 
administration and counter-fraud activity 
within DSS agencies and local authorities, 
to report to the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, and to promote good 
practice. 
2. 	 The process for inspection at Liverpool included an 
initial fact finding stage, an on site visit and report 
generation. The onsite visit was concluded in July 
2000. 
3. 	 Each inspection report is considered by the 
Secretary of State who decides whether any further 
action is appropriate. The Secretary of State has 
powers to issue directions to a local authority to 
secure acceptable/minimum standards in 
performance. 
4. 	 This inspection is part of a programme to inspect 
the 30 highest benefit spending councils. 
5. 	 Media copies of the report can be obtained from 
the DSS Press Office on 020 7238 0866. A copy of 
the report can be found on the internet at: 
www.bfLgov.uk 
************************************************** 
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6th March 2001 
Good News for North West Pensioners 
More pensioners than ever will be entitled to extra 
money thanks to new benefit rules coming into force 
next month. 
The changes mean pensioner couples with less than 
£12,000 in savings and an income below £140 a week 
could get extra cash help under the Minimum Income 
Guarantee. 
Social Security Secretary Alistair Darling said: "Thanks 
to our campaign to urge pensioners to claim what is 
their right there are already over 18,000 extra 
pensioners in the North West who are benefiting from 
MIG by on average £20 a week. 
"From April many more pensioners will be entitled to 
extra money every week. To those pensioners I say 'get 
claiming now, you don't have to wait until April'. 
"In order to make it easy for pensioners to claim MIG 
there is an electronic claim line -just ring 0800 028 11 
11 and give your details over the phone - it can take 
about half an hour. 
"The electronic claim form is a quick, friendly way to 
claim but for those who prefer to use a real form we are 
producing a new simplified 1 a-page form - that will be 
ready to use from October." 
From April MIG for a single pensioner will rise to £92.15 
and for a couple to £140.55. 
And there is more good news. Many pensioners in the 
North West do not know what help is on offer so the 
DSS has published a new guide launched by Liz Dawn 
of Coronation Street. 
Mr Darling said: "This first ever "Pensioners' Guide" 
brings together in one place national and regional 
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information on benefits and services for 
pensioners including advice on health, 
keeping warm and security against crime. 
"We have worked closely with Age Concern, 
Help the Aged and the Local Government 
Association to bring together useful 
information and vital telephone numbers in a 
clear, practical and easy-to-read guide. Many 
pensioners will wonder how they got by 
without it in the past." 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 From April 2001 the rules for Minimum 

Income Guarantee will change: 

• 	 People aged 60 and over can now 
have up to £6,000 of savings - up 
from £3,000 - and they will not be 
taken into account in assessing their 
MIG claim. 
• 	 People aged 60 and over with 
savings of between £6,000 and 
£12,000 may still be eligible for some 
MIG - the amount will depend on 
their savings. 
2. 	 From April the full weekly rate of MIG will 
increase to £92.15 (for single people 
aged 60 or over) and£140.15 (for 
couples aged 60 and over). 
3. 	 Pensioners can see if they are eligible by 
visiting this link: 
http://www.dss.gov.uklmig/002.htm 
4. 	 The MIG electronic claim line is 0800 028 
11 11. Texphone number is 0800 028 35 
93. 
5. 	 Over 235,000 pensioners currently 

receive MIG in the North West (Nov 

2000). 

Pensioner's Guide 
2. 	 The Guide produced with help from 
Age Concern, Help and Aged and the 
Local Government Association is 
available by phoning 08456 065 065. 
It is also available on 
www.inf04pensioners.gov.uk 
*****.******************************************** 
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5th March 2001 
"It's A Deal": New Deal For Lone 
Parents - Advertising Campaign 
Begins 
A new £2.5 million advertising campaign 
promoting the New Deal for Lone Parents 
programme starts today. NDLP offers help to 
lone parents in making their choice about 
starting work. 
The TV and Press Advertising Campaign, created by 
Publicis, focuses on how NDLP can provide advice on: 
• Registered Childcare availability 
• Back to Work benefits that tide over job starters 
until pay day 
• Training allowances 
Social Security Secretary Alistair Darling said: "The 
New Deal is providing the practical help and support 
needed by lone parents who want to do the best for 
themselves and their families. Almost 200,000 lone 
parents have joined so far, more than 81,000 have 
found work and more than 22,500 have gone into 
training. 
"The New Deal for Lone Parents has been a real 
success. It has transformed the lives of thousands of 
parents. We need to build on it and this campaign 
shows the opportunities available to help thousands 
more into work." 
The advertising campaign uses television and national 
and regional press. 
It highlights the advantages lone parents can gain by 
returning to the workplace - renewed self-confidence, 
independence and an improved life style for themselves 
and their children. 
The TV campaign dramatises these benefits showing a 
lone parent who, during her lunch hour, uses newly 
learnt skills to secretly create a surprise 50th birthday 
card for a colleague called Jim, superimposing his head 
on a Chippendales body. With help from the NDLP 
programme, we can see how she has recovered her 
sense of self-worth, finding new friends and learning 
new skills along the way. 
The Press campaign comprises a series of four adverts 
each dealing with a potential barrier that the NDLP can 
remove. In each, the lone parent sets up the conditions 
in which they would be able to go back to work to which 
an NDLP Personal Adviser responds with the line "It's a 
deal". 
The campaign is due to last until 31 March 2001. 
************************************************** 
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2nd March 2001 
Pensioners Needing Help? New Guide Is 
Right Up Your Street 
Coronation Street star Liz Dawn today joined Alistair 
Darling to launch a new booklet right up the street of 
pensioners who need a guide to benefits and services 
they need. 
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For the first time "The Pensioners' Guide" 
brings together in one place key national and 
local information and could be worth hundreds 
of pounds to pensioners. 
Liz Dawn, Coronation Street's Vera 
Duckworth, said: "This new guide is really 
useful for pensioners, giving them a lot of vital 
information at their fingertips. 
"It is just the kind of booklet that would come 
in very handy at Rita's Kabin for pensioners 
who need advice on government services. It's 
written in such clear language that even our 
Jack would understand it." 
Social Security Secretary Alistair Darling said: 
"This is the type of handy guide that 
pensioners can keep at home and look at 
when they need to. 
"It signposts where people need to go to get 
further information and advice on pensions, 
health, keeping warm, social services and 
security against crime," he added. 
The Pensioners' Guide provides a useful 
checklist of services and benefits so 
pensioners can ensure they are not missing 
out. They can tell at a glance whether the 
service is likely to be available for them and 
whom they should contact to find out more. 
Pensioners welcomed the idea of a guide, with 
feedback from market testing suggesting it will 
fill an information gap and break down barriers 
to bene·fits and services. 
Among the help available covered is: 
• 	 The Minimum Income Guarantee - more 
pensioners than ever will be eligible for it 
from April when it will be worth £92.15 for 
a single pensioner. 
• 	 Help with heating including grants to help 
heat the home worth up to £2,000 in 
England, £2,700 in Wales and the Warm 
Deal in Scotland. 
• 	 Help with home security improvements 
such as new door locks, window locks 
and a smoke detector. 
• 	 Help with health costs and how to get 
support from social services. 
Notes for editors 
1. 	 There is a guide that refers to England 
and Wales (also available in Welsh) and a 
separate guide for Scotland. 
2. 	 Copies of the guides will be available 
from venues including bene"fit offices, 
Citizens Advice Bureaus and libraries. Or 
a copy can be requested by phoning 0845 
6 065 065 (textphone 0845 6 064 064). 
Copies of the guides are also available at 
www.info4pensioners.gov.uk 
3. 	 Copies. of a pictu.re of Liz Dawn and Alistair Darling 
launching the gUide are available to be sent to the 
media electronically. 
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BYERS - NEW INDICATORS SHOW 
BENEFITS MUST BE EXTENDED 
P/2001/150 
13 March 2001 BYERS - NEW INDICATORS SHOW 
THAT THE BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC STABILITY 
MUST BE EXTENDED TO EVERY REGION AND 
COMMUNITY 
Trade and Industry Secretary Stephen Byers today 
released new regional economic figures showing 
general improvements in areas including earnings and 
exports, but continued differences in overall regional 
economic performance, underlining the importance of 
an active regional industrial policy. 
Prepared using Office of National Statistics and other 
Government Oepartment"s figures, the March 2001 
edition of Regional Competitiveness Indicators covers 
14 different economic indicators, and maps the 
economic performance of the English regions, 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The indicators 
range from manufacturing productivity and research 
and development spending to levels of earnings, 
exports, investment and output by foreign owned 
companies, and numbers of VAT registrations (taken as 
a measure of business start-ups) and business survival 
rates. 
Some of the indicators reveal that: 
• 	 gross domestic product - proVisional figures show 
that in 1999 GOP per head in every region was 
above £10,000 per head for the first time, however 
there is still a large gap between the best and 
worst performing regions. 
• 	 earnings - average earnings for full-time 
employees have increased in all regions. The four 
regions with the highest increase since 1999 were 
Merseyside (up 9.6%), the North East (9.3%), 
Wales (up 9.1 %) and Northern Ireland (up 9.6%). 
• 	 manufacturing investment by foreign-owned 
companies - between 1994 and 1997 Scotland, the 
West Midlands, the North East, Wales, and 
Merseyside had the highest proportion of their 
region"s manufacturing investment made by 
foreign-owned companies, and Yorkshire and 
Humberside the lowest. 
manufacturing research and development - latest 
available figures show that between 1996 and 
1997 spending fell in the North East, North West, 
Yorkshire and Humberside, the East Midlands, 
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London, and the South East, with only the 
East of England, the South West, and 
Merseyside showing an increase. 
Two of the best performing areas of the 
economy - the South East, and East of 
England - were those with the highest [evels of 
investment in research and development, 
whilst Yorkshire and Humberside and the 
North East were both below half the UK 
average. Trade and Industry Secretary 
Stephen Byers said that whilst the UK overall 
was benefiting from hard-won economic 
stability, the figures showed the importance of 
an active regional industrial strategy to allow 
every region to prosper. 
"These figures show that there is much to be 
proud of in the economic performance of 
different parts of the UK, but they also show 
that we need to improve in a number of key 
areas - and close the gap between best and 
worst performing regions. 
"There are now more people in work in every 
region than there were in Spring1997, every 
region has experienced a growth in average 
earnings, and the number of companies 
exporting both inside and outside the EU has 
grown in almost every part of the UK. 
"These Indicators show that different parts of 
the UK have different strengths and 
weaknesses, and they underline the need for 
policies which will improve the number of new 
business start-ups and survival rates, boost 
investment in research and development and 
productivity rates, particularly in our 
economically weaker areas. 
"We have achieved stable economic growth 
for the UK as a whole, but there are still 
unacceptably wide gaps in the performance of 
different regions. We need to widen the 
winners circle still further and ensure that 
economic prosperity brings real benefits, and 
increasing prosperity, in every part ofthe 
country." 
"Our next steps must be to put in place the 
measures that will aI/ow al/ regions to fulfil 
their full potential. "A key goal for Government 
must be to ensure that the benefits of 
economic stability and the resulting rise in 
prosperity are extended to every region and 
community." 
NOTES TO EDITORS: 
1. 	 Measures to assist regions recently 
announced by the Department ofTrade 
and Industry/Department for Education 
and Employment include: 
2. 	 the foundation of University Innovation Centres to 
create hubs for growth in the regions. The first five 
will involve companies like BAE and Proctor and 
Gamble in the North East and Hewlett Packard in 
Bristol; 
3. 	 two new technology institutions in each region to 
produce a step change in the capacity of the 
regions to grow new dynamic businesses and hi­
tech employment; 
4. 	 a new £75 million incubator fund to support 
business start-ups and growing businesses; 
5. 	 a new early growth fund to make available up to 
#50,000 for business start-ups and small and 
medium enterprises; and, 
6. 	 special support to manufacturing industry through a 
new Manufacturing Advisory Service. 2. Media 
copies of Regional Competitiveness Indicators 
(March 200 1) are available from the DTI Press 
Office. They can also be accessed via the DTI 
website at http://www.dti.gov.uklsd/rci. 
+****~****************************************** 
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7 March 2001 BUDGET BOOST FOR WORKING 
PARENTS, BRINGING MATERNITY PROVISION UP 
TO DATE 
Working parents with a new baby will see real change 
in their family lives after today"s Budget announcement 
of reforms worth £1/2 billion a year, Trade and Industry 
Secretary Stephen Byers said today. 
The changes, part of the Government"s response to the 
Work and Parents: Competitiveness and Choice 
Review undertaken by Stephen Byers, will mean up to 
£1,200 a year extra for all 360,000 mothers getting 
maternity pay, and will guarantee most working mothers 
an income of £200 a week for up to six months after the 
birth. 
It gives women a real chance to stay at home in the 
crucial first months of their child"s life, without lOSing 
touch with the labour market. Together with the 
Children"s Tax Credit, which the Chancellor also 
announced in the Budget, including an increased credit 
in the year of a child"s birth, the package will mean up 
to £2,200 extra for families with new babies. 
In the Budget, the Chancellor announced: 
an increase in the flat rate of Statutory Maternity 
Pay (SMP) and Maternity Allowance from its 
present £60.20 a week to £75 a week from April 
2002 and £100 from April 2003. Women will 
receive 90 per cent of their previous earnings if that 
is less than the flat rate; - an extension of the 
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period of maternity pay at this enhanced 
rate from 18 weeks to 26 weeks from 
April 2003; 
the right to two weeks of paid paternity 
leave for working fathers from 2003, paid 
at the same flat rate as SMP; 
from 2003, paid adoption leave when a 
child is first placed with a family, to allow 
one of the adoptive parents to take paid 
leave for the same period and at the 
same flat rate as SMP; 
allowing more small businesses to claim 
extra compensation for administering 
maternity pay, by doubling the threshold 
for Small Employer Relief to £40,000 from 
April 2002. Around 60 per cent of all firms 
paying SMP each year will be able to 
reclaim their costs in full, plus 
compensation; and 
a further increase in the Sure Start 
Maternity Grant from £300 to £500 in April 
2002, for 215,000 low-income families a 
year. 
Stephen Byers said: "Today"s Budget is 
excellent news for all families. "In the last 
year, my Department led the most 
comprehensive review of work and parents 
ever undertaken by a Government in Britain. 
"It was clear that urgent change was needed. 
'Working patterns have changed dramatically 
over the last 25 years with more women and 
mothers in work than ever before. However, 
support for working parents has failed to keep 
up with these changes. The result is that 
everyday parents are struggling under the 
demands of trying to hold down a job and 
coping with bringing up young children. 
"As standards of living improve, quality of life 
becomes an issue for us all. It is increasingly 
important, whether you"re an employee or an 
employer. Finding new solutions to help 
working parents balance work and life is part 
of that. The Green Paper that I published in 
December contained nearly fifty proposals to 
provide real support to working parents. The 
consultation on those proposals closed today 
and I am delighted to say that there has been 
strong support from both employers and 
parents for increasing maternity pay and 
leave, providing paid paternity leave and 
giving parents who adopt paid leave. As a 
result we are today announcing the measures 
which concern tax and benefits. 
"Today"s Budget also bene'frts business as 
thousands will now qualify for more support for 
administering maternity pay. "The changes 
announced in the Budget today will have a 
real impact on millions of people"s lives 
benefiting business, parents and above all 
children." 
David Irwin, Chief Executive of the Small Business 
Service said: "Small businesses face a disproportionate 
burden in the costs of administering SMP. I am 
delighted to see that the Government has recognised 
this and will be doubling the threshold below which 
employers can get back from the state all the money 
they payout in SMP and a percentage on top in 
compensation. This will make a real difference to many 
small firms." 
In addition to these reforms the Chancellor announced 
further support for working parents through the new 
Children"s Tax Credit (CTC): - the value of the CTC will 
be increased from the previously announced £8.50 a 
week to £10 a week from its introduction in April 2001, 
making it worth up to £520 a year for around 5 million 
taxpaying families; - to recognise the additional costs of 
a new child in the first year, from April 2002 the CTC 
will be increased by a further £10 a week for families in 
the year of a child"s birth. 
Around 500,000 taxpaying families a year will see their 
tax bills reduced by up to £1,040 in the first year, £20 a 
week. The Government will give details of its plans on 
the remaining policy options in the Green Paper shortly. 
Notes to Editors 
1. 	 The Green Paper, Work and Parents: 
Competitiveness and Choice was published on 7 
December 2000 following a review announced by 
the Chancellor in the March 2000 Budget. It looked 
at the competitiveness case for change and put 
forward nearly 50 options. Alongside it the 
Government published a free summary of the 
options that has been made widely available. 
2. 	 Stephen Byers has chaired a Ministerial Group to 
help co-ordinate the work of the review. Other 
members are: Baroness Jay, Andrew Smith, Lord 
Falconer, Tessa Jowell, Margaret Hodge, 
Baroness Hollis, Alan Johnson and David Irwin. 
3. 	 The Budget measures to improve maternity pay 
complement the reforms to the Working Families" 
Tax Credit (WFTC) announced in Budget 2000 and 
starting this April, which will give extra support to 
low-income families after the birth of a new Child. 
They will allow families to make a new WFTC claim 
as soon as a new child is born and will enable 
mothers to qualify for WFTC while on maternity 
leave (entitled to Statutory Maternity Payor 
Maternity Allowance). 
4. 	 In the Budget, the Chancellor also announced 
measures to give working parents extra help with 
child care costs: - the childcare tax credit within 
WFTC is currently worth 70 per cent of eligible 
childcare costs up to £100 a week for a family with 
one child and £150 for a family with two or more 
children. To provide further help with childcare 
costs, the limits will be increased to £135 a week 
for childcare costs for one child and to £200 a 
week for two or more children from June 2001. 
5. 	 Feedback from the Work and Parents Green Paper 
Consultation is attached. Press enquiries on the 
Children"s Tax Credit and Working Families" Tax 
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Credit to the Treasury Press Office. 
Headline Feedback from the Work and 
Parents Green Paper Consultation 
Maternity leave 
• 	 Parents resoundingly support 
improvements to maternity leave. 
• 	 Almost all parents (97%) included at 
least one improvement to maternity 
entitlements as their top priority. 
• 	 Expectant and recent new mothers 

consistently put increasing the fiat 

rate of SMP and extending the period 

of paid maternity leave as their 

highest priorities. 

• 	 Employers support increasing the flat 

rate of SMP, if full reimbursement 

plus the compensation is given to 

more SMEs. Paid paternity leave 

• 	 Parents and employers recognise 

that more fathers want to provide 

more support to their partner around 

the time of a baby"s birth 

• 	 Two weeks paid paternity leave has 
consistently remained within the top 
3 priorities throughout the Green 
Paper consultation. 
• 	 The vast majority of fathers 
responding included paternity leave 
within their top priorities. 
• 	 Employers are content with such a 
right as long as it is funded by the 
State and is no more than a two 
week period. Small employers in 
particular have said that colleagues 
are willing to provide cover in these 
circumstances. Employers will have 
plenty of notice to plan how to cover 
the absence. Paid Adoption leave 
• 	 Employers and parents gave 
universal support to allowing one 
parent to take adoption leave for the 
same period and paid at the same 
fiat rate as SMP. 
• 	 1 in 5 employers cited adoption leave 
as a priority. 
• 	 Employers accept that as adoption is 
a considerable undertaking, time is 
necessary if good relationships are to 
develop. Extra help for employers 
• 	 Many small and medium employers 
say that raising the threshold for 
Small Employer Relief will help with 
cashflow issues ENDS 
!U : 
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